DoD Press Conference on Iraq Air Strikes

DoD News Briefing
Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold, Director of Operations, Joint
Staff
Friday, February 16, 2001 - 2:45 p.m. EST
(Special briefing on military action in Southern Iraq. Also
participating: Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley, DASD PA)

Adm. Quigley: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

Earlier this afternoon coalition aircraft struck targets in southern
Iraq, and I'm sure that many of you have questions on that. We have
with us this afternoon the director for operations of the Joint Staff,
Marine Corps Lieutenant General Greg Newbold. We'll walk you through
some of the high points of that and take some of your questions. I
will then follow up. He has only about 10 minutes or so here with us.
And we'll follow up with additional questions, as best we can.

General?

Gen. Newbold: Thank you.

Good afternoon. I'm going to use times that relate to Washington,
D.C., time. So when - as I run through this, you can equate to what
we have been doing here.

At about 11:20 this morning, military aircraft in the Central Command
region conducted an operation over Iraq. By 12:30 Washington, D.C.,
time, they were over target and at that time began the recovery. And
by about 1:40 our time, the aircraft had all cleared Iraqi airspace
and were in the process of recovering to their stations.

The military operation was conducted because the Iraqi air defenses
had been increasing both their frequency and the sophistication of
their operations. Both the frequency and the more sophisticated
command and control of their operations had yielded an increased
threat to our aircraft and our crews.

It reached the point where it was obvious to our forces that they had
to conduct operations to safeguard those pilots and aircraft. As a
matter of fact, it's essentially a self-defense measure in conducting
the operation.

We struck five command-and-control nodes north of the 33rd parallel
with 24 strike aircraft, using standoff precision munitions. All
indications we have are that the munitions and the strikes were
conducted efficiently and effectively. We have no indications that
there were any of the strikes that might have gone amiss. At no time
did any aircraft go north of the 33rd parallel. And I would also note
that all of these targets were picked because of the specific
separation that they represented from non-military targets. Of course,
the principal reason is that they posed a threat to U.S. aircraft.

On the slide href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2001/g010216-D-6570C.html">slide
you'll see over here is a depiction of the area coverage of these
radar sites, and it should be pretty evident that the range of these
radars reached deep into the Operation SOUTHERN WATCH area. And that
was the reason that they posed such a threat.

I'm going to show you next two examples of these types of radar. Tall
King is the first one. And let's go to the second one.

And all of the radars struck generally have ranges that can reach out
extensively - you saw the range represented on the map - but covered
our aircraft not long after they have entered Iraqi airspace on
missions, on nearly a daily basis.

Q: Are these surveillance only, General?

Gen. Newbold: Surveillance radar, but what they do is they then allow
the Iraqi air defenses to coordinate their activities, and it was
obvious to us that on nearly a daily basis they were posing an
increased risk. So in order to continue to accomplish our mission and
avoid the loss of aircraft, we had really no choice in this but to
conduct the strike.

Q: Had these radars just been established. Are they newly -

Gen. Newbold: They've been accumulating over time. Generally, they
have tried to used their radars south of the 33rd parallel, but as
they do that and they use them to oppose our missions and to conduct
attacks on our aircraft, over time, they've lost their ability to do
so, as we've struck their radars and their air defense systems. So
they have moved into what essentially they believe is a safe haven
north of the 33rd parallel.

Q: How far from Baghdad were the strikes?

Gen. Newbold: Generally, the systems were between five and 20 miles.
But again, I'd like to emphasize that we know precisely where they're
located, and each one of them is in the middle of an unoccupied area,
and were picked for that reason.

Q: Are there any restrictions for U.S. or British planes to remain in
the no-fly zone? And is striking outside, above the 33rd parallel, in
any way a change of policy or tactics by the United States?

Gen. Newbold: On the policy issues, you'd of course have to ask a
policymaker, but from a military perspective, it makes eminent sense
for us to conduct the missions as far as we can from their missile
systems and from their radars, and that's why we did it from the
standoff.

Q: Then why did you make a point of saying that none of the aircraft
crossed the 33rd Parallel?

Gen. Newbold: I think the point in saying that they didn't cross the
33rd Parallel is really to indicate the distance from Baghdad, the
fact that we are aware of our general zone of operations for these
things in routine operations are south of the 33rd.

Q: What kind of resistance did American aircraft encounter during
this? And can you give us any idea of what British aircraft did in the
strike?

