U.S.-Russian Military Theories and Practices

Article by Wen Weier
Beijing
XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI
[CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS]
20 Feb 95 No 2, pp 12-18

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Cold War has ended, ushering in a new phase in U.S. and Russian study of military theories, especially on contemporary warfare. They have come up with new theories, new concepts, and new policies. Today, U.S. and Russian armed services are revising their strategies and tactics based on these new theories, concepts, and policies.

Compared to the Cold War era, there are six major developments and changes.

I. National security: The concept has changed in intension and extension; new "security outlook" and "national defense outlook" are being proposed.

During the Cold War, nations generally took "national security" to mean "military security." After the Cold War, the international environment has changed dramatically, and the United States and Russia have come up with a new "security outlook" and "national defense outlook."

1. Economic security is the key.

The concept of "national security" has been expanded to include not only military security but also political, economic, social, and even technological, cultural, and ecological issues. Upon taking office, Clinton said that the United States should no longer consider national security matters using military terms in their narrow meaning of the Cold War era. He said that national security refers primarily to economic security and that the United States must give overwhelming priority to revitalizing the economy.

The latest U.S. "Report on National Security Strategies" points out that economic security is the basic principle of national security; economic strength is the stronghold of economic security, and it is vital for the United States to restore its economic health to lay the foundation for increasing its competitiveness in global markets in the next century. The fiscal 1995 U.S. "National Defense Report" points out that in the short-run, the U.S. security is dependent on strong armed forces, but in the long-run, its security must depend on a strong economy.

At the 49th United Nations General Assembly, Russian President Yeltsin said, in the past "security" was interpreted in a military sense, but that no longer holds true today. He said that security matters people run into today are much broader; today, security is almost synonymous with the concept of "steady development." The deputy secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council pointed out that, in principle, there are different levels of security--personal, social, and national; the three are inseparable; they are coordinated and interrelated, but the most important thing is to safeguard national security, to safeguard Russia's national interests and the state's rights and privileges with surety.

2. Military force is the last resort.

The U.S. and Russian militaries believe that at the end of the Cold War, although the international security environment has changed, the primary mission of the military has not--it is still to deter potential adversaries and to be ready to fight and win wars. Military might is still the backing of national security and is the final resort for solving problems. On that basis, the United States has formulated a program that will allow them to fight and win two simultaneous, large-scale regional conflicts. Russia has formulated a program to deal with limited wars and conflicts. At the 49th United Nations General Assembly, Clinton publicly proclaimed that when U.S. interests are threatened, it will take concerted action with other countries when possible, but if necessary, it will take diplomatic action and even use military force.

Russia's new military doctrine emphasizes that military strength will be its backing in the future, and it will use political, diplomatic, legal, economic, and other means to settle and prevent armed confrontations. Russia will use every means to safeguard its security, but it will give priority to utilizing peaceful, especially political and diplomatic, means; military force will be used only to defend itself and to drive away invaders.

3. Nuclear weapons have their unique role:

The fiscal 1995 U.S. "National Defense Report" reiterates that nuclear weapons are a strong and reliable deterrent force against enemy nuclear attack. Its nuclear strike force will remain highly flexible and will be ready to launch a nuclear counterattack. Russia's new military doctrine emphasizes that nuclear weapons are a political means to deter attack and not a means of military action, but meanwhile, Russia has openly abandoned its promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

II. Warfare: The focus has shifted from world war to regional, limited warfare and armed confrontations and fighting conventional wars under nuclear threat.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States, Russia, and others began to overhaul their respective national development and military strategies. Subsequently, they also comprehensively examined their defense systems and military construction. Thereupon, the United States has formulated a "regional defense strategy" while Russia has drawn up an "all-points mobile defense strategy." Compared to the Cold War era, their attitudes toward future wars have changed dramatically.

1. In terms of their appraisal of war, both the United States and Russia believe that the focus should be on limited wars and armed confrontations.

