News

Iraq and the UNSC on its Nuclear Program

Iraq NewsSUN, MAY 17, 1998

By Laurie Mylroie

The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .




I.   UNSC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON IRAQ, MAY 14
II.  UN MAY SCALE BACK NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ, CNN, MAY 14
III. IRAQI CABINET PROTESTS UNSC STATEMENT, XINHUA, MAY 17
IV.  NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE, LETTER TO BILL RICHARDSON, MAY 12
V.   D. ALBRIGHT & K. O'NEILL, "IRAQ: RESETTLE THE SCIENTISTS," BULLETIN 
OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, JAN-FEB 1998
VI.  NEWS FROM THE FREE IRAQ CAMPAIGN, MAY 14

   One reader, responding to the WSJ May 13, on US plans to reduce 
forces in the Gulf and shift toward "a less confrontational posture," 
remarked, "Unbelievable. Orwellian.  Are we living in some kind of 
parallel universe?"  No, they are living in a world of spin; in fact, 
they may be lost in it.
   On Thurs, May 14, the UNSC issued a presidential statement.   
Essentially, it marked a US compromise with Russia, which had wanted to 
use the IAEA's controversial April report, to "close" the nuclear file, 
while the US had wanted to wait until Oct.  The IAEA will make a 
previously unscheduled report in July.  
   The Orwellian world of spin and parallel universes is not limited to 
Wash DC.  Thus, as the UNSC stated Thursday, "The Council welcomes the 
improved access provided to the Special Commission and the IAEA by the 
Government of Iraq following the signature of the Memorandum of 
Understanding by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary 
General on 23 February 1998 . . .
  "The Security Council expresses the hope that the agreement by the 
Government of Iraq to fulfill its obligation to provide immediate, 
unconditional, and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the 
IAEA will reflect a new Iraqi spirit with regard to providing accurate 
and detailed information in all areas of concern . . .
  "The Security Council notes that the investigations by the IAEA over 
the past several years have yielded a technically coherent picture of 
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, although Iraq has not supplied 
full responses to all of the questions and concerns of the IAEA . . .
  "The Council affirms its intention, given the progress of the IAEA . . 
. to agree in a resolution that the IAEA dedicate its resources to 
implement the ongoing monitoring and verification activities of the IAEA 
. . . upon receipt of a report from the Director General of the IAEA 
stating that the necessary technical and substantive clarifications have 
been made, including provision by Iraq of the necessary responses to all 
IAEA questions and concerns . . . The Council requests the Director 
General of the IAEA to provide this information in his report due on 11 
October 1998 and to submit a status report by the end of July 1998 for 
possible action at that time."
   Nonetheless, Iraq's UN ambassador responded, as CNN reported later 
that day, "Iraq thinks at this moment that all the files have to be 
closed" and the UNSC action was "too little, too late."  Too little, too 
late for what?
    Today, as Xinhua reported, the Iraqi cabinet issued a statement 
saying that the UNSC "statement does not respond to Iraq's minimal 
rights in view of the great sacrifices of its people," while "Iraq is 
awaiting a positive response from the council as demanded" in its May 1 
open letter to the UNSC.

