Rabbits' Ears and Doves' Dreams: Information on North Korea's Missile Test-Firing Kept Secret -- only Bureaucrats Discuss Information With Foreign Minister and Others Kept In The Dark

Rabbits' Ears and Doves' Dreams: Information on North Korea's Missile Test-Firing Kept Secret -- only Bureaucrats Discuss Information With Foreign Minister and Others Kept In The Dark

Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN
14 Aug 94 Morning Edition p 1

[FBIS Translated Text] In May 1993, North Korea test-fired the "Nodong-1," a ballistic missile. That country's test-firing of the missile had a great impact on Japan's security policy. On 13 August, light was shed on how the government worked to manage the crisis during the course of collecting, managing, and making public the information on North Korea's test-firing of the ballistic missile. For the first time, light was also shed on the existence of the "Joint Information Council." The first meeting of the council, chaired by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara, was held to exchange information among officials in charge of defense and security in concerned ministries and agencies. The information on North Korea's test-firing of the ballistic missile was first made public four days after the meeting was held. The foreign minister and Defense Agency director general were not briefed on the incident. North Korea's test-firing of the missile provided the momentum for spreading in Japan the idea of the threat from North Korea, and at the same time the fact that the government secretly dealt with this important information involving Japan's security also came to light.

At noon on 9 July, North Korea announced the death of President Kim Il-song. In reaction, early-warning E2-C planes and EP-3 and YS-11E planes -- the latter two used for electronically collecting warfare data -- which were assigned to the Air Self-Defense Force [ASDF] and the Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF], scrambled from Mizawa Air Base, Iwakuni Air Base, and Irima Air Base. The planes flew near the Korean peninsula to determine the number of North Korean aircraft in-flight in the area. Members of the Self-Defense Forces [SDF] at the Miho Communications Station, run by the Ground Staff Office of the Ground Self-Defense Force, monitored North Korean radio. The Defense Agency [(DA] worked on an analysis of the cause of President Kim Il-song's death based on four possible scenarios: 1) a natural death; 2) an assassination; 3) a coup staged by a pro-Kim Chong-il group; and 4) a coup staged by anti-Kim Chong-il group. In the end, President Kim Il-song was found to have died of heart attack, a natural death, as North Korea announced. On 10 July, a report was presented to an extraordinary meeting of the Joint Information Council that the North Korean leader died of a heart attack.

In the morning of 29 May 1993, North Korea test-fired the Nodong-1 over the Sea of Japan. The ballistic missile, with an estimated range of 1,000 km, is said to be able to strike most areas of Japan.

The Day

The DA had obtained information from a U.S. Government source in advance that "North Korea may test-fire the ballistic missile." While the DA was strengthening its vigilance, North Korea sent a frigate and a minesweeper into the Sea of Japan. Those ships made an appearance when North Korea's test-firing of the ballistic missile in 1990 failed. A senior DA official believed that the ships were there to confirm the hit accuracy of the missile and recover the wreckage, and that North Korea would certainly test-fire the missile.

A U.S. early-warning satellite detected North Korea's test-firing of the missile. At the time, a ground radar station of the ASDF in Wajima on Noto peninsula intercepted unusual radio waves. The DA determined that North Korea had test-fired a new kind of missile as a result of its analysis of the information provided by the United States. Two P3-C of the MSDF took pictures of two ships steaming back to North Korea. The information on North Korea's test-firing of the missile was classified as top secret out of consideration for the United States.

Several Days Later

The DA and the Foreign Ministry, which found out about North Korea's test-firing of the missile through diplomatic channels, sent the information to the prime minister's official residence, and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa was briefed on the incident. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono told Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara: "Let us keep other people in the dark about the information." As a result, the information was classified as top secret.

Nine Days Later

At a meeting of the Joint Information Council held in the prime minister's official residence on the afternoon of 7 June 1993, high- ranking government officials proposed that the information be classified top secret. Present at the meeting were Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara and senior officials from the Cabinet Information Research Office, the Cabinet Security Affairs Office, the Foreign Ministry, the DA, the National Policy Agency, and the Public Security Investigation Agency. Some senior officials in the Transport Ministry were also asked to attend the meeting for discussion of other matters.