The United States believes that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of an all-out nuclear or conventional war has greatly diminished. Threats to the United States in the future will come from four areas: One, a new nuclear crisis; two, regional powers; three, security threat caused by chaos in the former Soviet Union and in the Eastern European countries as they undergo changes; and four, economic threats against U.S. interests.

Russia, on the other hand, believes that any realistic threat will not come from the United States or NATO; rather, it will come from the surrounding countries. The likelihood of an all-out nuclear or conventional war between Russia and the NATO countries has clearly diminished, but the likelihood of limited war and armed confrontation with neighboring states caused by political, economic, territorial, national, and religious conflicts has increased sharply. Therefore, the focus of Russian war-preparedness is on how to deal with limited wars and armed confrontations, which will be the main form of warfare in the future.

2. In terms of their appraisal of imagined enemies, both the United States and Russia are actually targeting regional powers.

In the near-term, the United States is mainly concerned about Third World countries, especially some regional powers and countries that are proliferating nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, but in the long-run, it is most worried about the economic and technological powers; they will be competing with the United States for economic superiority, technological superiority, and world leadership. The U.S. Long-Term Comprehensive Strategy Commission believes that the security environment will become even more complicated in the next 20 years; new powers, new technologies, and new alliances will emerge, and in particular, economic development and changes will be most critical.

Russia, on the other hand, believes that in the near-term, the main threat will come from the surrounding states, and in the long-run, the main threat will come from the United States and Japan.

3. In terms of their estimates of the scale of war, the United States and Russia are prepared to fight two simultaneous regional conflicts.

The United States has formulated a plan to "win two simultaneous large-scale regional conflicts" in which maximum troop participation may reach 480,000. The fiscal 1995 "National Defense Report" indicates that "to defeat potential hostile regional forces is the core of the U.S. military plan."

Russia's guiding principle stresses that it will not initiate an attack on neighboring states and will conduct mobile defense operations and rely on its mobile troops as the main fighting force. It wants to be able to participate in two medium-sized wars or in one or two fairly large-scale wars concurrently in which maximum troop participation may reach 200,000 men.

4. In terms of weapon analysis, both the United States and Russia have shifted their emphasis from nuclear war to conventional war under nuclear threat.

The United States believes that the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated, that strategic nuclear weapons are being drastically reduced, and that U.S.-Russian relations have improved, and therefore the threat of the United States launching a large-scale nuclear attack has greatly diminished. It has formulated a strategic nuclear program aimed at providing effective deterrence; it has renamed its nuclear strike force, now calling it the nuclear deterrent force. On the other hand, it still wants to be able to organize a new nuclear unit if the nuclear disarmament situation should change for the worse.

Russia believes that nuclear weapons are a political means to deter war and not a means of military action. It is understandable why some people refer to Russia's strategic nuclear force as a strategic deterrent force. Thus, both the United States and Russia understand that future wars will be conventional wars fought under nuclear threat.

5. In terms of preparedness for future theaters of operations, the United States and Russia have emphasized different things.

The United States has shifted its focus from dealing with threats in Europe to dealing with global conflicts, especially regional conflicts where U.S. interests are threatened. Russia, however, has shifted its emphasis from central Europe to its own periphery and has implemented an all-points mobile defense system.

6. In terms of the characteristics of how future wars will be conducted, the United States and Russia have basically reached the same conclusion.

They both emphasize that,

The United States and Russia have taken the following major steps to deal with future limited warfare and conflicts:

A. Reorganizing the command setup:

The United States has reorganized the 10 major combat commands set up during the Cold War era into nine major commands, and consequently the command functions have changed. Specifically, the European, Pacific, central, and southern commands are in charge of the overseas military presence units under their respective jurisdiction; those units are responsible for making early response to regional crises. The Atlantic command is responsible for directing operations of units fighting two simultaneous large-scale regional conflicts and is mainly responsible for special combat duties. The transport unit command is responsible for mobile troop command; it is in charge of shipping military personnel and supplies worldwide.

