News

USIS Washington File

08 March 2000

Text: Korea Forces Commander Mar. 7 on Korean Peninsula Security

(N. Korea most likely country to engage U.S. in major war) (8390)

North Korea remains a contradiction as well as a threat to the United
States, according to General Thomas Schwartz, commander-in-chief
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander, United
States Forces Korea.

Schwartz gave his assessment of the threat the communist regime
presents to the United States at a March 7 hearing of the Senate Armed
Services Committee on military strategy and operational requirements
as part of the review of the Department of Defense's authorization
request for fiscal year 2001.

North Korea, Schwartz told the Senate panel, "is the country most
likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war." At the same
time, the Pyongyang regime's most pressing domestic problem "is an
economy in decline for the tenth consecutive year," he said.

Despite such a dismal economic situation, Schwartz added, "they show
no intentions to reform," and continue to pour scarce resources into
the military in what Schwartz termed a "Military First" policy.

If Pyongyang continues to misallocate its scarce resources, Schwartz
suggested, "we must consider that the North Korean economy could break
down completely, precipitating social chaos and threatening the
existence of the regime itself."

The Korean peninsula, Schwartz told the senators, "remains volatile,
unpredictable, and dangerous. The regime is committed to its 'Military
First' policy and its strategy of brinkmanship."

North Korea's Premier Kim Chong Il "will clearly sacrifice popular
welfare to continue his 'Military First' policy," he added.

North Korea's "dogged adherence to a 'military first' policy, when
viewed against the backdrop of a nation on the brink of complete
economic and social collapse, indicates the true priorities of the
regime and its enduring hostility towards the Republic of Korea,"
Schwartz said.

The North Korean military, Schwartz said, "provides deterrence,
defense, and a massive offensive threat, as well as leverage in
international negotiations."

Pyongyang's army "is much more than just a military organization; it
is North Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and consumer, the
central unifying structure in the country, and the source of power for
the regime," he continued.

According to Schwartz, Pyongyang's military goal is to "reunify the
peninsula by force."

North Korea's basic war-fighting strategy, Schwartz explained,
"mandates achievement of surprise, prosecution of a short and violent
war, prevention of major United States reinforcement of the peninsula,
and negation of the Republic of Korea's mobilization."

Schwartz told the Senate panel North Korea's armed forces "are the
fifth largest in the world."

Pyongyang's ballistic missile inventory now includes more than 500
SCUD missiles "of various types," Schwartz said. More ominously, he
said, North Korea continues to "produce and deploy medium-range No
Dong missiles capable of striking United States bases in Japan."

Pyongyang, Schwartz added, "is developing multi-stage missiles with
the goal of fielding systems capable of striking the Continental
United States. They tested the 2,000-kilometer range Taepo Dong 1 and
continue work on the 5,000 plus kilometer Taepo-Dong-2."

Schwartz pointed out that North Korea "is one of the world's largest
missile proliferators and sells its missiles and technology to anyone
with hard currency."

North Korea possesses weapons of mass destruction, he said. "A large
number of North Korean chemical weapons threatens both our military
forces and civilian population centers."
 
In the face of such dangers, Schwartz said, "the alliance between the
Republic of Korea and the United States has never been stronger."

South Korea's President Kim Dae Jung "remains fully committed to the
alliance and to close coordination with the United States on policies
toward North Korea," Schwartz said.

Kim is also "committed to an engagement policy of economic cooperation
and reconciliation designed to induce the Pyongyang regime to abandon
hostility toward the Republic (of Korea)," he said.

Deterrence, Schwartz stressed, is the Combined Forces Command's number
one mission.

"Our presence on the peninsula counts," he said. "Combined Forces
Command readiness remains the critical factor since the
forward-deployed North Korean military is only twenty-six miles from
Seoul."

The United States, Schwartz told the lawmakers, must ensure that U.S.
"resolve is consistent and visible so that North Korea, or any other
potential adversary, cannot misinterpret it."

Following is the text of Schwartz's remarks:

(begin text)

STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ
COMMANDER IN CHIEF UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
7 MARCH 2000

Mister Chairman and distinguished committee members, I am honored to
appear before you for the first time as Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command, Republic of Korea -United States Combined Forces
Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea. I want to first
express my deep gratitude to Congress for the consistent support you
provided our forces over the years. The 35,000 Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, and Marines, and 3,000 Department of Defense civilians of
United States Forces Korea benefit from your support which enables us
to accomplish our vital mission.

I welcome this opportunity to present the current security situation
in the Korean Theater of Operations. I will provide you four major
categories of information:

1) The North Korean Threat,

2) The Republic of Korea and United States Alliance,

3) Command Vision and Missions, and

4) Command Priorities.

THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT.

As we prepare to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War,
North Korea remains the major threat to stability and security in
northeast Asia and is the country most likely to involve the United
States in a large-scale war. A decade of steep economic decline has
not deterred the North's leaders from allocating precious resources to
improving their military forces. North Korean military force
improvements conducted over the past year clearly illustrate an
emphasis on being prepared for war, no matter the cost. Their dogged
adherence to a "military first" policy, when viewed against the
backdrop of a nation on the brink of complete economic and social
collapse, indicates the true priorities of the Kim Regime and its
enduring hostility towards the Republic of Korea. To update you on
this threat I will describe North Korea's leadership, economy,
military forces, and force improvements.

