The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
I. UNSCOM REPORT, OCT 6
II. IAEA REPORT, OCT 6
III. IAEA REPORT IGNORES EVIDENCE OF IRAQI A-BOMB COMPONENTS, NCI, OCT 8
IV. US, UK, UNSC FAIL TO ACT ON UNSCOM, IAEA REPORTS, USIS, OCT 13
V. TARIQ AZIZ FEELING HIS OATS, AL QUDS AL ARABI, OCT 15
This is the 72nd day without weapons inspections in Iraq.
SIPRI has published an UNSCOM factsheet. It is at:
http://www.sipri.se/pubs/Factsheet/unscom.html
On Oct 6 UNSCOM and the IAEA presented their semi-annual reports to
the UNSC, which discussed the reports Oct 13.
As usual, the UNSCOM report was a series of horrors. On BW the report
said, "A team of biological weapons (BW) experts from a number of States
and the Commission travelled to Baghdad in late July to assess (for the
fourth time in 18 months), Iraq's biological Full, Final and Complete
Disclosure (FFCD). . . . Iraq did not submit new information . . . None
of the components of the material balance could be verified. These
included BW munitions, bulk BW agent production, and microbiological
growth media. . . .
"The Commission has not been able to verify the BW missile warheads
material balance. . . One week after the end of the July meeting, a
senior Iraqi official stated that instead of the declared 5 anthrax and
16 botulinum toxin missile warheads, there had been in fact 16 anthrax
and 5 botulinum toxin missile warheads filled. . . . Iraq did not
present any supporting documents or other specific evidence to
substantiate the new statement. This new explanation contradicted all
accounts of the unilateral destruction of special warheads, including
those filled with biological warfare agents, that had been provided for
the previous three years by Iraqi personnel directly involved in warhead
filling and destruction activities. . .
"The development of the drop-tank for dissemination of BW agents
appears to have been pursued with the utmost vigour by Iraq. The team
of international experts assessed that the account in the FFCD of the
drop tank project could not be verified.
"Aerosol generators for BW agents were developed by Iraq by
modification of helicopter-borne commercial chemical insecticide
disseminators. A document was submitted by Iraq that reports the
successful testing of such devices in August 1988. Iraq did not account
for the final disposition of the devices produced . . .
"The international expert team at the July 1998 meeting concluded that
Iraq's FFCD, in its totality, cannot be verified. The team recommended
that no further verification of Iraq's current biological weapons FFCD
be conducted at the senior international expert level, until Iraq
commits itself to provide substantive, new information."
On Missiles, the report said, "Iraq refused to discuss the issue of
proscribed liquid missile propellant and did not respond positively to
the Commission's requests for access to specific documents that would
facilitate the completion of the verification of outstanding missile
disarmament issues . . . No remnants of indigenous missiles or their
engines have been recovered by the Commission at the declared
destruction sites. . . Due to the methods used by Iraq in its unilateral
destruction and the incompleteness of destruction inventories provided
by Iraq, the establishment of even a rough material balance of
proscribed guidance and control components may not be able to be
achieved."
On CW, the report said, "Iraq declared that 550 shells filled with
mustard had been lost shortly after the Gulf War. To date, no evidence
of the missing munitions has been found. A dozen mustard-filled shells
were recovered at a former CW storage facility in the period 1997-98.
After 7 years, the purity of mustard ranged between 94 and 97%.
"Among 1,500 R-400 bombs produced by Iraq, more than 1,000 bombs were
declared as destroyed unilaterally by Iraq, including 157 bombs stated
as filled with biological warfare agents. The accounting for about 500
bombs unilaterally destroyed was not possible due to the state and
extent of destruction. . . .
"According to Iraq, 3.9 tonnes of VX were produced, in total-some 2.4
tonnes in 1998, the remainder in 1990. Iraq provided documents on the
1988 production, but it did not provide sufficient verifiable evidence
on the status of its 1990 production. . . . In addition, Iraq denies
that it weaponized VX. Sampling by the Commission of special warheads
has thrown significant doubt upon this claim. . . . In September 1998,
the Commission held an international expert meeting with the
participation of specialists from laboratories involved in the analysis
of [the Iraqi missile residue] samples. In addition, experts from
China, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom attended this
meeting. All analytical results available to date [including the US VX
findings] were considered valid by the assembled experts.