Russia also has overhauled the duties of Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the General Staff. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for formulating national defense policies and safeguarding troop supplies and technologies. The headquarters of the General Staff is in command of the combat troops. Russia also has trimmed its five major armed services to four, eliminating the territorial air defense unit and turning the duties over to the air forces. The combat forces have also been reorganized. The army has replaced its "group army-division" system with the "army-brigade" system. The navy has set up a new branch--the coast guard, responsible for coastal defense operations. The air force has set up a military aerospace command; it is the youngest branch command in the Russian military.

B. Revising the military strategies of the three branches of the armed services.

The United States and Russia have revised the military strategies of the three branches of the armed services according to their respective new national military strategies.

The U.S. Army has turned its air-land combat strategy into an air-land-sea-space strategy. Based on that strategy, in future wars, its troops will be an important follow-up combat unit capable of fighting two simultaneous large-scale limited wars. At peacetime, they will be stationed at home, but in wartime they will be shipped to trouble spots by the mobilization unit to complete follow-up combat duties alongside other branches of the military.

The U.S. Navy has formulated a new "from-sea-to-land" military strategy. In the past, its troops were responsible for blue-water combat duties; today, they are charged with "from-sea-to-land" combat duties, which means in future wars, they will be the mobile strike force capable of fighting two simultaneous large-scale limited wars alongside units dispatched to forward areas. The

U.S. Air Force has formulated a new "global destination, global strength" strategy. Its troops have special importance in fighting two simultaneous large-scale limited wars and are the most important response and attack force; they will share mobile attack combat duties with the Navy and other branches.

The Soviet Army has replaced a "large, in-depth, multilevel defense strategy" with an "all-points mobile defense strategy." Upon completing overseas military withdrawal, the Russian military will be reorganized according to plans to set up a mobile unit and a strategic reserve unit. Specifically, the mobile unit is under the jurisdiction of the central authorities and is the main unit that deals with limited wars and domestic crises. The strategic reserve unit is the main force that deals with wars that have further escalated.

The Russian Navy has shifted from a "blue-water attack" strategy to an "inshore defense" strategy. It will fight alongside other branches in future wars to effectively protect Russian territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.

The Russian Air Force will shift from a "foreign soil operations" strategy to a "territorial defense" strategy. Upon completing overseas military withdrawal, the Russian Air Force will undergo comprehensive reorganization to form a new aeronautical group and then begin to make a transition to a mixed formation system and gradually create a "dragon"--a continuous command, combat, and safeguard chain--to fight alongside the navy and the army.

3. Reorganizing the combat troop structure.

The United States and Russia are comprehensively restructuring their combat forces according to their respective new military strategies and new military doctrines.

The U.S. military is replacing a "basic strength" structure with a "plank" structure. The former was a military structure introduced during the Bush administration. It divided the U.S. Armed Forces into four parts: the strategic, Atlantic, Pacific, and emergency commands. After Clinton took office, some changes were made, and subsequently, the "plank" structure was put in. It also divides the armed forces into four categories--troops dealing with two simultaneous large-scale regional conflicts, troops for maintaining a U.S. military presence overseas, troops for noncombat military operations, and a strategic deterrence unit.

Upon thorough examination by the Defense Department, the preliminary decision is that in peacetime, troops for fighting two simultaneous regional conflicts will be stationed at home; troops for maintaining a U.S. military presence overseas will be stationed in the major theaters of operations; personnel for the noncombat military operation units will be picked from troops that handle regional conflicts; the strategic deterrence unit will rely heavily on sea-based ballistic missiles and will be stationed at home as well as overseas in peacetime.