Leadership: Less than six years after the death of his father, Kim
Chong Il has consolidated power and is firmly in control of North
Korea. The leadership continues to focus on its three fundamental
themes -- regime survival, reunification, and achieving status as a
"great and powerful nation." Lacking his father's charisma and
revolutionary credentials, the North Korean leader relies upon
military and security forces to maintain his chokehold on the
citizenry. Kim Chong Il sustains regime support by resourcing key
areas at the expense of lower priority sectors of the economy and
society. The result is neglect of entire segments of society selected
by geography, age, and political reliability. Meanwhile, his inner
circle, insulated from the economic and social trauma impacting the
lives of ordinary citizens, remains an exclusive, pampered, cult-like
group 34 in which relations by blood or marriage, revolutionary ties,
and loyalty are the primary prerequisites for power.

Economy: With no serious internal threats to regime survival, the
leadership's most pressing domestic problem is an economy in decline
for the tenth consecutive year, yet they show no intentions to reform.
The three major components of the North's economic infrastructure --
power generation and distribution, communications, and transportation
-- are failing. Shortages of food, energy, and foreign exchange
cripple industry and trade. The underlying cause of the failing
economy is the regime's mismanagement of national resources. The
regime allows minor deviations from its centralized policies such as
open markets outside government control and limited private
agricultural activities. But, these are only begrudging adjustments to
failure of the central rationing system and not indicative of reform.
Until they initiate the major reforms required to create a healthy
economic environment, the North will continue to rely on outside help
to avert complete economic collapse -- and as a result become even
more of an aid-based economy. If this trend continues, we must
consider that the North Korean economy could break down completely,
precipitating social chaos and threatening the existence of the regime
itself. We should anticipate a flood of refuges, humanitarian needs,
and the potential for chaos, military coup, or the devastation of
civil war. We continue to update our contingency plan to deal with
these possibilities.

Military Forces: The "Military First" orientation has always been the
heart and soul of the Kim Regime. It provides the only conceivable
means by which the regime can survive and achieve its ultimate
security through reunification. The military continues to grow in both
conventional and asymmetrical forces with increasing emphasis on the
latter. The military provides deterrence, defense, and a massive
offensive threat, as well as leverage in international negotiations.
The army is much more than just a military organization; it is North
Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and consumer, the central
unifying structure in the country, and the source of power for the
regime.

Pyongyang's military goal is to reunify the peninsula by force. North
Korea's fundamental war-fighting strategy mandates achievement of
surprise, prosecution of a short and violent war, prevention of major
United States reinforcement of the peninsula, and negation of the
Republic of Korea's mobilization. The North Korean Armed Forces today
are the fifth largest in the world. The ground forces, numbering one
million active duty soldiers, provide the bulk of the North's
offensive war-fighting capability and are the world's third largest
army. They are supported by an air force of over 1,600 aircraft and a
navy of more than 800 ships. Over 6 million reserves augment the
active duty personnel. Seventy percent of their active force, to
include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is
garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this
force is protected by underground facilities, including over four
thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone. From their
current locations these forces can attack with minimal preparations.

North Korea fields an artillery force of over 12,000 self-propelled
and towed weapon systems. Without moving any artillery pieces, the
North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds an hour against Combined
Forces Command defenses for several hours. The artillery force
includes 500 long-range systems deployed over the past decade. The
proximity of these long-range systems to the Demilitarized Zone
threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks.

Realizing they cannot match Combined Forces Command's technologically
advanced war-fighting capabilities, the North's leadership focuses on
developing asymmetrical capabilities such as ballistic missiles,
special operations forces, and weapons of mass destruction designed to
preclude alliance force options and offset our conventional military
superiority.

The North's asymmetric forces are formidable, heavily funded, and
cause for concern. The progress of the North's ballistic missile
program indicates it remains a top priority. Their ballistic missile
inventory now includes over 500 SCUDs of various types.

They continue to produce and deploy medium-range No Dongs capable of
striking United States bases in Japan. Pyongyang is developing
multi-stage missiles with the goal of fielding systems capable of
striking the Continental United States. They tested the
2,000-kilometer range Taepo Dong 1 and continue work on the 5,000 plus
kilometer Taepo-Dong-2. Pyongyang is one of the world's largest
missile proliferators and sells its missiles and technology to anyone
with hard currency.

North Korea's Special Operations Forces are the largest in the world.
They consist of over 100,000 elite personnel and are significant force
multipliers providing the capability to simultaneously attack both our
forward and rear forces.

North Korea possesses weapons of mass destruction. A large number of
North Korean chemical weapons threatens both our military forces and
civilian population centers. We assess North Korea is self-sufficient
in the production of chemical components for first generation chemical
agents. They have produced munitions stockpiles estimated at up to
5,000 metric tons of several types of chemical agents, including
nerve, choking, blister, and blood. We assess that North Korea has the
capability to develop, produce, and weaponize biological warfare
agents, to include bacterial spores causing anthrax and smallpox and
the bacteria causing the plague and cholera. While North Korea denies
possession of nuclear weapons and has frozen its nuclear program at
Yongbyon, we remain concerned the North could revive a weapons
production program. The Perry process provides a diplomatic roadmap
for addressing that threat as well as the missile threat.

