Annex C Report of the Special Group Established for Entries into Iraqi Presidential Site [9 April, 1998] Initial entry to the Presidential Sites Summary report of the Head of the Team Text courtesy Iraq News 1. The initial entry to the eight Presidential sites in Iraq, tasked by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, was performed by mission UNSCOM 243 during the period of 25 March to 4 April 1998. The initial entry was conducted following the Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the Secretary-General of 23 February 998. This agreement and its implementing procedures provided for special arrangements by which Iraq would accept UNSCOM and IAEA access to the eight Presidential sites. Previously, and contrary to Security Council resolutions, access to these sites had been blocked from UN inspectors. As will be seen below, one major aspect of the agreement involving the continuing nature of such access - is still unresolved, merely postponed. 2. The initial entry to these sites had limited objectives which were achieved. It is important to emphasize that this mission was not a search type mission, nor was it no notice. Iraq had over a month to make whatever preparations it desired. 3. Cooperation from Iraqi counterparts was satisfactory. The presence of senior diplomatic observers worked out generally well. Of particular note was the constructive presence of Presidential Secretary Mr. Abid Hamoud and Lt. General Amer Rashid, the Minister of Oil, during the visits. 4. The team was composed of a Head of Team, Mr. Charles Due1fer (the Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM), a Chief Expert, Mr. Roger Hill, arid approximately 71 inspectors from 17 countries. The IAEA was a joint participant in this mission represented by Deputy Chief Expert. Mr. Jacques Batite and 14 IAEA experts. 5. The team assembled in Bahrain on 21 March and conducted training until 25 March when the team trave1led to Baghdad. Detailed planning was done in advance to identity site approach routes and the inspection procedures. Operation and logistical planning was conducted in Bahrain and was accomplished smoothly. The team also provided operational and logistical support for the senior diplomats once in Iraq. This placed an additional responsibility on the UNSCOM 243 logistics and operations planners. They performed superbly and the diplomats had few complaints on the planners. 6. Site entries began on 26 March. The eight Presidential Sites were surveyed according to the following schedule: 26-27 March - Three sites in Radwaniyah 28 March - Tikrit 29 March - Mosul and Jabal Makhul 30 March - Lake Tharthar and Basra 31 March - Report writing and perimeter re-survey visits 1-2 April - Republican Palace and Sijood 3-4 April - Report writing and perimeter resurvey visits 7. The team was organized into three entry subteams and additional support subteams, including a special sensor team, external security team, and headquarters team. Sites were divided into sectors; with each entry team responsible for a respective section. 8. A baseline survey was conducted at all Presidential sites that allowed the Commission to establish the location, general purpose, and aerial understanding of most buildings within the sites. This involved brief visits to approximately 1,000 buildings during an eight day period. Obviously, time was limited at each building and quick assessments were required. Document and computer searches were to be limited to spot checks intended to set a precedent. 9. Iraq, ultimately, provided the cooperation necessary to complete these tasks. Present during all mission activities was Lt. General Amer Rashid. Present during most of the visits was also Presidential Secretary Mr. Abid Hamoud. Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz was present at all site visits, but avoided contact with UNSCOM members. 10. The utility of this limited mission is three-fold. First, the acquired database will allow UNSCOM and the IAEA to conduct more focussed subsequent inspections which will support both ongoing monitoring tasks as well as searching for prohibited materials and related documents. Second, the visits allowed inspectors to gain a much better understanding of the nature of the facilities in these areas and that will help clear up many uncertainties and concerns. Finally, the precedent of access to these sites and the use of normal UNSCOM/IAEA inspection techniques was demonstrated. 11. The mission was not intended to be a search for prohibited material and none was found. In fact, there was very little equipment, documentation, or other material in the sites at all. It was clearly apparent that all sites had undergone extensive evacuation. In all the sites outside of Baghdad, for example, there were no documents and no computers. The buildings were largely empty. In the Baghdad area, there were limited documents and a few computers at selected government facilities such as the Presidential Diwan. However like other areas, most buildings were emptied of contents. The Republican Palace, including the area described as belonging to the President, was evacuated. Iraq's explanation for this was that such measures were taken in anticipation of a military strike. This makes follow-on missions more important. 12. A key accomplishment of the mission was to plot more precisely the boundaries of the Presidential sites. Changes were made to four of the sites and included significant surveying work. Discussions over the precise boundaries were conducted primarily with Lt. General Amer Rashid with the episodic involvement of Presidential Secretary Mr. Abid Hamoud. The presence of the senior officials provided for quick decisions as required. The revised perimeters of the sites have now been agreed in the signed note between the Deputy Executive Chairman Mr. Charles Duelfer and Lt. General Amer Rashid. 13. One element of the discussions on the established perimeters concerned the provision for subsequent changes of the Presidential areas. The Commission is concerned that Iraq could change portions of these sites without notifying the Commission and this might lead to problems in subsequent inspections. The team sought to include a provision for 24-hour notification to the Commission of any such change. However, Lt General Amer Rashid asked that this not be included in the signed document since it would imply a continuing right of access to such sites by the Commission. This, he stated, was not Iraq's position. 