On Monitoring, the report said, "Prior to 5 August 1998, monitoring
activities were conducted without major incident. Iraq's decision of 5
August specifically stated that monitoring activities according to the
requirements of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) would continue.
This statement, per se, should not place any restrictions on the
Commission's ability to conduct monitoring activities at any site
throughout Iraq. In fact, this is not the case. Iraq's authorities
made it clear that 'Capable Site inspections' (i.e. a site that the
Commission seeks to confirm does not possess undeclared dual-use
capabilities)would not be permitted to continue as such inspections were
considered by Iraq to be potentially related to the disarmament phase of
the Commission's work. This position was demonstrated when, on 23
September, a monitoring team attempted an inspection of an undeclared
facility deemed to be a 'capable' site and was blocked."
Reuters, Oct 13, reported that "The International Atomic Energy
Agency said Tuesday that Iraq's nuclear file could be shifted from
intrusive inspections to long-term monitoring once Baghdad cooperates
with UN arms experts again. This in effect would 'close' the active
nuclear dossier."
The Nuclear Control Institute described the IAEA report as
"schizophrenic." As Paul Leventhal, NCI president, explained, "This is
the most embarrassing and indefensible of the IAEA reports on Iraq . . .
Its suggestion that the Security Council can consider closing the
nuclear file is insupportable in light of intelligence that Iraq
possesses components for three or four nuclear bombs, lacking only the
fissile material to complete the weapons. It's like putting a convicted
felon up for parole who's packing a gun that lacks only bullets."
The NYT, Oct 14, described the UNSC response to the UNSCOM/IAEA
reports in an article entitled, "UN Cajoles Iraq to Cooperate on
Weapons." Cajoles? The UNSC's only official response seems to have
been what USIS, Oct 13, described as "an informal press statement" by
UNSC President, UK amb. Jeremy Greenstock. Greenstock said that "in the
light of these reports, members of the council look to Iraq to take the
decision to resume full cooperation. . . . On the IAEA report, members
of the council noted that the report stated that should Iraq recommence
full cooperation with the IAEA, there would be no impediment to the full
implementation of the IAEA's plan for ongoing monitoring and
verification which must be comprehensive and intrusive. . . On the
UNSCOM report, members of the council focused on the need for Iraq to
return to full cooperation if forward progress was to be made. . . . On
the chemical weapons and missile files, members of the council felt
there were not many items still to be resolved if that cooperation was
forthcoming. They noted that on the biological weapons file, rather
more work was needed which depended crucially on full disclosure by
Iraq, including information on biological weapons which they already say
they have."
US ambassador Peter Burleigh called on Iraq "to come back into
compliance right away." He also said that "the United States has been
'alarmed by many of the aspects of the Iraq [weapons of mass
destruction] program for years and we continue to be deeply concerned
about them.'" So why doesn't the US do anything? Burleigh also said,
"What we want to find out is whether Iraq has any more weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq that it can use and therefore continue to be a
threat to its neighbors This is . . . our core question." Why should
any reasonable person doubt that? And he continued "a second concern is
whether Iraq 'is still actively pursuing a program of developing weapons
of mass destruction.'" Despite this, all that seems to be happening is
that Annan's envoy, Prakash Shah, returned to Baghdad yesterday for more
talks.
The Iraqis are strutting. As the London-based, pro-Iraqi, Al Quds Al
Arabi, Oct 15, wrote, "Tariq Aziz expressed strong optimism about a
Security Council comprehensive review within two months, according to
the UN Secretary General, for lifting sanctions and he indicated that
American deception against Iraq is now collapsing in international fora
with the support of the French and other Europeans. Tariq Aziz said
this at a dinner in Amman hosted by former Jordanian Prime Minister,
Tahir Al Masri, and attended by pro-Iraqi personalities, such as Muthir
Badran, the former prime minister. During this dinner, Aziz said that
the sentiment in the Security Council is clearly in Iraq's favor. . .
Kofi Annan has a real initiative to cooperate with Iraq. He made
promises about the comprehensive review and we have confidence in his
ability to live up to his promises. Annan has put forth a special
agenda. He wants to make the work of UNSCOM credible and he wants to
remove any accusation that they have a political motivation by some
countries with influence in the Security Council. . . .