Russia will install a new armed forces structure, and before the year 2000, the new structure will be made up of four branches--an army, a navy, an air force, and a strategic deterrence unit. After the year 2000, there will only be three branches--the air force and the strategic deterrence unit will be combined to form an aerospace air force. The new branches will create new formations: The army will form a mobile unit and a strategic reserve unit. The navy will still rely on its four main fleets as the mainstay but will set up a coast guard. The air force will be made up of the long-range airmen, frontline airmen, and two other units. The strategic deterrence unit will rely heavily on sea-based ballistic missiles.

III. Troop deployment: from "forward deployment" to "forward presence" and the theories of "troop delivery" and "rapid mobilization" along with plans for their implementation.

During the Cold War era, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other powers pursued a general policy of "forward deployment." They sent massive numbers of troops to forward positions and created clearly confrontational situations; the two were constantly on the brink of war. After the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, U.S.-Russian relations have clearly improved. Therefore, they have changed to the "forward presence" theory, also known as "military presence." Its characteristics are:

1. Maintenance of "forward presence" is emphasized.

This is different from the heavily armed confrontation of "forward deployment." Based on its need to maintain necessary strategic position, the United States has begun to adjust its troop deployment. It plans to reduce troops deployed in the European theater to 100,000 men, down from 310,000 during the Cold War era; currently, the number stands at 166,000. In the Asia-Pacific region, troops will be reduced from 119,000 to about 100,000 men, and they are close to that goal today. In the Middle East, it continues to pursue its long-standing strategy; currently, 29,000 men are deployed, and with the Gulf crises coming to an end, it is planning gradual troop reductions.

At the end of August 1994, Russia had completed troop withdrawal from outside former Soviet territory. Specifically, it has withdrawn 575,000 men from Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; 186,000 men from Mongolia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan; and 5,000 men from Cuba. Currently, it is withdrawing 130,000 people from the three Baltic states. When these troops return home, the Russian military will redeploy them according to the principle of a forward-leaning, inverted-triangle setup.

With this round of major revision, U.S. and Russian overseas troop deployment will change dramatically, abandoning the old posture that emphasized central Europe; both will maintain a low-level strategic balance in Europe. The United States may still put its strategic focus on Europe, but Asia's strategic position has clearly increased. After completing troop withdrawals, Russia will still regard the West as the focal point of strategic deployment and will emphasize establishing strategic relations with the former Soviet republics; it will further reduce the number of troops stationed along the Chinese-Russian border to the east and will improve relations with neighboring states.

2. Diversity of "presence" is emphasized.

To show a "presence" and increase diversity in the form of "presence," besides installing 12 brigade units in forward areas, the U.S. military has also decided to hold periodic maneuvers with its allies. It will keep a certain amount of military installations in the forward areas, dispatch high-ranking officers to visit forward areas periodically, and make military sales to its allies, including sales of advanced weaponry. Russia, on the other hand, will take effective measures to maintain its sphere of influence abroad. It has guaranteed provision of weaponry to India and will help India set up defense industry facilities. Russia has actively forged military relations with Vietnam and has worked hard to satisfy Vietnam's arms purchases and will continue to have use-rights at the Cam Ranh Bay base.

3. "Troop delivery" and "rapid mobilization" capacities are emphasized.

The theory of "troop delivery" is a basic theory of how future wars will be fought. It was developed by the U.S. military after the Cold War to deal with massive arms and troop reductions from forward areas. It primarily addresses the issues of how to deliver troops to emergency war zones and how to win wars. The essence of that theory is to "deliver small forces to complete big tasks." The theory of "rapid mobilization" is a new kind of basic combat theory developed by Russia after the Cold War to help the Russian military strengthen its ability to intervene in former Soviet territories. Its essence is to solve the problem of how to rapidly deploy troops to trouble areas in the event of a crisis. In that respect, both the United States and Russia have formulated their own programs and have set new standards.

The U.S. military considers that as an early response, it should be able to dispatch a heavy-duty army division--made up of one to three regiments--plus support platoons and eight air force fighter wings and one to two units of troops equivalent to an army brigade at anytime, from immediately to up to 14 days, and in approximately a month's time it should be able to deploy another heavily-armed unit made up of three divisions plus the rest of the 10 wings of air force fighters and additional units of marines, and in the next six weeks after that, it should be able to dispatch the rest of the troops needed to launch a counterattack.

