22 January 1999
(Calls Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty a "living document") (4950) Geneva-- Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John Holum says the United States views the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty "as a flexible, living document that should be susceptible to modification as the international environment changes." Holum, who is also director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told reporters in Switzerland January 21, "It is, as a practical matter, possible to design a national missile defense in response to the threat of a few warheads that would not interfere with the basic purposes of the ABM Treaty. On that basis, we intend to focus on adjusting on the ABM Treaty, as we have already done in the case of demarcation between theater and national missile defense, to adjust the ABM Treaty to accommodate this new concern." The issue of modifying the treaty again surfaced following the U.S. announcement of new spending over a five year period for its National Missile Defense program. Holum said that the budgetary decision, announced January 20 by Defense Secretary Cohen, "does not constitute a decision to proceed with a national missile defense." The $6.6 billion for fiscal years 2000 through 2005 is money that Cohen has put in the defense budget "for the out years, as it is our common practice when we are...looking ahead to the possibility of deploying a new system," Holum said. A deployment decision has not been made, he underscored, adding "That will be discussed with our Treaty partners." The undersecretary pointed out that it is possible "to design a national missile defense in response to the threat of a few warheads that would not interfere with the basic purposes of the ABM Treaty, and that is what is driving the current discussion." Holum was in Geneva to address the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the need for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and for securing stronger verification measures for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). During a subsequent press briefing he was asked about the U.S. position on anti-personnel landmines (APL). "On the APL ban, we have the objective of signing the Ottawa Convention, but that is conditional," he explained. When the convention was being negotiated last year, the United States "tried very hard to achieve amendments...that would have allowed for our particular responsibilities and requirements in (South) Korea," he said, "and also to deal with the problem of mixed munitions -- anti-tank weapons that are protected themselves" by APL. Holum said the U.S. objective "is to phase out pure APL and also to resolve the problem of mixed munitions" and when that is accomplished "we hope to sign the Ottawa Convention." In the meantime, the United States would like to see the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD to limit the transfer of APL. Such a limitation, Holum said, would fill "an important gap." Following is a transcript of Holum's remarks: (begin transcript) HOLUM: Thank you very much. It is good to be back with all of you, I recognized some familiar faces, as well as some new participants. I just want to observe at the outset that we have made a great deal of progress on important arms control non-proliferation issues in recent years. Many of these forward steps have occurred here in Geneva. In particular the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. We also extended the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, made it permanent. We have brought into force the Chemical Weapons Convention. So we have been proceeding with a positive frame of mind. Last year was a wake up call that reminded all of us that there is still great deal to be done if we are going to get on top of the problem of non-proliferation. In particular the nuclear tests in South Asia, missile tests in Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, as well as continued defiance in Iraq, and other challenges underscore that we have a great deal of work to do. I am here in Geneva to focus on two of the leading items of the arms control and non-proliferation agenda. First is the Biological Weapons Convention, which is far reaching in terms of its prohibition and limitations, but has important gaps, in that it is largely reliant on voluntary measures for enforcement. It needs teeth. And the ad hoc committee of members of the Biological Weapons Convention has been working to try to fill those gaps. We are hoping that major progress will be made this year. I had a number of conversations regarding that effort yesterday. This is a very high priority in the U.S. and in many other countries. And then today focused on the CD agenda and in particular on the effort to complete the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty which we regard as an indispensable step on the way to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It is basically the means we have to cap the potential for nuclear weapons globally by limiting their basic ingredients. That is the highly enriched uranium and the plutonium that are necessary to make nuclear weapons. The CD, having marked time since the test ban was agreed, now seems in my judgment to be in the mood to act to get back down to what this committee is known for. That is producing real, enforceable, effective, practical results in arms control and non-proliferation. We are looking forward to a great deal of progress. There are some obstacles, but I think the negotiations will get underway soon. QUESTION: What would you say would be benchmarks you might use to determine how things are advancing. If you haven't had progress