United
Nations


Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/494
20 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH



NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL


  The Secretary-General has the honour to  transmit to the Security  Council
a  report submitted  by the  Executive  Chairman  of the  Special Commission
established by  the Secretary-General  pursuant to  paragraph 9  (b) (i)  of
Security Council resolution 687 (1991).






95-18315 (E)   200695/...
*9518315*
Annex

Ninth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph     
9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the    
activities of the Special Commission


I.   INTRODUCTION

1.    The  present report  is the  ninth on  the  activities of  the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9  (b)
(i) of Security Council  resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Council  by
the Executive  Chairman of the Special  Commission.  It  is the eighth  such
report  provided  in  accordance  with   paragraph  3  of  Security  Council
resolution  699 (1991).   It covers the  period from 10 December  1994 to 16
June  1995,  and is  further  to  reports  contained  in documents  S/23165,
S/23268,  S/24108 and  Corr.1,  S/24984, S/25977,  S/26910,  S/1994/750  and
S/1994/1422 and Add.1.

2.  The work of  the Special Commission in the reporting period has  covered
the  whole range of  activities envisaged by  section C  of Security Council
resolution 687  (1991).   However, the  focus has  been to  ensure that  the
Commission  is henceforth in  a position  to monitor  Iraq's compliance with
its  obligations  not  to  use,  retain,  possess,   develop,  construct  or
otherwise acquire  those weapon capabilities banned  to it under  resolution
687   (1991).    For   the  Commission's   monitoring  to   proceed  from  a
comprehensive and  accurate base  requires that  the Commission  be able  to
account, as far as possible, for the disposal or current location of  Iraq's
capabilities,  both past and present, which could be used for banned weapons
purposes.  Consequently, a  large part of the  developments to be covered in
the present report has already been addressed in the report submitted on  10
April 1995 under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) (S/1995/284).


II.  DEVELOPMENTS

A.  General

3.  The Commission  has continued to be extremely active in the period under
review.   Investigations  to elucidate  fully  all  aspects of  Iraq's  past
programmes have continued apace with analytical  work being conducted at the
Commission's headquarters  in New York,  inspection and investigation  teams
being dispatched to Iraq, inquiries on  specific matters being addressed  to
supporting Governments and the responses to  those inquiries being fed  back
into the  analytical and  investigative work.   Seminars  with international
experts  on  relevant  issues  have been  convened  in  New York  under  the
auspices of  the Special  Commission in  order to  assist in the  analytical
process.    Further  work  has  been  undertaken  on  the  proposal  for  an
export/import  monitoring mechanism  called for  by the  Security Council in
paragraph 7 of its resolution 715 (1991).   This proposal is currently  with
the Sanctions  Committee established under  Security Council resolution  661
(1990) for its  approval, prior  to onward transmission  to the Council  for
adoption.   A  more detailed  assessment of  the status  of the Commission's
work in each area is given below.

  4.   During  the period  from  14  to 17  May 1995,  the Deputy  Executive
Chairman of the Special Commission visited Baghdad with a group of  chemical
weapon experts.  The primary  purpose of  that visit was  to address  issues
arising from the analysis,  by the Commission, of Iraq's amended full, final
and complete disclosure of its  past chemical weapons  programmes, submitted
on 25 March 1995. Its secondary purpose was to press Iraq to respond to  the
Commission's concerns relating to Iraq's past biological warfare  programme.
The mission obtained agreement by Iraq  that significant questions did exist
and that Iraq would  address the chemical issues  in written form during the
Executive Chairman's  next  visit to  Iraq.    On biological  matters,  Iraq
indicated that  it could resolve the  Commission's concerns,  but only after
the Commission had agreed that all other areas were closed.

