TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN
EUROPE (CFE) TREATY DOC. 102-8


TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1991

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building, Hon. Joseph Biden, presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Helms, and Lugar.

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will come to order. Today the Foreign Relations Committee continues its consideration of the CFE Treaty with testimony from all of the principal agencies of the U.S. intelligence community.

We will begin in open session with Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is now acting as spokesman for the entire intelligence community.

The committee will then reassemble in S-407, the secure hearing room above us in the Capitol to hear classified testimony from the CIA; from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; from the National Security Agency; from the intelligence chiefs of the four military services; and from ACDA which is most directly concerned with verification.

In this hearing, our overall concern is the ability of the United States and its allies to monitor compliance with the CFE Treaty. We are keenly interested to learn the views of the intelligence community as to its confidence in U.S. ability to detect various kinds of cheating on the treaty and confidence in detecting militarily significant violations.

In addition, I want to inquire into the nature of and the reasons for the widely publicized data discrepancy between the Soviet Union's declarations as to its levels of treaty-limited equipment and the levels estimated by the U.S. intelligence community.

This discrepancy began as a very large number and has been shrinking in recent months as U.S. intelligence agencies have revised our estimates, but some discrepancy still remains.

And finally, I would like to discuss the unprecedented data sharing and inspection process for which the CFE Treaty provides. The Chairman of the Joint Chief's, General Powell, yesterday placed great emphasis on the process both of data disclosure for which he said that as a military commander in NATO he would have paid dearly, and on the inspection process.

I am interested to assess what we can expect from this process in terms of cooperation between the militaries, between the intelligence agencies and between national governments.

Is it possible, if this treaty fulfills the hopes attached to it, that this cooperative process can transform the very nature by which nations think of and seek to pursue the protection of their national security?

I do not know the answer to that, but I would like to explore it a little bit.

We welcome you today and are anxious to hear your testimony, but I yield to my friend from Indiana to hear what he has to say and then to Senator Helms.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join in welcoming representatives of the intelligence community to our hearing this morning. I will look forward to their testimony.

Did the Soviets give a true account of what was within the zone of reduction at the time of the CFE Treaty signature or did they lie to avoid some of their destruction liabilities?

Did the United States intelligence community accurately reflect the amount of treaty-limited equipment in the zone at the time of the treaty's signature or did the intelligence community make such serious errors in the estimates that our ability to monitor the CFE Treaty effectively has been drawn into question?

These are surely the kinds of provocative questions that surround the data discrepancy issue associated with the CFE agreement, and they should be the focus of our discussions this morning.

The data describing the Soviet holding of treaty-limited equipment in the zone submitted by the Soviets prior to signature on November 19, 1990, diverged from both on October 1990, intelligence estimate and from the information provided earlier by then Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

This may reflect the failure of the intelligence community to take into account the huge amounts of Soviet equipment being withdrawn from Europe as well as the continuing and accelerating Soviet withdrawals between July 1990, the date of the Shevardnadze letter and November 19, 1990, the date of the treaty signature.

This alleged intelligence failure and suggestion of undetected Soviet cheating will lie at the heart of this issue and the ratification debate, and it will lie obviously at the heart of my questions, this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I think I made my position pretty clear on this treaty-that it is almost irrelevant, but I am concerned about how much more deceit and deception we are going to have from the Soviet Union.

Everybody thinks that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat, so let us just pop the champagne corks. But it just is not so. If you look at what they continue to spend on their military, they are playing the same old game. I will believe it when I see it when it comes to this issue.

But I have no opening statement, no formal opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to our witnesses answering our questions.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator.

A wise man, Mr. Deputy Director, said something to me after Senator Helms made a similar statement on the opening day. He said the cooperation between Biden and Helms is in inverse proportion to how seriously they think the issues need be addressed. We are cooperating a lot right now. [Laughter.]

At any rate, we are happy to have you and are anxious to hear what you have to say.

Senator HELMS. Sir, let me say before we begin that I am not walking out because I am displeased with anything that you said, but I have to be in two places at once.

Senator BIDEN. There is a minor matter on the floor on which we disagree, but I like it when you are here better, Jesse.

Senator HELMS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.


