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UNITED NATIONS UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION The Executive Chairman 22 July 1998 His Excellency Mr. Sergey V. Lavrov President of the Security Council United Nations Excellency, I write to inform you, and through you, the members of the Security Council of an incident which occurred during a recent inspection. On Saturday 18 July an inspection team (UNSCOM 244) led by Ms. Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack sought to inspect the headquarters of the Iraqi Air Force. This team's mission was to seek information and, in particular, documentation to assist in verifying the disposition of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programme. UNSCOM 244 had been proceeding relatively smoothly and Iraq had provided the necessary access at previous sites. At this particular site Iraq declared it to be sensitive. The expanded modalities for inspection of sensitive sites were then employed. During the inspection, the operations room of the Operations Command of the Iraqi Air Force was declared especially sensitive by Iraq. Only the Chief Inspector, one other inspector and an interpreter, were admitted. In this room, they examined a safe containing a number of files. One of the files contained a listing of munitions expended by the Iraqi Air Force. On examination, it became evident that, together with the conventional munitions detailed, four particular types of other munitions were included. They were denoted as "special." Those types have been dec1ared by Iraq to have been used for chemical and biological warfare agent delivery. Obtaining a verifiable material balance of such non-conventional munitions has been a high priority of the Commission. In this context, Iraq has repeatedly denied the existence of any documents on this subject. In fact, in its October 1997 report to the Security Council (see table on page 11 of S/1997/774 dated 6 October 1997), the Commission indicated that more than l00,000 filled special munitions consumed in the time-frame 1981-1988, remained unaccounted for. No documents or information on the consumption of such munitions has been provided by Iraq. The Chief Inspector initially decided that, rather than taking possession of the document, a copy would be made. The senior Iraqi representative present agreed that the document could be copied. He later changed his mind, saying that the Commission's inspectors could only take notes or copy the document with certain sections blacked-out. This was unacceptable to the Chief Inspector who explained that the Commission had the right, in accordance with Council resolutions and the Plan for Ongoing Monitoring and Verification to examine, copy or remove any record, data, information or documentation relevant to its activities. The Iraqi representative then seized the document from the Chief Inspector and said that the team could not view the documents further. The Chief Inspector protested Iraq's decision and informed me of the events. I was subsequently telephoned by Gen. Amer Rashid, Minister of Oil. While not prejudicing the Commission's rights as laid down by the Counci1, I agreed to Gen. Rashid's proposal that the document in question could be jointly sealed by UNSCOM and Iraq and stored in the custody of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, pending my visit to Baghdad (2 August - 5 August) when it could be reviewed by me and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz. Iraq's actions are in contravention of the Commission's fundamental right to examine, to determine the relevance of and to remove any document. As you are aware, resolution 707 (1991), paragraph 3 (ii) "demands that Iraq allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their inspection teams immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect." In addition, the Commission's Plan for Ongoing Monitoring and Verification, endorsed by resolution 715 (1991) (S/22871 Rev. 1), makes clear in paragraphs 2 (e) and 5 (a) of Annex I that the Commission has the right to secure full and free access at any time to material and other items, including documentation which, in its judgement, may be necessary for its monitoring and verification activities and also has the right to request, receive, examine, copy and remove any record, data, information or documentation. These rights which have been reaffirmed in resolutions 1115 and 1134 (1997)) and Iraq's corresponding obligations must be maintained. This is important not only for the Commission's disarmament activities, but also if ongoing monitoring and verification is to be effective and the Council can have confidence that Iraq is fulfilling its obligations. This incident, to which only a temporary solution has been found, demonstrates the importance of inspections especially in circumstances in which Iraq's claims are false and/or unable to be verified and, the crucial nature of the rights the Council has assigned to UNSCOM. I intend to recall those rights to the Government of Iraq during my forthcoming visit and request again, that relevant documents, including the one presently at issue, be provided to the Commission. I will keep the Council informed of the outcome in this matter. Finally, the provision of documents remains the most important step Iraq can take to speed the completion of the necessary disarmament tasks. The incident of 18 July was consistent with the point I made to the Council on 24 June to the effect that UNSCOM is convinced that highly relevant documents continue to exist in Iraq, in the possession of the Government of Iraq. Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. Richard Butler [signed]