OPERATION DESERT FOX: EFFECT OF COALITION ATTACKS

Overall Objective

To reduce substantially Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbours and international security, in particular by degrading his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability, including control and delivery systems, and his wider military capability.

Specific Objectives

  To degrade Saddam's WMD capabilities including his concealment organisation.

  To reduce Saddam's ability to command and control his regime, especially those elements associated with WMD.

  To reduce Saddam's conventional capability and his ability to threaten his neighbours.

  To ensure force protection of coalition aircraft by disrupting the integrated air defence system and strategic and mobile surface to air missile sites.

Military Attacks

  Over 400 cruise missiles (more than in 1991 Gulf Conflict), and 218 tactical bomber sorties (32 by UK—15 per cent of the total).

  100 sites attacked:

—  sites and units involved in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes (30 targets);

—  command and control facilities and communications network through which the Iraqi regime controls its military and internal security forces (20 targets);

—  the Republican Guard, which is key to the threat which Saddam is able to pose to his neighbours and to his grip on power (nine targets);

—  Iraqi air defence system (34 targets);

—  airfields, including those associated with the remotely piloted WMD delivery system and with helicopter forces used for internal repression (six targets);

—  pumping station involved in illegal oil exports (one target);

—  87 per cent of targets were either damaged or destroyed—made possible by the extensive use of precision-guided weapons.

Outcome

  As a result of the campaign:

—  We have significantly damaged Saddam's ability to produce and repair ballistic missiles by severe damage and destruction to critical elements, including unique facilities and research equipment, such as Saddam's only missile engine test stand, the only wind tunnel suitable for missile tests and the largest metal press in Iraq. Provided that sanctions remain in place, it will take one to two years to rebuild this capability. A key element of the threat Saddam could pose to his neighbours—including his ability to deliver biological or chemical weapons—has thus been seriously weakened.

—  The Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialisation Headquarters in Baghdad was successfully picked out by precision guided weapons and damaged. This building was heavily involved in WMD programmes, particularly their organisation and administration. This work is assessed to have been disrupted for several months at least.

—  We have badly damaged the L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle programme ("The Drones of Death") developed for the delivery of biological and chemical weapons.

—  We have set back his biological and chemical weapons capability, including through attacks against production and research and development facilities. We have also successfully disrupted infrastructure and destroyed key buildings occupied by the Special Republican Guard and Special Security Organisation units who concealed and controlled the chemical and biological programmes. The Directorate of General Security in particular lost some of its most important buildings, which we believe contained key equipment and documents.

—  Air Defence sites were hit at Al Basrah, An Nasariya, Al Habbaniya, Ash Shuaybah and Al Khut amongst others. As a result there was no successful engagement of allied aircraft during Operation Desert Fox. Moreover, major damage inflicted upon Saddam's missile repair facilities has reduced his capability to maintain and upgrade air-defence missile systems.

—  We have struck hard against corps and divisional headquarters of the Republican Guard, a key prop of Saddam's regime which spearheaded the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The headquarters attacked are the locations where operations are planned and are focus of communications. Installations were hit in Baghdad, Abu Gharib, Al Khut, As Shuaybah and Tikrit amongst others. Rebuilding of this infrastructure may take up to a year. These strikes ensured that Saddam could not attack Kuwait while Desert Fox was in progress. This privileged force will now be in no doubt that we know their locations and that they continue to be vulnerable to the precision capability of the US and UK. We did not attack the poorly-paid conscript Regular Army.

—  We have severely disrupted Saddam's senior level command and control network, including elements associated with visible symbols of the Iraqi regime such as the Ba'ath Party Headquarters, Abu Rajash Presidential Palace, the Baghdad Presidential Bunker and Residence, and the Tikrit Presidential Complex. Such targets are particularly important because they are critical points for gathering information and disseminating Saddam's orders. They are therefore crucial to Saddam's ability to control the regime. Saddam is afraid of a coup by his officers and makes all decisions himself. He relies on an effective command and control system to pass on instructions and we assess that he will now be finding it far harder to control his military and internal security forces.

—  Through our attacks on Iraqi Airfields we destroyed a number of assault helicopters used to repress the civilian population, particularly the Kurdish and Shi'a minorities.

—  As a consequence of our attacks on his military capability, and particularly on those forces closely associated with his WMD concealment programme, those close to Saddam will realise that we have the ability and the will to target the regime, as distinct from the Iraqi people.

—  The risk of civilian casualties was a major consideration during the very careful target selection process for Operation Desert Fox and only precision guided weapons were used where there was any risk of collateral damage. For these reasons, we are confident that civilian casualties were minimal. We are confident that Operation Desert Fox has been the most accurate bombing campaign in which we have ever been involved. Saddam has obviously claimed that we were responsible for widespread collateral damage. However, he has failed to show any evidence of this and UN humanitarian workers and the media have been prevented from viewing all but a carefully selected few of the sites hit. Taken with Saddam's history of lying, exaggerating and fabricating evidence, this indicates strongly that genuine collateral damage was minimal.

The Future

—  We remain vigilant for any signs that Saddam is rebuilding his capabilities or threatening his neighbours. Saddam remains at risk if he attempts to do so. Our forces will remain in the region and will be bolstered by the arrival of HMS Invincible escorted by HMS Newcastle and RFA Fort Austin in the next few weeks. We are consulting further with the UN Security Council and European partners on measures to contain the threat of Saddam in the future.