Force Improvements: North Korea continues to improve its military. In
the last 12 months, North Korea has done more to arrest a decline in
readiness and to improve its military capability than in the last five
years combined. Highlighting these enhancements is an ambitious
program to improve ground forces capabilities. A key component of this
initiative involves the deployment of large numbers of long-range
240mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170mm self-propelled guns
to hardened sites located near the Demilitarized Zone. Other force
improvements include emplacement of anti-tank barriers in the forward
area, establishment of combat positions along major routes between
Pyongyang and the Demilitarized Zone, repositioning of key units,
beefing up of coastal defense forces in the forward area, construction
of missile support facilities, preparations for extended range missile
testing, and procurement of fighter aircraft. Applying lessons from
our operations in Europe and Southwest Asia, the North Koreans have
modified key facility defenses, dispersed forces, and improved an
already impressive camouflage, concealment, and deception effort.
Summer and fall 1999 training levels were extremely high. Key
activities during the ongoing winter training cycle are at record
levels and demonstrate a concerted effort to improve readiness.
Production of military equipment, to include missiles, aircraft,
submarines, and artillery systems also continues.

We remain keenly concerned and closely monitor the North Korean
threat.

The situation on peninsula remains volatile, unpredictable, and
dangerous. The regime is committed to its "Military First" policy and
its strategy of brinkmanship. Kim Chong Il will clearly sacrifice
popular welfare to continue his "Military First" policy. We are now in
a critical period as the North's conventional capabilities are more
difficult to maintain and its asymmetrical forces- weapons of mass
destruction, special operations forces, ballistic missiles -- are
still rising. Increasingly dependent on outside aid, the North Korean
government continues to resist the major reform needed to revive its
economy.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNITED STATES ALLIANCE

The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States has
never been stronger. Our continuing cooperation and understanding is a
success story in many ways, and institutionalized in our Mutual
Defense Treaty and in our Security Consultative and Military Committee
Meetings. Four alliance areas deserve particular note. These are the
South Korean political and economic evolution, military readiness,
interoperability, and defense burdensharing.

Political and Economic Evolution: This is a time of unprecedented
political and economic change in the Republic of Korea. Two years
after the first-ever election of an opposition presidential candidate,
President Kim Dae Jung remains fully committed to the alliance and to
close coordination with the United States on policies toward North
Korea. President Kim is also committed to an engagement policy of
economic cooperation and reconciliation designed to induce the
Pyongyang regime to abandon hostility toward the Republic. This policy
has popular support and has created limited business activity and
cultural exchange between North and South. Inter-Korean trade,
although only in the $350 million range, is up about sixty percent
over last year.

The Republic of Korea has undergone a substantial recovery from the
economic crisis that hit the region two years ago. Real gross domestic
product growth is back to more than six percent and inflation is low.
United States exports to Korea rose 42 percent in the first four
months of 1999 after a significant decline the previous year. The
economic future continues to look bright.

Military Readiness: I have no doubt that the military forces of the
Republic of Korea are a trained and ready partner in Combined Forces
Command. Even a quick look at what the Republic of Korea provides to
the alliance is indicative of its commitment. Every day, along the
entire 155 mile long Demilitarized Zone, the South Korean Army mans
100 percent of the front line corps. During Armistice, or at the
beginning of a limited warning attack by the north, the Republic
provides 690,000 active duty personnel, which is 95 percent of all
combat forces on the peninsula. Even at the peak of a United States
commitment to the war plan, the Republic still would provide the
majority of the fighting forces and mobilizes more than three million
reservists. The Republic of Korea's military is a highly trained,
professional force, committed to the defense of its homeland.

Interoperability: In the third alliance area, interoperability, we
have a mixed story of success but some work remains. A success story
is the Global Command and Control System -- Korea, our premier
combined command and control system. It is the Defense Department's
largest and most complex combined, bilingual, command and control
system and provides the world's most sophisticated, near real-time
common operational picture. In 1990 there were only fifty system
workstations. Today there are over 750.

While this increase in interoperable command and control workstations
represents a good news story, we must be aware that United States
efforts to digitize and transform represent significant fiscal
challenges to our allies around the world. This is true for South
Korea too. United States forces' capabilities complement South Korea's
capabilities on land, sea, and in the air. The South Korean government
is making efforts to digitize key systems to increase their
capabilities. We must continue to work with them as they select and
purchase the systems most crucial to war-fighting effectiveness.
However, we must also remember that most nations have neither the
economic nor technological resources to keep up with our advances in
military capabilities. We must ensure our war-fighting transformations
include coalition interoperability.

South Korea's overwhelming preference for American military equipment
during their modernization also improves interoperability. In the last
ten years, eighty percent of all Korean overseas procurement came from
the United States. Foreign Military Sales figures for fiscal year 1999
rose to $511 million from $267 million in fiscal year 1998. Both are
still below the pre-financial crisis figure of $854 million in 1997.
We 11 expect an increase to the $700 million range this fiscal year.
Recent purchases include the Multiple Launch Rocket System, a theater
airborne intelligence collection system, AGM-142 precision guided
air-to-ground missiles, AIM-120 air-to-air missiles, and a suite of
weapon and electronic systems for their newest classes of destroyers.

Additionally, the United States and Korea will extend the
co-production program for the Korean KF-16 fighters by another twenty
aircraft for a program total of one hundred forty aircraft. Decisions
will be made within the next one to two years on the acquisition of
several significant United States weapon systems such as the F-15E
fighter, the AH-64 Apache Longbow attack helicopter, and the Patriot
surface-to-air missile system.