The first question, as far as Iraqi attempts to interdict our strikes,
we have heard that there were anti-aircraft artillery fired and some
surface-to-air missiles which we believe were fired ballistically,
which means without the benefit of guidance, which makes it a little
safer to those who shoot them.

Q: And British aircraft in the strike?

Oh. British aircraft cooperated with us in the strike. I would prefer
not to get into which aircraft struck which targets, though.

Q: General, can you -

Q: There's a real important trend that has been going on here. Can you
describe the trend of their increasing ability to go after American
aircraft? Have there been more missiles fired in January, for example,
than there had been in the months before?

Gen. Newbold: It's a good question. Yes, is the answer to both of
those, in January and up to this point in time in February, frequency,
meaning how many systems fired - a broad arrange of systems - and on
a daily basis how many times they've fired. And, of course, they were
getting closer and closer to our aircraft.

Q: Well, to follow up on that, and then a question. Have there been
any close misses to the Iraqis being successful in trying to shoot
down U.S. aircraft?

Gen. Newbold: No close misses, but the pilots are able to observe
either the missile plumes or the bursting of the anti-aircraft fire
when they're close enough to aircraft to see.

Q: In a follow up, can you explain to us, was it simply these two
radar sites, or was it only the five targets north of the 33? And was
more than just two radars involved? Was there part of the command and
control system that was hit?

Gen. Newbold: If you'll look at the slide, five targets - one of them
was south of the 33rd parallel. And of those targets north of the 33rd
parallel, they represent a variety of radar systems. But command and
control nodes, not just radar that were above the 33rd.

(Cross talk.)

Gen. Newbold: You haven't had your hand up for a while.

Q: Was this an entirely CENTCOM-generated mission? Is it something
that you all - or that CENTCOM handled by itself, or was it
influenced by the White House? Did they - did the White House ask you
to --

Gen. Newbold: I can tell you with certainty that this - it was a
military operation, emanating out of the forces that fly the mission
on a daily basis. It was a request from them which came up to us.

Q: Did President Bush sign off on it?

Gen. Newbold: Any time we fly a mission like this, it's required to be
briefed all the way up through the national command authorities.

Q: So you talked about the increased networking of the command and
control system?

Gen. Newbold: Yes.

Q: Is there also an equivalent increase in SA-6 activity, both in
quantity and sophistication of the missiles themselves that were
posing a threat?

Gen. Newbold: You've asked about a specific system, the SA-6. What I'd
prefer to say is that it's generally the range of systems which are
both surface-to-air missiles, something like an unguided missile
system, and the anti-aircraft artillery - (off mike).

Q: General, can you tell - a three-part question if I may , and first
of all - or four - (laughter).

Gen. Newbold: I'll give you a one-part answer, but you can just --
(laughter).

Q: Okay, first of all, who is supplying Iraq with these radars, if you
know? Secondly, did you go after any tactical targets such as AAA or
such as surface-to-air missile sites on this particular strike? And
third, were any of the command and control nodes hardened, and did you
have to use any kind of bunker-buster or ordinates to take out - (off
mike)?

Gen. Newbold: I'm sorry, I actually don't know the source of the
radars, because even though they may be produced by a particular
country, they can come from a variety of sources.

I probably won't get into the one on bunker-busting; I'd just as soon
stay away from that one. And your second question --

Q: Were there any tactical targets, such as AAA sites or
surface-to-air missile sites and any of the command and control --

Gen. Newbold: No -

(Cross talk.)

Q: General, was this handled -

Q: I didn't hear the answer. Just a minute.

Gen. Newbold: Your question was were there other tactical targets,
like surface-to-air missiles, and the answer is no.

Q: General, are you saying that this was handled exactly like all of
the many fairly routine strikes that have been going on in northern
and southern Iraq in terms of command and control - that the decision
was made at the operational level, the operation was carried out and
then it was briefed afterwards back up the chain of command? Is that
how these have been handled all along, or is there something special
about this one, as opposed to these other strikes that have been going
on rather routinely?

Gen. Newbold: The first point of clarification is no decision was made
at a tactical level on this strike. The recommendation and the source
of the recommendation was at the tactical level, and that's the way it
should be. I would tell you that these strikes like this have occurred
since the beginning of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and then NORTHERN
WATCH, since 1991. They are not routine, but they are part and parcel
to protecting our aircraft as they conduct the missions, and they do
occur occasionally.