Bureaucrats in charge of security affairs hold a session of the Joint Information Council twice a month to exchange information and discuss security affairs. The Joint Information Council was established in 1986 to discuss ways to cope with a state of emergency. The topics of discussion at meetings of the Joint Information Council have been kept secret.

At the outset of the 7 June meeting, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara said, "I would like to caution all of the attendees not to reveal to the outside what we discuss from now on at this meeting." After Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara explained the items to be discussed at the meeting, DA Deputy Vice Minister Haruno Ueno said: "North Korea test-fired a new kind of ballistic missile from its northern coastal areas. The missile appeared to have landed in waters off the coast of the Noto Peninsula after flying about 500 km." He did not use the name of the Nodong-1.

Katsuya Suzuki, chief of the Information Analysis Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, gave a briefing on North Korea's foreign policy. Yoshio Omori, chief of the Cabinet Information Research Office, gave a supplementary briefing on North Korea's foreign policy. The meeting lasted about 30 minutes. DA Director General Toshio Nakayama and Foreign Minister Kabun Muto were not briefed on North Korea's test-firing of the missile. The two conceded that "we first learned about North Korea's test-firing of the missile only after it was openly reported."

13 Days Later

On the morning of 11 June, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihaya revealed the information that North Korea had test-fired the missile to a group of reporters, adding that his revelation was based on "information from foreigners." Concerned ministries and agencies were surprised and embarrassed by his revelation of the information on North Korea's test-firing of the missile because he, as a chairman of the Joint Information Council, tried to keep other people from finding out about the information.

Shigeru Hatakeyama, chief of the DA Defense Policy Bureau, bluntly told DA Deputy Vice Minister Ueno, "Did the deputy chief cabinet secretary not promise to keep the information top secret?" Ueno argued against the revelation of the information by the deputy chief cabinet secretary, saying, "What is discussed at meetings of the Joint Information Council is always kept secret." Hatakeyama phoned Deputy Cabinet Secretary Ishihara to protest against his revelation of the information, but Ishihara brushed aside his protest, saying, "I have my own judgment." Hatakeyama had no choice but to remain silent.

16 Days Later

On 14 June, DA announced that "it had confirmed North Korea's test-firing of the ballistic missile."

One Year Later

In an interview with MAINICHI SHIMBUN that was carried in a series entitled "The Discontinuity of Foreign Policy," Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara defended his decision to make public North Korea's test-firing of the missile, saying: "I have come to have questions about the sense of safety of the Japanese who care little about the possibility that North Korea may fire its missiles into their homes. I made public the information with a strategic purpose, and I believed that my revelation of the information might produce the intended effect."

An official who attended meetings of the Joint Information Council said: "Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara stated that he disclosed North Korea's test-firing of the missile on the basis of information from foreigners out of consideration for the United States, the Foreign Ministry and the DA. It is desirable for a top Government official to make some vague remarks." Another official, who attended meetings of the Joint Information Council, presumed that "Prime Minister Miyazawa and Deputy Prime Minister Masaharu Gotoda may have discussed the possibility of making public the information." Miyazawa and Gotoda said through their liaison offices that "it is a delicate issue and that we cannot comment on it."

The government's handling of the information on North Korea's test-firing of the missile underscores the absence of a system under which the people are given access to important information. The handling of such important information has been left to the judgment of a handful of bureaucrats and politicians.

Tomorrow, we will mark the 49th anniversary of the end of the World War II. Forty-nine years have passed since the unprecedented fighting ended. Over the past 49 years, Japan has enjoyed prosperity and peace. With the end of the East-West Cold War and the political system which began in 1955, Japan is pressed to reevaluate its security. Information is surfacing as a keyword of Japan's security. Japan is collecting information at home and abroad to build itself into a pacifist state. This information will help determine the path Japan will follow in the future. How will information be collected, used, and made available to us?