DATE=11/21/98 TYPE=ON THE LINE NUMBER=1-00689 SHORT # 1 TITLE= WILL SADDAM COMPLY? EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037 CONTENT= INSERTS AVAILABLE FROM AUDIO SERVICES THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE ANNCR: ON THE LINE -- A DISCUSSION OF UNITED STATES POLICIES AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES. THIS WEEK, "WILL SADDAM COMPLY?" HERE IS YOUR HOST, ROBERT REILLY. HOST: HELLO AND WELCOME TO ON THE LINE. THIS MONTH, UNDER THREAT OF IMMINENT MILITARY ATTACK, IRAQI DICTATOR SADDAM HUSSEIN AGREED TO ALLOW WEAPONS INSPECTORS TO RESUME THEIR WORK. EARLIER, IRAQ HAD ENDED ALL COOPERATION WITH UNITED NATIONS WEAPONS INSPECTORS. THE U-N MONITORING PROGRAMS HAD BEEN PUT IN PLACE AT THE END OF THE 1991 GULF WAR TO INSURE THAT IRAQ COULD NOT REBUILD ITS BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES. PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON SAID THAT "THE WORLD IS WATCHING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO SEE IF HE FOLLOWS THE WORDS HE UTTERED WITH DEEDS. OUR FORCES REMAIN STRONG AND READY IF HE DOES NOT." JOINING ME TODAY TO DISCUSS IRAQ AND U.S. POLICY ARE THREE EXPERTS. ZALMAY KHALILZAD IS DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE PROGRAM AT THE RAND CORPORATION AND FORMER ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE. MICHAEL EISENSTADT IS SENIOR FELLOW AT THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY; AND JOSHUA MURAVCHIK IS RESIDENT SCHOLAR AT THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE. WELCOME TO THE PROGRAM. MR. KHALILZAD, BOTH SIDES HAVE DECLARED VICTORY IN THIS MOST RECENT ENCOUNTER. WHO WON? KHALILZAD: IT'S NOT SURPRISING THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE DECLARED VICTORY. IN MY JUDGMENT, THERE WAS NO CLEAR VICTOR, ALTHOUGH I THINK SADDAM DID BETTER THAN WE DID BECAUSE HE DID MANAGE NOT TO COOPERATE WITH THE U-N INSPECTORS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. HE MANAGED TO FORCE US TO SPEND A GREAT DEAL OF RESOURCES AND, IN FACT, OUR MILITARY READINESS BY DEPLOYING FORCES TO THE AREA. AND AT THE END HE GAVE US ENOUGH NOT TO ATTACK HIM. YET, HE HAS GIVEN US PROMISES THAT HE HAS GIVEN BEFORE, WITH NO REAL PROSPECTS THAT HE WOULD HONOR THEM. SO, WE'VE PAID MORE OF A PRICE THAN HE DID AT THE END OF THE DAY. SO, BECAUSE OF THAT I THINK HE'S COME OFF SOMEWHAT BETTER THAN WE DID. BUT NO GREAT VICTORS OR VANQUISHED IN THIS LATEST ROUND. HOST: MICHAEL EISENSTADT, WHAT'S YOUR ANSWER TO THAT? EISENSTADT: I WOULD SAY IF THERE WAS A VICTORY FOR THE UNITED STATES IT WAS A HOLLOW VICTORY. SADDAM WAS ABLE TO ONCE AGAIN ENGAGE IN OBSTRUCTION WITHOUT PAYING A PRICE. WE MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY WHERE WE HAD BROAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION. WE DID NOT. WE DID NOT ENGAGE IN MILITARY ACTION. WE MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY THERE. IF WE WANT TO KEEP THE INSPECTORS IN IRAQ, IF WE WANT THE INSPECTORS TO BE ABLE TO SUCCEED IN THEIR MISSION, WE CANNOT DO THAT UNLESS WE ARE WILLING TO USE FORCE. HOST: WHAT WOULD THE CONSEQUENCES HAVE BEEN WERE THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE USED MILITARY FORCE AFTER A CLEAR OFFER FROM IRAQ TO FULLY COMPLY? EISENSTADT: I THINK THAT GIVEN THE LATE DATE OF THE OFFER, GIVEN THE FACT THAT IT WAS AT THE LAST MINUTE AND THE ATTACK ALREADY WAS IN TRAIN, I THINK WE COULD HAVE COMMENCED OPERATIONS, CONTINUED THEM FOR A DAY OR TWO WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING OVER THE TERMS OF THE DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT. AND