Notes used byAmbassador Munir Akram while addressing the National Defense University, 21 November 1996, Washington D.C.

In the US, concern about nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been consistent, although its intensity and focus has been variable.

Today, I will present Pakistan's perspective on the issue - the history, the current realities and the future course.

While the US media has focused conspicuously on Pakistan's nuclear programme, and some dramatic accounts have played upon atavistic fears about the so-called "Islamic bomb", the real history of proliferation in South Asia is different.

Table-1 recounts the evolving positions of India and Pakistan on nuclear proliferation.

Table-I

INDIA AND PAKISTAN - POSITIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION

A Historical Comparison

• Two, important conclusions flow from this comparison:
  
  one, the impetus for proliferation has consistently emanated from India in a series of escalatory steps;
  
  two, Pakistan's initial effort at each stage has been to halt proliferation through political means. However, Pakistan's non-proliferation initiative in South Asia received no international (US) support until 1991 (after Pressler was applied against Pakistan).
  
  Another conclusion: Steps taken by Pakistan to acquire matching capability have been in response to India's escalating steps.
  
  Pakistan's sense of grievance with the US/West about the non-proliferation issue emanates from various reasons.. One reason is the generous external assistance to India's avowedly dual purpose nuclear programme. Table-II lists such assistance.
  
  Table-II
  
  EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO INDIA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
  
  Canada
  
  CIRRUS. Research Reactor. No safeguards.
  Heavy Water Plant.
  Nuclear Fuel Complex.
  Two Power Reactors - Rajasthan.
  
  United States
  
  21 tons of heavy water. No safeguards.
  Assistance for reprocessing facility. Trombay.
  Training in US of 24 specialists in reprocessing.
  
  France
  
  Exchange of personnel and special training on plutonium extraction from spent nuclear fuel.
  
  Our sense of grievance is compounded by the history of discrimination against Pakistan in the international efforts to halt nuclear proliferation. Table-III Enumerates the record of such discrimination.
  
  Table-III
  
  Canada
  
  Supply of CIRRUS to India outside safeguards vs supply of KANNUP to Pakistan under IAEA safeguards.
  
  After India's 1974 nuclear explosion, unilateral termination of:
  
  - fuel supplies to KANNUP,
  - sale of a fuel fabrication plant and, finally
  - all peaceful nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.
  
  United States
  
  1976 Symington Amendment: Penalized acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capability after 1976 (i.e. exempting India but covering Pakistan).
  
  1979 termination of economic assistance to Pakistan for contracting to purchase of reprocessing plant. 1980 U.S. decision to ship 38 tons of enriched uranium to India.
  
  1979 pressure on France to cancel RPP contract. 1985. France persuaded by U.S. to take up supply of enriched uranium to India.
  
  1985 Solarz Amendment, aimed at penalizing nuclear-related purchases by Pakistan from U.S.
  
  1985 Pressler Amendment - requirement for annual Presidential Certification that Pakistan (not India) did not possess a nuclear device.
  
  Despite this sense of grievance, Pakistan has persisted in its efforts to promote a regional solution to the threat of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Table-IV enumerates the 10 proposals made by Pakistan since India's 1974 nuclear explosion. India has not responded positively to any of these initiatives.
  
  Table-IV
  
  Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Initiatives
  after India's Nuclear Explosion
  
  
  1974 - Proposal in UNGA for a NWFZ in South Asia. (Endorsed 22 times by UNGA. India opposed).
  
  1978 - Proposal for a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons.
  
  1979 - Mutual inspection by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities.
  
  1979 - Simultaneous adherence to the NPT.
  
  1979 - Simultaneous acceptance of IAEA `full-scope' safeguards.
  
  1987 - A bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty.
  
  1988 - A UN Conference on non-proliferation in South Asia.
  
  1991 - Five-nation talks on non-proliferation in South Asia.
  
  1993 - South Asia Zero Missile Zone.
  
  1996 - Multilateral Conference on security, arms control and non-proliferation in South Asia.
  
  The US has played an important role in the evolution of the proliferation picture in South Asia. Unfortunately, in our view, its policies were one-sided and punitive against Pakistan - as epitomized in the Pressler amendment. We agree that Pressler was "bad law and worse policy". Table V outlines some of the negative effects of Pressler in South Asia.
  
  Table-V
  
  The Pressler Amendment
  - a `blunt instrument'
  
  i. Discriminatory, targeted Pakistan alone; exempted India.
  
  ii. Created disincentives for India to accept non-proliferation restraints (since this would lead to normalization of Pakistan US relations).
  
  iii. Encouraged India to accelerate proliferation activities, specially missile development.
  
  iv. Neutralized US ability to influence future nuclear policies of both India and Pakistan.
  
  v. Since Pressler was applied, the situation in South Asia and in the world has changed dramatically. In the post cold war era, Pakistan's security concerns have become more complex. Table-VI lists Pakistan's current security concerns.
  