STATEMENT OF RICHARD KERR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. KERR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here. It is an important treaty from our perspective. I would also like to say if I could at the beginning that the intelligence community as a whole, led by Doug MacEachin, the Chief of our Arms Control Intelligence staff has been intimately involved in this process throughout the period of negotiation.

We have had a very real and direct role and involvement in it and I think that is an important thing to say up-front in this portion of the hearing. And as you fully understand, in any negotiation, you never end up exactly where you want to be from any point of view in that negotiation and in intelligence there is always a give and take.

We have been directly involved in it and had an opportunity to participate in that rolling debate if you will. And I give great credit to the people on the arms control staff, to Doug MacEachin and to the people who supported him directly in the negotiations. We were not bystanders.

From an intelligence perspective the CFE Treaty imposes two major monitoring requirements on the intelligence community And you have already identified some of your concerns about them and while I cannot explore them in detail in this session, I certainly will in the next session.

The first of these is to confirm that the U.S.S.R. and the other East European states eliminate enough treaty-limited equipment to conform to the limits imposed by the treaty, and after those reductions are accomplished, to observe and report on whether or not those states' activities indicate that they are remaining in compliance. Those are the two major missions from an intelligence perspective.

In addition to the national technical means, the treaty provides for onsite inspection, designed to aid verification, and I would certainly second the point that you made that General Powell passed on, that this is a unique and a very powerful aspect of the treaty, the onsite inspection.

Inspection of reduction, I will address in the first instance. The United States and its NATO allies will be entitled to have inspectors present to observe all destruction or conversion of treaty-limited equipment without a right of refusal. This will ensure that the first monitoring requirement is met.

We will then have inspection within the declared force structure. Declared site inspection are by quota, with no right of refusal. During the first baseline phase and that is in the first 120 days after entry into force, the United States and the NATO allies will conduct more than 300 inspections.

These inspections are intended to validate the data on their forces that all parties to the treaty declared at signature. During the 3 year reduction period, the alliance will be able to conduct some 270 additional inspections. These will enable us to further validate the declared data, including those follow-up declarations the U.S.S.R. and the other East European states will make.

There is also provision for inspection outside the declared structure. The treaty provides for challenge inspections within specified areas which have not been declared to hold treaty-limited equipment. The Soviets can refuse to accept such an inspection, but they must then provide all reasonable assurance that no treaty-limited equipment are at the site.

Onsite inspection, as I indicated and certainly as General Powell indicated and I think all of those involved would argue, is a critical element of our monitoring capability.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Kerr, in the second sentence there, "inspections are by quota." What does that mean, "declared site inspections are by quota?"

Mr. KERR. Each country has a set number. Doug, you might help me a little bit in terms of how that originally was established.

Senator BIDEN. Would you identify yourself for the record.

Mr. MACEACHIN. Yes, sir. I am Doug MacEachin, Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence staff. The quotas are set in terms of the number which each participant must receive. They must receive a certain percentage, based on the number of objects of inspection that he has.

What was the other half of your question?

Senator LUGAR. I was just trying to determine what that phrase meant.

Mr. MACEACHIN. Well, what it amounts to then, where the 300 comes from, that is the number which the other side must receive. Now so far as the active side, the inspecting parties, they can set their quotas, divided amongst them as they choose. There is an intra-alliance arrangement with our allies.

Senator BIDEN. To say it another way, the old Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the other side that you are referring to, must, over a period of time receive 300 inspections and the NATO countries including the U.S., although that is not exactly how it is negotiated, can divide up among ourselves. Is that right?

We can say the United States is going to take 107 of those or 41 of them or 58 and that is already agreed to, and at some point you will tell us what they are.

Mr. MACEACHIN Yes, but it has to be agreed to.

Senator BIDEN. It has to be agreed to. I was going to ask that question because, for the record, I think it is important in this open hearing to try and clear up any confusion.

Can all 300 inspections be within the Soviet Union?

Mr. MACEACHIN No, sir. The quotas are derived for each country has to accept a certain percentage based on its holdings of the treaty-limited equipment. Actually it is based on another more complicated,formula which we can go into, but there is a formula that determines how many inspections each country must receive.