Q: General, were any of these sites struck in December of '98 in
DESERT FOX and rebuilt? I mean, do you get any sense that he is
rebuilding his command and control and AAA?

Gen. Newbold: The precise sites, I can't say. I will tell you that
strikes like this were conducted in '98. And I - I'd have to get back
to you on whether these were targets that might have been part and
parcel - [An Numaniyah control station was stuck during Operation
DESERT FOX].

Q: General, what about rebuilding?

Q: Do you anticipate the need for more military strikes, or do you
think you've accomplished all you needed to accomplish with today's
actions?

Gen. Newbold: We think we've accomplished what we were looking for; in
this sense, to degrade, disrupt the ability of the Iraqi air defenses
to coordinate attacks against our aircraft. But as you know, this a
cyclic affair, and --

Q: But it's not likely we'll have more strikes soon?

Gen. Newbold: We don't anticipate strikes like this soon. Of course,
in the course of our daily operations, as you know, we're shot at
fairly routinely.

Q: General, you say that - I'm sorry, you've talked about increased
activity along the 33rd. Are we talking about an increase in numbers
of anti-aircraft sites, of surface-to-air missile sites, of radar
sites? And if so, is Iraq in the business of acquiring additional
armaments, additional capabilities? And why this spike in the last six
weeks that we've seen? Also, it appears, according to your graphic,
that one of the sites was north of Baghdad. Is that right?

Gen. Newbold: Let me start with the first one and make sure I'm clear
on this. It was not the number of systems that posed the threat, it
was that the systems in place were firing more frequently and they
were more accurate because they were coordinated. And there was one
target just north of Baghdad, as is shown there.

Q: So these sites that you hit were designed to cut down on their
ability to coordinate and synchronize their efforts against U.S. and
British aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone.

Gen. Newbold: I should have had you giving the brief. (Laughter.)
That's precisely right. (Laughter.)

Q: And do we see the same sort of activity taking place in the north,
or is this southern-no-fly-zone specific?

Gen. Newbold: This one is southern-no-fly-zone specific, although
increased activity up north.

Q: General, in terms of the fact that you've noted increasing
sophistication in the way that Iraq has been engaging U.S. aircraft,
any ideas how the Iraqis developed these new tactics? Are they taking
lessons learned from Kosovo? Are they being briefed by the Serbs, who
defended against us in Kosovo? Where did these new tactics come from?

Gen. Newbold: I don't really - I can't answer that question because I
don't know. I would tell you that there are exchanges of information.
I don't think this is a matter of improved tactics so much as it is
improved command and control.

Staff: Just one or two more, please, ladies and gentlemen.

Q: General, can you be clear on one thing? These were preemptive
strikes as opposed to aircraft were painted and the U.S. struck back;
is that correct?

Gen. Newbold: No. These are in direct response to Iraqi actions over a
cumulative period of time over the past two months, where their
actions have increased - provided an increasing threat to our
aircraft.

Q: How about today, though?

Were U.S. planes painted and then you fought back, or was this a
planned strike --

Gen. Newbold: No, this was a carefully planned, orchestrated strike.

Q: General, because this -

Gen. Newbold: Let me - the gentleman in back has had his hand up for
--

Q: Thank you, General. Sir, aren't you concerned, sir, that strikes
like this might increase the hostility toward the U.S. and its
military presence in the area? And are you taking any additional
precautions to avoid that?

Gen. Newbold: Yes. The aircraft do that routinely. They change their
plan on a daily basis to ensure that they are at minimum risk to the
aircraft. And our preference wouldn't - I can guarantee you, would
not be to strike. Our preference is to conduct SOUTHERN WATCH, to
monitor Iraqi activities that threaten their neighbors, like Kuwait.
And it's only in response to the firing at the U.S. and coalition
aircraft that they get into responding to this.

Q: Thank you, General.

Q: General, one question. Because this was different, did you have to
get Saudi Arabia's permission?

Q: Thank you, General.

(General Newbold departs.)

Adm. Quigley: I'll wait just a second here.

Are there any follow-on questions I can possibly help with? Barbara?

Q: Yes.

Adm. Quigley: Why did I think -

Q: Because the parameters of this strike were slightly different, did
you seek or receive Saudi Arabia's permission before you launched it?
Did you inform them of it?

Adm. Quigley: Not that I'm aware of, no.

Q: When did the president approve this?

Q: Admiral?

Adm. Quigley: Yes?

Q: Has there been a change in threat condition levels in the area?