WHY NOT NEGOTIATE WHILE BOMBING? THAT WAY WE WOULD STILL GET THE SAME AGREEMENT THAT WE GOT OUT OF THIS WHOLE CONFRONTATION AND YET SADDAM WOULD HAVE BEEN FORCED TO PAY A PRICE. IF WE USED FORCE, THERE WOULD BE A GREATER DISINCENTIVE FOR HIM TO CHALLENGE US SOON. NOW, BECAUSE HE DID NOT PAY A PRICE, I THINK THE CHALLENGE WILL COME SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, THAN IF WE HAD USED FORCE. HOST: JOSHUA MURAVCHIK? MURAVCHIK: WE'VE GOT OURSELVES IN A TERRIBLE BIND ON THIS BUSINESS OF USING THREATS TO RESTORE INSPECTIONS. WE ALREADY GAVE UP MEANINGFUL INSPECTIONS WHEN WE AGREED TO KOFI ANNAN'S DEAL BACK IN FEBRUARY. AND AT NO POINT IN THIS CURRENT CRISIS DID THE ADMINISTRATION SUGGEST UNDOING THAT. BUT THAT AGREEMENT ITSELF PUTS MORE THAN A THOUSAND BUILDINGS IN THE SO-CALLED PRESIDENTIAL SITES OFF LIMITS FOR THE KIND OF CONFRONTATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS BY THE INSPECTORS THAT ARE THE ONLY KIND THAT ARE LIKELY TO DISCOVER WHAT IS GOING ON THERE. HOST: BUT LET ME ASK YOU: IF YOU SAID THAT THE INSPECTION REGIME AFTER FEBRUARY WAS INEFFECTIVE, WHY WAS SADDAM HUSSEIN SO INTERESTED IN ENDING IT? MURAVCHIK: HE WANTS TO CONTINUE ROLLING IT BACK TO ZERO. THE NATURE OF THE WAY HE PLAYS THE GAME IS THAT HE PUSHES FOR EVERYTHING HE GETS. AND THEN HE'S VERY ADEPT AT PULLING BACK A LITTLE BIT AT THE LAST MOMENT ONCE HE'S TESTED THE LIMIT. BUT BY DOING THIS OVER THE COURSE OF SEVEN YEARS, HE'S PROGRESSIVELY WEAKENED THE INSPECTION REGIME. HOST: SUPPOSEDLY, ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, IRAQ HAS AGREED TO UNFETTERED AND UNRESTRICTED INSPECTIONS. IS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING, ZALMAY KHALILZAD? AND IF SO, ARE THE INSPECTIONS BY THE U-N SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ A SUFFICIENT TOOL TO, AS THEY SAY, KEEP SADDAM IN THE BOX AT LEAST AS FAR AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE CONCERNED? KHALILZAD: OF COURSE HE HAS AGREED TO INSPECTIONS, UNFETTERED INSPECTIONS. BUT THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT HE'S DONE IT. HE'S DONE THIS REPEATEDLY AND HE HAS NOT HONORED THEM. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS WILLING TO COME CLEAN IN TERMS OF HIS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. HIS AIM IS TO ERODE OUR RESOLVE AND TO IMPOSE COSTS ON US SO THAT HE ULTIMATELY WILL CONFRONT US WITH EITHER GOING TO WAR OR TO ACQUIESCE TO HIS POSSESSION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. CLEARLY, HIS PREFERENCES ARE ACQUIESCENCE. I THINK THE ONLY PROSPECTS FOR IRAQ COMING CLEAN IN TERMS OF ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IS IF THERE IS A REGIME IN IRAQ THAT HAS NO INTEREST IN THESE WEAPONS AND IS WILLING TO REMAIN AT PEACE WITH IRAQIS AND WITH THE NEIGHBORHOOD. AND SADDAM IS NOT THAT PERSON. SO WE ARE LIKELY TO CONFRONT THIS PROBLEM ONCE AGAIN, PERHAPS IN WEEKS IF NOT IN MONTHS. HOST: WHICH RAISES THE INTERESTING QUESTION: WHAT IS HIS INTEREST IN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION? WHAT IS THE POLITICAL PURPOSE THOSE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE THERE TO SERVE? EISENSTADT: ULTIMATELY, IT'S BOUND UP WITH HIS SURVIVAL. HE SEES THAT AS LONG AS HE HAS CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, NOBODY'S GOING TO ASSEMBLE A COALITION TO DRIVE ON BAGHDAD. AND THE OPPOSTIONISTS WHO MIGHT HAVE THE IDEA OF TRYING TO OVERTHROW HIM, HE BASICALLY HAS USED WEAPONS IN THE PAST AGAINST INSURGENTS IN HIS OWN COUNTRY -- CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE LIKE -- AND THIS IS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON OF TERROR. SO, HE SEES HIS SURVIVAL AS BOUND UP WITH THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. IN THE END, THE BOTTOM LINE IS, IF HE HAS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN SURVIVAL OR THE WEAPONS, HE'LL GIVE UP THE WEAPONS IF NECESSARY OR HE'LL USE THEM IF NECESSARY. BUT, CLEARLY, HE SEES THEM VERY CLOSELY BOUND UP TO HIS OWN SURVIVAL IN THE FUTURE. HOST: JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IN BAGHDAD IS A NEW GOVERNMENT THERE. AND HE DID SIGN THE IRAQ LIBERATION ACT, WHICH MAKES SOME HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS AVAILABLE TO IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUPS. DO YOU THINK HE'S RIGHT IN SAYING THAT? AND DO YOU THINK IT'S A REALISTIC COURSE TO PURSUE? MURAVCHIK: IT'S THE MOST WELCOME THING THAT'S COME OUT OF THIS CONFRONTATION. AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE'S ANY AMERICAN VICTORY, IT MAY BE THAT THAT VICTORY LIES IN THESE EVENTS HAVING FINALLY PROPELLED THE PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE UP THIS COURSE OF ACTION, WHICH, DESPITE SIGNING THE LEGISLATION, THEY HAD NOT EMBRACED BEFORE. AND I THINK IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS IS A NEW DEPARTURE IN POLICY. NOW, IT REMAINS TO BE IMPLEMENTED BUT NOBODY KNOWS HOW EFFECTIVE THIS CAN BE. BUT WHAT I'M PUT IN MIND OF IS BACK IN THE 1980S UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHEN WE HAD THE SO-CALLED REAGAN DOCTRINE. AND WHEN WE GAVE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA, CAMBODIA -- AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AT THE TIME WAS THAT THIS WAS A COMPLETELY HOPELESS ENDEAVOR, THAT THE NICARAGUAN CONTRAS COULDN'T ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING. IN THE END, WE DIDN'T KNOW UNTIL WE TRIED AND WHEN WE TRIED, IT WORKED. THE AFGHAN MUJAHADEEN DEFEATED THE SOVIET UNION, THE CONTRAS FORCED THE SANDINISTA REGIME INTO AN ELECTION WHICH IT LOST AND WE HAD A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT THEN. SO, IT TURNED OUT TO BE A VERY EFFECTIVE POLICY IN THAT CASE. AND WE'VE GOT TO SEE HOW EFFECTIVE IT CAN BE HERE. HOST: LET ME ASK THIS QUESTION THEN. THE OBJECTIVES IN PURSUING SUCH A COURSE NOW WOULD BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY WERE DURING THE COLD WAR THAT JOSHUA MURAVCHIK JUST MENTIONED. FOR INSTANCE, IT IS ALWAYS AN ANNOUNCED OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY TO PRESERVE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ. NOW, IF THE UNITED STATES ATTEMPTS TO ASSEMBLE A COALITION OF ANTI-SADDAM FORCES, SOME SAY THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO DO THAT WOULD BE BY EXACERBATING TRIBAL RIVALRIES WITHIN IRAQ BECAUSE SADDAM REPRESENTS A MINORITY TRIBE AND HAS STAFFED HIS ADMINISTRATION WITH HIS RELATIVES AND FRIENDS FROM THAT TRIBE. MIGHT NOT DOING THAT VERY THING LEAD TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF IRAQ, THOUGH, AND THEREFORE DEFEAT OUR LARGER OBJECTIVE? KHALILZAD: THE PROCESS FOR STRENGTHENING THE IRAQI OPPOSITION AND GETTING RID OF SADDAM BY SUPPORTING THE IRAQI PEOPLE TO HAVE A NEW GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO BE A PROTRACTED PROCESS. WE CAN USE OUR LEVERAGE OF SUPPORT FOR THE IRAQI OPPOSITION, TAKING THIS DANGER INTO ACCOUNT, BY ENCOURAGING COOPERATION, BY ENCOURAGING LEADERSHIP THAT'S BROAD BASED, REPRESENTING DIFFERENT SECTS AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN IRAQ. BUT AT THE END OF THE DAY, THERE IS SOME RISK THAT A VICTORIOUS IRAQI OPPOSITION COULD LEAD TO A DEGREE OF INSTABILITY IN IRAQ. THAT RISK WE CAN