Senator LUGAR. So if the Soviets have two-thirds of the equipment, they get about 200 inspections?

Mr. MACEACHIN. That is right.

Senator LUGAR. And then you divide it among the other signatories.

Mr. MACEACHIN That is right, and in fact, I think the Soviet number is 180. The Soviets receive 180 of the roughly 300.

Senator LUGAR. How many roughly will the United States be responsible for of the 180?

Mr. MACEACHIN By NATO agreement, the United States will take, I think, roughly 20 percent of the baseline inspections. Now the inspections are broken down into four periods. The first 120 days that is the so-called baseline, and then there is a period between that and the end of the 3 year reduction period--

Senator LUGAR. The baseline one in the first paragraph is 300, so the answer would be roughly 20 percent of 180 or about 36 times the United States would inspect Soviet facilities in the first 120 days, correct?

Mr. MACEACHIN. Right.

Mr. KERR. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. One last question on this particular subject. Are inter-alliance inspections available at some point in this treaty? Cannot the Poles inspect the Russians, the Czechs inspect the Russians?

Is that a different allocation of inspection numbers and opportunities?

Mr. MACEACHIN No. In fact, the maximum number of inspections that the Soviets have to receive is set. So if the Poles take one, they have taken up one of the inspections.

Senator BIDEN. And the only way they can take one is if NATO agreed to give them one?

Mr. MACEACHIN. That is right. If NATO has so agreed and NATO has agreed to provisions that give them some.

Senator BIDEN. So NATO has agreed.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. KERR. I think that is an important point and one worth exploring here. As I have said, onsite inspection is critical to our monitoring capability. We believe it will provide an effective deterrent to any concerted, large-scale cheating at declared sites.

And it will make cheating by assigning extra illegal treaty-limited equipment to the currently active overt structure extremely risky. The challenge inspection provision will also help deter cheating that would conceal extra treaty-limited equipment at nondeclared locations.

Although any particular challenge may be rejected, a pattern of repeated refusals and challenges made for serious cause would likely give rise to compliance questions through the machinery provided by the Treaty.

The monitoring of this treaty, the CFE Treaty presents the intelligence community with some serious challenges.

Senator Biden. Excuse me again, but I really think in this open session, it is important for people to understand what we are talking about.

You say a pattern of repeated refusal and challenges made for serious cause would likely give rise to compliance questions through the machinery provided in the treaty. The machinery provided in the treaty is what?

Mr. KERR. There is a mechanism for revolving disputes and it is a joint consultative group.

Senator BIDEN. So the Joint Consultative Group is the place to which the complaint would be made?

Mr. KERR. Yes.

In terms of our own concerns and the challenges that face us, the forces to be monitored are large and complex, and they contain tens of thousands of individual pieces of equipment, all of which are mobile and most of which are small enough to be rather easily concealed, so the challenge is impressive.

The treaty limits apply only to a part of the Soviet Union, and no type of equipment is completely Eliminated, and this contrasts quite sharply with the INF Treaty where the presence of a particular piece of equipment in itself was a violation of the treaty. In this case, that is not the situation. It is the numbers and the location that are key, and it is the connection between those two.

A precise count of treaty-limited equipment is not possible, as you know. We have been through this and it is extremely difficult for the intelligence community to provide constant coverage of equipment, and there are no real breakpoints, if you will, such as are available in the INF Treaty that make, as I said, detection of a piece of equipment a violation in itself.

Nevertheless, we believe that the combination of national technical means and onsite inspection will make cheating risky to undertake on any scale that would pose a serious military threat to the West. We have high confidence that we would detect and properly identify any large-scale scheme to exceed treaty limits well before enough extra weapons were acquired to sustain an attack on Central Europe.

Now, let me address in this session and we will obviously pursue this further in the next session, the problem of the Soviet data, You are obviously aware-we have had a good deal of discussion, and both of you have raised it in your statements-that when the Soviets tabled their figures on treaty-limited equipment holdings as November 19, 1990, there were major discrepancies between those figures and our most recent estimates available at that time.

I think it is important to give a little background on what the context of that is and why that discrepancy existed and what we have done about it since that time. As of mid-1988, U.S. estimates roughly matched what the Soviets acknowledged that they had in the area. We had a general agreement on the figures at that point in time.