5.  Over the period  from 29 May to 1 June  1995, the Executive  Chairman of
the  Special  Commission visited  Baghdad for  high-level  talks with  Iraq.
During that  time,  the  Executive Chairman  had separate  discussions  with
Iraq's Deputy  Prime Minister,  Mr. Tariq  Aziz, and  with  the Director  of
Iraq's  Military  Industrialization  Corporation,   General  Amer   Mohammad
Rasheed al Ubeidi.   The aim of the  visit was threefold:   to continue  the
high-level  dialogue initiated  in July  1993; to  seek to push  forward the
process of  clarifying outstanding  issues, particularly  in the  biological
weapons area; and  to prepare, through the  discussions, for the  writing of
the present report.   Technical talks  were also held  on chemical  weapons,
during which some significant progress was  made, and on ballistic missiles.
However, Iraq  refused to engage in efforts to resolve, with the specialists
accompanying the Executive Chairman for  that purpose, the biological weapon
issues referred  to in  the Commission's  last report  of April 1995  to the
Council.

6.   During  the  meeting  with the  Deputy Prime  Minister, he  stated that
Iraq's  sole reason  for cooperating  with  the  Special Commission  and the
International Atomic Energy  Agency (IAEA) was that it sought  reintegration
into the  international community through the  lifting of  the sanctions and
embargo, that is, through the fulfilment of the terms  and implementation of
paragraphs 21 and 22  of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), leading  to
the  normalization  of  relations with  Member  States.   If  there were  no
prospect of such reintegration,  it would be  difficult for Iraq to  justify
the expense and the effort involved  in such cooperation.   However, because
Iraq wanted  full reintegration  into  the international  community, it  was
prepared to make  the necessary sacrifices as long  as there was a  prospect
that such sacrifices would bear fruit.

7.  Mr. Aziz stated that, for Iraq, prospects for the desired  reintegration
would only look good if the Special Commission  and IAEA reported clearly to
the Security Council that  the essential provisions  of Council  resolutions
687 (1991) and  715 (1991), that is,  those required for the  implementation
of  paragraph  22  of  the former  resolution,  had  been implemented.    He
described those  essential provisions  as  being the  elimination of  Iraq's
weapons of  mass destruction  and ballistic  missiles with  a range  greater
than  150 kilometres and  the operation  of an  effective ongoing monitoring
and  verification system  to ensure  Iraq's compliance with  its obligations
not  to  reacquire  such weapons.    At  the present  stage,  Iraq  required
statements, on the  one hand from  the Special Commission that  the chemical
weapons  and  missile files  were  closed  and  the  ongoing monitoring  and
verification  system was operational,  and on the  other from  IAEA that the
nuclear   file  was  closed.     If  Iraq  thus  deemed   the  prospects  of
reintegration  to be  positive,  it  would be  ready  in late  June 1995  to
address to the Special Commission's satisfaction  the sole outstanding issue
of significance, the biological issue.  If the  prospects were not good,  it
would have to assess the situation again.

8.   In response to this, the  Executive Chairman stated  that much had been
achieved  in the  implementation of paragraphs  8 to 10  of Security Council
resolution 687  (1991) - indeed, the  bulk of what  was required.   However,
those provisions were not confined  to the elimination of the named weapons,
but also  of  associated major  parts,  subsystems  and components  of  such
weapons and of  facilities for their  research, development  and production.
The latter  had, because of Iraq's  incomplete and  late declarations, taken
longer to  identify and eliminate than had the weapons.  Nevertheless, while
there remained a major  issue in the  biological area concerning the  extent
of Iraq's past programmes and hence  the comprehensiveness of monitoring  in
the biological  area, most of the  work was now done.   A system of  ongoing
monitoring   and  verification   was  operational   in  all   areas.     The
export/import  monitoring mechanism  was available  for early  adoption  and
implementation.