Defense Burden sharing: Finally, defense burden sharing is also a
success story. Of the four burden sharing categories in the 1999
Report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,
South Korea has met Congressional goals in three- level of defense
spending, outlays for foreign assistance, and provision of assets to
multinational military activities. In the fourth category, cost
sharing, the Republic of Korea paid $692 million out of $1.84 billion
United States non-personnel stationing costs fiscal year 1999. This 38
percent contribution fell short of the 1999 goal of 62.5 percent, but
Korea still provided a substantial contribution compared to other
nations, when factoring differences in gross domestic product.

In February 1999, the United States and Republic of Korea governments
reached a new multi-year Special Measures Agreement covering 1999
through 2001. Under the agreement, Korea contributed approximately
$333 million in 1999. With adjustments based on Korean economic growth
and inflation, the contribution for 2000 rose to $391 12 million. A
key piece of the Special Measures Agreement is Host Nation Funded
Construction that increased from $120 million in 1999, to $132 million
in 2000.

Continued strengthening of the South Korean economy should create a
similar increase to the 2001 contribution.

A notable element of South Korea's burden sharing contribution is its
military support to peacekeeping operations in East Timor. Deployed
since October 1999, the infantry, engineer, and medical units,
numbering 419 personnel, help bring peace to a troubled region.
Americans should applaud the quick and significant commitment made by
the South Korean government to support regional stability and
democratic ideals.

COMMAND VISION AND MISSIONS

My vision is for Combined Forces Command to reflect the model alliance
the United States has with the Republic of Korea. The command
functions as a joint and combined "team of teams" consisting of our
world-class Korean and American, active and reserve forces. This
professional team of trained and ready forces maintains the armistice
and guarantees freedom for the South Korean people. These Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen and Marines embody a winning spirit allowing them to
fight and win at a moment's notice. We initiated Strategic Management
plans for both Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea
to attain this vision.

Our number one mission is deterrence that we achieve through our
presence, and readiness. Our presence on the peninsula counts! It has
for fifty years and it will continue to be vital to the stability of
the region. Combined Forces Command readiness remains the critical
factor since the forward-deployed North Korean military is only 13
twenty-six miles from Seoul. We achieve readiness through training and
exercises.

Our forces are trained and ready. Our exercises are the best in the
world and must remain the best. I will address training and exercises
in greater detail in a moment.

COMMAND PRIORITIES

Achieving our vision and accomplishing our missions require us to
prioritize scarce resources. Our command priorities are 1) Combat
Readiness, 2) Force Protection, 3) Force Development, and 4) Quality
of Life. I will discuss each of these in detail followed by additional
resource issues.

Combat Readiness: Our number one command priority of Combat Readiness
consists of the six key elements of planning, training, exercises,
logistics, equipment, and personnel.

Under planning, we continue to adjust and refine our wartime
operations plans through our continuous review process. We update our
plans to reflect the changing threat and Combined Forces Command's
constantly evolving capabilities and operational concepts.

The issue of Anti-Personnel Landmines impacts on planning. The Center
for Army Analysis recently completed a study confirming the
requirement for Anti-Personnel Landmines in the prosecution of the
command's war plan. Let me be very clear here, these weapons, both the
non-self destructing and self destructing types are absolutely
essential to defend the Republic of Korea. It is important to
emphasize that use of Anti-Personnel Landmines in Korea is not
indiscriminate, but tightly controlled. We are grateful that Congress
repealed the Anti-Personnel Landmines Use Moratorium last 14 year.
While we sympathize with the intent of the Ottawa Convention, it is
imperative to balance it against the military effectiveness required
to successfully defend the Republic of Korea. Without the controlled
employment of these essential tools we will incur significantly
increased casualties and risk delaying the halt of the enemy north of
Seoul.

Another upgrade to the command's operations and concept plans is the
development of a new annex that describes the political-military
inter-agency coordination process for both Korean and American
agencies during the execution of the plans. We will first develop this
annex for our instability concept plan, followed by the war-fighting
operations plans.

The second major element of readiness is training. Our combined forces
continue to remain trained and ready. However, all Service components
continue to face training challenges. We need to reverse problems with
our training areas, support our Korea Training Center Vision, and
create realistic training for Military Operations in Urban Terrain.

Our joint forces experience a lack of adequate training areas on the
peninsula.

The training area problem is a function of training areas being widely
dispersed, often temporarily unavailable, and too small to support our
modern weapon systems. Current training areas also suffer from
sustained encroachment by nearby civilian urbanization, and safety
concerns for these civilians have reduced the size and time available
for required training. We have initiated a Land Campaign Plan that
will clearly state our needs and provide the vision necessary to
address this problem. This initiative will be a major effort, but the
result can be reconfigured training areas that allow us to consolidate
training and gain more exclusive land access.

One good example of the challenges that lie ahead is the development
of the new Inchon International Airport, scheduled to open in 2003.
The proposed civilian airline routes of this new airport encroach on
the airspace at Koon Ni Bombing Range, the primary United States range
in Korea. Current Korean proposals will eliminate most flying into
Koon Ni Range. Unless we develop an alternative, the loss of Koon Ni
range will force our aircrews to train off-peninsula at a much higher
cost. Our Land Campaign Plan must address this critical issue.