• Table-VI
  
  Pakistan's current security concerns
  
  
• Continuing tensions over Kashmir and exchange of fire on LOC

• Significantly larger Indian force deployments against Pakistan.
  
• Possibility of a second Indian nuclear explosion.

• Likelihood of serial production and deployment of the Prithvi and development of Agni.

• Indications of US-Western acceptance of an Indian nuclear weapons capability and nuclear and missile proliferation.

• Steady exacerbation of the conventional force imbalance against Pakistan

• Persistence of a discriminatory approach by US/West to non-proliferation and security in South Asia - CTBT, cut-off, Pressler, Kashmir etc.

• Renewed Russian intervention in Afghanistan, together with India, and resulting escalation of tensions in the region.

• External interference and promotion of terrorist violence in Pakistan.
  
• A few words about each of these concerns:
  
  Kashmir: The Kashmiri uprising erupted six years ago. The crisis has not been resolved despite all the hype about "elections" in Kashmir. It is the prime cause of tensions in South Asia; the main impediment to normalization. A solution to Kashmir, or at least progress towards the solution, is essential to make progress on the overall objective of promoting security and nuclear restraint.
  
  Indian force deployments: The gravity of the conventional threat facing Pakistan is illustrated in the attached charts.
  
  Table A: A comparison of the Indian & Pakistani Armies.
  
  Table B: A comparison of the Indian & Pakistani Air Forces.
  
  Table C: Deployment Summary - IAF.
  
  Table D: Comparison - Indian and Pakistani Navy.
  
  
  A second Indian nuclear explosion: This has not been ruled out by the Indian Government; the preparations made for a second test in Pokharan have not been reversed. A second Indian test will imply a decision to "weaponise" and deploy nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It will be an irreversible step of nuclear escalation by India.
  
  The Gowda government has declared it will go ahead with production and deployment of the Prithvi and development of the AGNI. The annexed Chart G depicts the wide threat which these missiles will pose to Pakistan and the region. Pakistan will have to respond. Our presumption will be that India's missiles are nuclear armed. It will create a `hair-trigger' security environment in South Asia.
  
  Indian opposition to CTBT evoked what we perceived as a response of appeasement from the US and its allies. India's declarations that its nuclear option is "open", that it retains the right to conduct nuclear tests and to build the bomb, have evoked no response from the US-West. Even India's new opposition to the FMCT has been received with "understanding". The question arises: are the US and its allies comfortable with an Indian nuclear weapons capability? If this perception gains ground, it will have serous implications for non-proliferation in South Asia.
  
  In the post cold war era, Pakistan's capability - both financial and political - to acquire conventional weapons for defense against India has significantly diminished due to Pressler, informal embargo by Russia and high prices of French/European weapons' system. Meanwhile, India apart from manufacturing various weapons, has contracted to buy weapons worth over $ 5 billion from Russia, Ukraine etc.
  
  Although the Brown Amendment has alleviated an important point of friction between Pakistan and the US, the reality of discrimination against Pakistan de jure and de facto - continues. This is evident not only from the continued presence of Pressler on the statute books, but also the US/Western responses to India and Pakistan on missile proliferation, the CTBT, the `cut-off' Treaty, conventional arms sales and on Kashmir.
  
  While the close Pakistan-US relationship has eroded since 1990, due in part to the non-proliferation issue, the prospect of a two-front conventional threat to Pakistan in future has revived due to the renewed intervention by Russia, in concert with India, in Afghanistan. These developments do not encourage restraint in the arms control arena.
  
  Finally, India - facing no threat of being branded a terrorist state - has joined others in promoting terrorism in the cities of Pakistan. Such intervention could have serious consequences for peace and stability in South Asia.
  
  Given the serious and complex security environment in South Asia, it is obvious that nuclear non-proliferation can be promoted only by evolving an approach which can address the inter-related issues - Kashmir, conventional arms and the nuclear threat - in a comprehensive and integrated way. This reality was recognized by the US State Department in 1993. It was also reflected in the 1994 US proposal for multilateral talks on South Asian security and non-proliferation. Unfortunately, this proposal was not pursued after India's rejection in April 1994.
  
  At the moment, all dialogue on South Asia's political and security issues is at a standstill. India insists on bilateral talks only. Pakistan feels that parallel regional and multilateral talks could help to resolve some of security issues. Global negotiations could also contribute to the overall goal. A breakthrough is needed, both at the conceptual and the political level.
  