  There are enormous problems with Iraq's nuclear program [see "Iraq 
News," Sept 25 97; Apr 16 98].  It is the expert opinion that all Iraq 
lacks for a nuclear bomb is the fissile material, although that only 
became known after the Aug 95 defection of Hussein Kamil.  Indeed, in 
Dec 95, then Israeli Foreign Minister, Ehud Barak, raised the danger of 
a potential Iraqi nuclear breakthrough in exceptionally strong terms 
with then US Sec Def, William Perry.   But nothing was done.  The US 
view was that it could take care of the problem by overthrowing Saddam, 
particularly as Saddam looked especially weak after Kamil's defection.
   But the administration hoped to overthrow Saddam quietly, in a coup, 
and otherwise sought to keep Iraq off the agenda in an election year.  
In Jun 96, Saddam arrested the conspirators associated with the Iraqi 
National Accord, whom the CIA expected to carry out the coup, while in 
Aug 96, Iraqi tanks assaulted the Iraqi National Congress in Irbil.  And 
the administration lost all its options for overthrowing Saddam.  How it 
now intends to address the problem of Iraq's proscribed unconventional 
programs--including the nuclear program--is anyone's guess.  
   Most recently, on May 12, Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley of the 
Nuclear Control Institute wrote the US ambassador to the UN, detailing 
known problems in Iraq's nuclear declarations.  They include material 
related to weapons-design; centrifuge R&D; and missing components and 
equipment for a bomb.
   Also, David Albright and Kevin O'Neill of the Institute for Science 
and International Security, wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
Jan/Feb 98, warning that even at the present level of highly intrusive 
monitoring and inspections, "Under some scenarios, Iraq might be able to 
construct a nuclear explosive before it was detected."  They advised 
resettling Iraq's nuclear scientists in countries like the US.  
   And the present level of inspections and monitoring will not last.  
One problem in the IAEA approach is that it is willing to "close the 
file" on inspections and deal with unanswered problems in what was 
envisaged as a follow-on monitoring phase, provided for in UNSCR 715 
[Oct 11 91].  Not only is the IAEA approach highly questionable in 
itself, it threatens to set a precedent for UNSCOM, which is under 
relentless political pressure from Iraq's friends on the UNSC. And once 
the weapons "files" are "closed" and the sanctions ended, neither the 
IAEA nor UNSCOM will last long in Iraq, if they last that long. 
   Congress has been AWOL on the subject of Iraq's retention of 
proscribed weapons and its treatment of UNSCOM.  Since Hussein Kamil's 
defection, when the problem became known, it has not held one hearing on 
the issue.  Only once was the UNSCOM chairman asked to testify, and then 
it was a hearing related to the Nunn-Lugar legislation on enhancing the 
US ability to cope with unconventional terrorism.  Why doesn't Congress 
speak out and otherwise take some action to stop the Clinton backsliding 
on UNSCOM and Iraq's proscribed weapons?  If India was alarming, what 
about the day Saddam has a nuke?  
   Finally, the Free Iraq Campaign will start May 23, with its first 
rally in San Jose, CA, making its way to Wash DC.

I. UNSC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON IRAQ, MAY 14
S/PRST/1998/11
14 May 1998
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
   At the 3880th meeting of the Security Council, held on 14 May 1998, 
in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The 
situation between Iraq and Kuwait", the President of the Security 
Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council: 
   "The Security Council has reviewed the report of 16 April 1998 from 
the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission 
(S/1998/332) and the report of 9 April 1998 from the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (S/1998/312). The Council 
welcomes the improved access provided to the Special Commission and the 
IAEA by the Government of Iraq following the signature of the Memorandum 
of Understanding by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the 
Secretary-General on 23 February 1998 (S/1998/166) and the adoption of 
its resolution 1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998. The Council calls for 
continued implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. 
   "The Security Council expresses the hope that the agreement by the 
Government of Iraq to fulfil its obligation to provide immediate, 
unconditional, and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the 
IAEA will reflect a new Iraqi spirit with regard to providing accurate 
and detailed information in all areas of concern to the Special 
Commission and the IAEA as required by the relevant resolutions. 
   "The Security Council expresses its concern that the most recent 
reports of the Special Commission, including the reports of the 
technical evaluation meetings (S/1998/176 and S/1998/308), indicate that 
Iraq has not provided full disclosure in a number of critical areas, in 
spite of repeated requests from the Special Commission, and calls upon 
Iraq to do so. The Council encourages the Special Commission to continue 
its efforts to improve its effectiveness and efficiency and looks 
forward to a technical meeting of the members of the Council with the 
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission as a follow-up to the 
review of sanctions held by the Council on 27 April 1998. 
   "The Security Council notes that the Special Commission and the IAEA 
must discharge their mandates as defined under resolutions 687 (1991) of 
3 April 1991 and 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991 with full Iraqi 
cooperation in all areas, including fulfilment by Iraq of its obligation 
to provide full, final and complete declarations of all aspects of its 
prohibited programmes for weapons of mass destruction and missiles. 
   "The Security Council notes that the investigations by the IAEA over 
the past several years have yielded a technically coherent picture of 
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, although Iraq has not supplied 
full responses to all of the questions and concerns of the IAEA, 
including those specified in paragraphs 24 and 27 of the report of the 
Director General of 9 April 1998. 
   "The Council affirms its intention, given the progress of the IAEA, 
and in line with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), to agree 
in a resolution that the IAEA dedicate its resources to implement the 
ongoing monitoring and verification activities of the IAEA under 
resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, upon receipt of a report from 
the Director General of the IAEA stating that the necessary technical 
and substantive clarifications have been made, including provision by 
Iraq of the necessary responses to all IAEA questions and concerns, in 
order to permit full implementation of the ongoing monitoring and 
verification plan approved by resolution 715 (1991). In this regard, the 
Council requests the Director General of the IAEA to provide this 
information in his report due on 11 October 1998 and to submit a status 
report by the end of July 1998 for possible action at that time. 
   "The Security Council acknowledges that the IAEA is focusing most of 
its resources on the implementation and strengthening of its activities 
under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan. The Council notes 
that, within the framework of its ongoing monitoring and verification 
responsibilities, the IAEA will continue to exercise its right to 
investigate any aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, in 
particular through the follow-up of any new information developed by the 
IAEA or provided by Member States and to destroy, remove or render 
harmless any prohibited items discovered through such investigations 
falling under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) in conformity with 
the IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by 
resolution 715 (1991)."
     