by, say, April on such and such point. Is that going to be an alarm signal? ANSWER: There are many pieces to these negotiations and some of the issues are highly technical and very complex. I don't expect there will be agreement by April, for example, on the verification structure or on the scope of the treaty. The first hurdle, obviously is to continue what the CD did last August. That is to set up the ad hoc committee to commence negotiations. It should be a simple step to take up where they left off last year, and recreate the committees and other institutions and special coordinators that were set up at the end of last year. That would be the first milestone. Then I think there would have to be an assessment of whether countries are coming to the table with detailed and fully developed positions. Remember that this concept has been on the agenda for a long time. There has been a lot of expert work done, there have been consultations with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and a variety of other steps that have really equipped the Conference on Disarmament to get down to work. The question would be whether we now are arriving with positions spelled out as opposed to just getting around to coming up with national views. My sense is that these positions are fairly well developed but it will take actual negotiation to confirm that. Q: I have three questions: The first is connected to the last U.S./U.K. strike against Iraq. How would you assess the reduction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and do you believe that Iraq still represents a regional threat after these air strikes? The second one is on the Middle East as a nuclear biological, chemical, weapons, free zone, and, here, I refer to Israel. And the third one is what is the U.S. reaction to Switzerland's proposal to host the new biological weapons organization in Geneva? A: In terms of the strike on Iraq, there is no question that Saddam will seek to reconstitute his capabilities with regards to weapons to mass destruction. So we certainly regard Iraq as a continuing threat in the region. What is most important now is to find some way to restore Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM (UN Special Commission) in carrying out the necessary inspections, to establish the baseline and move forward. There is work underway at the UN Security Council to accomplish that objective, but Saddam Hussein needs to know that until UN security Council Resolution 687 and the other Resolutions are fully satisfied the sanctions will remain in place. The potential for action to prevent his reconstitution will continue. With the regard to the Middle East resolution on weapons of mass destruction, this is a concept that enjoys support in the region. We have favored the concept. At the same time, we have been realistic in recognizing that the prospects for making headway on such a resolution are dependent, as a practical matter, on the Peace Process and on results in that very important and difficult endeavor. As for your third question, I don't think we have taken a position yet on the location. Someone may correct me on this, but I think that it is still an open issue to be worked out in the negotiations. Typically, the decisions of that kind are resolved more toward the end of the process than at the beginning but you raise an important point. One of the things that needs to be done in negotiating the protocol is to develop an implementing body. It should not be a large bureaucracy, but a small, efficient group of experts that would be capable of carrying out the new elements of this regime, including on-site challenge inspections. Q: Two questions: Why is it that the U.S. is opposed to destroying the stock piles of uranium and plutonium, or is it an issue which is on the table open for negotiation? The second concerns the ban on landmines: The U.S. has not joined many other countries in the Ottawa treaty. Is there any change likely in this policy that you see in the future? Will this be negotiated at the CD? A: On the question of existing stocks, we are not opposed to destruction. In fact, the U.S. and Russia are engaged in a series of cooperative activities to began eliminating the very large stockpiles of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) and plutonium that are coming out of weapons, as these weapons are dismantled. We see that, however, as more appropriately a bilateral or regional effort rather than an element of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) globally. That is for very practical reason. I don't know how an international body could decide on the appropriate procedures for elimination of stocks, more importantly on what size stocks are appropriate. Do you decide that Pakistan should have X quantity and that India should have Y quantity, and how does that relate to countries that are in the process of disarming? It is just not something you can do in a global context. So what we feel we should do in the FMCT is accomplish what can be achieve here. It is a big step to put a ceiling on the amount of material there is, even as we are engaged in other efforts bilaterally with Russia and trilaterally with Russia and the IAEA to reduce these stocks. On the APL ban, we have the objective of signing the Ottawa Convention but that is conditional. When the ban was being negotiated we tried very hard to achieve amendments to the Ottawa Convention that would have allowed for our particular responsibilities and requirements in (South) Korea, and also to deal with the problem a mixed munitions, anti-tank weapons that are protected themselves by anti-personnel landmines. Our objective is to phase out pure APL and also to resolve the problem of mixed