21 July 1999
(Reviews plan to fight chemical/biological arms threat) (1800) Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson July 20 outlined current Department of Energy (DOE) efforts to stem chemical and biological weapons proliferation, underscoring the need for interagency cooperation to deal with the threat. Chemical and biological weapons are "more accessible than ever before," and "now we must harness the expertise of our laboratories" to counter their increasing threat, Richardson said in a speech to a meeting of the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program in McLean, Virginia. U.S. security against "nuclear, biological, and chemical dangers hinges on creating tomorrow's tools today, so that we can defeat threats posed not by a Cold War-era totalitarian superpower but by the terrorists, criminals and regimes that threaten to undermine our national security," he said. DOE's objectives are "to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to reverse where damage has occurred, and prepare for the emergencies if these weapons are ever used." Following is the text of Richardson's address: (begin text) Thirty years ago today, America left a message to whomever is out there beyond the stars. "We came in peace for all mankind," we declared. And that message is burned into a plaque that will reside in the rainless, windless, decay-less environment of the moon for all of eternity. "We came in peace for all mankind." When you consider that declaration, you almost wish that any other life-forms to read it might suffer from lack of irony. With all the bombs that humans have built, who could believe such a statement? It's a good thing, though, that we're here today with the mission of honoring that statement we made 30 years ago. It is especially pleasing to see such a broad cross-section of American government addressing chemical and biological proliferation and terrorism. I understand that representatives are present from the Defense community, the Intelligence community, Health and Human Services, the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), the Department of Transportation, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), and of course the Department of Energy and its laboratories. In addition, I'm happy to recognize congressional staff, and staff from OMB (Office of Management and Budget) and from the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Just as dramatic advances in technology carried Armstrong, Aldrin, and Collins to the moon on the wings of Apollo, similar - and perhaps more awesome - advances have made chemical, biological and nuclear weapons more accessible than ever before. President Clinton has frequently stated that no greater threat than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction confronts us as we enter the next millennium. Speaking this spring at the National Academy of Science, the President called on his cabinet to take aggressive steps to counter this emerging threat, to foil this challenge to American security and prosperity. We are responding to that challenge. Born from the yields of the Manhattan Project, the Department of Energy remains the primary agent in our nation's maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. But it is much more: we are also charged with the job of drawing down our nuclear complex, keeping nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands, and containing the knowledge needed to make nuclear weapons. And now we must harness the expertise of our laboratories to address the increasing threat of chemical and biological weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention remain ignored by some countries we suspect of having offensive chemical and biological capabilities - including regimes believed to support terrorism. The nefarious production of deadly biological agents can be concealed in unassuming facilities, making early detection extremely difficult. Our nation's security against these nuclear, biological, and chemical dangers hinges on creating tomorrow's tools today, so that we can defeat threats posed not by a Cold War-era totalitarian superpower but by the terrorists, criminals and regimes that threaten to undermine our national security. The Department of Energy is working to thwart these threats. Three years ago, with the support of the Congress, we initiated our Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program. Under this Program, our labs draw on our dual expertises - in science and technology (we play a key role in the Human Genome Project) and national security -- to uniquely position us to fight these threats. Our objectives are to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to reverse where damage has occurred, and prepare for the emergencies if these weapons are ever used. Preparing and responding to the domestic chemical and biological attacks, in particular, presents enormous challenges - many of them unique from the challenges the military faces. But the Department has a unique history in addressing these challenges. Since it inception, the Department has pushed scientific inquiry to develop the scientific "horsepower" these challenges demand. Indeed, we are, at the core, a science agency - and 40 percent of our $18 billion budget is for R&D. The last five years have seen some wonderful progress. One Department of Energy lab has developed an instrument the size of a suitcase that can detect a biological agent by decoding its DNA -- in less than 30 minutes. That's a giant