This particular checkpoint came near the close of a long period of stability during which Soviet forces were mostly static and had undergone slow, evolutionary change. As you know, this suited the way we do our estimates which is, essentially, over a considerable period of time of accretion of information to build up a database.

By early 1989, the Soviet unilateral conventional force reductions n the withdrawal from Central Europe had begun and, although is disruption complicated our process of estimating holdings, we believe we were successful in tracking the changes taking place throughout 1989.

Evolution moves began, change began slowly. We believe we were able to follow them. But by the early 1990's the pace and size of the withdrawal increased as the Soviets evacuated treaty-limited equipment beyond the Urals. This shift took place so rapidly that we were unable to identify all of the units in the treaty zone from which the equipment was being withdrawn. We essentially lost our place as they began to move and draw forces out, and were unable to keep that database up to date. That is why we began to have this discrepancy.

Since last November, the intelligence community has been conducting a thorough review of all of the available evidence to compare against Soviet claims. At this time, our best judgment is that the Soviets' November 19 figures reflected what they had intended to have in the zone when the treaty entered into force, if not fore.

We have confirmed that some of the weapons being moved east of the Urals did not arrive at their destinations until a month or so after the signature. We also know that a number of items that the Soviets claimed to have eliminated by November 19 was still in the zone.

Had we had in place the negotiated measures and the inspection rights associated with this treaty, onsite inspection, the intelligence community would have been able to track with much more precision the Soviet movement of equipment over the past 3 years. We consider this aspect of onsite inspection to be the most important contribution to treaty monitoring of Soviet equipment holdings. That, in brief form, is a description of our data problem, and I would be glad to address that more completely in the closed hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kerr follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD KERR

Good morning Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee. With me this morning are representatives from throughout the intelligence community.

The CFE Treaty imposes two major monitoring requirements on the intelligence community. These are, first, to confirm that the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern states eliminate enough treaty-limited equipment to conform to the limits imposed by the treaty and, after those reductions are accomplished (that is 40 months after entry-into-force), to observe and report on whether or not those states' activities indicate that they are remaining in compliance.

In addition to national technical means, the treaty provides for onsite inspection designed to aid verification.

--Inspection of Reduction. -- The United States and the NATO allies will be entitled to have inspectors present to observe all destruction or conversion of treaty-limited equipment without right of refusal. This will ensure that the first monitoring requirement is met.

--Inspection Within Declared Force Structure. -- Declared site inspections are by quota with no right of refusal. During the first baseline phase (the First 120 days after entry-into-force) the United states and the NATO allies will conduct more than 300 inspections. These inspections are intended to validate the data on their forces that all parties to the Treaty declared at signature.

--During the 3-year reduction period, the alliance will be able to conduct some 270 additional inspections. These will enable us to further validate the declared data, including those follow-up declarations the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern states will make.

--Inspection Outside Declared Structure. -- The treaty also provides for challenge inspections within specified areas which have not been declared to hold treaty-limited equipment. The Soviets can refuse to accept such an inspection but must then provide all reasonable assurances that no TLE are at the site.

Onsite inspection is a critical element of our monitoring capability. We believe it will provide an effective deterrent to any concerted, large-scale cheating at declared sites. It will make cheating by assigning extra, illegal treaty-limited equipment to the currently active, overt force structure extremely risky. The challenge inspection provision will also help to deter cheating that would conceal extra treaty-limited equipment at nondeclared locations. Although any particular challenge may be rejected, a pattern of repeated refusals of challenges made for serious cause would likely give rise to a compliance question through the machinery provided by the treaty.

Monitoring the CFE Treaty presents the intelligence community with serious challenges.

--The forces to be monitored are large and complex, containing tens of thousands of treaty-limited equipment, all of which are mobile, and most of which are small enough to be rather easily concealed.

--Treaty limits apply only to a part of the Soviet Union and no type of equipment is completely eliminated.

--There are no restraints on production of new treaty-limited equipment.

