J F Dunn "The Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Debate" March 1993 Soviet Studies Research Centre The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Camberley, Surrey GU15 4PQ DISCLAIMER The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence 1. INTRODUCTION On 16 July 1990 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet (Verkhovna Rada) adopted a "Declaration of State Sovereignty" by a majority of 355 to four. Article IX of this document, dealing with the "External and Internal Security" stated inter alia: "The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its intention to become in future a permanently neutral state, taking no part in military blocs and holding to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons." Since the Declaration proclaims itself to be binding, its non-nuclear principles have been reflected in subsequent legislation such as Article 1 of the Law on Defence. The radical non-nuclear policy of the Declaration is explicable in terms of the circumstances in which it was conceived. First, the Ukraine was at that stage being swept by a nationalist revival; the democratic and nationalist opposition in the VR harnessed this mood and pressed the communist majority into concessions. Thus, in part the Declaration represented an attempt to differentiate the aspiring new state from the central authorities in Moscow. Secondly, the non-nuclear policy was driven by a hope that radical denuclearisation would favourably impress the West and thus secure international recognition. Thirdly, the Declaration came only four years after the Chernobyl explosion and thus reflected a still widespread mistrust of all nuclear capabilities, both military and civilian. Finally, the non-nuclear policy was conceived without military in-put. At this stage the Ukraine had no army of its own to indicate to policy-makers the implications of their decisions. The main concern was to counter the Soviet army, seen by many nationalists as foreign, but still operating on "sovereign" Ukrainian territory. Although the 1990 Declaration did not stipulate that the Ukraine should immediately divest itself of all nuclear weapons (the "intention to become in future" indicates that non-nuclear status might be qualified in the interim), it was nevertheless an unconditional surrender of nuclear weapons which the international community read into the document and which Ukrainian leaders initially seemed to espouse. Thus, in conformity with the Declaration and agreements made earlier with Russia, the Ukraine transferred all its tactical nuclear weapons (approximately 3000) to Russia for destruction, a process completed in May 1992. This left the Ukraine in possession of only 176 inter-continental strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with 1240 warheads and a limited number of bombers with strategic nuclear capabilities. However, even before the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia was complete, Ukrainians began to debate the wisdom of abandoning their nuclear arsenal. Although the top political leadership in the government still support the elimination of the remaining ICBMs, they now face growing opposition in parliament. The intensity of the debate is evidenced by two issues. First, on 28 October 1992 the VR failed to ratify the new draft Military Doctrine. To a majority of VR deputies it seemed that the consistently defensive and non-nuclear draft doctrine was too pacifist to provide adequate security. Secondly, the VR is due to consider ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the Ukraine's accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as negotiated by the executive in Lisbon on 23 May 1992. Despite pressure from the West and the knowledge that both Belarus and Kazakhstan have now acceded to both treaties, the Ukraine has not yet ratified the treaties in parliam ent. 2. ARGUMENTS FOR ELIMINATION There is little doubt that the Ukraine's initial espousal of a non-nuclear policy was politically (rather than militarily) motivated. The "Financial Times" has identified Professor Volodymir Vasylenko of Kiev University as "the architect" of the decision to renounce nuclear weapons. According to the "Financial Times" Vasylenko persuaded the government of the benefits of non-nuclear status by arguing: "You cannot have a nuclear force that is not tied to the Russian force, because of technology and control systems. By being a nuclear power we would not have full independence." The obverse of the desire to distance the Ukraine from its colonial masters in Russia is the desire to integrate the Ukraine into west European economic and security structures. Thus, the political leadership has pointed out that retention of nuclear weapons could antagonise the West and jeopardise the acceptance of the Ukraine into the western order. Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasyuk has stated: "Our western partners made it clear that if the Ukraine had not chosen nuclear-free status, all possible political, economic and psychological sanctions would have been applied against us." Political arguments for giving up nuclear weapons have been reinforced by practical considerations. A Colonel in the Ukrainian army and VR Deputy, Valeriy Izmalkov, has pointed out that the main threats to Ukrainian security are regional, potentially emanating from neighbours such as Russia and Romania. However, the Ukraine's remaining nuclear weapons have an inter-continental range, making them all but irrelevant to current security concerns. Thus, Izmalkov believes that Ukrainian security would have been better served by retaining tactical nuclear weapons. Furthermore, although the Kiev government now has "administrative" (as opposed to "operational") command of the ICBMs on its soil and has a direct presidential link with their launch pads, this command amounts to no more than control over "non-use"; it does not include the ability to launch the weapons independently. Grigoriy Perepelitsa points out that any attempt to operate a nuclear policy would require the co-operation of Russia (which is seen by most Ukrainians as the main potential aggressor)! On available evidence it seems unlikely that the Ukraine would be able to develop the know-how and infrastructure necessary to support an operationally effective, independent strategic nuclear force in the short to medium term. Given the gravity of the economic crisis now facing the Ukraine, there is also growing unease about the cost of retaining nuclear weapons. Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov has stated that their retention would not be in the economic or strategic best interests of the state. Georgiy Kostenko suggests that nuclear weapons are so expensive to develop and to maintain that they would impoverish the Ukraine and render it incapable of maintaining a conventional army or fleet (precisely, he says, the capabilities which the new state needs most, given existing regional threats). Moreover, Izmalkov has pointed out that while the Ukraine has the capacity to produce missile delivery systems (rockets), it cannot manufacture nuclear warheads. The Ukraine is therefore dependent on Russia for parts, design, maintenance, testing and early warning. Any attempt to "remain" a nuclear state would necessitate the development of a complete home-based nuclear infrastructure, thus diverting resources from other sectors. The Ukrainian Ambassador to the UN, Victor Batiouk, points out that 20% of France's military budget is devoted to its "force de frappe" and implies that the Ukraine could not afford such expenditure. On the other hand, as a positive incentive to denuclearisation the US Ambassador to Kiev, Roman Popadyuk, has suggested that a non-nuclear Ukraine could profit from US aid; he suggests that ratification of START I will "open the door to significant financial gains for the Ukraine". In addition to the practical and economic considerations outlined above many more "theoretical" arguments for the elimination of nuclear weapons have been adduced. Chief among these is the fear that a nuclear Ukraine could be drawn into an arms race. Such a development would seriously weaken both the Russian and the Ukrainian economies and would inevitably favour the larger, potentially richer Russia. Moreover, since the Ukraine has no territorial claims on other states, most war scenarios in Kiev postulate an invasion of Ukrainian territory by (an)otherpower(s). The detonation of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, but especially on Ukrainian territory would mean the unacceptable death and destruction of Ukrainian personnel, resources and territory. Since the resulting devastation would make "victory" impossible, the usefulness of even tactical nuclear weapons is severely circumscribed. Thus, nuclear weapons can be effective only as a threat; their relevance is military-psychological rather than military-strategic. However, the efficacy of the nuclear "threat" can be measured only by the "restraint" which it imposes on a potential aggressor. Restraint becomes effective only through the establishment of a "balance of terror", when both sides know that each has a "second strike capability" and will therefore be able to respond even to a preemptive unilateral attack. Supporters of the Ukraine's non-nuclear policy argue that the Ukraine has no credible "second strike capability" and thus can never hope to establish a "balance of terror" and effective nuclear restraint vis-a-vis Russia. Another argument suggests that since the end of the Cold War the threat of superpower confrontation has been replaced by a series of regional "risks". The major risk factors are those associated with regional conflicts which have the potential to involve outside powers. In such regional conflicts nuclear weapons are irrelevant. First, it is argued, nuclear weapons have never protected their owners from regional war, and, when involved in such wars, the nuclear states have never used their nuclear capability. According to this interpretation the Ukraine's strategic nuclear weapons would be relevant only if the Ukraine intended a global projection of power, a policy which it has decisively rejected. 