THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF "STAR WARS"
MEDIA ADVISORY: Contact: Lisbeth Gronlund or David Wright
Tuesday, March 17, 1998 617) 547-5552
Next Week Marks Fifteenth Anniversary of "Star Wars"
Despite big budgets, little progress, and high security costs,
deployment of a national missile defense looms closer than ever
On March 23, 1983, the United States embarked on an ambitious program to
develop
a "Star Wars" system to defend itself from a large-scale attack by ballistic
missiles and to, in the words of President Ronald Reagan, render nuclear
weapons
"impotent and obsolete." Fifteen years later, the US continues to develop and
plan for deployment of a national missile defense system. Although some $40
billion dollars has been spent and the goals are much less ambitious now, the
basic technology is still not ready and key technical problems remain unsolved
(see enclosed fact sheet). And yet, the United States is closer than ever to
deploying a national missile defense system and scrapping the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Unfortunately, this is more than just a waste of tax-payers' dollars. The
ongoing national missile defense program threatens to undermine current
reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals and block prospects for much
deeper reductions in nuclear weapons. This year, as for the past several years,
Congressional Republicans are pushing to mandate the deployment of a limited
national missile defense by 2003. Although the Clinton administration maintains
that there is no current threat that would justify deployment, it is pushing to
develop a system that would be ready by then. The Pentagon will soon select a
general contractor to develop this system. By 2000, for the first time, a
national missile defense will be certified as ready for procurement and
deployment by 2003. This alone will add to the political pressure for
deployment.
Why is the United States still pursuing a program of such dubious technical and
political merit? Deploying missile defenses remains a strongly ideological
issue
for many Republicans. This seems to be a misguided attempt to unilaterally
guarantee US security and thereby avoid the difficult-but ultimately
necessary-cooperative work with other countries to ensure our common security.
This spring, Senator Jesse Helms and other Senate Republicans are also taking
aim at the ABM Treaty itself, which prohibits the United States and Russia from
building national missile defenses. Their zeal to eliminate the treaty is
proceeding with apparent disregard for the negative effect this could have on
security relations with Russia and also China. If you have any questions,
please
contact Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund of Dr. David Wright in the UCS Cambridge office at
617-547-5552
FACT SHEET
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF "STAR WARS"
Big Budgets But Little Progress
On March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced his "Star Wars" program to
build a defense of the United States against attacks by nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles. After 15 years and some $40 billion, how far has the US national
missile defense program come? Although the goals of the program have been
scaled back dramatically, they are still technically infeasible. Despite this,
the United States is closer than ever to deploying a national missile defense:
it will select a general contractor this month to develop a system by 2000 that
could then be deployed within three years of a decision to do so. At the same
time, pushing ahead with national missile defenses poses a political barrier to
deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, which remain the most effective way to
increase US and international security.
The Goals Have Been Scaled Back Dramatically:
1983: The original goal, laid out in Reagan's March 23 speech, is to render
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" and to protect the US population from a
large-scale attack by thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads.
1987: The original mission is implicitly dropped as unrealistic and the focus
shifted from protecting cities to enhancing deterrence by protecting US nuclear
weapons from a disarming first strike.
1991: Under President Bush, a space-based layer of "Brilliant Pebbles"
interceptors is added to the plan, but the goal is scaled back to defending the
United States against up to 200 warheads launched simultaneously.
1997: Scaled back once again, the current goal is to defend against only 5 to
20 "simple" warheads, nominally launched by accident or without
authorization by
Russia or China, or deliberately by a hostile nation that might acquire
long-range ballistic missiles in the future. The program might be expanded
over
time, with the objective of defending against a greater number of warheads.
Given Its New Limited Goals, Is the Program Now Closer to Success?
Ironically, no. Why not?
The technology still isn't ready:
Despite the considerable time and money invested, the basic technology for a
national missile defense-"hit-to-kill" interceptors that would destroy their
targets by ramming into them-is not ready for deployment. The test record for
hit-to-kill interceptors has been very poor, even against cooperative test
targets. According to a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report, "Of the
20 intercept attempts since the early 1980s, only 6, or about 30 percent, have
been successful." Even more relevant to national missile defenses are the 14 of
these intercept tests that were conducted at high altitudes, of which only 2
were hits, for a 14 percent success rate. And the test record is not getting
better with time: the most recent successful high-altitude test occurred in
January 1991 and the last 9 such intercept tests have been failures.
The testing program is inadequate:
The planned test program is so meager that the Pentagon won't know how well the
system works by 2000, when they may decide to build it. The Pentagon is
completely ignoring the "fly before you buy" maxim. As the GAO report notes,
only one integrated system test is planned prior to the deployment
decision, and
even that test will not include all system elements. Moreover, according to the
system engineering contractor, the test program will not adequately test the
ability of the system to discriminate warheads from decoys and debris, even
though this task would be essential to the successful defense of the United
States.
The fundamental problem of countermeasures remains unsolved:
A more fundamental problem is that defenses will not face cooperative targets.
All defenses that seek to intercept warheads outside of the atmosphere can be
defeated by technically straight-forward countermeasures, and this problem
remains unsolved despite decades of work. Indeed, this is precisely why the
current program objectives call only for defending against "simple"
warheads-those without effective countermeasures. However, any country that
could build or acquire a long-range missile could also build or acquire
effective countermeasures that would require less sophisticated technology than
long-range missiles.
In the real world, defending against 5-20 warheads may be no more realistic
than
Reagan's dream of building an impenetrable shield.
National Missile Defenses Threaten Deep Reductions in Nuclear Weapons:
Fifteen years after Reagan's Star Wars speech, there are still compelling
security reasons not to build a national missile defense. The most
effective way
to reduce the nuclear threat to the United States is to make deep reductions in
nuclear arsenals worldwide, and the end of the cold war now makes this
feasible.
However, such deep cuts will almost certainly be derailed by US deployment of a
national missile defense, because missile defenses can more easily threaten a
small deterrent force than a large one. Perversely, even though a missile
defense is unlikely to be very effective, other countries are likely to assume
it would be and will act accordingly by resisting deep reductions.
Indeed, Russia has made it clear that it remains concerned about US missile
defenses and that its continued compliance with nuclear reductions under the
START agreements depends on continued US compliance with the ABM
(Anti-Ballistic
Missile) Treaty, which prohibits national missile defenses. Moreover,
given the
strong Republican support for national missile defenses in Congress, Russia
would likely (and not unreasonably) see deployment of even a limited system as
the first installment of a larger system.
For more information, contact UCS Senior Staff Scientists Lisbeth Gronlund or
David Wright in the UCS Cambridge office at 617-547-5552.