On the Russian side, an army instant response unit will be sent to the war zone; the main force should be dispatched within one to three days after the incident, and the rest of the forces should be airlifted to the trouble spot within three to seven days. Rapid deployment units will be used to support the instant response unit if the conflict should escalate. The strategic reserve force is a unit set up to deal with extraordinary situations or large-scale wars. Naval and air forces will provide effective support to ground operations.

IV. Troop organization: proposing the theory of "substituting quality for quantity" in military construction, putting "quality" before "numbers," and embarking on the road to building "quality" troops.

At the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia began to pursue a general military construction policy that puts quality at the heart and replaces quantity with quality, embarking on the road to building quality troops. Quality troop-building consists of three parts:

  1. good soldiers--they must have high school or better education, and without compromising the country's real strength, the number of soldiers should be cut back as much as possible.
  2. Good equipment--on the premise of continuous upgrading and development, advanced equipment should take over human functions as much as possible.
  3. Combining personnel and equipment to give play to maximum combat effectiveness.

The United States has declared that it will construct a modern army that is the best equipped in the world and which can win two simultaneous large-scale regional conflicts, so that by the early 21st century, the U.S. military will become a force with the greatest "personnel edge" and "technological edge" in the world.

Russia has suggested abandoning the old strategy of competing with the United States "one-on-one," and instead it will maintain a standard which will enable it to participate in two medium-sized wars concurrently and will no longer seek to outnumber the United States. It has made improving quality its army-construction policy, "sufficiency and reasonableness" its guiding principle, and compatibility with its economic strength the basis as it builds a sharp, small-scale, modern army that meets the needs of high-tech conventional warfare, that is highly mobile, that is in possession of the most modern equipment, and that has the highest proportion of professionals.

The latest U.S. developmental plans include the following: The army will be equipped with Comanche armed helicopters and XM8 armored guns; the air force will be equipped with mid- and high-altitude maximum endurance pilotless planes, laser-gun-equipped planes, and kinetic weapons; the planes have maneuvering radii of 500-2,000 nautical miles, with up to 30 hours of flight time, and meanwhile, the navy will build new submarines which can secretly approach enemy coastlines for reconnaissance of the coastal and air defense systems and to send special forces ashore. They are also planning to build multipurpose vessels to replace the existing cruisers and destroyers.

Russia has formulated plans to equip its troops according to a "long-term armament program." Specifically, they will increase the defense and combat capacity of individual soldiers, develop aerospace technologies and equipment and various high-accuracy weapons and mobilization tools that can send troops to the war zones quickly, increase the reliability of strategic nuclear weapons, and vigorously upgrade combat command and communications means at all levels, from squads to divisions.

In addition, the United States and Russia are vigorously developing nonlethal weapons, also known as mild weapons. They fall into three main categories: Weapons that cause the other side to lose combat effectiveness; weapons that disarm the other side's conventional equipment; and weapons that interfere with or destroy the other side's electronic equipment. Experts predict that such weapons will be introduced into the battlefields en masse within the next 15 years.

In accordance with their need to build a quality army and their troop construction plans, the United States and Russia are in the midst of changing their military from a personnel-intensive to a technology-intensive mode; troop size is getting smaller, and things are changing dramatically.

One, active forces:

The U.S. military plans to reduce its armed forces from the peak of 2.17 million men during the Cold War era to 1.45 million, approximately a 30-percent reduction, and currently the number stands at 1.61 million. The Russian military plans to reduce its armed forces from 2.8 million to 1.5 million men by the end of the century, approximately a 46-percent reduction, and currently the number stands at 1.91 million.