Another long-term challenge that we must address is the support for
our Korea Training Center Vision. We must match available land with
the right technologies to efficiently use both. The Korea Training
Center's current capabilities match those that existed at our National
Training Center two decades ago. The Korea Training Center remains
very manpower intensive due to the lack of instrumented technologies.
Our goal is to fully instrument the facility with the Homestation
Instrumentation System by fiscal year 2008. The Korea Training Center
requires an average of $4.5 million per year through fiscal year 2007.
The Department of the Army is currently working to fund the
requirement for fiscal year 2001.

To squeeze the most benefit out of every training minute, we must
infuse new training technologies. In the near term, full funding of
our Joint Exercise Program is critical to maintaining our current
level of readiness. We need an additional $7 million annually for our
Korea Battle Simulation Center that is the key element of our Joint
Exercise Program. We can no longer continue to migrate Operations
Tempo dollars to fund these readiness programs.

Finally, Military Operations in Urban Terrain is a training imperative
for all ground forces in Korea. Urbanization now dominates the
landscape in South Korea. As a result, our ground forces will have to
fight in this challenging urban environment. To do that, we need a
place to train. As a new requirement, we need congressional funding
support of $12.4 million for military construction of an Urban Terrain
Center Training Facility that replicates the extreme challenge of
fighting in cities that our forces will face in Korea.

The third element of combat readiness is exercises. Both the content
and timing of our combined and joint exercises posture the command to
deter, defend, and win.

Exercises are readiness. Because of the proximity of the threat, the
complexity of fighting this major theater of war together with our
Korean allies, and our high personnel turnover, we must maintain our
three theater level exercises annually to maintain readiness to defeat
a North Korean attack. Each of our three exercises is unique and
focused on a different, essential component of the combined war fight.
We are seriously concerned that any reduction in funding of our three
joint exercises will significantly reduce our readiness and combined
training. This is a combined fight and the only way we can train our
combined forces is through those three critically important exercises.
Please let me elaborate.

ULCHI FOCUS LENS, our primary war-fighting command post exercise, is
the largest computer-driven exercise in the world. It includes
participation by the South Korean government, the United States
Embassy in Seoul, the South Korean-United States Combined Forces
Command's air, land, and sea forces and United States active and
reserve component forces that deploy to the peninsula. This exercise
introduces 17 the challenges associated with noncombatant evacuation
operations, theater ballistic missile defense operations, amphibious
operations, and operations in the critical main battle area. ULCHI
FOCUS LENS is our capstone exercise. The loss of this exercise would
weaken readiness and deterrence, and hamper our combined forces
training to fight and win.

FOAL EAGLE, our only theater-level field training exercise, involves
both rear area security operations and force-on-force training at the
corps through battalion task force levels. This exercise trains our
combined forces to defeat both the massed North Korean conventional
forces and their asymmetric threats. Typically, over 600,000 South
Korean personnel and 17,500 United States personnel participate. FOAL
EAGLE includes large and small, light and mechanized, combined and
joint force-on-force maneuver. It also includes a large airbase
defense exercise, theater air-defense, special operations, and
combined naval and amphibious operations. FOAL EAGLE is our key
force-on-force exercise. It is the only Corps force-on-force exercise
in the world and improves our tactical interoperability.

The RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT and INTEGRATION exercise
focuses on South Korean mobilization and United States reinforcement
of Korea. This exercise uses computer simulations and a scripted
scenario to emphasize rear area operations, South Korean Mobilization,
the flow of United States reinforcements into the theater of
operations, and sustainment of those forces. This exercise is
synchronized with other United States joint exercises such as POSITIVE
FORCE and United States Transportation Command's TURBO CHALLENGE.
Other training in this exercise includes Wartime Host Nation Support,
Non-combatant 18 Evacuation Operations, and protection of air and sea
lanes. This exercise is our only means to work through the critical
sustainment and logistical challenges of our complex combined
war-fight.

The TEAM SPIRIT exercises were initiated in 1976 and were conducted
annually as a demonstration of inter-allied unity in the defense of
South Korea until 1994. The TEAM SPIRIT field training exercise was a
force-on-force maneuver exercise, which would include large
reinforcements of the theater, and in particular the forward area.

TEAM SPIRIT exercises have been suspended to promote inter-Korean
relationships, but the option remains open to conduct the large-scale
dramatic demonstration of South Korean and United States resolve to
defend against North Korean aggression. The determination whether or
not to conduct a TEAM SPIRIT exercise is an annual decision made
through mutual agreement on the part of South Korea and the United
States.

Exercises are also prime opportunities for engaging our National Guard
and Reserve forces. We are currently developing a plan to maximize the
use of our Guard and Reserve forces in our war plans. We are excited
about this initiative. Nevertheless, we must be careful that we do not
over mission the Reserve Component. We will work closely with the
Service components and Joint Forces Command.

Finally, and most importantly, budget cutbacks have seriously impacted
our exercise program. United States Forces Korea had to reduce its
contribution to the combined exercise program by $2.0 million from
fiscal year 1999 to 2000. We will maintain three major exercises, but
we will have to sacrifice some realism and training quality. Again, we
must monitor our cuts carefully because these exercises are not
hypothetical- they are the exercising of real, "go to war" plans.
Korea is the only 19 theater in the world where real war plans drive
all exercises. Any further cuts in exercise dollars will seriously
impact our ability to fight and win.