II. UN MAY SCALE BACK NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ
U.N. may scale back nuclear inspections in Iraq
May 14, 1998; Web posted at: 6:34 p.m. EDT (2234 GMT) 
UNITED NATIONS (CNN) -- The U.N. Security Council agreed Thursday to 
consider scaling back inspections of suspected nuclear sites in Iraq -- 
which would mark the first significant reduction in the inspections 
regime imposed on Iraq in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. 
   In a statement drawn up by U.S. and Russian diplomats after lengthy 
negotiations, the Security Council agreed to decide whether the 
International Atomic Energy Agency should shift from its current program 
of inspections of suspected nuclear sites to less-frequent verification 
visits. The decision will be based on a report from the IAEA due July 
31. 
   The change would mean IAEA inspectors would no longer look for 
evidence of Iraq's past efforts to build nuclear weapons but would watch 
for attempts to revive a nuclear program or import materials needed to 
restart it. 
    Supporters of the reduction in inspections wanted to reward Iraq for 
its cooperation with U.N. monitoring of its nuclear weapons capability. 
But Iraq's U.N. ambassador, Nizar Hamdoon, termed the council's action 
"too little, too late," calling for an immediate end to U.N. 
inspections. 
   "Iraq thinks at this moment that all the files have to be closed," he 
said. 
Change could come as soon as July
   If the IAEA recommends a reduction in inspections, the Security 
Council could give the go-ahead by the end of July, although American 
diplomats say they don't expect any decision will be taken until 
October. 
    The change would not apply to other U.N. weapons inspection programs 
in Iraq that are looking for evidence of biological or chemical weapons. 
   Thursday's decision was a compromise between two factions among the 
permanent members of the Security Council. Russia, France and China 
wanted to reduce the regime of inspections now, based on a recent 
evaluation by the IAEA that Iraq had complied with U.N. requirements in 
dismantling its nuclear weapons program. 
   But the United States opposed an immediate reduction in inspections, 
saying Iraq had not answered all of the questions about its program. 
   "There is some progress in the nuclear field. We've acknowledged 
that," said Bill Richardson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. 
"But we are not closing the nuclear file." 
   Some independent experts back the U.S. position, warning that any 
reduction in monitoring would give Iraq more room to hide any 
bomb-building plans it may have. 
   The Nuclear Control Institute sent a letter of support to Richardson, 
saying there are still too many questions about Iraq's nuclear 
capacities and missing bomb components, equipment and nuclear fuel. 
Correspondent Brian Jenkins and Reuters contributed to this report.   

