In the beginning of 1997 I was brought to the Department of Energy, Headquarters, Office of Safeguards and Security as the lead analyst for a new team. The purpose of the team was to evaluate risk to bomb grade special nuclear materials at the 10 DOE sites that house weapons quantities of nuclear materials, as well as to the transportation of these nuclear materials and nuclear weapons. The total nuclear materials in the inventory at those sites is about 1000 metric tons of uranium and plutonium.
We were addressing the risk of: theft; radiological dispersal, and construction of a “homemade” nuclear bomb. Within four months of the formation of the nucleus of the quality assurance team we determined that there was high risk at the Rocky Flats Plant outside of Denver to theft and radiological dispersal.
The team ultimately consisted of personnel from the DOE, Sandia’s simulation lab, Army special forces, and RETA analysts. These personnel provided an independent three way cross check of risk at the DOE sites. Over the next two years we also identified major risks at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Transportation Division, as well as lessor problems at the other sites. These problems were briefed at the highest levels in DOE. I want to emphasize that the vulnerabilities and risk reported was not the work of one person or one company.
In January 2000, I wrote an internal memo to the “Security Czar” alerting him to the my concern of the unnecessary risk to public health and safety posed at a number of these facilities. The Czar took no action to address these vulnerabilities. Shortly after my letter to the Security Czar my 5- year contract was terminated. I then wrote to the incoming Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, hoping he would resolve these vulnerabilities. He took no action.
I finally began working with the Project On Government Oversight in the production of their report “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk.” I had tried to work from the inside to address my concerns. Never before in my professional life had I gone outside the system to resolve problems. In this case, however, the system was unwilling to address these issues.
With the tragedy of September 11, the concerns expressed heretofore in classified correspondence and in the POGO report have been exacerbated because of the dramatic increase in the threat and the actual use of chemical and biological weapons. If the DOE could not protect the 1000 metric tons of bomb grade nuclear materials earlier - it certainly cannot protect it now.
In response to the POGO report, we have been asked “is DOE corrupt?” The question is not precise - the Department of Energy is dysfunctional. It has been reported as a dysfunctional bureaucracy by the executive and the congress continuously since 1995, up to and including today.
The health and safety of the public, the strategic importance of nuclear materials, and confidence in our future welfare is in jeopardy from well trained terrorist organizations. Today the Department of Energy still denies a problem and certainly has no plans, policies, or resources to address these concerns.
Ron Timm is President of RETA Security, a firm that provides security engineering and services for numerous private and public sector clients. Mr. Timm had been a consultant on security issues for the DOE for 17 years and received three letters of commendation for his work from DOE. In his role as a senior analyst for DOE, Mr. Timm conducted reviews of the protection programs for each of the 11 major DOE facilities and the Transportation Safeguards Division. Mr. Timm’s contracts with DOE were terminated in 2001 after he wrote to Congress and Secretary Abraham to voice his concerns about the lack of security at nuclear weapons plants. Mr. Timm’s whistleblower retaliation complaint against DOE is currently pending.