Transcript: Bolton Calls U.S.-Russia Arms Talks "Very Productive"
(Under secretary of state's Geneva news conference March 22, 2002) (4520)
The U.S. under secretary of state for arms control and international
security concluded two days of negotiations in Geneva with Russian
officials by declaring the talks "very productive" and saying the two
sides "overcame a number of outstanding issues."
John Bolton told a March 22 news conference in Geneva that the two
sides discussed two documents that they hope can be agreed to at the
summit of the two presidents in May. One is an agreement on lowering
the current levels of offensive nuclear weapons, and the other is a
political declaration on a new strategic framework between the United
States and Russia, he said.
The major subject of discussion, Bolton said, was the announcement by
President Bush that the United States intends to reduce the number of
deployed offensive nuclear warheads from the current level of 6,000
down to between 1,700 and 2,200 over a ten year period, and a similar
announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin. How to count the
warheads -- whether to attribute a maximum number of warheads to each
delivery platform [usually a ballistic missile], as under the current
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), or to count the actual
number of deployed warheads -- has been a subject of extensive
discussion, he said.
"I know that probably sounds like something fairly minor, but in the
world of arms control, [it] ... can make a big difference," Bolton
said. "[A]lthough we have not reached agreement on that question," he
continued, "we have fully explained to their satisfaction what we have
in mind."
Bolton said that because time is relatively short until the May
summit, the United States has proposed deferring until later
negotiations about what to do with the warheads removed from delivery
systems.
"[P]ast treaties have not made any mention of what happens to the
warheads that are downloaded," Bolton said. The United States hasn't
"made a decision on what to do with the warheads that will be
downloaded. Some will be stored, some are spares. We want to have
insurance against a problem of safety or reliability with an entire
class of warheads. These are all questions that the Russians face as
well. They have got thousands of warheads that are in storage now in
Russia," he said.
The political document deals with the New Strategic Framework, a
phrase used by President Bush to describe movement beyond Cold War
antipathy with the Soviet Union to the full range of strategic issues
between the United States and Russia, Bolton said. The focus of the
document will be on the reduction of offensive weapons, missile
defense, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them, he said. Counter-terrorism, which Bolton said
has been a "very fruitful area of cooperation" since September 11, may
also be included in the document.
The transcript of Bolton's press conference follows:
(begin transcript)
Press Conference by The Honorable John R. Bolton
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland
March 22, 2002
UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Thanks very much. It's a pleasure to be back
in Geneva. I was here today with a delegation from the American side
for the third negotiating session with our counterparts from the
Russian Federation, discussing potential agreements that might be the
subject of the Presidential summit when President Bush visits Moscow
on May 23rd. Yesterday and today we discussed two documents, one a
draft that we are negotiating on offensive nuclear weapons, and
second, a possible political declaration discussing the new strategic
framework between the United States and Russia.
This third meeting follows the meetings held in Washington last week
when the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, met with
President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National
Security Adviser Rice, and is in preparation for a meeting of
Secretary of State Powell and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in
Madrid in early April. Obviously all of these meetings are in
preparation for the May summit.
Basically what we did over the past two days was to consider a number
of the issues that remain unresolved between the Russian and the
American sides on the offensive weapons document and on the political
declaration. We also reached agreement on a number of more or less
technical issues in further preparation for the ministerial meeting.
We covered such things as how to account for the warheads that are the
principal subject of this document. As you will recall, during the
Washington/Crawford summit, President Bush announced that the United
States would make substantial reductions in its operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads from just under 6,000 to a range of between
1,700 to 2,200 over a ten year period. President Putin made a similar
announcement, and the purpose of our discussions has been to try to
codify those announcements into a document that would be legally
binding and would survive the administration of the two Presidents.