3. THE DIFFICULTIES BECOME CLEARER In the immediate pre- and post-independence period the arguments of the anti-nuclear school of thought carried the day. Originally Leonid Kravchuk, Chairman of the VR and future President of the Ukraine, was "not worried" if the weapons went to Russia for decommissioning. Gradually, however, his worries developed sufficiently to lead to him to reverse his position and on 12 March 1992 to suspend temporarily the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. Kravchuk's motivation for the moratorium is a subject of speculation; his stated reason was that there was no international mechanism for verifying the destruction of the transferred Ukrainian tactical weapons. The Rukh leader, Vyacheslav Chornovil, was worried about sole Russian possession of nuclear weapons from the start. He argued that his country was a rightful inheritor of nuclear weapons and although it should maintain the objective of becoming nuclear-free, the simple transfer of weapons to Russia was not the means of achieving this. Instead Chornovil argued for a series of international agreements, leading to the gradual elimination of the republic's nuclear weapons. Volodymir Filenko, later head of "Nova Ukraina", also argued against transferring the weapons to Russia: "Most MPs think we cannot just give weapons to Russia. It would upset the balance of power between Russia and Ukraine. We're afraid of Russia if you like. We're fighting for independence from Russia." Some believed that the Ukraine should decommission its own nuclear weapons. The Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Pavlychko, argued that the Ukraine should destroy its nuclear weapons on site with international assistance. Gradually, however, the costs of this option became evident. Experts estimated the cost of decommissioning Ukrainian nuclear weapons at around US$2 billion. In fact, Izmalkov argues that the Ukraine does not have the capacity to deal with even the fuel of the remaining weapons. He points out that of the 176 ICBMs, 130 are highly toxic, liquid-fuel based rockets; the remaining 40 are solid-fuel based. The Ukraine, he believes, has neither the capacity to reprocess the fuel or to store it securel y. 4. CONDITIONS ARE ATTACHED As it became clear that the elimination of its remaining nuclear weapons could be both politically and financially expensive, the Ukrainian government began to make their removal conditional upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. The government argued that the unprecedented decision of a state to eliminate its own nuclear weapons warranted an unprecedented response from the international community. Ukrainian denuclearisation should, it said, be carried out in the context of binding guarantees for Ukrainian security from NATO. It quickly became clear, however, that neither NATO membership nor security guarantees were on offer. Thus, the Ukrainian government subsequently downgraded its request and sought "political commitments" and "assurances" from the major nuclear powers. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasyuk commented: "It is a question of the nuclear states making a political commitment in the form of an appropriate document stating that they will regard as unacceptable any use or threat of force against Ukraine on the part of the nuclear states. Needless to say, this kind of commitment does not guarantee Ukraine's security, but it will be of tremendous political and legal importance." At the January 1993 summit meeting between presidents Kravchuk and Yel'tsin, Russia agreed also to provide security guarantees for the Ukraine. However, these guarantees have not met Kiev's requirements on Russian recognition of Ukrainian territorial integrity. They have therefore been rejected and further consideration of START I has been postponed. The increasingly obvious costs associated with denuclearisation also moved the Ukraine to insist on outside financial and technical help. In November 1991 the US Senate approved a plan to provide up to US$500 million for help with dismantling Soviet nuclear and chemical weapons. The Ukraine worries that the lion's share of this aid has gone to Russia. It has rejected a US offer of US$175 million to help with decommissioning Ukrainian weapons as insufficient. On 14 April 1992 Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko declared that the Ukraine could only meet targets on eliminating its nuclear weapons "if we receive the proper help we expect from outside, including western countries." However, on 28 October 1992 Defence Minister Morozov was forced to admit that the Ukraine still had not received any foreign assistance with decommissioning its nuclear weapons. Ukrainian worries were further stoked by news that on 31 August 1992 the US had agreed to purchase enriched uranium from decommissioned Russian weapons for use (after reprocessing) in civilian nuclear reactors. The deal was said to involve the purchase of between US$5 - US$10 billion worth of fissionable material over ten years. This news reinforced a growing Ukrainian belief that the republic had ownership rights to the nuclear materials on its soil, especially the enriched warhead uranium and plutonium. Some argue that these represent a significant economic investment by the Ukrainian state and are extremely valuable. If they are to be eliminated, then only by means of a sale, and they must make a significant contribution to reviving the Ukrainian economy. In the light of these developments many came to believe that the unconditional transfer of tactical nuclear weapons with their (allegedly valuable) fissionable material to Russia was precipitate, especially given that the Ukraine must re-import low-grade nuclear fuel from Russia for use in its civilian nuclear reactors. The debate on nuclear weapons has thus moved a long way from the initial principled decision to "denuclearise". An awareness is growing that nuclear weapons represent a valuable bargaining chip. The debate has moved from principle to utility. 5. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ELIMINATION As the political and financial costs of eliminating the Ukraine's nuclear weapons became clear, those supporting their retention became more confident. Many of those now critical of the original non-nuclear policy recognise that the Ukraine is bound by its July 1990 commitments, but argue that it is not committed to relinquishing its nuclear force immediately. The majority position, as summed up by Ivan Plyushch, Speaker of the VR, is that the Ukraine should "strive toward" nuclear disarmament. However, this is a "goal for the future" and the exact nature of future arrangements will "depend on many factors". For those opposed to denuclearisation the major worry is the uncertainty of the political situation in Russia. All are worried by recurring Russian claims on Ukrainian territory (e.g. Sevastopol', the Crimea) and by the possibility that an extreme nationalist might come to power in Russia. Given this threat some observers are sceptical about the value of security guarantees. One commentator suggested that seeking security guarantees from Russia is like "asking the fox to guard the chickens". Igor Derkach, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Defense and State Security has argued that were Russia to press a claim, the Ukraine would be unable to defend its territory with conventional weapons. On the other hand many believe that the presence of nuclear weapons would act as a deterrent to Russian military action. Of those urging caution on elimination Yuriy Kostenko, now Minister for Environmental Protection and Head of the Nuclear Disarmament Commission, has made probably the most informed contribution. Kostenko argues that all states attempt to guarantee their security by one or more of three methods: either through military might or economic power or through a system of international alliances. At present the Ukraine lacks both the military and economic potential to defend itself. Moreover, its closest relations are with the former Soviet republics, in particular with Russia, from which the greatest threat to its security emanates. Kostenko therefore argues that the Ukraine is exposed. To compensate, nuclear missiles should be retained in the interim. He argues that they should be eliminated only in direct proportion to the Ukraine's integration into the west European community of nations: "Figuratively speaking, the last strategic missile on Ukrainian soil should be destroyed when the Ukraine's fate has been fused with that of many states of Europe." Major-General Volodymir Tolubko MP, Chief of Kharkiv Military University (and seen by some as a possible future Minister of Defence) is an outspoken defender of the Ukraine's nuclear capabilities. Tolubko believes that the political and economic benefits of owning nuclear weapons are "obvious". Given that the Ukraine already possesses these weapons, Tolubko believes it would be economically unwise to attempt to substitute them with a large conventional army. He asserts that Soviet nuclear forces cost only a fraction of the money spent on conventional forces (allegedly, only 6% - 8% of the total military budget). He further believes that retaining nuclear weapons makes sense as part of a policy of preserving those parts of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex which produce high-quality, internationally competitive weapons. In this Tolubko has the backing of the nationalist "Ukrainian National Assembly" which has also argued that the preservation of a nuclear status "meets the fundamental inte rests of the Ukrainian armaments industry". But Tolubko's main concern is military security. He argues that in the absence of a single European collective security system and of effective guarantees for Ukrainian security, the new state should maintain its nuclear arsenal. The Ukraine's nuclear weapons should be reduced only in proportion to reductions carried out by other nuclear states, including the UK and France. If the latter maintain their weapons why should the Ukraine renounce its nuclear potential? "Against whom are Britain and France preparing to defend themselves, or whom will they fight with nuclear weapons? Why do these states have a right to possess nuclear weapons without the question being raised, as it has been in the case of the Ukraine, of their having to destroy them?" One aim of the Ukraine's original non-nuclear