News


Tracking Number:  201092

Title:  "IAEA Official Says Iraq Still Withholding Information." Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, IAEA official David Kay said that Iraq is continuing to withhold information from the commission on its nuclear capability. (911018)

Translated Title:  Funcionario OIEA afirma Irak aun oculta informacion. (911018)
Author:  GOMEZ, BERTA (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date:  19911018

Text:
*ARF508

10/18/91 * (Spanish coming) IAEA OFFICIAL SAYS IRAQ STILL WITHHOLDING INFORMATION (David Kay before Senate panel) (740) By Berta Gomez USIA Staff Writer

WASHINGTON -- Iraq is continuing to withhold information from the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) on its nuclear capability, an IAEA official told Congress Oct. 17.

David Kay, deputy leader of one of the IAEA action teams that have been conducting inspections of Iraq's nuclear facilities, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that much work remains to be done, particularly in relation to procurement networks and centrifuge enrichment design work.

He noted out that Iraq's nuclear know-how "remains firmly in the hands of the Iraqi personnel who directed and carried out this program," meaning that long-term monitoring and verification "of substantial intrusiveness" must be maintained in Iraq.

Thus far, he said, the agency has determined that the Iraqi nuclear program was a "long-range program that was backed by a significant institutional, manpower and financial commitment. It had technical vision and direction that, if it had proceeded unhindered ... would have resulted in Iraq in relatively short order joining the ranks of nuclear weapons states."

On a more positive note, Kay said he was encouraged by the progress made thus far by the IAEA. Through its inspection efforts, carried out in conjunction with the United Nations, the agency "has proven that an international effort backed by the latest information that member states can provide, and with the firm backing of the Security Council, is capable of successfully undertaking some of the most daunting tasks that can face any inspection regime," he said.

He agreed with Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio), who also testified, that one important lesson of the Iraqi inspections "is that we need to pay far greater attention" to clandestine efforts to disseminate nuclear material and know-how.

Kay also assured the committee that U.S. and allied intelligence information had been instrumental in the

GE 2 ARF508 success of the inspections teams. "Without that data," he said, "we couldn't have done what we did."

Beyond the rough outline provided by Kay, the Foreign Relations Committee also held a closed, executive session to hear testimony from Dr. Robert Gallucci, deputy director of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Much of the earlier session focused on a measure proposed by Glenn. The "Omnibus Nuclear Proliferation Control Act of 1991," Glenn said, would ban U.S. imports and government procurements from firms that the president determines are helping any nation or group to acquire a nuclear explosive device or "unsafeguarded" bomb material.

"My goal is to send an unmistakable signal to any would-be supplier of an illicit nuclear program: If you knowingly sell to such a program after enactment of this law, you can forget about doing business in the United States" or with the U.S. government, Glenn said.

In many ways, the measure resembles a bill already approved by the Foreign Relations Committee dealing with chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Glenn noted that both pieces of legislation would give the president the authority to trigger sanctions, as well as the right to waive any specific sanction after one year, if deemed necessary to protect vital U.S. interests.

The Glenn measure would require the administration to make an annual report assessing the compliance of other nations with regard to their nuclear non-proliferation commitments, as well as a one-time report assessing the effectiveness of new U.S. diplomatic efforts to achieve non-proliferation objectives.

Glenn also urged support for a separate measure -- a joint resolution designed to strengthen the safeguards of the IAEA.

It urges the president to seek increased funding for the agency and identifies a number of multilateral initiatives designed to bolster its effectiveness. These include universal adoption of full-scope safeguards for nuclear commerce; a ban on the international shipment of highly enriched uranium fuel for research reactors; and new controls over nuclear materials that may soon be used abroad for naval propulsion, Glenn said.

The senator also suggested that the agency be encouraged to publicize more information about its inspections. "It is simply inexcusable that there is no central public repository of such data, or even of current national laws and regulations of nuclear commerce," he said.

GE 3 ARF508 Committee members expressed support for both Glenn proposals and stressed that nuclear non-proliferation must become one of the defining characteristics of future U.S. foreign policy. NNNN


File Identification:  10/18/91, AR-508; 10/21/91, AS-103
Product Name:  Wireless File
Product Code:  WF
Languages:  Spanish
Keywords:   INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY; INSPECTIONS; ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION; IRAQ/Defense & Military; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; MILITARY CAPABILITIES; KAY, DAVID; CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY; SENATE FOREIGN RE
Thematic Codes:  1NE; 1AC; 1UN
Target Areas:  AR
PDQ Text Link:  201092; 201219