leap forward - essentially bringing our labs into the field. But for the most part, our biological detection capabilities are inadequate: they're too big and they cost too much. With that in mind, I've set a challenge in motion. Earlier this year, I challenged our labs to develop, within three years, chemical and biological agent detectors small enough to fit into the hand of a fireman or a cop. These devices would tell within minutes if a chem-bio agent were present, and what kind of agent, like anthrax or plague. These kinds of devices could turn a catastrophe into a manageable problem. These are the kinds of devices I have charged our labs to find: effective, portable tools -- tomorrow's tools, today. With the right detection tools, health and safety officials can act quickly to treat victims of chem-bio aggression, and protect others from exposure. I've also challenged our labs' best and brightest to develop, demonstrate and deliver the first phase of an integrated biological detection system -- a network of sensors and analytical software that will help us defend our critical national assets, like subway systems, and to shield major events like a Super Bowl or the Olympics. So I've challenged our national laboratories to complete this critical system by 2002 -- in time for use at the Olympics in Salt Lake City. Significant progress has been made in the development of this system, and tomorrow many of you will hear about it. Similarly, we are progressing in developing a system to protect subways from chemical attack. In a program we call "PROTECT," we are working closely with the Department of Transportation and a number of major U.S. subway systems to examine the vulnerability of subway systems to attack. We're developing computer models to estimate not only what the effects of any such attack might be, but how to respond swiftly by changing air flow, or moving trains in the subway system to strategic locations. Our scientists have estimated that by implementing such a system to guide response, over 1800 lives would be saved in a small-scale sarin nerve gas attack -- when compared to how we might respond today. The reduction in potential casualties could be 10 to 100 times greater in the case of a deadlier biological agent - like anthrax. In the future, experience gained in our subways will be extended to other vulnerable infrastructure, like airports, arenas, and office buildings. I think we can all agree that developing these systems is a critical undertaking potential, and deserves our committed resources. Similarly, building the detectors and systems that I've mentioned is no simple task, and the Department of Energy relies on many partners as we push the envelope. To those of you here from other agencies, I want to make clear that we welcome, and need, your participation. All agencies must come together on this -- anything less puts our citizens at risk. The Department of Energy is committed to fulfilling this responsibility. I requested an increase in funds of nearly 70 percent for our chem-bio defense efforts next year - raising our total request to $32 million in FY 2000 for this critical work. As we prepare our budget request for FY 2001, let me assure you that we remain committed to aggressively moving forward to counter the chem-bio threat. The recently-released Deutch report spoke to the need for continued and improved coordination within the U.S. Government to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction. We're studying the report right now. Our core position, however, is to ensure that our capabilities are fully and efficiently engaged. We will do everything we can to ensure that our capabilities are truly national assets, by lessening barriers to perform work for other agencies, while at the same time strengthening our own programs. This Friday, our Under Secretary Moniz, Under Secretary of Defense Gansler, and John Lauder, the Director of the Nonproliferation Center, will participate in a meeting of the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee -- one of the key coordinating mechanisms within the counterproliferation community. The main topic will be continued, improved senior level coordination in the chem-bio area. I anticipate that this meeting will reinvigorate and renew efforts to enhance our interagency cooperation and coordination, and look forward to hearing the results of this meeting. Finally: to those of you here from our labs. This year, our chem-bio effort has participation from eight of our national labs. And so I want to ask you to redouble your efforts; we are not fully prepared. To the senior management at the labs: search out your best; bring their expertise to bear on this national challenge. Form partnerships with other labs, with industry, and academia. This is a joint effort. America's success was built on meeting challenges like those we face today. Our national character - like it or not - was forged in crisis. 30 years ago tomorrow in the New York Times, Russell Baker wrote, "So there he is at last...Man on the moon. He can't even get to the office without undergoing the agonies of the damned, but give him a little metal, a few chemicals...and vroom! There he is, up on a rock a quarter of a million miles up in the sky." We have the right stuff to provide the security our nation needs - while also honoring the pact we made with the universe in those words we left up on the moon three decades past. "We came in peace." Let's work together so that we continue on that path of peace. (end text)