  In our view, a three-track approach - bilateral, regional and global - may be the most effective way to address the inter-related security and non-proliferation problems affecting South Asia.
  
  Table-VII outlines the issues which could be addressed at the bilateral, regional - multilateral and the global levels.
  
  
  Table-VII
  
  THREE TRACK APPROACH TO SECURITY, ARMS CONTROL
  AND NON-PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
  
  
  

1. Let me make it clear that acceptance of this integrated approach is not posed as a pre-condition for bilateral talks. However, we are convinced that such a three-track process will be the most effective and is, indeed, inevitable. We hope that the US and our other friends will support this approach to South Asian security and non-proliferation.
   
   Meanwhile, if there is political goodwill, some "early measures" could be taken to create the appropriate climate for a genuine peace process in South Asia. Table-VIII enumerates the early measures which could be promoted - on the CTBT, FMCT, Missile non-proliferation, Conventional arms Control and Kashmir.
   
   Table-VIII
   
   Some early measures for mutual restraint and
   confidence-building in South Asia
   
   CTBT
   
   An assurance by India that it does not plan to conduct another nuclear explosion.
   Visible reversal of preparations made at Pokharan to conduct another nuclear explosion.
   
   FMCT

1. Opening of parallel discussion in CD on:
   
   Issues involved in cut-off Treaty;
   
   Related problems e.g. uncontrolled and unequal stockpiles, with a view to agreement on ways and means to concluding the Cut-off Treaty as soon as possible. (India may insist on simultaneous `negotiations' or `discussions' on nuclear disarmament).
   
   
2. Missile Proliferation
   
   Simultaneous declarations by India and Pakistan not to deploy nuclear capable missiles, together with commitments not to serially produce such missiles.
   
   Kashmir
   
   Opening of bilateral talks on Kashmir. Agreement to allow association of Kashmiri representatives in the dialogue significant withdrawal of Indian forces from IHK.
   
   
   Conventional Forces
   
   Arrangement of seminars (by third party-US) for India and Pakistan to exchange views on each other's security concerns (as a CBM), rationale for force deployments etc. (with civil and military participation and possible participation of military experts from the major powers).
   
   We believe that we have displayed considerable responsibility and extraordinary patience in dealing with the nuclear proliferation issue. While Pakistan desires dialogue, security, peace and nuclear restraint in South Asia, there should be no presumption that we will accept double standards and discrimination. Our gestures and support for non-proliferation are often taken for granted. Our legitimate efforts to preserve our security in response to Indian nuclear escalation are selectively criticized and at times penalized. No country should be expected to accept such treatment forever.
   
   The US, as the leading world power, has the responsibility and opportunity to promote a genuine and equitable structure of peace and stability in South Asia and arrest the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. We look forward to more determined and even handed efforts by the Clinton Administration in its second term to help in fostering agreement on an effective South Asian peace process.
   

   Table A
   

   COMPARISON INDIA AND PAKISTAN ARMY
   

   Formations	Indian Army	Pakistan Army
   Armoured Divisions	3	2
   Semi-Mechanized Rapid Divisions	4	-
   Mountain/Infantry Divisions	27	19
   Total Divisions	34	21
   Independent Armoured/ Mechanized Brigades	9	7
   Independent Infantry Brigades	6	5
   Para Brigade	1	-
   Amphibious Brigade	1	-

   Table B
   

   COMPARISON INDIA AND PAKISTAN AIR FORCES
   

   Type of Aircraft	Indian Airforce No of Squadrons	Pakistan Airforce No of Squadrons
   Combat Aircraft	*44 Plus	19
   Transport Aircraft	11	1
   Helicopters all types	60	8
   Surface to Air Missile	49	6
   Airbases	46	12

   * Includes state-of-the-art Aircraft SU 30, MIG 25, 27, 29, Mirage 2000 and Deep Strike Jaguars.
   
   Table C
   

   DEPLOYMENT SUMMARY- INDIAN AIR FORCE
   

   Deployed against	Squadrons
   Pakistan	30
   Bangladesh	02
   Myanmar	01
   China	07
   Reserve (Central India)	01
   Total	44

   Table D
   

   COMPARISON INDIA AND PAKISTAN NAVY
   

   Units	Indian Navy	Pakistan Navy
   Submarines	18	6
   Aircraft Carriers	1	-
   Surface Ships	131*	32
   Aircraft/Helicopters	162	29

   * Including 5 Destroyers, 13 Frigates and 15 Missile Corvettes

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