In addition on the political declaration on the New Strategic
Framework, we are covering the whole range of strategic issues,
offensive weapons questions, defensive systems, non-proliferation,
counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism. There will obviously be
other issues addressed at the May summit, other political issues,
other economic issues, such as Russia's entry into the World Trade
Organization. Those other issues, that is to say the non-strategic
issues, did not play a part in our discussions here. Those are being
discussed by other of our colleagues in the respective foreign
ministries and other agencies.
So, that's a quick summary of what we have covered here over the past
two days. I would say in summary the talks were very productive. I
thought we made progress. We overcame a number of outstanding issues.
We still have a number of issues to resolve, but, as President Bush
recently said in connection with Defense Minister Ivanov's trip to
Washington, he is hopeful that we will be able to have a signing
ceremony in Moscow to codify the reductions in offensive weapons, and
those of us who work in the respective governments, with just two
months to go before that summit, would be working hard to try carrying
out their instructions. With that, why don't I stop. I would be
pleased to answer your questions on that subject.
QUESTION: I wonder if you could be somewhat more specific about the
areas in which you have made progress and what the differences are
that remain. If you could perhaps also tell us what the numbers are in
term of the cuts you are envisioning and I believe that the Russians
are a little bit concerned that the United States wants to store the
warheads that it plans to cut instead of destroying them. Was this
discussed as well?
BOLTON: The major subject of discussion, of course, is the reduction
of approximately two thirds for the United States, from a level of
about 6,000 warheads to the range of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally
deployed warheads. We have had, over the past several months,
extensive discussions on the subject of how to count that reduction. I
know that probably sounds like something fairly minor, but in the
world of arms control, the question of attributing warheads to various
weapon systems versus actually counting the precise number of
operationally deployed warheads can make a big difference. We've been
exchanging information with the Russians over a several month period
to give them a sense of what we mean by our proposed way of counting
for these reductions. I think it is safe to say now that, although we
have not reached agreement on that question, we have fully explained
to their satisfaction what we have in mind. We have a number of other
issues dealing with transparency and verification questions. We've had
extensive discussions with them about the implications of having the
START I treaty continue in effect, which is certainly our hope for the
remaining life of that treaty.
The issue of warheads that remain after the two countries reach the
reduced levels that we are talking about, has also been the subject of
conversation, and in fact, was one of the principal topics that
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Defense Minister Ivanov spoke about
in Washington last week. The precedent in prior arms control
agreements, of course, is that past treaties have not made any mention
of what happens to the warheads that are downloaded. Some go into
storage, some are dismantled, some are used for other purposes. I
think that while there is not complete congruence on this point yet,
the parties have reached an understanding that in order to reach
agreement by the summit in May, we have to focus on the subject that
is of most concern to us, that is to say, the operationally deployed
warheads. That's certainly the direction that we have been urging, and
I think that we are going to continue to urge over the next several
months. But there is not agreement on it yet.
QUESTION: I was wondering if you could talk a little more about the
discussions you're having regarding offensive nuclear weapons?
BOLTON: Well, that's what I was just talking about. The purpose of
attempting to reach agreement is to codify in a legally biding
document the reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons that the two Presidents announced in Washington. On the part
of the United States, President Bush has said that he wants to reduce
operationally deployed warheads to the minimum number possible
consistent with American national security; that's why he picked the
range of 1,700 to 2,200. We would be prepared to do that whether we
are able to reach agreement with the Russian side or not. But as I
say, the hope of the two Presidents is that they can reach an
agreement that would survive their respective administrations.
Speaking on my part I hope that's a long way away. But, in any event,
something would be legally binding beyond the political declaration.
QUESTION: Could you throw some light on what the Russian perception is
at this point on your draft nuclear posture review? We hear Russians
privately express their concerns in the CD (Conference on Disarmament)
here. They say that this program, for all practical purposes, starts
the arms race all over again.
