Humanitarian basis for the no-fly
zones
27. The no-fly zones were established by the US,
the UK and France after the Gulf War for humanitarian reasons
in an attempt to stop Saddam's repression of Kurdish people in
the north of Iraq, and the Shia population in the south. The aim
is to prevent Iraq being able to attack these people from the
air. The Secretary of State commented—
The northern no-fly zone operates north of the 36th
parallel and was established in April 1991 as part of Operation
'Provide Comfort' to give humanitarian assistance to the Kurds.
It is now known as Operation Northern Watch. The southern no-fly
zone was established in August 1992 to protect the Shia population.
It originally covered the area south of the 32nd parallel but,
following new incursions by Iraqi forces, in September1996 the
zone was extended northwards to the 33rd parallel and now covers
about a third of the territory of Iraq (see maps at the front
of this Report).[64]
28. Mr Simon Webb, the MoD's Director General of
Operational Policy, provided us with some details of the sort
of attacks on minority peoples which had occurred before the no-fly
zones were established, including the use of chemical weapons
against Kurdish people at Halabjah in March 1988, which caused
thousands of casualties.[65]
Similarly, in southern Iraq—
There is evidence that Saddam's intentions towards
the minority peoples has not changed and, although he has less
ability to attack them from the air, repression on a lesser scale
has continued through ground attacks. The Secretary of State told
us there was photographic evidence that—
29. In his reports to the UN Human Rights Commission,
the Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iraq, Max van der Stoel,
reported 'grave violations of human rights committed by the Government
of Iraq' against the people living in the southern marshes area.
These included 'repeated, intense artillery and mortar attacks
followed by ground-force attacks on villages and towns in several
areas'.[68]
Houses were reported to have been burned or bulldozed, entire
villages and communal lands confiscated by government forces,
and entire families 'forcibly relocated' particularly in the area
bordering Iran.[69]
In northern Iraq, the Special Rapporteur reported continued repression
of the Kurdish population with the internal deportation of non-Arab
people as part of the Iraqi regime's policy of 'Arabization'.[70]
A further report in October 1999 said that—
Legal basis for the no-fly zones
30. The precise legal basis for the no-fly zones
is controversial. The MoD's view is that—
The UK and the US governments have frequently said
that the basis lies in UN Security Council Resolution 688 of April
1991 which—
The Secretary of State told us—
and he expanded on this—
31. Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee
recently examined the 'doctrine' of humanitarian necessity in
their Report on Kosovo. They concluded—
Specifically in relation to NATO's intervention in
Kosovo, that Committee decided that the action was 'of dubious
legality in the current state of international law' but 'justified
on moral grounds'.[76]
The Foreign Affairs Committee supports the 'aim of establishing
in the United Nations new principles governing humanitarian intervention'.[77]
We too would support that aim but in the meantime, in the absence
of internationally agreed procedures, we have no doubt that
UK participation in the no-fly zone operations over Iraq is justified
on moral and humanitarian grounds.