TRY TO MINIMIZE, BUT I THINK NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE THE ABSENCE OF THAT SORT OF INSTABILITY. BUT THE STRATEGIC QUESTION FOR US IS: IS THAT MORE DANGEROUS FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS, TO REGIONAL STABILITY, THAN HAVING SADDAM ARMED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION? IN MY JUDGMENT, THAT IS A RISK THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RUN, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN IN THE PROCESS OF ASSISTING THE IRAQIS TO MINIMIZE THAT PROSPECT. HOST: WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THAT? EISENSTADT: I AGREE WITH ZAL AND JOSH. I THINK IT'S CLEAR THAT CONTAINMENT AS A POLICY, THE POLICY WE'VE BEEN PURSUING SINCE THE GULF WAR, IS NECESSARY BUT IT'S NOT ENOUGH, AND IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A MECHANISM FOR GETTING RID OF THE REGIME, WHICH IS REALLY THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM. SO WE HAVE TO WORK WITH THE OPPOSITION. WE HAVE TO DO MORE THAN WE HAVE BEEN DOING IN THE PAST IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION. MY CONCERN IS, HOWEVER, THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THIS WHOLE AMERICAN INITIATIVE CAME OUT. I SEE THIS, UNFORTUNATELY, AS REALLY A GESTURE BY CLINTON TO PROTECT HIS EXPOSED FLANK AT A TIME WHEN HE DREW BACK FROM MILITARY ACTION, TO PROTECT HIS FLANK FROM DOMESTIC CRITICS AND NOT BEING REALLY A GENUINE DECISION IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION. HOST: BUT HE HAD SIGNED THE IRAQI LIBERATION ACT BEFORE THIS LATEST CONFRONTATION. EISENSTADT: SURE. BUT IT'S VERY CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS HAVE DIFFERENT IDEAS AS TO WHAT SUPPORTING THE OPPOSITION MEANS. AND I DON'T THINK ENOUGH THOUGHT AND WORK HAS BEEN DONE AND PLANNING HAS BEEN DONE BY THE ADMINISTRATION TO REALLY TAKE THIS BEYOND THE LEVEL OF PLANNING INTO IMPLEMENTATION. HOST: CONSIDERING THE ALTERNATIVES, IS IT NOT BETTER TO HAVE THE INSPECTORS BACK IN IRAQ NOW, THAN THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF TEN THOUSAND DEAD IRAQIS, MANY OF THEM CIVILIANS? SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO WAS WILLING TO WITHSTAND THE KIND OF POUNDING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE DELIVERED BUT WHO AFTERWARD SAYS, I HAVE NO FURTHER INCENTIVE TO DEAL WITH THE U-N AND MEET THE U-N RESOLUTIONS. EISENSTADT: I DISAGREE WITH THOSE PREMISES. FIRST OF ALL, OUR EXPERIENCE WITH SADDAM IS THIS: HE ALWAYS DRAWS BACK FROM THE BRINK WHEN FACED WITH THE THREAT OF FORCE. AND IN FACT, WE SAW IT ALREADY. IF HE DREW BACK FROM THE BRINK WITHOUT US USING FORCE, WHY DO YOU THINK HE'S GOING TO RIDE THROUGH A BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND EMERGE UNSCATHED. I THINK THAT HE BELIEVES THAT HIS DOMESTIC SITUATION IS VERY TENUOUS. HE DOESN'T WANT TO TAKE A RISK WITH A BOMBING CAMPAIGN THAT COULD PERHAPS DESTABILIZE HIM DOMESTICALLY. WITH REGARD TO REPORTS ABOUT TEN THOUSAND CASUALTIES, I DON'T KNOW WHERE THIS NUMBER CAME FROM. IF YOU LOOK AT DESERT STORM, THE BEST ESTIMATES THAT HAVE BEEN DONE RIGHT AFTER THE WAR BY HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WAS THAT -- AND THIS WAS A TERRIBLE TOLL -- NO MORE THAN TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED TO THREE THOUSAND IRAQI CIVILIANS WERE KILLED IN THAT WAR, A FORTY-THREE DAY WAR. I DON'T SEE HOW THEY GOT A TEN THOUSAND NUMBER WHEN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT FOUR TO SIX DAYS OF BOMBING IN VERY RESTRICTED WAYS. HOST: I THINK THEY GOT IT BECAUSE THE IRAQIS, SADDAM HUSSEIN, HAS BEEN RELOCATING HIS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR THE FACILITIES TO DEVELOP THEM IN CIVILIAN AREAS, KNOWING ABOUT THE U.S. RELUCTANCE TO INFLICT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. IS THAT RIGHT? KHALILZAD: OF COURSE IN THESE BOMBINGS, YOU CAN'T BE ENTIRELY SURE HOW IT WILL COME OUT. WAR IS AN UNCERTAIN BUSINESS. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN CASUALTIES. WHETHER THE TEN THOUSAND FIGURE IS RIGHT OR WRONG, IT'S DIFFICULT TO BE CERTAIN. MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT A BOMBING CAMPAIGN OF LIMITED DURATION AIMED AT PUNISHING IRAQ FOR ITS DEFIANCE WITHOUT IT BEING TIED TO A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE OF GETTING RID OF THE PROBLEM, WHICH IS SADDAM'S POSSESSION OF W-M-D, THAT CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT GETTING RID OF SADDAM, AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A GREAT CONTRIBUTION. I THINK IF THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN TIED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING RID OF THE REGIME, THEN I THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ENTERPRISE WORTH UNDERTAKING. HOST: JOSH MURAVCHIK? MURAVCHIK: I THINK I AGREE WITH THAT. THAT IS, IF WE WERE GOING TO UNDERTAKE BOMBING, I THINK PROBABLY THE WORST THAT WE COULD HAVE DONE IS TO MAKE IT A LIMITED CAMPAIGN. I THINK IF WE WERE GOING TO GO DOWN THAT ROUTE, WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE AT THE OUTSET THAT THIS IS A CAMPAIGN THAT'S NOT GOING TO BE LIMITED TO FOUR DAYS OR TO SIX DAYS. IT'S GOT NO END POINT AND WE SHOULD JUST CONTINUE TO TAKE OUT ANY FACILITY IN IRAQ THAT WE SUSPECT IS INVOLVED IN HIS WEAPONS PROGRAM. BUT THAT IS SOMETHING THAT WE MIGHT LOSE THE STEEL IN OUR NERVES TO CONTINUE DOING BECAUSE CASUALTIES WOULD MOUNT. BUT IT'S THE ONLY KIND OF CAMPAIGN THAT I CAN SEE AS MEANINGFUL. AND THEREFORE, I EMBRACE THAT ALTERNATIVE THAT ZAL HAS BEEN POINTING TOWARDS, WHICH IS: FOCUS ON GETTING RID OF THE REGIME AND DOING WHATEVER IT WILL TAKE TO DO THAT. HOST: WHAT ABOUT THE LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A COURSE OF ACTION LIKE THAT? THERE WAS AN UNUSUAL CONSTELLATION OF EVENTS THAT LED TO TOTAL SUPPORT FOR THE CONTEMPLATED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ THIS TIME, WITH EVEN RUSSIA AND FRANCE SUPPORTING IT. BUT IT SEEMS THAT RUSSIA, CHINA AND FRANCE ARE THE FIRST ONES TO BEGIN MAKING EXCUSES FOR IRAQ AND MAY ALREADY AGAIN BE ENGAGED IN SAYING, THEY'RE COOPERATING, SO NO STRIKES. WHAT'S THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL AGAIN ENJOY THAT KIND OF UNANIMOUS SUPPORT, ALLOWING THE FREEDOM OF ACTION THAT WE HAD. KHALILZAD: THE QUESTION IS HOW IMPORTANT IS UNANIMOUS SUPPORT IF THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH YOU HAVE THAT SUPPORT ARE NOT THAT MEANINGFUL. IF OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO GET RID OF SADDAM BECAUSE WE THINK THE PROBLEM CAN'T BE SOLVED WITHOUT THAT, WHAT WE NEED IS THE SUPPORT OF THOSE COUNTRIES THAT CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN BRINGING THAT ABOUT. AND IN THE KIND OF STRATEGY THAT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING HERE TODAY, THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES WILL BE KEY. IT WILL BE TURKEY. IT WILL BE SAUDI ARABIA. IT WILL BE KUWAIT AND POSSIBLY JORDAN. I THINK IF WE HAD A SERIOUS PLAN THAT COULD DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM OF ELIMINATING SADDAM, I THINK THOSE COUNTRIES WOULD SUPPORT US. THEY'RE NOT INTERESTED IN SOME LIMITED EFFORT THAT CAN STIR THE POT BUT NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. HOST: THE UNITED STATES DID HAVE THE KEY SUPPORT OF EGYPT, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE FIVE GULF STATES THIS TIME, AT LEAST IN THEIR SAYING THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS, LET IT BE UPON SADDAM'S HEAD. IS THE UNITED STATE LIKELY TO MAINTAIN THAT KIND OF SUPPORT FOR A COURSE OF ACTION THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SPOKEN OF THAT WOULD LEAD TO A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD? EISENSTADT: THAT I'M NOT QUITE SURE ABOUT. I THINK THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE IDEA OF CONTINUING U-N INSPECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH U-N RESOLUTIONS. BUT EVEN GIVEN THAT, IT HAS BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO GET SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION WHICH IS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THAT POLICY, TO MAKE THAT POLICY WORK. I THINK ALL THE MORE SO IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO HAVE BROAD REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR AN OPPOSITION-BASED STRATEGY, BUT AS ZAL SAID, WE DON'T NEED THE SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE REGION. WE NEED JUST THE SUPPORT OF A FEW COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO MAKE THAT OPTION WORK. MURAVCHIK: IF I CAN ALLUDE AGAIN TO MY ANALOGY TO THE 1980S AND THE REAGAN DOCTRINE. WE CERTAINLY DID NOT HAVE UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR WHAT WE WERE DOING THEN, BUT WE DID HAVE SOMETHING THAT WAS VERY IMPORTANT, WHICH WAS A STRONG FEELING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AT THAT POINT WAS VERY DETERMINED TO PUSH FORWARD WITH THIS POLICY. AND OTHERS MAY HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT BUT THEY AT LEAST COULD CALCULATE THAT IF THEY DECIDED TO SIGN UP ON OUR TEAM, THAT WE WERE GOING TO SEE IT THROUGH. I THINK WE GOT OURSELVES IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH WE PLAY HAMLET AND OTHER COUNTRIES AREN'T SURE HOW SERIOUS WE ARE WITH ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. AND THEN, FIRST OF ALL, THEY MAY NOT COMPLETELY AGREE WITH US, AND SECOND OF ALL, THEY'VE GOT NO INCENTIVE TO PUT ASIDE THEIR DOUBTS IF THEY THINK WE OURSELVES MAY CHANGE OUR MINDS NEXT MONTH, NEXT YEAR. I THINK THAT IF WE SHOW THAT WE HAVE REALLY COME TO A POLICY WITH GREAT DETERMINATION AND THAT WE ARE GOING TO SEE IT THROUGH, HOWEVER LONG IT TAKES AND HOWEVER MUCH EFFORT IT TAKES, THEN AT LEAST A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF OTHERS WILL BE WILLING TO COOPERATE. KHALILZAD: I THINK JOSHUA'S POINT IS KEY. THE CRITICAL ISSUE FOR US IS A DECISION HERE, THAT WE DECIDE ON WHAT'S OUR OBJECTIVE AND THAT WE HAVE A STRATEGY THAT CAN GET US FROM HERE TO THERE. ONCE WE HAVE RESOLVED THAT HERE, I THINK THAT EVERYBODY'S CALCULATION WILL CHANGE. AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WITH REGARD TO SOME OF THE KEY COUNTRIES WHOSE SUPPORT WE WILL NEED IN THIS STRATEGY, THEY WILL COME ON BOARD. HOST: I'M AFRAID THAT'S ALL THE TIME WE HAVE THIS WEEK. I'D LIKE TO THANK OUR GUESTS -- ZALMAY KHALILZAD FROM THE RAND CORPORATION AND FORMER ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE; MICHAEL EISENSTADT FROM THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY; AND JOSHUA MURAVCHIK FROM THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE -- FOR JOINING ME THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS IRAQ AND U.S. POLICY. THIS IS ROBERT REILLY FOR ON THE LINE. 20-Nov-98 2:28 PM EST (1928 UTC) NNNN Source: Voice of America .