Thus, precise counts of treaty-limited equipment are not possible and the Treaty provides no break points such as are available in the INF Treaty, which makes the detection of a single proscribed weapon a violation once the reductions period is completed. Nevertheless, we believe the combination of national technical means and onsite inspection will make cheating risky to undertake on any scale that would pose a serious military threat to the West. We have high confidence that we would detect and properly identify any large-scale scheme to exceed treaty limits well before enough extra weapons were acquired to sustain an attack on Central Europe.

The Problem of the Soviet Data. -- As I'm certain you're all aware, when the Soviets tabled their figures on treaty-limited equipment holdings as of November 19, 1990, there were major discrepancies between those figures and our most recent estimates available at that time. To understand how this came about and to gauge the implications for successful monitoring, it is necessary to review the history behind this event.

--As of mid-1988, U.S. estimates roughly matched what the Soviets have acknowledged they had at that time.

--This checkpoint came near the close of a long period of stability during which soviet forces were mostly static or had undergone slow evolutionary changes.

--By early 1989 the Soviet unilateral conventional force reductions and withdrawal from Central Europe had begun and, although this disruption complicated our process of estimating equipment holdings, we believe we were successful in tracking the changes taking place throughout 1989.

--By the early 1990's, the pace and size of the withdrawal increased, as the Soviets evacuated treaty-limited equipment beyond the Urals.

--The massive shift took place so rapidly that we were unable to identify all the units in the treaty zone from which equipment was withdrawn.

Since last November, the intelligence community has conducted a thorough review of the available evidence in comparison with the soviet claims. --At this time, our best judgment is that the Soviet November 19 figures reflected what they intended to have in the zone when the treaty entered into force-if not before.

--We have confirmed that some of the weapons being moved east of the Urals did not arrive at their destination until a month or so after signature.

--We also know that a number of items that the Soviets claimed to have eliminated by November 19 were still in the zone.

Had we had in place the negotiated measures and inspection rights associated with this treaty, the intelligence community would have been able to track with much more precision the soviet movement of equipment of the past 3 years. We consider this to be the most important contribution of the treaty to monitoring soviet equipment holdings.

Senator BIDEN. We are going to move to a closed session, but I think we may be able to ask just a few questions in open session before we do that. There are a number of issues that have been raised, and I think, quite frankly, it is useful and not at all burdensome to address them, and if anything that I ask you comes even remotely close to requiring classified information, then say so and we will stop.

Mr. KERR. Yes, Sir.

Senator BIDEN. In your statement on page 4 you use a phrase which Senator Helms has questioned relatively extensively in the last two hearings, and that is "serious military threat," or the phrase that is sometimes used, "militarily significant." I assume they are synonymous phrases. Then you, I believe, define it, by saying, "any large-scale scheme to exceed treaty limits well before enough extra weapons were acquired to sustain an attack on Central Europe." Is that what constitutes a serious military threat?

Mr. KERR. Yes. The JCS has provided to us an analysis and judgments about what they believe would constitute such a threat, and our measure and our judgments are matched against that statement by the JCS, so we have used their figures, their judgment about what would constitute a serious military threat in our own evaluation of our ability to detect.

Senator BIDEN. So again, it would be any large-scale scheme that would bring into play enough weapons and personnel?

Mr. KERR. It would be addition of significant additional equipment.

Senator BIDEN. That would have the effect, in the judgment of the military of allowing the Soviets to sustain an attack on Eastern Europe, to change that balance?

Mr. KERR. I think that is a fair statement.

General ARMSTRONG. I would not add anything except to point out that the number of military personnel is not limited by the treaty.

Senator BIDEN. I should speak more precisely. Right now there are 75,000 pieces of equipment there and it does not matter much, unless you marry people with that equipment and then put them into fighting units, as was described to us yesterday by the generals, the chiefs who testified.

I have one more question in open session, if I may. On page 5 of your statement, Mr. Kerr, you have two bullet points under No. 8. You say, "We have confirmed that some of the weapons being moved east of the Urals did not arrive at their destination until a month or so after signature," and second you state, "We also know that the number of items the Soviets claimed to have eliminated by November 19 were still in the zone."

Now, let me take them one at a time. The confirmation of the fact that the weapons being moved from places within the zone-there may be different zones, but within zones that were covered-out of the zone (east of the Urals; that is, out of the zone), the fact that they were-are you suggesting by that statement that they were en route after the signature?

