U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
JUNE 22, 1994
 
 
 
                   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                     DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
 
                           I N D E X
 
 
                  Wednesday, June 22, 1994
 
                               Briefer:  Christine Shelly
 

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NORTH KOREA
   U.S.-North Korean Communication .................   1-2,6
   IAEA Inspectors' Activities/Extension of Visas ..   2-3
   Assistant Secretary Gallucci's Meeting Schedule .   2-3,5-6
   Resumption of North/South Dialogue ..............   4-5
   President Carter's Visit to Region ..............   4
 

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                      DEPARTMENT OF STATE
                      DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
 
 
DPC #96
 
               WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1994, 1:17
P.M.
             (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE
NOTED)
 
...............

 
     Q     Has there been anything from North
Korea, either formal, informal, a response or
comment, an observation, any communication from
them in any form regarding -- I don't want to
leave any room here for the State Department to
say there's been no official response to the
U.S.  Apparently, there have been two
communications to them about the North Korean
nuclear problem, of course.
 
     MS. SHELLY:  No.
 
     Q     What do you take --
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Based on our past experience
with them, we would expect a response to take
probably a few days.
 
     Q     Have you been told that there will be
a response?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Not that I'm specifically
aware of, but we are expecting that they will
get back to us.
 
     Q     Just to clarify, if this information
is correct -- was there a second clarifying
message that was sent to North Korea, apart from
the Gallucci letter or in addition to the
Gallucci letter?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Not that I'm aware of, Barry.
 
     Q     Do we have any report from the
inspectors who are still there as to what
they're doing and whether they're inspecting and
whether they're doing what they set out to do,
or are they waiting on the North Korean reply
before they do that?  What are they doing --
sitting around hotels or are they actually doing
their work?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  I don't have a lot of details
for you on this.  We understand that North Korea
extended the IAEA inspectors' visas recently and
told them that they could stay at the Yongbyon
nuclear facility for as long as they needed to.
 
     My understanding is that they promised the
inspectors that they and their equipment would
remain in place.  We're seeking confirmation
from North Korea that that includes access to
the facilities that the IAEA has decided or
determined that they need in order to assure the
continuity of safeguards.
 
     As far as I know, there has not been any
hindrance of their activities in that regard.
 
     Q     As I understand it, Gallucci has been
overseas -- that was my understanding -- and
that he was supposed to confer with IAEA
officials.  Has he --
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Assistant Secretary Gallucci,
as you know, accompanied the Secretary on his
trip to Brussels for the meetings which took
place today with Russian Foreign Minister
Kozyrev.
 
     On Thursday, Assistant Secretary Gallucci
will meet in Vienna with IAEA Director General
Hans Blix and IAEA experts on the North Korean
nuclear issue.  His plans are to have him return
to Washington on late Friday afternoon.
 
     Q     Now this reference you made a moment
ago to "you're seeking assurances," does their
response to that request have any connection or
any link to whether you have high-level talks?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  I think you know that we
addressed in the last -- several senior
officials as well as the State Department here
in briefings -- we've addressed the
circumstances under which we would proceed to
the third round.  There is no change in that in
the last day or two.  We're ready to begin the
third round upon receiving the North Korean
confirmation that it will freeze the major
elements of its nuclear program during the
talks.
 
     As you know, those are the three elements:
No processing of the spent fuel recently removed
from its reactor, no refueling of its reactor,
and allowing the IAEA to maintain the continuity
of safeguards at the North Korean nuclear
facility.
 
     Q     So you're just going to take their
word for it -- this piece of paper with them
promising to be good?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Sid, we're waiting to hear
back.  We've got to see what they come back to
us with.  I can't really be anymore specific
than that.
 
     Q     But that's what you want to start the
third round -- you want a letter from them?
That's all?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  We would like a communication
back from them.  I don't know whether we have
specifically designated in what form it should
come back.
 
     Q     There's nothing else like letting the
inspectors do X, Y, or Z, or something like
that?  Just their assurances?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Their confirmation of what we
laid out is our understanding of the conditions
necessary to go forward.
 
     Q     Christine, could you further amplify
or define the third point with regard to the
IAEA people, what they are to be allowed to do?
Was that defined in the letter?  And, secondly -
- for the second point, the refueling of the
reactor, why have we asked them not to refuel?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Because we want the program
frozen.  That's the answer to the -- that's the
necessary precondition for the talks.  So if you
don't have that, then you don't have the
freezing of the program, and I already answered
the first part of your question in the first
question about what the inspectors were up to.
 
     Q     Any response to the formal agreement
to have these preliminary talks on June 28?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  I don't have a big reaction on
that.  We, of course, welcome the resumption of
the North-South dialogue.  We understand that
they are supposed to have a meeting next week,
June 28, to work out the arrangements for a
summit which would then follow at some point.
 
     Certainly, the issues separating North and
South Korea are ones which should be resolved
and will have to be resolved through direct
dialogue.  We certainly welcome the news that
they're going to meet soon on this, and would
expect that they will be able to move on to sort
out the modalities for the summit.
 
     Q     Can I follow on that?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Sure.
 
     Q     There's been a lot of sniping at
President Carter.  People have criticized that
his mission muddied the waters, it didn't
accomplish that much.  Is this or is it not a
tangible result of his meeting last week?  Is
there credit due President Carter on this?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  There's been a lot in the
press about characterizing various statements
and views from people.  The key point for us is
that President's Carter's visit provided an
opportunity, a kind of opening, that the North
Koreans clearly decided that this was the event,
as it unfolded, during which they decided that
they -- or they sent signals that they were
ready to change their behavior.
 
     So with respect to the impact that it has
had in providing an opening for the North
Koreans to take actions which are more in the
direction of what we would like to see, we
certainly welcome that.
 
     Q     Would the U.S. still support the
holding of a North-South summit if you do not
get the assurances you're seeking from the
North?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  The timing of a third round
and a North-South summit are not connected.  I
think that each of those two things are going to
be occurring on their respective tracks.
 
     Betsy.
 
     Q     Is Gallucci going anywhere else or
will he return from Vienna on Friday?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  My understanding of his travel
plans are that he will be returning on Friday.
 
     Q     From Vienna?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  Yes.  It's my understanding.
 
     Q     Christine, on the three conditions,
does the third condition give you total
assurance that the first two conditions are
being met?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  I'm not sure I understand your
question.
 
     Q     If the continuity of the IAEA
inspections are guaranteed, are they sufficient
to tell you that the first two conditions --
reprocessing and non-refueling -- are being
adhered to by North Korea?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  In terms of the facilities
that they need to have access to, that includes
their 5-megawatt reactor; it includes things
like the spent fuel holding pond, reprocessing
lines and the radio chemical laboratory -- those
are the sites that they need access to in order
to be able to continue to make those
determinations.
 
     If some of the other activities were
initiated, they would certainly, presumably,
have some idea of that, or at least some hint
that that might be happening.  I'm not sure that
that satisfies it exclusively.  We want an
explicit -- we want the inspectors to be able to
do those things which they need for their
continuity of safeguards determinations, but we
want specific assurances which confirm their
understandings which the North Koreans
themselves had given about the no-reprocessing
and no-refueling.
 
     Q     Are the two inspectors adequate to
carry out these inspections enough to give you
assurances that -- confidence that the
assurances are being carried out?
 
     MS. SHELLY:  That's certainly a very valid
question.  I'm not sure it's one that I'm in a
position to answer.  I think how many are
necessary and in what kind of shift basis --
that kind of thing -- are really questions you
would have to direct to the IAEA.  I'm sure that
they will approach the operation and will staff
it in a way which permits them to do that, but I
don't have any details on how exactly how many
are necessary and how they can do that.
Certainly, it's a valid question, but ask the
IAEA.


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     (The press briefing concluded at l:53 p.m.)
 
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