Adm. Quigley: No, not that I'm aware of. Not that I'm aware of.

Q: Were these carrier-based airplanes that carried out the strike?

Adm. Quigley: Some were indeed. Both carrier-based and land-based,
yes.

Q: The Harry S Truman? Based on Harry S -

Adm. Quigley: Harry S Truman is the carrier in the Gulf at the point,
yes, by --

Q: And Craig, is the type of aircraft, type of weapon - can you give
us any --

Adm. Quigley: These were both sea-based and land-based strike aircraft
from a variety of installations in the region, firing long- range,
precision-guided weapons.

Q: So they were -

Adm. Quigley: That's the most detail I can provide. I'm sorry.

Q: (Off mike) - stand-off -

Adm. Quigley: Different types of stand-off weapons, yes, Chris -

Q: Why can't you say -

Adm. Quigley: - but precision-guided, stand-off weapons.

Q: Why can't you just say what they are?

Adm. Quigley: Because if the Iraqis now know precisely how effective
this strike was, and if they could somehow figure out, knowing the
weapon that was fired, how effective this weapon system was, and they
could possibly devise a way to counter it, it would reduce our
possible effectiveness on future such strikes.

Any sort of advantage that we could possibly provide to the Iraqis in
that type, we're just going to try everything we can to not do that.

Q: If I could just follow up on that point, though, why does that rule
only seem to apply to strikes in Iraq, but didn't, for instance, apply
to the NATO strikes in Yugoslavia where - in 1998 you didn't - in
1999 you didn't disclose types of weapons in Iraq. But then when those
same weapons were used in a combat situation in Yugoslavia, you did
disclose the weapons. Why the - why is it inconsistent with the
policy?

Adm. Quigley: I think you're looking at a much longer-duration effort
in SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH, Jamie. I have a possibility of
deriving some sort of benefit of knowing what type of weapon that the
coalition would use against me. I may not be able to devise a way to
defeat it or to reduce its effectiveness somehow on the first strike
or the third or the fifth, but if it's a long- duration activity, like
SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH, I could get there eventually.

Any sort of advantage that we could possibly provide to the Iraqis in
that regard, we're just going to try everything we can to not do that.

If it's more of a tactical situation, which was the situation in the
Balkans, okay, during the Kosovo operations, that is much more of a
real time situation where I'm employing weapons. You just can't
possibly devise a counter to those weapons in the very short time that
is available to defensive system. But in a longer-time horizon here,
that's a possibility. We think it's an increased possibility and we're
just not going to take that risk.

Q: Craig -

Q: Do you have any numbers for us on the increase of SAM firings --
magnitude, descriptively, over the last couple of months?

Adm. Quigley: I think we do. Yeah, I don't have them with me, John,
but I think we do. But we have seen a significant increase in the
January-February time frame, and the systems that were struck today
that General Newbold described very much contributed to that, we
believe. And we hope that we will have significantly degraded his
ability to coordinate that air defense system [there have been 65
provocations this year consisting of 51 AAA and 14 SAM incidents;
there were 221 provocations during 2000].

Q: Quickly, within just two hours two hours of this strike, how is it
that you come to the conclusion that the strikes were both effective
and efficient?

How is it that you've concluded your bomb damage assessment so
quickly?

Adm. Quigley: Well, we don't have the bomb damage assessment, Barbara
-- I should be quick to point that out - and we won't for quite some
time, and to the level of detail that you all would expect. But you do
have an immediate indication as to whether or not your standoff
ordnance guided properly, or if you lost the signal and it didn't
guide properly. So you know if the weapons you used performed as they
should.

And as General Newbold described, these targets were chosen very
specifically for two principal reasons. One is their effectiveness
against coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone and, two, their
location apart from populated areas. So if I don't have an indication
that the weapon somehow malfunctioned, then I really do need to hold
off before I am too specific on my battle damage assessment. But all
the initial looks say it looks pretty good.

Q: Do you have any indication that, given the targets you struck,
those parts of the Iraqi air defense system have gone dark now?

Adm. Quigley: I don't have that level of detail in this close to real
time. I'm sorry.

Ivan?

Q: Craig, the aircraft engaging in this strike today, were these the
tactical aircraft that are normally used in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH,
or were there also manned bombers from, say, Europe and CONUS - B-1s,
B2s and --

Adm. Quigley: No. These were aircraft that you see normally operating
in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and in that part of the world.

Otto?