9.   The Chairman  stated that,  in the  missile and  chemical areas,  while
technical  issues remained outstanding,  they related  more to  the level of
technical expertise  achieved by  Iraq or  to accounting  for components  or
materials  than  to  weapons  themselves   or  to  an   operational  weapons
production  capability.     Uncertainties  arising  from  such  issues   (as
mentioned in  the  report to  the  Security  Council contained  in  document
S/1995/284)  had   been  reduced  by   Iraq  during   discussions  with  the
Commission.    They  were no  longer  significant,  in  his  view,  for  the
evaluation of the fulfilment of the terms of paragraphs 8 to 10 of  Security
Council  resolution  687  (1991), namely  the assessment  of  whether Iraq's
proscribed  ballistic missile  and  chemical weapon  capabilities  had  been
eliminated and that current dual-purpose capabilities were being  adequately
monitored.   However,  he  insisted that  those issues  still  needed  to be
resolved and the Commission would continue to use its rights to do so  under
the relevant resolutions,  the plan for  ongoing monitoring and verification
and the agreement contained in the Exchange of Letters of 7 and  14 May 1991
between the SecretaryGeneral and  the Foreign Minister  of Iraq,  regardless
of what action the Security Council took on  the implementation of paragraph
22 of resolution 687 (1991).

10.   In  that  regard, the  Executive Chairman  welcomed  the Deputy  Prime
Minister's pledge, made in October 1993  and reaffirmed during the  meeting,
to   cooperate  with   such  efforts   and  with  future   inspection  teams
investigating matters relating  to past programmes,  even after any decision
by the Security Council to ease or lift the sanctions and the embargo.


B.  Missiles

11.  As reported in April 1995 (S/1995/284), the Commission has  essentially
completed the accounting of proscribed ballistic missile capabilities,  that
is, ballistic missiles  with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related
major  parts, and  repair and  production facilities  associated with Iraq's
past programmes  in that area.   Furthermore, as  also noted  in the report,
missile  monitoring was now  operational.   Further progress  has since been
made  in  the  Commission's  investigations,  in  the  disposal  of  certain
missile-related items  and  in clarifying  the direction  of Iraq's  missile
research and development efforts.   Additional responses to the Commission's
requests for  information  from some  former  suppliers  would be  of  great
assistance  in the  early completion  of  the  verification process  in this
area.  Investigations will continue until  the Commission is satisfied  that
it  has obtained as detailed a picture as possible  of all aspects of Iraq's
past  programmes  and   current  capabilities.    However,  the   Commission
considers that  final elucidation of  these outstanding  matters should  not
materially affect  its current assessment, as  contained in the  conclusions
of the  present  report,  of the  overall  extent  of  Iraq's  past  missile
programmes.


C.  Chemical weapons

12.   As stated in  its reports of June 1994 and  April 1995 (S/1994/750 and
S/1995/284),  the  Commission  has  completed  the  destruction  of   Iraq's
identified chemical weapon  facilities, stockpiles and  production equipment
and the Commission's chemical monitoring system  in Iraq is now operational.
Destruction  activities were extensive,  lasting two  years and resulting in
the destruction  of over  480,000 litres  of chemical  warfare agents,  over
28,000  chemical  munitions and  nearly  1,800,000  litres,  over  1,040,000
kilograms and  648 barrels, of some 45 different precursor chemicals for the
production of chemical warfare agents. Ongoing monitoring and  verification,
together with an  effective export/import monitoring mechanism, is  designed
to preclude Iraq from resuming prohibited chemical activities.

13.   The  Commission has  actively  pursued  its investigations  to clarify
those issues raised  in the April  report:  completing the  material balance
for  imported precursors  and agent  production; accounting  for  production
equipment  and  munitions;  and  fully  elucidating  the  extent  of  Iraq's
achievements in research, development and production  of the nerve agent VX.
In  that regard, it has held  a seminar in New York of international experts
on chemical  weapons and, in the  absence of documentary evidence from Iraq,

has  had  further contacts  with several  supporting  Governments to  obtain
verification of the  quantities and  types of chemical weapon-related  items
supplied by companies operating in their territories.   This has resulted in
the  receipt  of a  large  number  of documents,  which  the  Commission  is
continuing to  analyse.  The discussions  held at Baghdad  in May 1995  with
Iraqi  experts  and  inspection  activities  since  the  April  report  have
provided more information and led to some important clarifications.

