Pentagon Spokesman's Briefing

Presenter: Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley, USN, DASD PA

Thursday, March 1, 2001

DoD News Briefing - Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley, USN, DASD PA

(Also participating: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and
Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Paul Wolfowitz)

Q: Craig, the other day you told us you couldn't identify the weapons
used in Iraq attacking the radar network there because it might aid
and abet Saddam Hussein's military. But Admiral McGinnis - is it?

Quigley: McGinn, I believe.

Q: McGinn. Went into the use of the weapons in vast detail on the
record. Is he aiding the enemy in this instance, or were you just
being arbitrary in not telling us what weapons were used?

Quigley: Well, no, I - clearly, I don't think he believes he's aiding
anyone in that regard. I don't know as if I can improve upon his
words. I think I'll let his words stand without any embellishment from
me.

Q: Well, on the point of not telling us what these weapons were, your
version was this might aid the enemy. Is he right or were you right?

Quigley: I guess both would be true, in my view. (Laughter.) And the
reason that I'm reluctant from here, from the podium, in a public way
to discuss in any great detail the choice of weapons against a
particular target is it could lead to an adversary having an
unintended advantage the next time, or the next time after that. And
since you're talking about the no-fly zone enforcements here, both
north and south, having continued for some time, then it is entirely
possible that we would have future engagements, perhaps not exactly
like this one, but very likely to use a particular weapon system
against a particular type of target.

If there's an advantage that we could impart to an adversary by
acknowledging the sort of weapon and some of our thinking involved in
that, that would not be a good thing, from a tactical sense.

Clearly, Admiral McGinn thought that that - the knowledge that he
imparted the other day would not serve to compromise that. So --

Q: Well, who's making the policy here? This is very arbitrary on your
part. He says it on the record; you refuse to discuss it.

Quigley: Well, I think the policy that we've done from here over time
of not being particularly forthcoming on what types weapons and what
sorts of targets has been fairly consistent. There have been --

Q: But on Iraq - in Iraq we - you listed every weapon in our
inventory except nuclear weapons - we've used fuel/air explosives,
stand-off guided missiles, dumb bombs - in vast detail. Same thing
during Kosovo.

Quigley: I think when you do something like Desert Fox, a sizeable
strike like we did in December 1998, we tend to be more forthcoming
when you have a big event of that sort, because it is a notable event.
It's very newsworthy. But in the daily routine of responding to
attacks on coalition aircraft that's been going on for some time,
we're just going to try to not offer any advantage to the Iraqis that
could place coalition air crews at risk.

....

Q: Excuse me.

Are you satisfied, from intelligence reports, with the damage that was
done in a recent joint strike near Baghdad? And if not, do you see
possibly another strike in the near future?

Rumsfeld: Of course, our interest was in addressing the question of
the safety of the pilots, coalition pilots that are flying those
missions. And there is no question but that their safety is better
today than it was before. There's also no question but that the - as
you're well aware - the Navy munitions did not find their targets
precisely. And we now think we have a pretty good grip on why that
happened, and it's unlikely to happen again.

....

Q: In your confirmation hearing, you said that you had not seen a
plausible plan yet for providing military support to the Iraqi
opposition to take a run at Saddam Hussein. Does that mean that that's
off the table now, or is that something that you'll be - you know,
you'll be working to come up with a plan to do that?

Wolfowitz: Well, I'd say two things. First of all, as was said
earlier, I've got a lot of work to do in working the nuts and bolts of
this building, so I don't expect to be spending most of my time on
policy issues.

As far as Iraq policy is concerned, what I said in the hearings is you
have to make your decisions based on what is possible in given
circumstances. When President Bush saw a million-plus Kurds on the
border with Turkey a month after the Gulf War, he saw an option to use
ground and air forces to clear an area in Northern Iraq that has
remained secure to a considerable degree now for almost 10 years.

So, can we create options, can we exploit options? I think that's what
I assume the administration is going to be looking hard at. But
strategy doesn't consist of writing an abstract: "This is what I'd
like to do." It consists of having a plan that creates options; when
the options develop, you act on what you've developed.