News


Tracking Number:  183163

Title:  "Iraq Cannot Have Peace with Saddam Hussein in Power." Speaking to the Overseas Writers' Club, presidential advisor and National Security Council official Richard Haass said the US remains convinced that normal relations with Iraq cannot be restored with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in power. (910509)

Date:  19910509

Text:
*NEA424

05/09/91 *

IRAQ CANNOT HAVE PEACE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN IN POWER (Text: Hass speech to Writers' Club, 5/9/91) (1960)

Washington -- Richard N. Haass, special assistant to President Bush and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, said the United States remains convinced that normal relations with Iraq cannot be restored with Saddam Hussein in power.

"Peace is unlikely to come to the region and to the Iraqi people so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power," Haass said May 9 in a speech before the Overseas Writers' Club.

"In our view, Saddam is discredited and cannot be redeemed. As a result, all possible sanctions will remain in place until he is gone. Iraqis will not participate in the region's post-crisis political, economic and security arrangements until there is a change in regime," Haass said.

Talking about the Middle East peace process, Haass said the administration is doing all it can to work toward reaching a lasting peace in the region. Such a peace, he said, must be based upon U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

A peaceful agreement must include provision for Israeli security, and for the" "legitimate political rights of Palestinians," and a "solution to the questions of land, water and security central to this region's past, present and future."

The following is the text of Haass's speech, titled "Beyond the Gulf War: The United States, the Middle East and the Gulf," as prepared for delivery:

(BEGIN TEXT)

The end of the Cold War; no matter how welcome, should not be confused with the end of history. There is still the residue of U.S.-Soviet competition, especially in the military sphere, but also in the regional. Here one needs only point to Afghanistan. And we cannot yet say with certainty that U.S.-Soviet relations have been placed on a new plane, on a permanent basis. This judgment has to await the evolution of domestic developments in the Soviet Union.

GE 2 nea424 This is not meant to ignore or deny all that has improved in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Just imagine had the past nine months been acted out against a backdrop of reflexive Soviet support for Iraq. No Security Council support, no sanctions, no freedom to deploy forces with the confidence that the Soviet Union would not come to the aid of its friend and ally. It could well have been a very different story.

But it is important to keep in mind that the diminution of U.S.-Soviet competition is not without some complicating consequences. If the Soviet Union is less prone to exacerbate regional conflicts, it is also less able to regulate them. Iraq is the painful and costly example of how individual states, blessed with impressive sources of wealth that in turn can lead to the accumulation of advanced arsenals provided with no strings attached, can make war on their neighbors and much of the world. A world without a Soviet challenge around every corner is not to be confused with a world without challenges.

This is why the test with Iraq was so important. What motivated us was not simply a stake in oil or concern for the well-being of traditional friends -- although these are no mean concerns -- but also an awareness that how we met this challenge to stability would go a long ways toward establishing the pattern of international affairs in the initial phase of the post-Cold War era. Accepting Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait would have had consequences far beyond the Gulf. Other would-be aggressors would have drawn the lesson that aggression pays; other would-be victims would have seen that appeasement was the only path.

Fortunately, this was not what transpired. And in the successful international response one can discern the outlines of what we have come to describe as the new world order. At its core the new world order is about two things: rules of the road to govern relations between states, and consensus on what to do when these rules are violated. The basic rule is that force should not be used to settle international disputes. And when it is, it is up to like-minded states to join together to resist.

This is what took place in the Gulf. Needless to say, with what was accomplished -- and we should not lose perspective or sight of all that we did accomplish by standing up to aggression -- we have not yet created Kant's perpetual peace. A more reasonable and reachable yardstick is creating stability in a part of the world where the passage of time is measured traditionally not by achievements but by wars. Anyone doubting this assertion need only think back to 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, Lebanon, Iran-Iraq and most recently Iraq against Kuwait.

GE 3 nea424 Our efforts to create a new era of stability in the Gulf in the wake of this most recent fighting have six dimensions. The first involves constraining Iraq. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 provides the basic framework. The intent is to prevent the re-emergence of an Iraqi threat to the region. The means are continued sanctions, some of which are open-ended, such as the ban on the sale of arms to Iraq. Some of the sanctions are linked to Iraqi performance, be it in destroying its weapons of mass destruction or paying adequate compensation to the victims of its aggression. Together, the sanctions are designed to penalize Iraq for what it has done and to preclude it doing so again in the future.

The second dimension of our post-war gulf policy is to put into place viable security arrangements, to deter and if need be defend against future challenges to stability. The United Nations observer mission (UNIKOM) is already in place along the Iraq-Kuwait border, and consultations are proceeding on Arab peacekeeping and defense forces. But more will need to be done. This is the purpose of Secretary Cheney's current visit. The outlines of what we seek are emerging: an enhanced naval presence, more regular exercising and training and planning, some prepositioning of equipment. We are not interested in permanent stationing of U.S. ground forces. The intent is to build an approach that meets the security demands without creating political pressures that could threaten the very stability we seek to help engender.