14.  Iraq, at the Commission's  request, has provided additional information
on its  procurement and disposition of  precursor chemicals  acquired for VX
production  and  the  reason for  the  cancellation of  the  project.   This
included  original  documentary  evidence  to  support  Iraq's  declarations
concerning  its  procurement  of  certain  precursor  chemicals.    It  also
included details of the location of  the sites at which Iraq disposed of one
of the  three key  VX precursor  chemicals, which  enabled the  Commission's
resident  chemical monitoring group to  verify the Iraqi account.  By taking
samples at the  sites concerned, the  group verified that quantities  of the
pure chemical  were indeed present and  that the size of  the pits in  which
the  chemical  was  buried  was  consistent,  in  general  terms,  with  the
quantities of  the chemical  Iraq declared to  be buried there.   Iraq  also
gave  the Commission  information, pertaining  to  the second  VX precursor,
that the chemical monitoring  group will verify in the coming weeks in order
to confirm the disposition  of the major portion  of Iraq's declared imports
of the  precursor.   On other  issues related  to the  VX project, Iraq  has
promised that it will  continue its efforts to obtain facts that will enable
the  Commission to  verify  Iraq's account.   It  has  followed up  on  this
undertaking and is continuing to send more information to the Commission.

15.  During the discussions  in May 1995, the Commission received additional
information on  quantities of  various munitions  acquired by  Iraq and  the
purpose for  their acquisition, particularly as  it related  to the chemical
weapon  programme.   Iraq reaffirmed  in writing  that all  of the  munition
types investigated  by the  Commission in  relation to  the chemical  weapon
programme were  indeed acquired  solely for  chemical-fill purposes.   While
accounting fully for such munitions remains  an important task, in the light
of the  Commission's current knowledge of  the disposition  of Iraq's stocks
of chemical agents  and their precursors, the  significance of the issue  of
empty  munitions  in   terms  of  chemical   warfare  capabilities  is  much
diminished.  Iraq further stated that it would  address, in the framework of
future  biological  discussions,   the  Commission's   concern  that   these
munitions  might  be or  might  have  been  used  for  the weaponization  of
biological warfare agents.

16.  The Commission is  now confident that it has a good overall picture  of
the  extent  of Iraq's  past  chemical  weapons  capabilities  and that  the
essential  elements of  it have  been  destroyed.   Remaining  issues, which
centre  by and large on verification of Iraq's  revised declarations, can be
resolved satisfactorily given continued cooperation on  the part of Iraq and
assistance from  supporting Governments on supplies  to Iraq.   These issues
will  be  pursued  until  the  Commission  considers  that  all  avenues for
investigation have been exhausted.


D.  Biological weapons

17.  The situation in the biological area remains blocked by Iraq's  refusal
to  address  the Commission's  concerns.    The  evidence  available to  the
Commission establishes that Iraq obtained or sought to  obtain all the items
and materials required to  produce biological warfare agents in Iraq.   With
Iraq's  failure to account  for all those items  and material for legitimate
purposes, the  only conclusion that  can be  drawn is  that there is  a high
risk that Iraq purchased them and used them at least in part for  proscribed
purposes - the production of agents for  biological weapons.  Indeed,  since
the Commission's  last  report to  the  Security  Council, it  has  received
additional  documentary  evidence from  supporting  Governments  that  lends
further weight  to that conclusion.   While all  the elements  of the system

for  biological monitoring are  in place  and monitoring  is proceeding, the
Commission cannot be  certain that  monitoring is comprehensive in  coverage
because it  has been  unable to  obtain a  credible account  of Iraq's  past
military biological activities.