14. Lt. General Amer Rashid stated that it was well known to the Deputy Executive Chairman that Iraq had agreed only to a process of visits of finite duration. This was their view of what they had agreed in the 23 February Memorandum of Understanding. He also acknowledged that it was the view of the Deputy Executive Chairman that access would be required for long term monitoring. The Deputy Executive Chairman stated that it was his understanding that the Secretary-General was of the same view. However, since it was not the purpose of this mission to resolve the problem of time limits on access, it was agreed to delete reference to any ongoing procedures. It is essential to note, however, that the fundamental issue of continuing access is by no means solved and has only been postponed to the future. 15. The most distinguishing feature of this mission was the presence of a contingent of senior diplomats and the Commissioner designated by the Secretary-General to head the Special Group. The work was organised to ensure that diplomats were present during all visits to buildings and areas in Presidential sites. For the most part this did not interfere with the work of UNSCOM/IAEA. The senior diplomats performed their mission as observers well and with enthusiasm. 16. Nevertheless, in certain limited circumstances, diplomats engaged in argumentation and challenges to the work of UNSCOM experts, supporting Iraqi views against those of UNSCOM. At times it seemed that Iraq was raising spurious issues with the diplomats to put the Commission's experts on the defensive. The Commission's experts might then raise complaints of their own and this had the potential of developing into a damaging tit-for-tat situation. However, as the mission continued, this negative dynamic seemed to recede. It is important to recognise, however, that such problems are likely to reemerge in the future, especially when true no-notice inspections are conducted. 17. The cooperation provided by the Iraqis allowed the completion of the mission. However, this was not always readily achieved and there were some instances of denial of UNSCOM and IAEA rights which were, however, not deemed essential for the present mission. 18 The most contentious issue was the overflight and photography of the Presidential sites by the UNSCOM helicopter. Such photography is necessary for the baseline survey to verify reporting of building location and structure by ground inspectors. Iraq initially denied permission for such activity. While the Head of the team insisted on this aspect of the mission and would not proceed with the rest of the inspection without it, the Iraqis did not engage in discussion with the UNSCOM team. Instead, they engaged the Secretary-General's representatives and, indeed, the Secretary-General himself. 19. Ultimately, the Secretary General supported the UNSCOM position and Iraq relented. This has important implications for the authority of UNSCOM and its chief inspectors when dealing with the Iraqi counterparts and may reflect a fundamental change in the relationship between Iraq and the Special Commission. It will be important that the Secretary-General's representative be supportive of the approach of UNSCOM inspection teams or the chief inspector risks being undercut in seeking Iraqi compliance in future disputes over access or other matters. 20. Two other issues arose related to aerial operations. The team had sought to land an UNSCOM helicopter within these presidential sites. Iraq blocked this on all but one occasion. Further, the Commission had planned on moving inspectors and diplomats from a site in the north (Mosul) to a site in the south (Basra) by air. This would have saved time and wear and tear on the individuals involved since by road this is several hours of driving. During the recent meetings in Baghdad with the Executive Chairman, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq again declined to allow the Commission's aircraft to operate at any location other than Habbaniya Airbase, in contravention of Security Council resolutions. 21.Another potential problem surfaced regarding the procedures and stated requirements for the presence of senior diplomats at specific locations. Iraq stated that UNSCOM and IAEA staff could not enter buildings without a diplomat being present. This did not pose a problem during the course of this mission since many diplomats were present and it was not a surprise visit. However, it must be noted that the procedures do not contain any such requirement and in fact allow for the division of the team into sub-teams at the discretion of the head of the expert team. There is no stated requirement for a senior diplomat to be present in each sub team. In the future this may be problematic since no-notice visits require quick movement into the location often by multiple sub-teams. Assuring the presence of several diplomats at all locations will inhibit the possibility of surprise, since non Baghdad based senior diplomats may then be required. The team did not dispute the request by Iraq to have a diplomat present at each building entered, but this was without prejudice to future missions. 22. Another noteworthy feature of this mission was the extraordinary large numbers of Iraqi minders present at all times. This slowed the work. The organization of convoys of the 25 or so UN vehicles and the 40 to 50 or more Iraqi vehicles was difficult. Convoys at times exceeded a kilometre in length. Upon entry to sites and buildings the ratio of Iraqis to inspectors was often five to one or greater. At times inspectors asked minders to remain outside the buildings as the crowds inhibited serious work. 23. On balance, the mission was successful, but it was apparent that some key issues will arise again in the not too distant future and the Council should be prepared to face them when they arise. Certainly, the matter of continuing access is unsettled and will ultimately reemerge as the Iraqi side clearly feels that the phrase in the 23 February Memorandum of Understanding, referring to "initial and subsequent visits" means for a limited period only. Charles Duelfer Deputy Executive Chairman Head of the Team