munitions. When that is done, we hope to sign the Ottawa Convention. But those conditions have not yet been met. In the meantime, we are obviously very interested in establishing an ad hoc committee in the CD to limit the transfer of APL, which fills an important gap. Keep in mind, one of the important steps that has been taken in the APL field is the negotiation of a protocol on conventional weapons that basically bans long-lived, non-self destructing landmines that are deployed in unmarked fields. Those are the APL that are causing civilian casualties around the world. This is the great horror of long-lived APL. They wait around when the war is over and attack innocent victims. Farmers returning to their fields; children at play. All the major landmine producing and using countries have agreed on that protocol. If you couple that with a ban on transfers and with a strong and increasing landmine removal program as the U.S. and other are pursuing, you have a fairly strong and comprehensive program to attack this scourge. But we still have the objective of signing the Ottawa Convention at some point. Q: What do you think are the prospects of forming an ad hoc committee on landmines and going into a viable negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament? A: That's hard to say. My impression is that the Fissile Material Cutoff negotiations is likely to proceed on a faster track than APL transfer ban. There are still some countries who resist the notion of that having being done here. I think, there is general agreement that the FMC is ripe for negotiation. Q: On biological weapons: have delegations expressed concerns to you that any international inspections regime might be used or misused for potential spying subsequent to the revelation about UNSCOM? A: One of the difficulties in negotiating the biological weapons protocol is to balance the need for intrusiveness that would be reliable as an inspection regime against the requirements of industry and sensitive defense efforts on biological weapons to protect either proprietary or national security information. We will undoubtedly not come up with a perfect regime that satisfies everyone. This is an industrial area where a company can be built on a single biological process, and so loss of that proprietary information could mean the difference between success and failure for the company. By the same token, in the security area we are obviously anxious not to telegraph our directions in terms of defending against biological weapons, to make the task of cheater easier. So there would be a difficult trade off. In the end, I think we will arrive at a regime that adds measurably to our confidence in enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention without crossing lines that would make it excessively harmful from those standpoints. Q: Two questions: why are the delegation representatives and a number of governments against having the WHO (World Health Organization) as a kind of check point for the Biological Weapons Convention? It is the only organization which has a number of immunologists available of high quality and no one wants the WHO to intervene, to become a party of the Convention. Number two: There have been a number of new weapons developed, I am referring, for example, to cluster bombs which have been dropped by the tens of millions in South East Asia and in Iraq, Kuwait. Is there a reason not to consider those weapons as mass destruction weapons? A: I am not up to speed on the relationship between the WHO and the BWC. I know it has been a matter of discussion as to whether the WHO would have an appropriate role or not in investigating outbreaks of diseases. Obviously, there is an existing structure there. One of the triggers that we have supported for an inspection under the BWC would be a suspicious outbreak of diseases that would appear to be the use of biological weapons. That is a matter of some controversy. But I can't give you a definitive description of where things stand on that. In terms of new weapons of mass destruction, it is an important point to recognize that we focus on weapons that are capable of wiping out whole cities at a time, but there are weapons, mostly small arms, that in fact, do routinely wipe out whole cities a few people at the time. APL are obviously in that category. There are incendiary weapons and others that fall into the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which focuses particularly on those dangerous to civilian populations. I don't know if cluster bombs are appropriate to bring up in that context. I am not an expert on their use and consequences. But that's the right framework for addressing that kind of issue. Q: Secretary Cohen has said that the U.S. is going to revise the ABM treaty. Don't you see it as a potential threat to your idea to come closer to eventual nuclear disarmament as you said in your speech? What threat pushes the U.S. to increase its military budget by 12 billion dollars this year? A: On national missile defense: I would dispute the premise that it is in conflict with the goal of ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. I can envision as a practical matter that at some point national missile defenses would be indispensable in a decision to eliminate nuclear weapons. They would be a safeguard against the possibilities that someone might retain a few. Remember that missile defenses are, by their very definition, defenses, not offenses, and they are not based on nuclear capabilities. That's a long term answer, the nearer term answer is that over the course of the past year, missile tests, particularly by North Korea and Iran, plus the Rumsfeld Commission Report, have had the impact of dramatically