III. IRAQI CABINET PROTESTS UNSC STATEMENT, XINHUA, MAY 17
Iraq Dissatisfied with U.N. Statement on Nuclear
BAGHDAD (May 17) XINHUA - The Iraqi Cabinet expressed dissatisfaction on 
Sunday with the United Nations Security Council's presidential statement 
on its nuclear file, the Iraqi News Agency reported. 
   At a session chaired by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the cabinet 
maintained that to transfer International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 
activities in Iraq to permanent monitoring phase by July as stipulated 
in the statement does not respond to Iraq's minimal rights in view of 
the great sacrifices of its people. 
   The U.N. statement issued three days ago urged Iraq to continue 
cooperation with IAEA so that the council can close Iraq's nuclear file 
by July. 
   The Iraqi cabinet said Iraq is awaiting positive response from the 
council as demanded in an open letter the country presented to it on May 
1. 
   In the letter, Iraq demanded the U.N. Security Council to implement 
Article 22 of the U.N. Resolution 687, which provides the lifting of 
trade embargo against Iraq.  . . .

IV.  NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE, LETTER TO BILL RICHARDSON
May 12, 1998
Ambassador Bill Richardson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
Dear Ambassador Richardson:
     We are writing to convey the Nuclear Control Institute's summary of 
unresolved issues regarding Iraq's nuclear weapons program. These issues 
were raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its 
October 1997 consolidated inspection report, but were never resolved in 
subsequent IAEA reports.
     Important questions remain to be answered in the areas of weapons 
design; centrifuge research and development; missing weapon components 
and equipment; remaining uranium stocks; the EMIS ("calutron") 
enrichment program; Iraq's reporting to the IAEA and its efforts to 
conceal elements of its weapons program from the Agency; and post-war 
nuclear program activities.
     In spite of these important outstanding questions, the IAEA 
proposes in its April 1998 report a shift from inspections to less- 
intrusive monitoring. As you are aware, this report is fueling efforts 
by certain Security Council members to "close the nuclear file" as a 
first step toward lifting sanctions. We understand that the Security 
Council will soon consider formal affirmation of the IAEA's findings, 
possibly sometime this week.
     We agree with the Administration's position that it would be 
premature to close the nuclear file. We urge that the United States call 
for the continuation of complete, meaningful inspections until all 
outstanding questions about the Iraqi nuclear program can be resolved.
     Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter. We would 
welcome the opportunity to brief you and your staff further on these 
issues.
Sincerely,
 (signed)
 Paul Leventhal,  President
 Steven Dolley,  Research Director

Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Unresolved Issues
Steven Dolley
Nuclear Control Institute
May 12, 1998
     To view documentation from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspection reports, please click on the active link at the top of 
each issue category.
Weapons Design
      Many important weapons-design drawings and reports are still 
missing.  The status of R&D on advanced weapons designs (boosted, 
thermonuclear) remains unclear.
      Documentation of research on explosive lenses remains incomplete. 
 Some key design drawings are still missing.
      The extent of outside assistance offered to or received by Iraq, 
including a reported offer of an actual nuclear weapon design, remains 
unresolved.
Centrifuge R&D
       Almost all centrifuge design documents and drawings are missing.
        Information is incomplete and drawings are missing related to 
Iraq’s super-critical centrifuge R&D program.
        Significant inconsistencies exist between Iraqi and foreign 
testimony on the amount of foreign assistance and components provided to 
the centrifuge program.
Missing Components and Equipment
      Not all "Group 4" nuclear weaponization equipment has been located 
or accounted for.
      Some uranium-conversion components remain unaccounted for.
       A plutonium-beryllium neutron source, potentially useful as a 
neutron initiator for a nuclear bomb, is still missing.
 Uranium Stocks and Enrichment Program
       Large stockpiles of natural uranium remain in Iraq.
       Historical uranium MUF’s for Iraq’s uranium conversion and 
enrichment are large. Over three tons of uranium remains unaccounted 
for.
       The credibility of low (20%) historical capacity for EMIS 
(calutron) uranium enrichment reported by Iraq is open to question.
Iraqi Reporting to the IAEA
       The completeness of Iraq’s FFCD (Full, Final and Complete 
Declaration) is questionable. No information is publicly available on 
this report.
       The completeness of Iraq’s report on the technical achievements 
of its weaponization program is unknown. No information is publicly 
available on this report.
       Many documents seized by Iraq during the "parking lot stand-off" 
in September 1991 were never returned to the IAEA and remain unaccounted 
for, including key centrifuge documents.
        It is not publicly known whether all the documents from the 
Haider House cache have been translated and fully analyzed.
Iraqi Concealment Activities
         Iraq now officially denies that a governmental committee to 
minimize impact of NPT violations ever existed, even though Iraq itself 
first revealed the committee to the IAEA.
          Reports on Iraqi nuclear team’s interactions with IAEA 
inspectors are incomplete.
          It is not publicly known whether Iraq’s report on their 
post-war concealment activities has been completed and reviewed.
          Iraq has not enacted a criminal law to punish violations of UN 
resolutions.
Post-war Nuclear Program Activities
         Conversion of former weapons program facilities has not been 
fully documented.
         Documentation of ongoing activities at former weapons 
facilities remains incomplete.
         Information is inconsistent on the date of termination of 
weapons activity at the Al Atheer weapons facility.
          No evidence of any Iraqi decree to halt the nuclear weapons 
program.
          Extent of Iraq’s post-war foreign procurement network has not 
been documented.
NCI's report, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues," is 
available on the web at http://www.nci.org/nci/sadb.htm  Documentation 
from IAEA reports on unresolved issues may be found at
http://www.nci.org/nci/iraq511.htm

V. D ALBRIGHT & K O'NEILL, "IRAQ: RESETTLE THE SCIENTISTS" 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jan-Feb 1998
Iraq: Resettle the Scientists
By David Albright & Kevin O'Neill
   Last November, almost seven years after the end of the Persian Gulf 
War, Saddam Hussein demonstrated yet again that he cannot be trusted to 
honor Iraq's commitment to abandon weapons of mass destruction.
    The harsh economic sanctions and other punitive measures imposed by 
the U.N. Security Council after the war have failed to change the nature 
of the regime despite the suffering they caused the Iraqi people. Saddam 
Hussein is likely to restart his nuclear weapons program as soon as  
sanctions are lifted and his agents could more easily obtain banned 
items for a new  more secretive nuclear program.
    The Security Council has constructed a powerful set of  measures 
including economic sanctions, the destruction of Iraq s nuclear weapons 
assets and capabilities, and the world s most intrusive monitoring and 
inspection system, which is operated by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the U..N. Special Commission.  With years of valuable 
experience before the war, however, Iraq's nuclear weapons experts are 
another valuable and necessary asset.
   Although inspections have been improved, they are unlikely to be 
adequate to successfully monitor the activities of those scientists 
involved in the pre-Gulf war nuclear program.  In particular, monitoring 
is not sufficient to learn if these scientists are putting together a 
new, more secretive program that is explicitly designed to exploit the  
Action Team's weaknesses.  Under some scenarios, Iraq might be able to 
construct a nuclear explosive before it was detected.
   If the Security Council forced Saddam to allow his cadre of 
knowledgeable nuclear weapons scientists and their families to leave the 
country, if they so wanted, Iraq would be unable to reconstitute  its 
nuclear program.  To  enforce such a move, the Security  Council would 
have to punish Iraq if it retaliated against its experts, their 
immediate families, or relatives that remained in Iraq.  Possible UN 
reactions would include a refusal to remove sanctions or to reimpose any 
sanctions that might have been lifted.
   Would any nuclear scientists leave Iraq voluntarily? Probably.    
There is growing recognition that many of Iraq's nuclear experts are 
essentially prisoners.  Most were arbitrarily assigned to the nuclear 
weapons  program after returning from school abroad. After suffering 
years of hardships created by the sanctions, many scientists and their 
families may be eager to leave.
   The vast majority of these exports have been identified through 
captured Iraqi documents and Action Team inspections.  And the 
resettlement of even a few dozen devastate Saddam's ability to rebuild 
his nuclear weapons program.
   A key to success would be the protection of the scientists and their 
families.  The United States might be a possible resettlement site 
because it could provide adequate protection against Iraqi agents.  The 
Security Council would also the need to mandate the Action Team and the 
Special Commission with the task of investigating any suspected 
retaliation against family members remaining in Iraq.
   Resettled scientists would need to be provided with economic support 
until they found employment.  But the costs of resettlement could be 
collected from Iraq, just as the costs of the Action Team and the 
Special Commission  are taken from the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales.
   For their part, the resettled scientists would have to agree to have 
their activities monitored by the host government or the Action Team, to 
insure that they were not secretly helping Saddam rebuild his military 
programs. 
   Time is running out.  But a resettlement initiative could nip any 
future Iraqi nuclear program in the bud.  Such an initiative is a 
reasonable price for Iraq to pay to have sanctions eased.  The 
alternative is letting the nuclear cadre, intimidated by Saddam, remain 
in Iraq, awaiting the inevitable order to reconstitute the nuclear 
warpons program or to train the next generation of nuclear weapons 
experts. 
David Albright, a physicist, is the president of the Institute for 
Science and International Security (ISIS), in Washington DC.  Kevin 
O'Neill is deputy director of ISIS.  

