A LOOMING PROLIFERATION THREAT
By Paul Goble
Falling salaries among Russian scientists working on
nuclear weapons and missiles represent a looming
proliferation threat, according to a study by an American
think-tank.
That is because, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace said in a report released last week,
many of these underpaid specialists may now consider
selling nuclear materials or even offering their own
services abroad.
Prepared by Russian social scientist Valentin
Tikhonov, who was able to gain access to areas still closed
to Western scholars, the Carnegie study reports on surveys
conducted in eight Russian cities, five of which specialize
in building nuclear weapons and another three which are
involved in the production of missiles and missile-related
technologies.
According to the Carnegie report, 62 percent of all
workers in the enterprises in these cities make less than
$50 a month, with more than half of the scientists involved
reporting being forced to take a second job to make ends
meet. Almost nine out of 10 said they had suffered a
decline in their standard of living, and a majority felt
their salaries were only one-third or half of what they
should be.
Because of the precipitous decline in their incomes,
the report suggests, at least some of the scientists may be
tempted to sell off some of the nuclear materials to anyone
with the money to buy. And at least some of the nuclear and
missile scientists said they would like to work outside of
Russia, raising the specter that they might sell their
services to rogue states interested in developing a nuclear
missile capability.
If the scientists either sell nuclear materials or
offer their services to rogue states, the report says, this
would exacerbate "the problem of nuclear weapons
proliferation" around the world. If they do both, that
could represent one of the most serious proliferation
threats of all time. And to prevent that, the Carnegie
report urges that both Moscow and the West work together to
increase the salaries and job satisfaction of the
scientists involved.
At the very least, it says, "the Russian government
and associated experts have a responsibility to understand
the particular social and economic problems that beset
these specialists at a time when Russian reforms are
evolving," because "the better these trends are understood,
the more effective targeted programs to address current
circumstances will be."
What makes the Carnegie report so disturbing is that
it comes after almost a decade of efforts both by Moscow
and Western governments - especially that of the United
States - to try to prevent any leakage of nuclear weapons,
equipment, or personnel out of the countries that emerged
following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Beginning almost immediately after 1991, the U.S.
successfully pushed for the return of all Soviet nuclear
weapons to the Russian Federation. It promoted the
dismantling of nuclear weapons and the denaturing of
nuclear materials. And it provided assistance through the
Nunn-Lugar program to sustain Russian nuclear scientists
and thus dissuade them from selling their services to rogue
states.
Since 1991, the so-called Nunn-Lugar program - named
for U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and former U.S. Senator Sam
Nunn - has helped destroy some 5,000 nuclear warheads as
well as weapon materials and delivery systems.
Throughout this decade, the Russian government has
continued to insist that it has complete and effective
control over nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and
nuclear and missile scientists. So far, there is no
evidence that Moscow has lost control over the weapons, but
there has been leakage of at least small amounts of nuclear
materials and some nuclear and missile scientists seeking
higher-paid work.
The Carnegie report suggests that there may be more
leakage of both in the near term unless something more is
done to address the income needs of the Russian scientists.
And its conclusions are likely to prompt at least some
Western governments to consider extending more assistance
to prevent the flight of nuclear fuel and nuclear
scientists to countries like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
But precisely because the Carnegie study calls into
question much of the optimism at the core of most earlier
investigations into this matter, its findings are likely to
spark a new debate in both Moscow and the West about just
what is the best way to prevent proliferation at a time
when the major nuclear powers are cutting back their
programs while some other countries are seeking to acquire
such weapons.
And in that debate, some are certain to call for a new
round of disarmament talks, while others are likely to
insist that the Russian government must take steps to
control the situation with its nuclear scientists if it
wants to be taken seriously. But as the Carnegie study
reminds, while this debate is taking place, ever more
Russian nuclear and missile scientists will be
reconsidering just what their options are in the post-Cold
War environment.
(Compiled by Victor Yasmann)
Copyright (c) 2001. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free
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