The fourth element of readiness is logistics. The tyranny of distance
from the Continental United States military and industrial base
underscores the criticality of strategic airlift and sealift as well
as the essentiality of pre-positioning programs to reduce risk in the
early stages of a conflict.

We remain concerned by a two major theater of war scenario, where
limitations of strategic airlift and sea lift assets slow the movement
of forces and supplies to Korea.

I fully support the continued modernization and maintenance of
strategic en route infrastructure and the resources of our strategic
deployment triad: 1) For airlift, this involves the ongoing
acquisition of the C-17 and future efforts to improve the reliability
of the C-5, as well as continued support of the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet; 2) For sea lift, this includes completion of our Ready Reserve
Force and Large, Medium Speed Roll-On, Roll-Off programs; and 3) For
pre-positioning, this includes the maintenance and funding for the
programs of the military Services.

In the case of pre-positioning programs in Korea, there are shortfalls
in preferred munitions, repair parts and replacement weapon systems I
need to address. These pre-positioned logistics requirements support
initial operations of theater missile defense, counterfire, and the
air campaign. Further, these stocks are the initial sources of repair
parts and combat loss replacements.

Stockage of preferred munitions required for our campaign plan remain
a concern. We must achieve an appropriate level of munitions for
theater missile 10 defense, counterfire, air interdiction and
strategic attack. We would like more of these munitions stored on the
peninsula because of short warning times.

Significant shortages also exist in both ground system repair parts
and replacement weapon systems. War reserve repair parts sustainment
stocks are at only 8 percent fill. Equipment and end item sustainment
stocks to replace combat losses are at 46 percent fill, however, there
are no combat systems such as M1 tanks, M2 fighting vehicles, or M109
howitzers currently in these stocks. Action is underway to begin fill
of the M1 tank sustainment requirement. In addition, the Department of
the Army has funded $673 million over the next six years for war
reserve secondary items worldwide.

The fifth element of combat readiness- equipment- contains a number of
important issues, but four merit particular note. These are command
and control, the pre-positioned brigade set in Korea, ballistic
missile warning, and airborne electronic warfare systems.

We are most concerned about our command and control systems. We must
protect and harden our command, control, communications, computers,
and information infrastructure against the known North Korean
artillery and special operations forces threat. We need to insert
state-of-the-art technology and redundancy into our networks; we need
spares and a coordinating organization that can reconstitute a damaged
infrastructure; and we need to provide adequate computer network
defense for our new Information Assurance program. We are initiating a
major assessment of our key command and control facilities to identify
our specific long-term needs. Near term, fiscal year 2001, we need an
additional $35 million to cover these critical command and control
requirements. My existing Global Command and Control System operating
21 costs alone requires $6 million of that $35 million total. This is
critical funding for absolute "go to war" readiness.

Also included in the $35 million total is a new concept we developed
for Korea.

Based on modern available technology, this concept, called the
Consolidated Wide Area Network, can integrate separate smaller
infrastructures into a single network providing additional redundancy
and survivability. The Consolidated Wide Area Network is in the
Program Objective Memorandum and I urge its funding.

We are happy with the status of the pre-positioned brigade set in
Korea, but must now exercise the set. After significant progress, the
fill rate for the brigade set is 96 percent and continues to improve,
and we brought the equipment up to Army maintenance and readiness
standards. However, for the brigade set to be truly ready, we must
institute an annual exercise program that will allow a unit to draw as
much as a battalion-sized task force out of the set. This is similar
to the brigade set program in Doha, Kuwait and the Marine Corps
utilization of its Maritime Pre-positioned Squadron sets. Efforts are
currently under way to calculate the cost of this exercise.

We have taken steps to increase the ballistic missile warning time of
a North Korean attack through improvements in data warning and
distribution of warning throughout the peninsula. Additionally,
upgrades to our voice warning capabilities allow timely and accurate
dissemination of theater ballistic missile warning. Space-based
detection and tracking systems continue to advance and will improve
our chance of successful missile engagement. One example is the Space
Based Infrared Radar System which supports our long-term ballistic
missile detection needs. This system, 22 projected for 2004, will
provide better warning capability and quicker detection than the
current Defense Support Program satellites.

Even in this age of stealth technology, requirements remain for
forward-deployed airborne electronic warfare systems. As demonstrated
in Kosovo, electronic warfare and jamming systems, such as the EA-6B
aircraft, are critical to all aspects of our campaign. Our limited
warning time and lack of stealth assets stationed in theater mandate
assets able to provide these key electronic suppression capabilities.

The final element of combat readiness is personnel. Our main challenge
is the turnover of our people. Duty in Korea for most of our people
involves a 365 day-a-year forward deployed status. Ninety one percent
of them serve in Korea one year without their families and our
personnel turnover rate is about 95 percent each year. We soften the
blow with robust training, exercises, and mentoring of our new
arrivals.

Nevertheless, in a theater of 95 percent turnover per year, the small
size of our joint headquarters is a concern. Our staff has been
downsizing since 1990 and the fiscal year 2000 National Defense
Authorization Act mandates an additional 15 percent reduction over the
next three years. We are manned at only 34 percent of our wartime
staff requirements. The resultant long workdays, combined with being
continuously engaged twenty-four hours a day, increases stress on our
military members and their families. We need your help to reverse this
trend.

