Over the last two decades I have had an interesting perspective on security at the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons facilities – most recently as a Special Assistant for Secretary Bill Richardson working on security at these facilities until January 2001, and previously as an investigator for the House Energy and Commerce Committee. I am now with an investigative government watchdog group, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO).
I know from first hand experience and observation that several key DOE sites are woefully below acceptable security standards. People from such diverse groups as Army Special Forces, Departmental Survey Teams, Contractor analysts and site protective forces have provided me with confirmatory data – there is high risk to the health and safety of the public from homemade nuclear bombs, radiological dispersal, and theft of nuclear materials.
Working inside the bureaucracy on behalf of the Secretary was a particularly illuminating experience. I saw first hand how the bureaucracy lies to itself – leading to institutional recalcitrance and dry rot. For example, we concluded that a site at Los Alamos with tons of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium simply could not be protected – we wanted it shut down, and the nuclear materials moved out. When the Secretary gave clear orders, the bureaucracy simply out-waited him.
I can’t overemphasize the importance of the decision made by these men to bring their security concerns to the public. This Livermore information is particularly shocking – if we don’t take care of our troops we can’t expect our troops to take care of us. They have all attempted to make positive change from the inside. There are many, many more good people on the inside who are afraid to come forward because they have seen what has happened to the careers of these men and a whole series of other people who have publicly blown the whistle at DOE.
Many other good bureaucrats and contractors have not been coming forward to the Congress because for some time there hasn’t been anyone in the Congress who has focused on physical security at the nuclear weapons complex and is willing to protect whistleblowers. From my experience on the inside, it is hard – or virtually impossible – to move a bureaucracy without the threat of credible Congressional oversight. There has been no place for the good guys to go. We commend Congressman Markey for beginning this investigation. He has already put enormous staff resources into working on this problem, and we at POGO are proud to be working with him. We are also grateful that Congressman Shays has asked the GAO to review our findings.
There are reasonable solutions to these vulnerabilities. We have listed a number of specific recommendations in our report. A one page summary is also available.
Peter Stockton was Special Assistant to DOE Secretary Bill Richardson from 1999-2001. Mr. Stockton was the Chief investigator for Chairman John Dingell (D-MI) of the House Energy and Commerce Committee from 1972-1995, including during the Committee’s investigations of DOE security failures.