18.  Since April  1995, Iraq has responded  to the Commission's  concerns in
that regard only by  assuring the Commission that  Iraq could be prepared to
address the  matter in  late June 1995.   In the  meantime, Iraq has  stated
that  it is  not responding  to  the  Commission's questions  concerning the
scope of Iraq's military biological activities  or any other issue  relating
to Iraq's  proscribed biological  programme.   This has  had the  additional
detrimental  effect  of  delaying  the  completion  of  investigations   and
assessments  of certain  missile and  chemical  issues.   Iraq's  failure to
account for  its military biological programme  leaves one  of its essential
obligations unfulfilled.


E.  National implementation measures

19.  There  have been no new developments  since the Commission's report  in
April 1995 regarding the national  implementation measures Iraq  is required
to take  under the  plans for ongoing  monitoring and verification.   Iraq's
anticipated enactment  of those  measures  in the  course of  April has  not
materialized.   The Commission  will continue  to pursue  the matter  and to
press for the adoption  of the necessary legislation  so that this  positive
development can be reported to the Council.


F.  Aerial inspections

20.     The  Commission's  aerial   inspection  assets,  the   high-altitude
surveillance aircraft  (U2) and  the Baghdad-based  Aerial Inspection  Team,
continue to  make an important contribution  to the overall effort to ensure
that all relevant activities and facilities  within Iraq are encompassed  by
the monitoring regime.

21.   Both assets  continue to conduct  aerial surveillance  of sites  under
monitoring  in  Iraq  and  designated  sites,   at  the  direction  of   the
Commission. Experts  from the resident  monitoring teams  accompany the team
in  order to  assist  it  in focusing  on particular  areas of  relevance at
sites.  The results  obtained from aerial missions are an important part  of
the overall inspection process in Iraq.

22.  As at the end of May 1995, 250 missions have been undertaken by the  U2
and 580 missions by the Aerial Inspection Team.


G.  Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

23.   A  full  description  of the  status  of the  Centre  is contained  in
paragraphs 123  to 127 of the  April report.  In  addition, on 30 May  1995,
the Executive Chairman of  the Special Commission inaugurated the biological
room  in the Centre  and, in  May and  June, the security  camera system was
upgraded.  All of the Centre's planned facilities are now operational.


H.  Export/import mechanism

24.  As  stated in the April  report, a proposal  for a  mechanism, required
under  paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), to monitor the
sales to Iraq  by other  countries of dual-purpose  items has been  prepared
and  submitted jointly by the  Special Commission and  IAEA to the Sanctions
Committee established  pursuant to  Security Council  resolution 661  (1990)
for the  latter's consideration.   The  Committee has  twice considered  the
proposal since it  was resubmitted in February  1995, but, while it  appears
that there  is no  objection  to the  text  and  that all  delegations  have
expressed support  for the principles contained  in it,  formal agreement to
submit  it to  the Security  Council, in  the name  of all  three  bodies as
required by resolution 715 (1991), has yet to be reached.

25.  In  the meantime, the Special Commission  has continued its efforts  to
prepare for the  implementation of the  mechanism after its adoption  by the
Council:   dedicated  software  for  a transaction-based  database is  being
developed for installation on the Commission's computer network;  supporting
documents and  notification forms have been  further refined; a  preparatory
inspection of  Iraq's principal points  of entry for  traded goods has  been
undertaken to  ensure  that the  Commission  has  full knowledge  of  Iraq's
import procedures and facilities; and  Iraq's legislation relevant to import
and export  has been  obtained for  study.   Through such  preparations, the
Commission aims to be  in a position to implement its obligations under  the
mechanism immediately  upon the Security  Council taking appropriate  action
to adopt the mechanism and to bring it into effect.