Q: The general said 24 strike aircraft. Are we to assume that the
total air package was larger than that, given the number of support
aircraft?

Adm. Quigley: Yes. Yes. And I am not going to be able to be specific
about that, either. I will say that there was a considerably larger
total package of aircraft, but that provided jamming, electronic
counter-measures, suppression of any enemy air defense missions,
command and control - those sorts of activities that would support
the 24. The 24 were the ones that launched the weapons. There were a
larger number of aircraft that performed other missions.

Q: Twenty-four American and British?

Adm. Quigley: Twenty-four American and British, yes.

Pam?

Q: How did that package compare to the ones that are normally used in
these strikes? I think there have been nine strikes so far this year.
So how did those earlier strikes stack --

Adm. Quigley: This is larger than any of the ones that were earlier
this year. They typically are not --

Q: Twice as large? Three times as large?

Adm. Quigley: I'd have to go check the numbers, but this is definitely
larger than a one that you see - And keep in mind, this is something
that we reserve the right to do. It isn't necessarily a tit-for-tat in
SOUTHERN WATCH.

And this is a perfect example of that. We assess these systems as
being complementary and additive to the air defense capability of the
Iraqis in the SOUTHERN WATCH no-fly zone. So this wasn't something
that happened today or yesterday, this was cumulative over a period of
time, but contributed significantly to the effectiveness of those air
defense systems. And that's why this was a very deliberate, planned
procedure.

Q: Can you clarify the approval? Was this from -

Adm. Quigley: Yeah, let me take another whack at that. CINCCENT
started this process. Okay? The commander in chief of the U.S. Central
Command started this process, made a recommendation up through the
chain of command. Ultimately that recommendation was approved --

Q: By the president.

Adm. Quigley: - by the president.

Q: When?

Q: When?

Q: General Franks made the recommendation -

Adm. Quigley: Within the past few days, ultimately by the president.
The recommendation has been working its way up the chain of command
for some time with the requisite level of detail to make sure that all
the seniors in the chain of command understood the details, understood
the parameters, understood what was being asked for here. And
ultimately, that was approved by the president.

Yes?

Q: Why would this mission have to be signed off on by the president,
when strikes that occur weekly, if not more often, are done without
the president having to sign off?

Adm. Quigley: We have said that we would take on targets that would
contribute to the effectiveness of the Iraqi air defense system in
SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH. But typically, those targets that
we engage are in the SOUTHERN WATCH or NORTHERN WATCH zones; in other
words, south of 33 or north of 36. This was not. This was different.
We've done this before, but it is not like we normally do it.

Q: When was the last - (inaudible) -

Q: (Inaudible) - standing authorization to strike targets under the
rules of engagement in the southern and northern no-fly zones, but
when going north of the southern no-fly zone or south of the northern
no-fly zone, that's exceptional enough where it requires presidential
authority?

Adm. Quigley: Let me try to put that another way, if I could. There
are different rules of engagement - the rules of engagement describe
a different process, depending on the sort of option that you would
like to embark upon. And this was one of those that is a different set
of circumstances rather than the ones that you have seen either
Central Command or European Command do on a much more regular basis in
NORTHERN WATCH or SOUTHERN WATCH. So in accordance with the rules that
we put in place and have been approved up the chain of command on a
variety of these packages, this process had a - or this procedure had
a different process in accordance with those rules of engagement. So
you say, what am I about to embark on here? What am I going to ask
permission to do? What are the procedures that I have in place to do
that? And then I go about doing it.

And the answer to your question is, in SOUTHERN WATCH the last time we
went north of 33 was DESERT FOX in December of '98. The last time we
went south of 36 was September or October of '99. So it has been done
before, but it's been a while.

Barbara?

Q: If this has been going on for six weeks, this change of pace of
Iraqi activity, what made you decide to go today? Why did you wait so
long? And did you want to get this done especially before the
secretary of State traveled to the Gulf?

Adm. Quigley: I'm not going to get into the tactical reasons. There is
a variety of factors that go into the selection of exactly what time
you do this, and date, and things of that sort, but I'm sorry, I can't
provide those.

Q: Secretary Rumsfeld -

Adm. Quigley: I need to leave. Let me take one more question. Yes,
sir?

Q: To what extent was this a message sent by a new president to
indicate there's no policy change, no softening in U.S. attitude --

Adm. Quigley: This was done for the military purposes that General
Newbold described.

Q: Craig, one final thing.

Adm. Quigley: Thank you.