The third aspect of what we are doing in the Gulf falls in the realm of arms control. We have just seen a glimpse of a possible future for the region, one in which wars are not confined to battlefields and soldiers and conventional munitions, but a future in which downtowns become battlegrounds, in which civilians become combatants, and in which weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic missiles complement the familiar but also deadly world of infantry and armor. We cannot simply stand by and observe this phenomenon. We must try to stop or at least shape it. We are developing a comprehensive approach, one involving would-be suppliers and recipients alike, designed to stem and where possible roll back the proliferation of destabilizing conventional and unconventional weapons as well as the means to deliver them.

Fourth, we are renewing our efforts on the peace process. Secretary Baker has made three trips over the past two months to the region; he is about to embark on his fourth. The goal is to bring about direct negotiations among Israel and the Arab states and Israelis and Palestinians to be launched by a peace conference co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. For the first time, Israel would sit down face-to-face with its Arab neighbors. The principles that guide our effort are well-known: We seek a comprehensive peace, one based upon U.N. Security Council

GE 4 nea424 resolutions 242 and 338. We seek a true peace, one that includes Israel and provides it real security. But at the same time we seek a fair peace, one that provides for the legitimate political rights of Palestinians and finds a solution to the questions of land, water and security central to this region's past, present and future. We undertake this effort not with a blueprint, not with the ability to create peace, but with the determination to be a catalyst for peace, to help those who truly want to help themselves.

Fifth, we are conscious that stability cannot derive solely from relations between states. The new world order must address as well the question of conditions within states, what the President termed the just treatment of all peoples. What we are trying to do here is encourage greater respect for human rights, greater provision for meaningful political participation, greater encouragement of productive economic behavior and cooperation to foster development. There is no reason for the peoples and countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf to miss out on the intellectual, political, and economic currents of our time -- currents that have improved the lives of men and women around the world. All I would add here is a sense of modesty, that we go about this recognizing that we cannot write much less dictate the social contract for societies and cultures with long and distinct traditions of their own.

Sixth, and consistent with our interest in reform, our approach to building order in the Gulf recognizes and addresses humanitarian concerns. The United States has taken a leading role in providing and encouraging others to provide the necessary relief for the approximately two million refugees that have sought to escape Saddam Hussein's violence and repression. From the outset we have sought to meet these pressing human needs without getting enmeshed militarily in Iraq's civil conflicts. This would truly turn us into the world's policeman at a time when there is no consensus in the world or here at home for us to assume such a role -- and no assurance we could succeed even if there were.

This is not meant to imply that we do not care. We do. Hence the unprecedented scale of aid to the U.N. and other international organizations, the air-drop of supplies along the Turkish-Iraq border, the building of temporary encampments in northern Iraq, and the creation of larger zones so that people can return to heir villages. But this involvement is intended to be temporary and limited. We are working to increase the role of the United Nations and international agencies in providing for the relief operations and the well-being of the refugees so that these people can become former refugees as soon as possible.

GE 5 nea424 Consistent with this last point, we also recognize that peace is unlikely to come to the region and to the Iraqi people so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. In our view, Saddam is discredited and cannot be redeemed. As a result, all possible sanctions will remain in place until he is gone. Iraqis will not participate in the region's post-crisis political, economic and security arrangements until there is a change in regime.

This, then, summarizes where we are in the Middle East and Gulf. It should come as no surprise that securing the peace promises to be even more difficult than waging the war. As I said at the outset, history has not come to an end in the part of the world where history began. But two points are worth keeping in mind: dealing with the challenges resulting from success, however difficult they may be, is far preferable to dealing with what would have resulted from failure to reverse Iraq's aggression. And while the challenges facing us are considerable, they are not impossible. Indeed, they can be met if we apply the same degree of dedication and discipline, and evidence the same degree of leadership and engagement, that brought us to this point.

(END TEXT) NNNN


File Identification:  05/09/91, NE-424; 05/10/91, NA-506
Product Name:  Wireless File
Product Code:  WF
Languages:  Arabic
Keywords:  HAASS, RICHARD/Speaker; OVERSEAS WRITERS CLUB; IRAQ-US RELATIONS; HUSSEIN, SADDAM; ARAB NATIONS-ISRAEL RELATIONS; PEACE PROPOSALS; UNITED NATIONS-SECURITY COUNCIL; USSR-US RELATIONS; GOVERNMENT REFORMS; PERSIAN GULF AREA; SECU
Document Type:  TXT
Thematic Codes:  1NE; 1ME
Target Areas:  NE
PDQ Text Link:  183163