III.  CONCLUSIONS

26.   The  Government of  Iraq  has  stated that,  for it  to  see value  in
cooperating with  the Special Commission and IAEA, it needed to be convinced
that  there was  a prospect  of paragraphs  21 and  22 of  Security  Council
resolution 687 (1991) being implemented.   It, therefore, demanded that  the
Special Commission and IAEA report to the Council that  it had met the terms
laid down in paragraph 22.

27.  The  Commission has  repeatedly assured Iraq  that its endeavours  have
been  directed to  bringing about,  as soon  as possible,  a situation where
paragraph  22  can  be  implemented.    This,  however,  requires  that  the
Commission  be able to  report to  the Council that, based  on its technical
assessment,  Iraq  has  met the  requirements  of  paragraphs  8  to  10  of
resolution  687  (1991).    The  Commission   must  be  satisfied  that  the
proscribed items have been  disposed of, that  it has as complete a  picture
as possible of  Iraq's past programmes  and that  a comprehensive system  of
monitoring is operational.

28.  Paragraph 22 states that:

    "The Security Council,

    "...

  "Decides ...  that ... upon Council  agreement that Iraq has completed all
actions contemplated in paragraphs 8 to  13 above, the prohibitions  against
the  import  of  commodities  and  products  originating  in  Iraq  and  the
prohibitions against financial  transactions related thereto ... shall  have
no further force or effect".

 The Special Commission  is responsible for reporting on the  implementation
of  paragraphs   8  to  10   and  the   Director-General  of  IAEA   on  the
implementation of paragraphs 11  to 13.  The actions contemplated of Iraq in
paragraphs 8 to 10 are as follows:

"8.   ... Iraq  shall unconditionally  accept the  destruction, removal,  or
rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a)All  chemical and biological  weapons and  all stocks  of agents  and all
related subsystems  and components  and all  research, development,  support
and manufacturing facilities related thereto;

    (b)All ballistic  missiles with a range  greater than  one hundred fifty
kilometres, and related major parts and repair and production facilities;

"9.  ...   (a)Iraq shall submit to  the Secretary-General ... a  declaration
on the locations, amounts  and types of all  items specified in  paragraph 8
and agree to urgent, on-site inspection ...;

  "9.   ...    (b) (ii)The  yielding by  Iraq of  possession to  the Special
Commission for destruction, removal or rendering  harmless ... of all  items
specified  under  paragraph  8  (a),  including  items  at  the   additional
locations designated  by the Special Commission  ... and  the destruction by
Iraq,  under the supervision of  the Special Commission,  of all its missile
capabilities, including launchers, as specified in paragraph 8 (b);

  "...

"10.Decides further  that Iraq shall  unconditionally undertake  not to use,
develop, construct or  acquire any of  the items  specified in paragraphs  8
and 9, and requests the Secretary-General,  in consultation with the Special
Commission,  to  develop  a  plan  for  the  future  ongoing  monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance with the present paragraph ...".

Paragraph  5   of  Security  Council  resolution   715  (1991),  itself   an
elaboration of paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991), adds:

    "The Security Council,

    "...

  "5.  Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all  its obligations under the
plans  [for  the  future  ongoing  monitoring  and  verification  of  Iraq's
compliance  with paragraph  10 of  resolution  687  (1991)] approved  by the
present resolution  and cooperate fully with  the Special  Commission ... in
carrying out the plans".

 29.   Clearly,  Iraq has  not met  all these  terms, given  the absence  of
credible  accounting  for  its  military  biological  activities.    In  the
ballistic  missile   and  chemical  weapon  areas,  the  Commission  is  now
confident that  it has a  good overall picture of the  extent of Iraq's past
programmes and that  the essential elements  of its  proscribed capabilities
have been disposed of.  While there are still some  issues to be resolved in
those  two areas,  the uncertainties  arising  from them  do not  present  a
pattern consistent  with efforts to conceal  a programme  to retain acquired
proscribed  weapons.   These remaining  issues are  not of a  magnitude that
would  affect  the  assessment  as  to   whether  Iraq  has  completed   the
substantive actions required  of it  under paragraphs  8 to  10 of  Security
Council resolution  687 (1991) to eliminate its proscribed ballistic missile
and  chemical  weapon  and   related  facilities  and  to  permit  effective
monitoring of its compliance in those areas.