Two, the strategic nuclear force:

According to their nuclear disarmament agreement, the United States and Russia plan to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in two separate stages. In the first stage, the United States will reduce the number by 3,500 units, that is, from 12,000 to 8,500 warheads, by 1997, which represents approximately a 30-percent reduction. Russia will cut the number of warheads by 3,700, that is, from 10,000 to a little more than 6,000 units, approximately a 40-percent reduction. In the second stage, the United States will cut another 5,000 units or so, that is, to 3,500, by the year 2003, and Russia will reduce its number by 3,000 or so, that is, to 3,000.

Three, overseas and domestic military bases:

By 1997, the United States will cut overseas bases from 1,500 to a little more than 760 and domestic bases from 498 to 428. Russia will close most of its foreign bases as well as many bases at home too. Reportedly, Russia will keep only 30 military bases in the former Soviet territory.

To make sure that reducing the size of the military and reducing forward deployment will not undermine combat effectiveness, both the United States and Russia have built rapid response units. The U.S. military has built a force capable of fighting two simultaneous large-scale regional conflicts in addition to a non-combat military action unit. The former is made up of four to five army divisions, four to five army brigades, 10 air force fighter wings, 100 air force bombers, four to five naval aircraft carrier combat groups, and several special combat groups, with total manpower of 480,000. The air force is made up of one air strike or airborne division, one light infantry division, one mechanized infantry division, one marine division, one to two aircraft carrier groups, one to two air force combined aircraft wings, and air and sea transport units, with total manpower of 50,000.

Russia has formed a mobilization force which is divided into an instant response unit and a rapid deployment unit. According to GUOFANG, a Japanese monthly magazine, the instant response unit is made up of five airborne divisions, eight paratrooper brigades, six light infantry brigades, five to seven fighter wings, five bomber wings, and six naval infantry battalions, with total manpower of 750,000. The rapid deployment unit is made up of three group armies, one infantry division, three helicopter wings, and three bomber divisions, with total manpower of around 125,000.

V. Military alliance: the theory of "aligned partners"--an alliance whose essence is changing from a master-servant relationship and hostility to that of partnership and from the military-political mold to the political-military mold.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union set up their respective military blocs--NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Both sides prepared for the outbreak of a major war and remained in a state of tense military confrontation. At the end of the Cold War, the nature of NATO has changed dramatically, and the Warsaw Pact has collapsed; U.S.-Russian relations have changed. According to this new situation, the United States has come up with the strategic theory of "superalliance" and the principle of forging partnerships. Russia has come up with the strategic idea of "joint defense" and the theory of maintaining a "military presence" in formerly Soviet territories. Compared to the Cold War era, the nature and format of military alliances have changed dramatically:

1. The forging of aligned partnerships is emphasized.

The nature of NATO has changed; instead of a military-political organization, it has become a political-military organization. NATO has expanded from Europe to regions outside of Europe, and besides carrying out the "traditional collective defense" duties, it has taken on new United Nations functions and other international organization cooperative duties. Its internal relations have evolved from that of master-servant to that of partnership; members share defense duties and costs; externally, it is forming partnerships-in-peace with Russia, Ukraine, and other states of the former Soviet Union. Based on agreements, NATO and its partners will consult each other on national defense budgets, hold joint military maneuvers, and take part in NATO peacekeeping operations.

The Warsaw Pact has disbanded, but, in accordance with its joint defense concept and its "military presence" theory, Russia has established new "nonalignment" relations with the former Warsaw Pact nations through bilateral cooperative agreements. It has entered into collective security pacts with nine members of the Commonwealth of Independent States; the Commonwealth states are moving from disunion to union, and a new phase has unfolded in their reintegration. According to its National Defense Council, the Commonwealth states will set up a defense alliance at the end of 1995; its duties will be to safeguard the region's peace and stability during peacetime and set up a supreme command and organize a counterattack during wartime.