"During the discussion, Aziz revealed that there are strong efforts
being undertaken by his government to come to terms with the Kurdish
groups in the North. . . . Aziz said that the American administration
planned to make the Kurdish area in the North a base for the collection
of opposition forces and the activity of so-called opposition groups,
which aimed to bring down the regime. But these plans will not succeed
because the calculations of the Kurds are different. . . He also
revealed that there are contacts now with Turkish leaders to outflank
the reconciliation plan between Talabani and Barzani. . . .
"Aziz then deprecated the American long term plan which is backed by
the law to finance a plan to overthrow the regime [ED: "The Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998"]. . . The regime is much stronger than what
those misguided people think in the American State Department and all
those who claim that they are concerned about Iraq's future and national
interest. He said that Baghdad has its special plans to respond to the
jabs, which do not go beyond being worthless attempts from
oppositionists who receive instructions from the American apparatus.
And he added that the world now is more convinced there is no value in
threatening to overthrow the Iraqi regime from outside and more
convinced that the economic embargo has lost its justification."
I. UNSCOM REPORT
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/981008.htm
II. IAEA REPORT
http://www.nci.org/sadb.htm
III. US, UK, UNSC FAIL TO ACT ON UNSCOM, IAEA REPORTS
Nuclear Control Institute
Thursday, October 8, 1998
CONTACT: STEVEN DOLLEY
202-822-8444
'SCHIZOPHRENIC' IAEA REPORT IGNORES EVIDENCE OF IRAQI A-BOMB COMPONENTS
A new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) not
only ignores intelligence that Iraq possesses nuclear-bomb components,
but downplays the significance of Iraq's weapons- inspection ban, and
fuels efforts in the Security Council to "close" the Iraqi nuclear file,
the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) warned today.
"The IAEA report is schizophrenic," said Paul Leventhal, NCI
president. "First, it describes the lack of Iraqi cooperation and the
major gaps in IAEA's information on Iraq's weaponization program. Then
it concludes that 'it is the Security Council's prerogative to decide
whether Iraq has complied with its obligations.' Finally, the IAEA
advises the Security Council that, 'should it do so, the decision would
not change either the comprehensive or intrusive nature of the IAEA's
verification activities in Iraq.'"
"This is the most embarrassing and indefensible of the IAEA reports
on Iraq," Leventhal said. "Its suggestion that the Security Council can
consider closing the nuclear file is insupportable in light of
intelligence that Iraq possesses components for three or four nuclear
bombs, lacking only the fissile material to complete the weapons. It's
like putting a convicted felon up for parole who's packing a gun that
lacks only bullets."
Scott Ritter, former head of the UN Special Commission's effort to
unmask Iraq's concealment program, revealed UNSCOM's intelligence on the
nuclear components in Congressional testimony last month. U.S.
government experts have acknowledged the existence and the plausibility
of the report. IAEA Action Team head Gary Dillon and UNSCOM chief
Richard Butler last week publicly denied knowing of the UNSCOM
intelligence---"a position they know privately to be false," said
Leventhal.
"This craven effort by the IAEA and UNSCOM to discredit Major
Ritter---after he served them bravely and faithfully for seven
years---is the most repugnant aspect of this whole sordid story," added
Leventhal.
The IAEA report states that Iraq's suspension of inspections on August
5 "included instructions to Iraqi personnel not to respond to any
questions relating to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme." As a
result, "the IAEA is currently unable to investigate further any aspects
of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme or to ensure...that prohibited
activities are not being carried out in Iraq..." These questions include
such matters as "documentary evidence of Iraq's actual technical
achievements in nuclear weapons design and centrifuge development..."
The IAEA report also warns that "Iraq has the knowledge and technical
expertise to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant
materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future."
Reports by NCI research director Steven Dolley, issued in February
and May, assessed the significance of these unanswered questions. "The
significance remains the same," Leventhal said. "The nuclear threat in
Iraq is real, but the IAEA is sadly incapable of acknowledging it." The
IAEA's latest report, NCI's reports, and other information on Iraq's
nuclear weapons program can be found on the NCI web site at
http://www.nci.org/sadb.htm.