30.   The Commission  has pursued,  and is  continuing to pursue,  all means
available to  it  to  identify  and  verify  every  aspect  of  Iraq's  past
programmes.  It   realizes,  however,  that   conditions  have  been   such,
particularly where the acquisition and disposal  of items is concerned, that
a verified accounting  of each and every element  of the past programmes  is
beyond the  realm of  possibility, given  the various  hostilities in  which
Iraq  has  been engaged  and  the  unilateral  actions  by  Iraq to  destroy
weapons,  equipment,  supplies  and  documentation.    The  Commission   is,
however,  satisfied  that,  in  the  missile  and  chemical  fields,  it has
achieved  such  a  level  of  knowledge  and  understanding  of  Iraq's past
programmes that  it can  have confidence  that Iraq  does not  now have  any
significant  proscribed  capability.    It   is  also  confident   that  the
comprehensiveness  of its  ongoing monitoring  and verification  activities,
while those  activities continue, is such  that the  Commission would detect
any  attempt  to  reconstitute  a  proscribed  capability  in  those  areas.
Verification  of the latest  information obtained  by the  Commission in the
missile  and chemical fields  can be  carried out  satisfactorily during the
Commission's  ongoing  monitoring and  verification  operations,  using  the
rights and  privileges available to it  under the  relevant resolutions, the
Exchange of  Letters and the plan  for ongoing  monitoring and verification.
As noted  in paragraph  10 above, the  Commission welcomes Iraq's  pledge to
cooperate with  these  efforts, even  after  any  decision by  the  Security
Council to ease or lift the sanctions and the embargo.

31.  As regards paragraph 10 of resolution  687 (1991), it will be  recalled
that, by identical letters  of 6 April 1991 to the Secretary-General and  to
the  President  of  the  Security  Council  (S/22456),  Iraq  indicated  its
acceptance of that resolution, and  by further identical letters  of 11 June
1991  to  the  same  addressees  (S/22689),   Iraq  confirmed  that  it  had
unconditionally undertaken not to use, develop,  construct or acquire any of
the items specified in the  resolution.  By a letter dated 26 November  1993
from  the  Minister  for Foreign  Affairs to  the  President of  the Council
(S/26811), the Government of Iraq stated that it  had decided to accept  the
obligations  set forth  in resolution  715  (1991)  and to  comply with  the
provisions  of  the  plans for  monitoring  and  verification  as  contained
therein.

32.  On 7  October and again on 15 December 1994 (see S/1994/1138 and Corr.1
and S/1994/1422),  the Commission reported to  the Council  that the ongoing
monitoring and  verification system was  provisionally operational and  that
testing of the system had begun.   In its report to  the Council of 10 April
1995 (S/1995/284), it reported that the  elements of ongoing monitoring  and
verification were now in  place and the  system was operational and that  it
had received full cooperation  from Iraq in setting up and operation of  the
monitoring system.  To ensure the comprehensiveness of  the system as far as
Iraq's  obligations are concerned,  Iraq needs  to respond satisfactorily to
the Commission's concerns  regarding its past biological weapons  programme.
Furthermore,  as the  plan for  ongoing  monitoring and  verification  notes
(S/22871/Rev.1, para. 10),  the efficacy of the  provisions of the plan will
be  enhanced  when  they  are complemented  by  an  export/import monitoring
mechanism  that combines  transparency  with timely  information  on  future
sales  or supplies  to  Iraq of  relevant dual-use  items.    Presently, the
Commission  is  satisfied  that  Iraq's  cooperation  in  carrying  out  the
monitoring  plan  has  been of  a degree  that  satisfies the  provisions of
paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991).


-----


.