BOLTON: I don't know how they can say that, frankly, when we are
talking about a reduction of two-thirds in our operationally deployed
nuclear warheads. I call going from 6,000 to a range of 1,700 to 2,200
going down, not up. In the conversations that we've had here, in the
conversations we had in Washington last week, it was my impression
that the Russian side understood fully what the nuclear posture review
was about and it was a minimal subject of conversation. They've got
one of those in Moscow as well. In fact one of the things that
happened in this meeting was that General Baluyevskiy, the equivalent
of the Vice-Chairman of their Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave us a
briefing on their nuclear doctrine and on some of their thinking on
missile defense. So, among the professional military and diplomatic
personnel involved, I must say there was not any surprise about it at
all.
QUESTION: Do we understand well that this new treaty, if there is a
new treaty, will replace START II which will never enter into force?
BOLTON: We haven't decided on our part whether there will be a treaty
or some other form of legally binding agreement, but the intention
would be that START I would continue in force. All of its provisions
would continue in force, but because START II has not entered into
force, it would not. In other words, the documents would be START I
and then this agreement.
QUESTION: Have you discussed the problem of the replacement of the ABM
treaty?
BOLTON: We have had conversations, since the announcement on December
13th last year by President Bush of our notice of withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty, about a variety of possible efforts at cooperation and
transparency in connection with the ongoing United States effort to
develop a limited ballistic missile defense system. We have explained
to the Russian side at some length, as we did before our notice of
withdrawal, that the limited national missile defense system we are
contemplating was not aimed at the Russian offensive capability. We've
been willing to provide them with information about what our thinking
is, what our development prospects have been for missile defense, and
also to engage them in cooperative kinds of activities, because in
many respects, the threats that the United States is concerned about
from rogue states -- and I'll just name three, North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq -- are threats that are likewise faced by Russia, which is in
fact geographically much more proximate to those states than we are.
We are hoping to have some concrete things to announce perhaps as part
of the political declaration that I referred to a moment ago, when we
arrive in Moscow for the summit. Just one little footnote: one of the
things that inhibits our cooperation with the Russians on Missile
defense is of course the ABM treaty. So until that treaty expires, we
are limited in some of the things we can do, but it's our hope to show
to the Russian side that we are open and transparent on missile
defense and to engage in cooperation in a way that might be mutually
productive.
QUESTION: Could you elaborate a little bit on your possible
cooperation on Missile Defense with the Russians?. For example are you
looking for sharing data on early warning systems, assisting the
Russians in improving their radar system, or can you elaborate on any
concrete issues?
BOLTON: I think there are a number of measures that are under active
discussion relating to data exchange that would allow us to work
together to detect missile threats to both of our countries. There are
a series of other things that we might be able to do in terms of
scientific and technological exchanges on the question of missile
defense. As I say, it is still relatively early in those discussions,
although we were joined here, in Geneva -- our prospective delegations
between Foreign Minister Mamedov and myself -- by one of the working
groups that was set up earlier to discuss missile defense cooperation.
And I think I mentioned a moment ago, General Baluyevskiy gave us a
fairly extensive briefing this morning which was continuing in the
working group on some Russian thoughts on cooperative mechanisms. Our
hope is that by the time of the summit in May that we will have some
practical concrete areas of cooperation that we can announce. But
those are also discussions that are under way, and I can't be more
specific at this point because they are not advanced enough to be more
specific.
QUESTION: Yes, you said that the second document would try to reach
some sort of new strategic framework. Can you outline what the
elements of that framework would cover and any detail on what you may
have agreed on or are close to agreeing?
BOLTON: The New Strategic Framework is a phrase that President Bush
has used to try to characterize our relationship with Russia in the
post Cold War era, to say that we have obviously moved beyond the Cold
War antipathy between the two countries and that it is time now,
recognizing this new relationship where neither side considers the
other an adversary, to try to reflect that in our daily bilateral
relations. So the New Strategic Framework really refers to the whole
range of issues that we have been discussing. But specifically, the
work that we are doing focuses on offensive weapons reduction, on
missile defense, both of which I have discussed, on questions of
non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, where we both have a
substantial interest in making sure that weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems do not spread around the world. Counter
terrorism, particularly since September 11, has been a very fruitful
area of cooperation at several levels between Russia and the United
States. So that is an on-going process. It is not intended to be a
fixed agreement. We are going to reflect the progress that we have
made up until the time of the summit, but I have no doubt that the two
presidents in their conversations will take it even further in the
discussions they will have in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
QUESTION: I believe that the United States and Russia are apart on
verification issues: you don't agree on how the warhead cuts should be
verified. Have you been narrowing this down, and can you tell us what
the difference in the two positions is?