IV. US, UK, UNSC FAIL TO ACT ON UNSCOM, IAEA REPORTS
USIS, 13 October 1998
UNSC Calls on Iraq to Resume Cooperation with Weapons Inspectors
(Security Council notes progress before August decision)
By Judy Aita
USIA United Nations Correspondent
United Nations -- Noting that work was near completion on its chemical
and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs before Iraq ended
cooperation with the United Nations, the Security Council October 13
urged Baghdad to resume cooperation with UN weapons inspectors.
After reviewing the six-month reports of the UN Special Commission
overseeing the destruction of Iraqi weapons (UNSCOM) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the council said that "in the
light of these reports, members of the council look to Iraq to take the
decision to resume full cooperation."
Council President Jeremy Greenstock of Great Britain said that on
"the IAEA report, members of the council noted that the report stated
that should Iraq recommence full cooperation with the IAEA, there would
be no impediment to the full implementation of the IAEA's plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification which must be comprehensive and
intrusive."
"On the UNSCOM report, members of the council focused on the need for
Iraq to return to full cooperation if forward progress was to be made,"
Greenstock said in an informal press statement.
"On the chemical weapons and missile files, members of the council
felt there were not many items still to be resolved if that cooperation
was forthcoming. They noted that on the biological weapons file, rather
more work was needed which depended crucially on full disclosure by
Iraq, including information on biological weapons which they already say
they have," the council president said.
The council's statement echoed the reports of progress made by UNSCOM
and IAEA on certain categories of weapons before Iraq's August 5
decision to end cooperation with the two agencies and demand that the
council declare Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction and end
sanctions. The two agencies said that in the areas of nuclear weapons,
ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, with a little more data from
Baghdad, they were about ready to move to less intrusive inspections and
long-term monitoring.
US Ambassador Peter Burleigh called on Iraq "to come back into
compliance right away."
"That's the next step that is required here," Burleigh said.
The ambassador added that the United States "very much appreciates
the work that IAEA and UNSCOM do in Iraq under very difficult
circumstances. We call on Iraq to come back into cooperation immediately
with both agencies. They can't do their work properly under current
circumstances."
Both agencies "reported declining confidence in the level of what
they can report about Iraq in all their programs of mass destruction,"
he noted.
The United States has been "alarmed by many of the aspects of the
Iraqi (weapons of mass destruction) program for years and we continue to
be deeply concerned about them," the ambassador said. That includes
getting the full information on Iraq's VX nerve agent and anthrax
production and an accurate count on the number of ballistic missiles
Iraq had and destroyed.
"What we want to find out is whether Iraq has any more weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq that it can use and therefore continue to be a
threat to its neighbors. This is ... our core question," he said.
A second concern is whether Iraq "is still actively pursuing a
program of developing weapons of mass destruction," Burleigh said.
The ambassador said that the position of the United States, as well
as the other members of the council, on the nuclear files (which are
IAEA's responsibility) has not changed since May.
He noted that the council is "ready actively to consider a resolution
that would authorize a transition (to long-term monitoring)."
"Iraq has to answer three remaining questions and concerns of the
IAEA and also pass the penal legislation that is required by IAEA. Iraq
hasn't done any of that," Burleigh said. "... there is no new
information that has been provided by the government of Iraq in the
six-month period."
UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler has scheduled a technical
experts meeting for October 22 and 23 to go over the results of tests on
missile fragments for VX nerve agents from laboratories in the United
States, France and Switzerland.
IAEA Executive Director Mohamed Al Baradei said that IAEA has "no
indication that Iraq has nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons usable
material or the capability to produce such items."
"These, we believe, are credible assurances but not absolute
assurances. As we have always said, we cannot give any absolute
assurances with regard to any country and therefore we must continue to
do on-going monitoring and verification in Iraq and the system must be
vigorous and comprehensive," El Baradei told journalists after his
private meeting with the council.
Since Iraq suspended cooperation in August, IAEA has been limited to
monitoring "declared nuclear activities, which deprives the system of
very important search and detection capability," he said.
However, the IAEA director noted that Iraq's nuclear file "will never
be closed."
"We can say we have seen as much as we can see from the clandestine
program and we are ready to focus most of our resources on the ongoing
monitoring and verification, but that does not exclude our right at any
time in the future to go back in case we see anything," El Baradei said.