reducing the time that the intelligence community previously estimated it would take for any country to acquire an intercontinental ballistic missile capability that could threaten the U.S. with weapons of mass destruction. It is, as a practical matter, possible to design a national missile defense in response to the threat of a few warheads that would not interfere with the basic purposes of the ABM Treaty. On that basis, we intend to focus on adjusting on the ABM Treaty, as we have already done in the case of demarcation between theater and national missile defense, to adjust the ABM Treaty to accommodate this new concern. We regard the ABM Treaty as a flexible, living document that should be susceptible to modification as the international environment changes, and the environment is changing. I underscore that the budgetary decision that Secretary Cohen has announced does not constitute a decision to proceed with a national missile defense. Rather he has put funds in the budget for the out years as it is our common practice when we are thinking, or looking ahead to the possibility of deploying new system. But the deployment decision has not been made. That will be discussed with our treaty partners. The increase of the defense budget relates to a long standing and intensified concern about force readiness that the Joint Chief of Staff have described to the Congress and the response to that concern is upgrading force readiness. Q: You mentioned earlier that there would have to be some difficult tradeoffs between chemical interests and national security sensitive research. Can you elaborate on your latest consultation with industry. Are they still not on board on mandatory inspection of facilities? A: I hesitate to speak for industry, they can certainly speak for themselves. We have consulted at great length on this particular problem. It is fair to say that the still have strong reservations about a visits outside of challenge inspections. We have resolutions from the latest rounds of the ad hoc session to examine a number of new ideas. We'll be consulting with industry as well as among the various interested federal agencies. I hope and expect that in the course of all of this, we'll come up with a set of procedures that meet the basic concerns of industry yet, at the same time, provide a sufficiently intrusive inspection regime that we can say we have measurably improved the enforceability of the Biological Weapons Convention. Q: You mentioned earlier that the missile development seen in Pakistan, Iran, India and North Korea, has been an issue of concern. Could you elaborate the concerns highlighted by the Chinese recently on the U.S.-Japanese missile initiative which in many ways has been a response to North Korean missile testing? A: That is certainly a concern and an area which has quite reasonably made Japan more interested in the possibility of cooperation on the Theater Missile Defense. They are, after all, within range of North Korea's medium-range missiles. This was a particularly egregious case from their stand point because the Korean missile overflew Japan's territory without notice. It doesn't help to say it was a satellite launch, because as you know, satellite launchers and missiles are essentially the same thing. To the extent that China is concerned about the possible development of Theater Missile Defenses in Japan, it gives China a strong interest in joining us in working to restrain the North Korean missile programs that are the impetus for those developments. Q: I still possess interviews I did with General Daniel Graham in Washington many years ago. If you remember he was the forefather of the Protection System. What do you think has made the situation changed so much since he invented and now? A: What has changed are reference to national missile defense is two broad trends: one is a reconstitution of what we talking about in terms of National Missile Defense. Nobody, only a very few people, are advocating a global large national missile defense that would defend against the possibility of attack from Russia, a country that has an advanced and developed missile capability. So what we have done is focused the missile defense effort on the more realistic possibility, first in the theater area, shorter range attack, to build theater range defenses which is a somewhat less challenging requirement, still challenging because we haven't had a lot of success in the test program for the THAAD (Theater High Altitude Defense) system. Plus building a nationwide defense against the possibility of a rogue state threat, a relatively small number of missiles. That is one development. The other development has been that the threat has grown much more rapidly than have been anticipated. The concern has been intensified based on the Rumsfeld Commission Report which is a very serious effort and focused, more than had been the case in the past, on the sharing of technology among countries that are interested in developing longer range missile capability. The launch from North Korea which arguably foreshadowed the capability of reaching U.S. territory with something. It was a three-stage launch. A third stage capability means, as it is perfected, a greater range. And thus, the potential within a few years, to launch a weapon of mass destruction against U.S. territory. That's why we have intensified the effort, and why Secretary Cohen made the announcement he did yesterday. Q: How do you assess, now that we are at the end of the first session of five of the BWC prospects for getting somewhere by the end of the year? If you could just comment on how far the U.S. is willing to go to meet demands by South Africa and others in the CD for a committee on