National Guard and Reserve personnel from all Services play a large
and crucial role in our command. We recently launched a major Reserve
Component initiative, which includes the objectives of developing
specific wartime tasks and accompanying mission guidance for each
enhanced Separate Brigade in our war plans. We are also 23
enthusiastic about the opportunities inherent in the "Chairman's Ten"
-- the Reserve Flag and General officers provided by Congress for
assignment to the CINCs. This program will provide us an even greater
opportunity to tap into the tremendous skill and expertise in our
Guard and Reserve general officers. Currently, we have a total of
twenty-two Reserve component flag and general officers from all
Services assigned as wartime fills.

Finally, we are under-funded for the day-to-day operations of the
headquarters, most of which are personnel salaries. We require $25.4
million in fiscal year 2001 to cover pay, travel, supplies, and small
contracts for Combined Forces, United Nations, United States Forces
Korea, and Eighth Army command headquarters.

Force Protection: Our second command priority is the crucial issue of
Force Protection. I want to address the issues of vulnerability to
terrorism, protection of noncombatants, security guards, and
operational force protection.

While the threat from off-peninsula terrorist groups is low, our
vulnerabilities to terrorism remain high. The surrounding urban
environments, decaying infrastructure, and the lack of available real
estate for force protection modifications are the key contributors to
our vulnerabilities. To eliminate these deficiencies and reduce our
vulnerability, we are in the process of determining the funding
necessary to create blast standoff, fix infrastructure, provide early
warning to our troops in the field, and improve our overall posture
against a terrorist attack.

One essential effort to address force protection weaknesses is our
Land Campaign Plan initiative. This planning effort, when fully
executed, will allow United States Forces Korea to consolidate and
shift many of our installations and training areas 24 from urban
centers to rural areas. The effort will also allow us to move more of
our people onto our installations. This requires a significant
long-term commitment from both the Republic of Korea government and
United States Forces Korea to consolidate at those sites.

We take very seriously the protection of our noncombatants. A
significant improvement to our Force and Family Protection Program is
the issuing of chemical biological protective systems to all
Department of Defense-affiliated noncombatants to include both command
and non-command sponsored personnel that began in November 1999. This
program is not a response to any new or increased threat, but is just
a prudent step in improving our force protection posture. The
equipment, coupled with an aggressive training program including
semi-annual non-combatant exercises will enhance the safety of our
family members.

Our contract security guard force is key to our force protection but
underfunded.

This cadre of professional security guards protects United States
Forces Korea personnel and resources without diverting soldiers to
secure our gates and perimeter.

The program is funded in fiscal year 2001. However, underfunding grows
from $12 million in fiscal year 2002 to approximately $17 million in
fiscal year 2007. If not corrected, we will be forced to migrate funds
from Operations Tempo because we cannot afford to take military
personnel away from training to guard installations.

In operational force protection, theater missile defense remains one
of our highest priorities. The Patriot defensive systems we have in
the Republic of Korea are essential to the accomplishment of our
plans. It is only prudent that we continuously evaluate the number of
Patriot defensive systems in the Republic of Korea. Even today 25 we
believe that the North Korean Ballistic Missile threat is growing
which creates a need for greater theater missile defense coverage. We
also fully support the development of the Theater High Altitude Air
Defense, the Airborne Laser, and Navy Area and Navy Theater Wide
initiatives. Only a comprehensive family of systems are capable of
protecting the force from the substantial theater ballistic missile
threat.

Force Development: As technology advances we must constantly seek
innovative improvements to our capabilities through Force Development.
We would benefit most from improved, intelligence collection; ability
to locate and track weapons of mass destruction; protect against
nuclear, biological, and chemical attack; and ability to defeat deep
buried, and hardened targets.

The forward deployed North Korean military makes early detection of
warning and indicators crucial, and continuous intelligence collection
an imperative. Airborne collection platforms of all types- imagery,
signals, signature- and other detection means are vital to us in
Korea. We need more of these systems to decrease risk. We also require
continued investment in, and modernization of, intelligence and
analysis capabilities to provide the detailed information needed by
today's sophisticated precision weapons and systems. My Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Brigadier General Nicholas Grant,
will present the specific requirements later in his classified
testimony.

Short warning times and close proximity complicate our defense against
North Korean weapons of mass destruction. Coupled with limited
information and lack of access to the North's programs, our command
faces a troubling threat. We need a 26 better capability to locate,
and track these weapons of mass destruction. Again, Brigadier General
Grant will present greater detail in his testimony.

Nuclear, chemical, and biological protection systems also remains one
of our top priorities for force modernization. We need additional
biological detection equipment and individual chemical protective
clothing for both in-place and deploying forces. Key to our success in
this area is the early deployment of Reserve Component decontamination
units.

Finally, the tremendous degree of deep buried and hardened targets in
North Korea can complicate our targeting efforts. We are fully engaged
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff on
programs that will enable us to attack and defeat these targets in the
event of hostilities and we will continue this involvement.