The remaining questions IAEA wants clarified are: the extent of
external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, the timing
and modalities of the abandonment of the nuclear weapons program, and
how much Iraq achieved in organizing its program. The agency also wants
some additional drawings to better understand the degree of
weaponization.
V. TARIQ AZIZ FEELING HIS OATS
Al Quds Al Arabi
October 15, 1998
The Balance is Tilting Toward Us in the Security Council and the new
Kurdish reconciliation will not Stand
For the first time, Iraq considers that it has a real chance to
persuade the Security Council that there is a plot for political reasons
to maintain the embargo on the Iraqi people. Tariq Aziz expressed
strong optimism about a Security Council comprehensive review within two
months, according to the UN Secretary General, for lifting sanctions,
and he indicated that American deception against Iraq is now collapsing
in international fora with the support of the French and other
Europeans.
Tariq Aziz said this at a dinner in Amman, hosted by former Jordanian
Prime Minister, Tahir al Masri. and attended by pro-Iraqi personalities,
such as Muthir Badran, the former prime minister. During this dinner,
Aziz said that the sentiment in the Security Council is clearly in favor
of Iraq, now especially after the French and Swiss tests put the lie to
American claims that Iraq posses VX and exposed the political aims
behind the maintenance of the embargo. The exposure of Israel's links
to some of the inspectors made the credibility of the inspectors a
matter of controversy. And the French and Swiss labs showed no traces
whatsoever of VX.
Aziz added that Kofi Annan has a real initiative to cooperate with
Iraq. He made promises about the comprehensive review and we have
confidence in his ability to live up to his promises. Annan has put
forth a special agenda. He wants to make the work of UNSCOM credible
and he wants to remove any accusation that they have a political
motivation by some countries with influence in the Security Council.
Aziz revealed that the Security Council will meet again in ten days
to listen to two reports. The first will be presented by the Iraqi
government in listing its achievements in complying with the
international obligations and the second will be from UNSCOM. And Aziz
revealed that Kofi Annan has decided for the first time to listen to
testimony from "neutral experts," when he studies the reports from
UNSCOM.
During the discussion, Aziz revealed that there are strong efforts
being undertaken by his government to come to terms with the Kurdish
groups in the North to foil American attempts which are directed towards
embroiling the Kurds in a new confrontation with the government in
Baghdad. Aziz said that the American administration planned to make the
Kurdish area in the North a base for the collection of opposition forces
and the activity of so-called opposition groups, which aim to bring down
the regime. But these plans will not succeed because the calculations
of the Kurds are different.
Aziz considered that Baghdad is able to foil the American conspiracy
with regard to the Kurds. He explained that the relations between the
government and the Kurds in the North continues to be good. And he also
revealed that there are contacts now with Turkish leaders to outflank
the reconciliation plan between Talabani and Barzani. He considered
that the reconciliation between the two under US auspices will not work
and will not succeed in bringing about a confrontation between the
government and the Kurds. And he said that this agreement will not
stand.
He said also that the time is now opportune to begin political
contacts aimed at reform with some patriotic, independent and clean
personalities, inside and outside Iraq. We have made contacts with
these people and we will have more contacts. We are drafting a new law
toward a multi-party system and there is a vision for internal political
reforms which will open up the system, even if some details are still
under study.
He also said we are very interested in dismantling the embargo and
showing the world that it has exceeded its limit. This matter may make
us neglect the internal situation. However, dialogue with some
personalities is in the cards and it will continue. There are serious
initiatives toward reform and the discussion of the internal political
situation. However, the possibility of developing the steps toward
internal opening and putting dialogue within a framework requires deeper
thought, because we are interested in studying the possibility of taking
these steps while the embargo is still on.
Aziz then deprecated the American long term plan which is backed by
the law to finance a plan to overthrow the regime [ED "The Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998"]. He said the Iraqi people have constantly
faced such conspiracies and they can confront them. He added that the
regime is much stronger than what those misguided people think in the
American State Department and all those who claim that they are
concerned about Iraq's future and national interest.
He said that Baghdad has its special plans to respond to the jabs,
which do not go beyond being worthless attempts from oppositionists who
receive instructions from the American apparatus. And he added that the
world now is more convinced there is no value in threatening to
overthrow the Iraqi regime from outside and more convinced that the
economic embargo has lost its justification. . . .