decision was to win favour in the West. Many now feel this policy has failed. Instead, they fear that relinquishing nuclear weapons could mean a decline in the Ukraine's international standing with a consequent unwillingness on the part of the major powers to include the Ukraine in international fora. Thus, some now argue that the West will be more impressed by the retention of nuclear weapons. Mykola Porovsky of the Congress of National Democratic Forces has argued that the US will not allow war in any region with nuclear weapons pointed at NATO territory. He implies that the West will cease to care if or when nuclear weapons are removed from Ukrainian territory. Were the Ukraine to retain its nuclea r weapons (thus disrupting START I and II and the NPT), initial western reaction would undoubtedly be negative. However, many believe that this displeasure would be short-lived; the West would eventually accommodate a nuclear Ukraine and would attach greater weight to its opinions given its nuclear capabilities. Military theoreticians have also contributed to the debate. Professor Vyacheslav Gordonov, for example, argues that the Ukraine's non-nuclear policy fails to take adequate account of current defence requirements. Gordonov points to the "Law on Defence", which enacts the non-nuclear principles of the original Declaration of State Sovereignty. He believes the law is excessively reactive and defensive and thus inherently flawed. Gordonov points out that the word "defence" [Russian: oborona] is semantically fixed; it is one type of military action carried out under duress. As such, defensive action can never bring victory and thus by definition cannot guarantee the ultimate security of the state. He argues: "Thus from the outset legislative acts defining the national security of the Ukraine carry within them the conditions for their non-fulfilment." According to Gordonov the present non-nuclear and excessively reactive defense policy is inappropriate in a world where significant threats to Ukrainian security remain, and where other states are working towards a nuclear capability. 6. CONCLUSION/PROGNOSIS Despite the arguments advanced by those who wish to eliminate nuclear weapons, the momentum in Kiev is currently away from denuclearisation and towards the retention of a nuclear capability. This is not to say that the Ukraine will decide to retain its ICBMs. Rather, as the problems and costs of denuclearisation and the attractions of procrastination become more obvious, it may not make a decision to get rid of them. A significant delay in ratification of START I and the NPT is possible. The pro-nuclear momentum of the current debate can be traced to a number of causes. First, there is a growing belief that the original non-nuclear policy laid down in the Declaration of Sovereignty was a response to a particular historical situation, namely the need to achieve and consolidate independence. Now that this has been achieved (much faster than anyone expected in 1990), there has been an inevitable re-evaluation of the initial, some say hasty, non-nuclear decision. Secondly, as the economic crisis has moved to the top of the political agenda, the nuclear issue is increasingly seen in economic terms. Over the past year it has become clear that either retaining or eliminating nuclear weapons will be expensive. Thus, the easiest option has been to stick with the status quo. General-Colonel Bizhan, Deputy Minister of Defence, has declared that: " ... in today's economic situation, the Ukraine cannot consider the destruction of nuclear weapons its priority task." Bizhan has suggested that those states interested in seeing the ratification of START I accelerated, should contribute financial and technical assistance. This seems to indicate that without the deus ex machina of western financial aid, denuclearisation will not take priority. A third factor contributing to momentum away from denuclearisation is a realisation among VR deputies that they hold the key to the global disarmament debate. The fact is that START I and the new NPT cannot become operative until ratified by the VR in Kiev. Also, the recently negotiated START II treaty between Russia and the US is meaningless if the provisions of START I are not implemented first. Thus the deputies of the VR enjoy the spotlight of global attention. Furthermore, since they hold such a strong hand they have the potential to demand a hefty price for the elimination of their weapons. A further factor is a growing Ukrainian disenchantment with western security policies. It is a measure of foreign policy naivety that having gained independence from Russia, the Ukraine initially entertained hopes of NATO membership and then of western security guarantees (although these had consistently been refused to the states of east-central Europe). Now the realisation of Ukrainian security isolation is growing; if the West failed to intervene in the former Yugoslavia, it will certainly not involve itself (other than by exhortation) in battles between Russia and the Ukraine. To many this growing sense of isolation reinforces the need for a nuclear "big stick" with which to threaten Russia. .