nuclear disarmament. Are you prepared to go beyond accepting just consultations, could you clarify? A: On the BWC, my own judgment is that I am disappointed in the first session. I hoped that there would have been more progress. At the same time, we have crystallized some decisions that would need to be made between now and the next session. We have 16 weeks of negotiating time this year, up from 13 last year. That signals that countries are more serious about making progress. If you measure progress as a linear commodity, we should be one fourth of the way there. We are not. We certainly have a lot of work to do. I'm still optimistic that we can by the end of this year or early next year, get to a basic text on the content of this Treaty. On nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, the logical next step is the FMCT, which is a nuclear disarmament activity. I am very skeptical about the Conference on Disarmament engaging in formal negotiations on timetables for eliminating nuclear weapons or other kinds of devices. If it is a negotiation, I don't think it can work here. The appropriate way to get to zero nuclear weapons is to continue the bilateral process and eventually extend to the five, in the way we have been doing. That process is making headway. My concern is that activities in the CD will actually slow that down because we are getting into other sets of arguments over what the position should be to negotiate here. It will not advance the process to have a distinct set of negotiations. On the other hand, if it is not a negotiation, if it is a place to declare national positions or ask questions. The CD should not do it. We can discuss nuclear disarmament in the First Committee, the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Review Process, in the Disarmament Commission, in a variety of places, and we do routinely. This is a negotiating body. Whether it is a negotiation or not a negotiation, I don't think it should be done here. Q: With regard to FMCT, in today's CD are you stated that FMCT will prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives by states not party to the NPT. How do you think the key countries not the party to the NPT will agree to the inspections? A: Of course it is conditional on their participating in the negotiations, then participating in the treaty. It would require them, like us, to undergo the kind of inspection procedures that I was talking about in my remarks. Basic access to facilities that enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium and then downstream possessors of those commodities. We are not talking about in this treaty dealing with existing stocks. But we are talking about an obligation against further production for weapons and in monitoring of the facilities that will be engaged in that activity. Q: Could you tell us as of today, how many tons of plutonium and HEU do the States has for the military stocks? Do you have any idea of calling for a moratorium of the production of fissile materials once the annihilation starts. A: I confess, I don't know the precise answer to the first question, although it very large quantities. But also emphasize that we have agreed to remove permanently, from military use between the U.S. and Russia, hundreds of tons of HEU and plutonium already. A big part of that will be done in the form of removing HEU from military programs, blending it down, and burning it in power reactors. The two countries have agreed that each would remove 50 tons of plutonium for weapon programs and dispose of them through arrangements still to be negotiated. It is much more complicated to get rid of plutonium. As for your second question, we have proposed that in light of the South Asian activities and the benchmarks that have been established by the UN, the P5, the task force on South Asia, and others, that one very useful step would be an agreement among countries that have tested nuclear weapons, to stop the production of plutonium. We are not producing these materials, others are not, but there is nothing formal about that. It doesn't take away from the requirement for the FMCT with the necessary verification processes. But it would help a great deal, particularly in avoiding what could otherwise be a runaway arm race in South Asia. There is a very strong need in that region to cap fissile material where it is. Q: You talked about seeing the mood of the CD shifting from marking time from actually doing something. Could you amplify a bit on what indications you see of that in the CD and any reasons? A: The conversations I had here, and with delegations in New York, create a building sense that the CD have not been productive since 1996. The Romanian Ambassador had an interesting characterization: '97 was a year of reflection, '98 was a year of decision, and '99 will be the year of action. I identify with that concept, even if I did not quote him exactly. I though it was a very good characterization of where the CD is. This institution is vitally important to the process of multilateral arms control, and that's where so much of the action is. It had has a long periods in its past history of not producing much. But now it's in a position where expectations are higher because it has done more on the CWC, on the test ban. So the world looks to this institution to be productive. The Ambassadors and their colleagues here feel that. They have to live up to expectations. That's one trend. The other trend is that we are realizing more widely that this is a very dangerous world, and so we gained more impetus by what happened in 1998 on the non-proliferation front. These are not theoretical problems. They are real ones, and it's time to get back to work. (end transcript)