VI. NEWS FROM THE FREE IRAQ CAMPAIGN
May 14th 1998                                   Los Angeles, California, 
USA
***** FREE IRAQ CAMPAIGN PRESS RELEASE *****
Our Iraqi-American grass roots effort has build up an enormous momentum 
over the last several weeks.  Today, over 75 Iraqi-Americans are 
involved daily in organizing one aspect of this campaign or another.  
This nation-wide activity has won endorsements from an array of seasoned 
Iraqi-American organizations, listed alphabetically below:
     Assyrian National Alliance, Chicago, IL     
     Canadian Iraqi Community Relief Fund, ONT
     Independent Iraqi Group of North America, Toronto, ONT
     Iraqi American Committee, Los Angeles, CA
     Iraqi Democratic Union, CA, AZ, MI
     Iraqi Forum for Democracy, Nashville, TN
     Iraq Foundation, Washington, DC
     Iraqi Turkoman Association of Toronto, ONT
     Kurdish National Congress of North America
     Muslim Public Affairs Council, Los Angeles, CA
   The "bus tour", as its dubbed inside our community, is on schedule to 
hold the first rally in San Jose, California on Saturday, May 23rd.  
Attendance at these rallies varies from as little as 50 in some 
locations to as high as 300 in San Diego, 400 in Phoenix, 700 in Detroit 
and over 1,000 in Lafayette Park (across from the White House).  Convoys 
of cars will be following the bus from Detroit, Boston, Cleveland and 
New York all the way to Washington, DC.
    During these rallies, Iraqi refugees who participated in the 
short-lived March 1991 popular revolt will be giving witness accounts of 
the atrocities committed inside Iraq as directed by Saddam Hussein.
    Members of the press may be scheduled to Be on the bus for short 
periods of this 3,500 mile journey.  The locations for these rallies 
have been selected and can be found on the Free Iraq Campaign web site 
at:
http://www.iraq.net/Editorials/FreeIraq.html  which is maintaIned daily.
   For more information, please contact:  Mr. Nibras Kazimi at 
nibrask@mediaone.net  
Tel. (508) 641-0443; Fax. (617) 876-0839
Yours Truly,
Mazin Yousif,
Free Iraq Campaign Manager
marka@broadcom.com
Tel. (714) 725-9719; Fax (714) 725-0440