Quality of Life: Quality of life, our fourth command priority, is
critical to our mission. Personnel Tempo is 365 days a year in this
hardship area. Our military and civilians wake each day to face one of
the most threatening situations in the world today. These men and
women deserve reasonable and appropriate quality of life benefits. Our
intent is to make a Korean tour the assignment of choice for our
military personnel by providing the best quality of life possible for
the personnel in my command. This is clearly not the case today. Our
objective for housing unaccompanied enlisted service members in
quality housing is to ensure we meet the Department of Defense mandate
that all barracks meet the current standard by 2010, with funding no
later than 2008. Our goal is to totally eradicate all such substandard
working and living conditions in United States Forces Korea by 2020.
To correct these deficiencies, I need to address military
construction.

First, let me say that as a direct result of your help with the
supplemental appropriations, United States Forces Korea has been able
to repair previous flood damage and prevent new damage. Last year,
General Tilelli thanked you for the prompt passage of the $253.8
million Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to restore badly damaged
facilities caused by the August 1998 floods in Korea. I add my thanks
to you for the legislation and can report that we are currently
executing the repairs as planned. Areas that were previously damaged
in 1998, received no further damage during the 1999 floods. Thanks to
you, this is truly a success.

The Military Construction funding for Korea during the past 14 years
has averaged only $60 million per year. Coupled with the total
elimination of Military Construction dollars for our command between
1991 and 1994, this has impacted on our service members' quality of
life. Chronic under-funding of annual Real Property Maintenance and
Repair, which is $73 million short, and annual Public Works, which is
$64 million short, in fiscal year 2001, exacerbates an already serious
problem with troop housing, dining facilities, work areas, and
infrastructure. Overcrowded facilities force us to billet over 1,560
unaccompanied personnel off-post. Existing unaccompanied housing and
dining facilities continue to suffer from rapid deterioration and
excessive wear and tear due to overcrowding. Of the over 9,600
buildings within my command, almost 14 percent are 40-80 years old.
Korean War-era Quonset huts and Vietnam-era buildings numbering 3,231
still have military personnel working and living in them.

During 1997 and 1998, the command suffered 545 electrical power and
357 water supply outages from decaying infrastructure. We cannot
continue to ask our people to live and work like this.

We need an average of $469 million per year in Military Construction
from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2008 to meet our minimum
requirements. However, we recognize that this amount is not possible
under today's budget constraints. A viable alternative is to defer
some projects and equally distribute our program out to 2020.

This will reduce the annual cost to $366 million of which $132 million
will be provided by the Republic of Korea and the remaining $234
million by Military Construction. I highly recommend that you come to
Korea and see these conditions first hand.

To reiterate our requirements for fiscal year 2001, we need an
additional $67 million in Readiness for training, command and control,
and combatant headquarters support; $73 million in Real Property
Maintenance; and $64 million in Public Works, for a total of $204
million in Operations and Maintenance funds.

Military construction requires an additional $146 million plus the new
requirement of $12.4 million for the urban terrain training facility
in fiscal year 2001. Overall, Military Construction requires $234
million annually (given the current level of Host Nation Funded
Construction) from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2020.

(See the Funding Shortfall Annex for detailed breakout of the above
totals) We are still assessing the additional requirements for our
comprehensive improvement on the command, control, communications, and
computers infrastructure.

Before concluding, let me point out that these funding shortfalls have
a very real and detrimental impact that ripples through all four of
our command priorities. Funding shortfalls force us to migrate funds,
where we pull critical money from one area to fund a higher priority.
For example, of the $204 million Operations and Maintenance 29
shortages for fiscal year 2001 that I just mentioned, $38 million
worth of those requirements are absolute "must fund" items. We will
have to accept risk to divert approximately $32 million from Land
Forces (OPTEMPO) into Land Forces Readiness (Operational
Readiness-OPRED) for the Korea Battle Simulation Center, and our
combatant headquarters. Additionally, we will reduce Base Operations
Quality of Life programs to migrate $6 million for some shortages in
our Global Command and Control System. We need your help to prevent
such migration. Eliminating our shortfalls will properly fund the
training, infrastructure, and an acceptable quality of life that we
owe our military people serving in Korea.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to leave you with four thoughts. First, I
want to emphasize that the support of Congress and the American people
is vitally important to our future in Korea. We thank you for all you
have done. Congress remains our Service members' best friend.
Concomitantly, we must ensure that our resolve is consistent and
visible so that North Korea, or any other potential adversary, cannot
misinterpret it.

As long as the North clearly understands that we are unified in our
security relationship, we strengthen our deterrence. We have an
investment of over 50 years in this region.

We must continue to build on it to guarantee the stability that is so
important to the people of Korea, Northeast Asia, and to our own
national interests. I urge committee members to come to Korea and see
first-hand the importance of the American military presence and the
strength and vitality of the United States -Republic of Korea
alliance.

Second, the North Korean military continues to grow and improve in
spite of severe economic problems. However, the strength of the
Republic of Korea - United States alliance, built on a foundation of
teamwork and combined training, provides both nations with a powerful
deterrent as well as the readiness to fight and win.

Third, this summer will begin the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War,
viewed by many of our veterans as the "forgotten war." We are
committed to honoring the brave veterans, living and dead and hope you
can join us in Korea for this commemoration to remember their
sacrifice.

Finally, you can be justifiably proud off all the exceptional things
the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Defense Department
civilians continue to do with great spirit and conviction. They remain
our most valuable asset. They sacrifice for our Nation every day. This
is why we remain so firm that we owe all those who faithfully serve
proper resources for training, a quality infrastructure, and an
adequate quality of life.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts with you.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)



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