BOLTON: Actually, there is a substantial area of agreement, beginning
with the very firm view of both sides that we will keep the START I
inspection verification and compliance mechanisms in place for the
remaining life of that treaty. Both sides also, over the years of
experience with that treaty, have come up with a number of suggestions
that would reduce the burdensomeness of some of the inspections
without reducing in any way their capacity to provide information. We
have got some additional thoughts that we provided to the Russian side
last week when defense minister Ivanov was in Washington, that are
more particularly tailored to the kind of transparency that we would
like to see as we come down to the lower levels that both sides have
agreed to. There are a number of issues now relating to the fact that
we will be talking about, at least in our view, operationally deployed
warheads, as opposed to the kind of verification you need under the
START I counting rules where warheads are attributed to particular
delivery platforms whether they are carrying the warheads or not. We
don't have at this point a written response from the Russian side to
the document we presented to them last week, but we did talk about it
in the past couple of days. I think they will be responding to us
fairly quickly. We have a separate working group which is addressing
transparency and verification that we are hopeful will be meeting
again before the next meeting that we have with Deputy Foreign
Minister Mamedov, which we have agreed will be held in Moscow on April
23 and 24th.
QUESTION: With respect to the agreement you are negotiating, are you
discussing a notification period for withdrawal and if so what is the
period being considered?
BOLTON: Almost every arms control treaty, in fact almost every major
international agreement provides for some kind of withdrawal
provision. The ABM treaty that I mentioned a moment ago obviously
does. In our draft we have included a withdrawal provision. We had
also proposed to the Russians that, short of actual withdrawal, there
might be a mechanism whereby we could give notice if we felt
international geo-strategic circumstances have changed to a point
where the offensive nuclear weapons range might need to be adjusted,
so that we could adjust that range without actually withdrawing from
the treaty. And we have had some interesting discussions on that. I
think it would be fair to say that we have not reached agreement. But
I think that the Russian side does not have a much different view of
the importance of flexibility for both countries, given the
uncertainties that we face looking into the future. So those are
important questions. We don't have agreement on them yet. In fact, I
think it is important to note that we don't have agreement on anything
in particular until everything is agreed. We say that nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed, but we are making progress on a
number of fronts. That is an issue that although we don't have
agreement I think there is a very clear understanding between the two
sides of what flexibility we are interested in. That is not an issue
that is going to be an insuperable obstacle for us.
QUESTION: Can I just follow up on what you had just said there? You
are saying that you would like a mechanism which would allow you to
change the figures, to raise them, conceivably?
BOLTON: Right. If there were changed circumstances in the world that
might be necessary. It might also be possible, within the range, for
the United States to vary up or down, or both sides, the way the
drafts are written, to go below the range. That is one of the things
that we see as important, and I believe the Russian side sees as
important too, that is, when looking ten years down the road you are
looking into a very uncertain future. While we are interested in
providing for stability between ourselves, it is less uncertainty
about us, than about uncertainty in the world. I think that is just a
prudent way to proceed. And I am encouraged that I think the Russian
side, at least in big picture terms, sees it the same way we do.
QUESTION: Mr. Bolton, I was wondering if you have any ballpark figures
what it would cost to store an estimated 4,000 nuclear warheads, or if
as the Russians wish, to have a lot of them destroyed? Have you
discussed the possibility of technical or financial assistance to
Russia if they do wish to destroy the weapons systems that you might
wish to store? And I understand there are some concerns by members of
Congress on the hazardous side effects of storing thousands of weapons
systems around the United States.
BOLTON: Well, the question of storage or destruction is one that we
have had discussions with the Russian side about. We are already
providing a substantial amount of assistance, as are other countries,
in terms of cooperative threat reduction programs and other programs
[in] Russia, to reduce the amount of fissile material that is in
warhead form. Part of the subject of storage versus destruction is a
capacity problem. Dismantling a nuclear warhead is not something you
do casually over a weekend. It is an involved, complicated and
dangerous process so that there is a certain limit that both sides
face in the destruction process.
That's one of the reasons why I think we had a very productive
discussion between Secretary Rumsfeld and Defense Minister Ivanov in
understanding why, for purposes of reaching an agreement by the time
of the summit, we should really focus on what the two presidents have
already announced in terms of reduction of operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads. Because once you get into the subject of
storage or destruction, you also have to get into the question of
production and a whole range of other issues that would make it
effectively impossible to reach an agreement by May and therefore
would give a misleading picture of just how much progress we have made
in the relationship on these issues. So I think those are subjects
probably for discussion later. Our focus would be on reaching an
agreement by May on the operational coordinates. I am going to have to
leave in a couple of minutes, so I will just take a couple more now.
QUESTION: Could I just ask you, does the American proposal foresee
destroying all the warheads that will be made non-operational, or did
you present a figure already to the Russians showing how many you
would like to destroy and how many you would prefer to store.
BOLTON: Well, we've talked in theoretical terms about what happens
when you come down from the current level of approximately 6,000
deployed warheads to a range of between 1,700 and 2,200. But I would
just say again, bear in mind the precedent of earlier strategic
weapons agreements where the subject of what happens to the downloaded
warheads was just not addressed in the agreement because of the
concern of focusing on what the immediate issue before the treaty
negotiators was. The net of that is that this agreement -- I will
predict a little bit ahead to what I think it will look like -- will
not be any different from prior arms control agreements in that
respect. And, although we are not there yet, I don't think that this
is going to be an insuperable issue between the two sides. We'll see.
We've got two months to go, and although it is not a lot of time, we
are going to be working to see if we can't overcome the remaining
areas of disagreement.
QUESTION: So, just for my understanding, your side would like to store
all the warheads you are making non-operational, or you don't plan to
destroy any?
BOLTON: Well, we haven't made a decision on what to do with the
warheads that will be downloaded. Some will be stored, some are
spares. We want to have insurance against a problem of safety or
reliability with an entire class of warheads. These are all questions
that the Russians face as well. They have got thousands of warheads
that are in storage now in Russia. The real issue is whether they are
operationally deployed, and whether that constitutes a threat. And
that is really the question we are focusing on.
QUESTION: This question is not directly related to the U.S.-Russian
issue. It's about the refusal to certify North Korean compliance of
the 1994 Geneva Nuclear Framework. Doesn't this lead to some kind of
confusion about what is the real intention about the refusal to
certify the North Korean compliance? What are the real criteria set by
your government for the North Korea's full compliance with the
framework. I wondered if you could answer this question please?
BOLTON: I'd really rather not get into areas outside the negotiations
we've had here, and I'm not sure, sitting here, whether the President
has made a decision on that issue. Since it is his decision, it would
be inadvisable, to say the least, for me to comment on the
deliberations we have had inside the government. So my suggestion
would be to get your colleagues in Washington to follow up on that
question. And when I'm back there, they'll probably call me. Let's
just take one more.
QUESTION: Sir, how long would it take to make a stored nuclear warhead
operational again?
BOLTON: Well that is a very hard question to answer since a warhead
that is not actually operationally deployed can be in various states
of dismantling. The answer to your question is, in some cases a very
short time, and in some cases a very long time. That is one of the
reasons why the difficulty of defining the entire universe of pieces
and parts of the nuclear weapons supply system is so difficult to
codify in an agreement, and one of the reasons that both we and the
Russians have focused only on the issue of most immediate concern.
Thank you very much. Nice to see you again.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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