2. Dealing with regional wars and conflicts is emphasized.

NATO believes that with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the probability of a major war breaking out in Europe is basically nonexistent. The threat to NATO will primarily be regional crises, and the NATO mission is to prevent and deal with regional confrontations. Russia and the former Warsaw Pact nations believe that the probability of worldwide nuclear or conventional war is minimal, and the major threat to their national security may be limited conflicts and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Russia believes its mission is mainly to protect its own national security and maintain its sphere of influence as a world power. To that end, Russia has decided, with the consent of the pertinent nations, to dispatch troops outside of its territory or within the former Soviet territory to take up peacekeeping duties.

3. The "superalliance" strategy is emphasized.

To deal with regional wars and conflicts, the United States, Great Britain, and other countries vigorously advocate the "superalliance" strategy. This strategy originated during the Gulf War. At that time, the United States joined with scores of countries to form a multinational force in the war against Iraq. Upon winning that war, this form of alliance caught the attention of Western countries. They believed that, unlike the permanent military alliance, this new military alliance made it clear that a temporary cooperation could be forged purposefully among the pertinent countries or organizations according to the nature and the location of the crisis or conflict and that joint military action could be taken under the guidance of the theory of collective security. This kind of cooperation is more flexible and puts military and security matters in political and economic context.

VI. Strategic defense: the U.S. focus shifts from developing a national missile defense system to developing and improving a war-zone ballistic missile defense system, while Russia begins to set up a new strategic defense system.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were each other's main enemy, and each concentrated on developing an antimissile weapon system to protect its territorial airspace; these were intended primarily to be used to destroy the other side's strategic missiles. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States revised its "strategic defense" theory, abandoned the "Star Wars" program, and came up with a new defense theory of strengthening "strategic depth." That theory first appeared in the fiscal 1993 "National Defense Report." It maintained that the need for an early deployment national missile defense system had diminished and suggested that in the future the focus should be on developing and improving a war-zone ballistics missile defense system. On that basis, the U.S. Defense Department also came up with the concept of "multilevel defense," and based on that concept, the U.S. military began to set up a joint war-zone ballistic missile defense system, namely, the new antimissile system, in the western Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe.

That system is made up of three parts:

One, the warning and monitoring system. It includes an advanced land-based radar system, an aerial warning system, and a "brilliant eye" space surveillance system which will primarily provide the antimissile system with target intelligence.

Two, the strategic guided missile defense system. It includes an army land-to-air guided missile system, an air force booster missile interceptor system, and naval "high altitude" and "low altitude" missile defense systems; its main purpose is to deal with mid- to short-range guided missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft; their interception distance is 200 kilometers, at an altitude of 150 kilometers. This system will be completed around the year 2000.

Three, the battlefield management system. The U.S. Defense Department has presented its budget to Congress and has asked for investments of $50 billion over a 15-year period to build and develop that system.

Russia has come up with the "mutual security concept," based on which they have developed the new theory of "joint defense" and have decided to set up a multilevel defense system.

1. To set up a unified air-and-space defense system. The Russian military believes that the early stage of a future war will basically consist of intense air and space combat; air and space have become inseparable, and only by setting up an air-and-space defense system can they guarantee the successful launching of the first strategic battle in the early stage of war. The air-and-space defense system follows the regional deployment principle and relies on the air force to set up an air-and-space reconnaissance system and a unified air defense troop and armament system in each air defense area to facilitate unified combat. Within each air defense area, there will be an inner-ring and an outer-ring; the outer ring will be 100-130 kilometers and the inner ring will be 50-70 kilometers from the center, and the entire country will form a unified air-and-space defense system.

2. Setting up key protection and defense systems in key areas. The Russian Ministry of Defense has decided to set up special defense zones in places like Kaliningrad to the west to be put under a special plan.

3. Setting up bilateral and multilateral joint defense systems with the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Currently, Russia is proposing a transnational plan which will benefit all nations and which will proportionally match costs to benefits.

The organic combination of the above three systems forms the new Russian strategic defense system.


THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL.
COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS