U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 24, 1994 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING I N D E X Friday, June 24, 1994 Briefer: Michael McCurry NORTH KOREA Remarks by ACDA Director John Holland on Nuclear Program ............................. 1 Third Round of Talks ............................. 2-5,23 --U.S./DPRK Meeting in New York .................. 4-5 Update on Assistant Secretary Gallucci's Meetings. 4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPC #98 FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1994, 1:05 P. M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED) MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon, everybody. I'd like to start with something and pick up from yesterday's briefing a little bit, because I got a question yesterday about some remarks that John Holland, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency had made. Unfortunately I described the interpretation of his remarks as being "curious", and after talking to John, I am now certain that it is curious. He, I think, was characterized in some news accounts as having suggested that the Administration is more interested in freezing the program than in going back and looking at the history of that program, and I have looked carefully at the transcript of what he said, and I am satisfied, based on what he said, that in several places he indicated in his remarks and his discussion with some Defense writers that the United States is unwilling to dismiss the past as water under the bridge, that we are going to have to resolve the discrepancies that have existed in the program in the past, and, looking at what he said, I think he made it pretty clear, and he did say, obviously, that right now the past is not going to change, as we prepare for this third round of discussions, so of immediate concern to us is making sure that the freeze that has been offered in major elements of the program of the DPRK remains in place. He did say that, but I would not want anyone to suggest from those remarks that somehow or other we don't attach great importance to resolving some of the outstanding questions that we have about the history of North Korea's nuclear program. Q Mike, while you bring it up, when they mixed the rods in, and when they denied access to the waste sites, it was said -- and obviously you've got to leave a little room for hyperbole -- but it was said that they had pretty well destroyed or blocked or prevented the accumulation of the evidence of reconstructing that past. Now, Mr. Gallucci has said there were other opportunities, but I don't think I have ever heard what those opportunities are. Do you happen to be able at this point to tell us what resources remain and whether the monitors are getting there or will be able to get to them? MR. McCURRY: I don't want to tread too directly into an area that is within the technical competence of the International Atomic Energy Agency, because they are the ones that determine that what we had lost when the reactor was defueled was irretrievable, that the ability to reconstruct certain aspects of the operating history had been lost. But they did suggest that there are other methods of determining things about the history of the program, and they pointed specifically to some suspect nuclear waste sites, as I believe many of you know. They also indicated that there are things you could do in reconstructing records about the history of the program. There may be other issues, as well, but that is within the technical competence of the IAEA to suggest, and they are the ones that we look to, being the international agency that monitors this type of activity, to provide answers to those very technical types of questions. Certainly if there are any other ways in which one could explore the questions of what is the history of that reactor, especially in the critical period in 1989 when it was defueled, it would be advisable, and indeed we would consider it important to explore those types of questions. That's the type of thing now that -- type of issue that can be raised during the course of a third round of talks. Q Mike, I went over the communiques from the last two sessions in June and July of last year, and the United States and North Korea agreed to discuss such things as a light water reactor and economic assistance, and all of those things that the United States is again prepared to talk about. Can you tell me why this -- these sets of talks should succeed, where the other set -- where the other sets of talks about these issues did not succeed? MR. McCURRY: Well, they were -- no, my understanding, my recollection of the first two rounds of high level talks is that they engaged on a variety of issues, and within the context of the second round of high level talks, they more or less established an agenda that would be available, could both sides reach an understanding that a third round of high level talks would be -- that there would be a premise for a third round of high level talks. I think the discussion of the things that are there and available for discussion, such as light water reactor technology, in the communique at the end of the second round, were suggested as avenues that could be explored in the future, based on some of the continuing dialogue. But there were some aspects, there were certain things that had to happen, certain understandings that we had to have in order for that type of dialogue to continue, and resolving those has been very much a part of the discussion around this issue over the past several months. Q Well, some people like Donald Gregg, even James Lilley and others, have suggested that the United States should be more specific and more forthcoming rather than general in stating to the North Koreans publicly, perhaps, what they might expect as a result of their cooperation and ending their nuclear program and coming clean on other things. Is the United States prepared to do that? MR. McCURRY: I'm not prepared, here and now to outline in the presentation we will make to the DPRK in a third round of talks, no. But I think we are well aware of the advice of the two people you mentioned. In fact, if I am not mistaken, I believe that at least one of them has had an opportunity to sit with the President of the United States and talk about exactly that kind of issue. Sid. Q Does the Administration now think there is a new political will at the highest levels of the Pyongyang Government to resolve these issues? MR. McCURRY: That is unknown. That's the type of -- that will be explored and determined in the course of the coming discussions. Q If I could follow up, so we are entering these talks even though we don't see signs? We aren't sure whether there are signs that Pyongyang is willing to actually settle the issue? MR. McCURRY: No. We are entering these talks based on some very specific assurances that have been communicated to us by the DPRK, including our understanding that they would be willing to discuss fully implementing the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their existing safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Those are very important understandings that serve as a premise for a talk, as well as their specific indications to us that they would freeze major elements of their program. Carol. Q Can you tell us about the meeting in New York today? MR. McCURRY: I can. It's not entirely conclusive, but it should be very shortly. At the working level in our New York channel, the United States met today with the DPRK. They discussed logistical arrangements for the coming third round of high level talks, which we expect to be held in early July. We expect some further -- some follow-up conversations after the meeting today, probably by telephone, and we expect that both governments very shortly in each capital will announce the formal date of the high level talks. Q Does "logistical arrangements" mean an agenda as well? That sounds like agreement on what should be -- MR. McCURRY: My understanding is that there was no extensive discussion of agenda, because I think both sides are in large agreement already on the nature of the agenda. We have suggested that there should be a broad and thorough dialogue. The DPRK has suggested that they are interested in what they often term a "package solution." I think both sides have a common understanding of the elements that could be included in that type of dialogue. Yes. Q Where is Bob Gallucci, and what has he reported? MR. McCURRY: He is returning now from Vienna. He had very productive meetings at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, consulted with IAEA officials, including Director General Blix, on aspects of the current effort by the IAEA to assure continuity of safeguards at the Yongbyon facility, and he also had a chance to explore with IAEA officials aspects of the coming third round of high level talks. Q On the logistics side, it seems unlikely that all these issues can be worked out in a very short period of time. Are you expecting that there will be a series of meetings? And how long is Gallucci going to go and meet for in this first meeting? MR. McCURRY: I think he is willing to tack for an extended stay in. Q Is the idea to try to do it all in one negotiation, or to start a process where he would come back here? MR. McCURRY: It is not known. I think that they will, as they have in the past, set out the arrangements for the first sessions, and then they will see during the course of those first sessions where the dialogue goes. Q Is there any thought being given to bringing in at some point representatives of other interested governments into the talks? Are these going to be strictly bilateral? MR. McCURRY: I haven't heard anything of that nature. This is a bilateral discussion, as I understand it, but I haven't seen a complete report on how the dialogue might proceed. But, as I say, I understand that the discussion today was logistic and was very positive and didn't seem to be very complicated. They were just working out procedural matters so that they could formally announce the date of the third round very shortly. Q Will it include anybody else on Gallucci's rank or higher? MR. McCURRY: He has been our lead negotiator -- Q Continuing? MR. McCURRY: -- and my understanding is that he would be expected to be the head of the U.S. delegation. Q Will anybody else from the U.S. Government of an equal rank or higher take part at any point that you know? MR. McCURRY: Not that I understand at this point, no. Q So you're expecting an announcement today? MR. McCURRY: It depends on how -- both sides are checking back on just some purely logistical things. It's not too complicated, and in fact it's as mundane as questions like, "Since they might meet over a weekend, which side stays open over a weekend?" It's that type of question, so I think that they're going to get into who gets to pay overtime, I guess. But that type of thing, they need to check back and forth, and if they can be in a position to announce that today, they will, but the announcement will coincide in both capitals. ............... Q There's a question back there he's been trying to get in. MR. McCURRY: Yes. Q Quickly on Korea -- MR. McCURRY: Thank you, Barry. Q -- I have been waiting for a long time. Judging from your remarks in the opening, could we interpret that this Administration is placing exactly the equal importance on the past as the placing on the future and the present? That means that both of these are conditional on the overall resolution of (inaudible)? I ask this because if North Korea tries to put these two things on the trade-off situations, what should be the United States' position? MR. McCURRY: It's an interesting question, but it takes you straight into the type of dialogue that might occur in the third round, which I can't do and won't do. But there is something behind the question, I think, which I can address. Our goal has been and will remain a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. And I think in achieving that goal, understanding the past history of the program, and making good on the commitments that the DPRK has given us for a basis for the current dialogue, are both important in reaching that goal. So I guess the best way to say it is that you, in resolving those questions in the past, is certainly the only way we can know that we have achieved our goal for a non- nuclear peninsula. Q Thank you., MR. McCURRY: You're welcome. (The briefing concluded at l:55 p.m.) (###)