32. Iraq rejects the zones and claims they have no
basis in UN Security Council Resolutions. An Iraqi government
official said, after Operation Desert Fox—
Other UN Security Council members have expressed
reservations about the no-fly zones. An official spokesman for
the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation said in January
1999 that the no-fly zones had been 'imposed outside the framework
of UN Security Council resolutions' and that Russia's 'negative
attitude to these unlawful actions is well known'.[79]
The mission
33. The main purpose of the no-fly zone operations,
in addition to preventing Iraqi aircraft flying north of the 36th
parallel and south of the 33rd, is tactical reconnaissance.[80]
The offensive part of operational activity is undertaken only
as a response to Iraqi attacks on coalition aircraft engaged on
missions to monitor the no-fly zones[81]
and targets in Iraq are attacked only when they threaten coalition
aircraft. The Secretary of State told us—
Targets include anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), surface
to air missiles (SAMs) and the radars which direct such missiles.[83]
These weapons are highly mobile and keeping track of the threat
is a constant problem. Coalition aircraft are also attacked by
Iraqi fighter aircraft. In the southern no-fly zone, between December
1998 and May 2000 coalition aircraft were directly threatened
by Iraqi air defence forces on over 320 occasions and aircraft
responded in self defence on 74 occasions.[84]
34. The major partners in the coalition are the United
States and the UK, and the host countries in the area who provide
bases and other support to the operation. France withdrew from
operations in the northern no-fly zone in December 1996 and from
the southern no-fly zone after Operation Desert Fox in December
1998 and has not yet resumed participation, although French aircraft
and personnel are still stationed in the region.[85]
The UK contribute to tactical reconnaissance, strike and air defence
operations. In the period from April 1999 to March 2000, the RAF
flew a total of 2,683 sorties in the no-fly zones, of which 2,233
were in the southern zone.[86]
65 Ev
pp 30-31; see also HC Deb., 29 July 1998, c 284w Back
67 QQ
9 and 19 Back
68 Report
by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of human rights
in Iraq, op cit, February 1999, paras 11-12 Back
71 Report
by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of human rights
in Iraq, op cit, October 1999, para 39 Back
73 UN
Security Council Resolution 688, 5 April 1991 Back
76 Fourth
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999-2000,
Kosovo, HC 28-I ,paras 132 and 138 Back
78 Republic
of Iraq Radio, Baghdad, 5 Jan 1999, via BBC Monitoring Online Back
79 ITAR-TASS
news agency (World Service), Moscow, 6 Jan 1999, via BBC Monitoring
Online Back
80 QQ
4 and 17 Back
84 HC
Deb., 6 June 2000, c 170w Back
86 HC
Deb., 5 June 2000, c 3w Back
Previously Saddam has used
helicopter gun ships to repress the Kurdish population in the
north and both fixed wing aircraft and helicopter gun ships to
repress Shia muslims in the south. Coalition patrols prevent him
using his air force in this way but there is no reason to suppose
he would not resume the tactics if the patrols ceased.[63]
The operation which stimulated
the no fly zone in the south was against the Shi'a Arabs in the
Delta there, which led to the displacement ... of 100,000 to 150,000
people, who were displaced by those operations, which included
aircraft and helicopter gun ships.[66]
... from time to time there
have been houses that have been bulldozed and villages that have
been flattened... We can see from the air ... that he continues—particularly
in the south—to use his ability to dominate the ground to
perpetrate these kinds of attacks on civilian populations.[67]
At the beginning of 1992,
the Special Rapporteur concluded that the gravity of the human
rights situation in Iraq had few comparisons in the world since
the end of the Second World War. The Special Rapporteur regrets
that since then he has had no cause to change his view.[71]
... the justification for
the No Fly Zones remains that of overwhelming humanitarian necessity
in that, without our deployment, a severe humanitarian crisis
would in all probability recur.[72]
... condemns the repression
of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq ... demands
that Iraq ... immediately end this repression ... requests the
Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq ...
appeals to all Member States ... to contribute to these humanitarian
relief efforts.[73]
... the justification is
essentially based on the overwhelming humanitarian necessity of
protecting people on the ground, combined with the need to monitor
the effect of 688; so it is the two taken in combination that
provides the legal justification.[74]
There is a clear justification
in international law for the international community to respond
to protect people where they are threatened by an overwhelming
humanitarian catastrophe. That is precisely the same legal justification
which was used in relation to Kosovo. It is that, in combination
with the indication in 688, that we should take steps to prevent
the attacks on people, on minority peoples in Iraq.[75]
... at the very least, the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current
international customary law...
Imposing the so-called no-fly
zones is illegal and is outside the framework of the resolutions
of the Security Council and international legitimacy. It is an
act of aggression and is rejected and resisted by Iraq ... it
is a flagrant violation of international laws, norms and charters,
particularly the UN Charter. Moreover, it is a flagrant violation
of the Security Council resolutions themselves ... It is the US
and British aircraft which are violating the sovereignty and sanctity
of northern and southern Iraqi airspace.[78]
... our mission is to supervise
the no fly zones. Our mission is not—and I must emphasise
this—to bomb assets on the ground ... if our aircraft did
not come under fire we would not need to conduct any kind of bombing
of targets on the ground.[82]
63 HC Deb., 8 February 2000, c 112w; see also Q 7 Back
Prepared 2 August 2000