Let me put it another way. Is it a violation of the treaty if, after the signature, they begin to move equipment in the zone? Would that constitute a violation?

Mr. KERR. Yes. It is a violation-if the equipment in the zone that was undeclared had moved after the signature, it would certainly be yes.

Senator BIDEN. So my question is, is your statement a reflection of your belief that they violated the treaty, or that they were en route to violating the treaty, because you say the equipment had not arrived at its destination until a month or so after signature?

Mr. KERR. I think the answer is essentially yes. There is a category of equipment that was moving. We are uncertain whether it was in the zone on the date of signature or was en route. We just do not have the evidence to determine that. We know that it arrived-our timing suggests that it was either in the zone, en route-it was moving. There is another category of equipment that we have identified--

Senator BIDEN. On that one point, is it a violation to have been moving or en route?

Mr. KERR. I believe if it were outside the zone it would not be a violation.

Senator BIDEN. Well, what you are saying to me, though, is that it was moving. Now, it was either moving through the zone, or it was--

Mr. KERR. We only know, sir, where it ended up.

Senator BIDEN. You only know that it ended up a month later than they said?

Mr. KERR. Actually, it was over a period of time. Let me describe it this way. Given the nature of our intelligence and the timing of it, there is enough time lapse there that we are uncertain where that equipment was, except we know where it ended up.

Senator BIDEN. Well, on the second point you muse there, you say "we also know that a number of items that the Soviets claimed to have eliminated by November 19 were still in the zone.

Mr. KERR. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. Now, is that duplicity on the part of the Soviets a violation of the treaty?

Mr. KERR. I am going to have to ask somebody other than me-a technical violation, certainly. I do not know how you would define that.

Mr. MACEACHIN. If I could, Mr. Chairman, let me go back to something. If they moved equipment out of the zone after the treaty was signed, the issue of the violation depends upon whether they declared it. If at the treaty signature date they declared this was in the zone, then moving it out of the zone is not really a violation. However, they still have to destroy that equipment. There is going to be a whole lot of complicated things. So the point is that they were obligated to declare everything that was in the zone on signature, because that is what determines what they have to destroy.

Senator BIDEN. So, the real issue here is whether or not they declared what you found arriving a month after they said it had.

Mr. MACEACHIN. Exactly. Both of these instances as you described it, virtually all of the equipment that was moved from the zone we can either confirm that it was out of the zone by the treaty signature or that it arrived shortly after. Those that arrived shortly after we cannot negate the possibility of their presence there prior to the signature date.

So the point is, where it was exactly on November 19 is something that is not now provable. We found some undeclared equipment in the zone. About 800 to 1,000 pieces we know did not show up at depots east of the Urals until about a month later. Where it was in the interim cannot be proved.

With the destruction, what we really believe happened is that they declared that they had destroyed 10,900 pieces of equipment prior to the treaty signature. We saw items in the zone that were not declared after the treaty signature being destroyed.

We believe that that is equipment that-this was about 800 we saw for certain; others may be inferred from some activities. That equipment was probably included in the 10,900 figure they gave us. In fact, they used the term with us in some conversations, "written off." We think those are items which were in the 10,900 articles and destruction had not been completed on time as of the treaty date.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, in your testimony you say on page 4, "Nevertheless, we believe the combination of national technical means and on site inspection will make cheating risky to undertake on any scale that would pose a serious military threat to the West, and we have high confidence that we would detect and properly identify any large-scale scheme."

I suppose the chairman has identified this area as clearly where most of the argument will occur. These are very careful words, very qualified words-"large-scale scheme." It sort of begs the issue of what is large, medium, or small, in a way, and what is a "serious military threat,"-all of these are substantial judgment calls.

Then on page 6, paragraph 9-I think we can talk about this briefly in open session-you say, "Had we had in place the negotiated measures and inspection rights associated with this treaty," which includes the onsite, "the intelligence community would have been able to track with much more precision the Soviet movement," which obviously is true given onsite inspection.

But absent onsite inspection or any other measures associated with the treaty, your testimony is essentially that things sort of got away from us in terms of the count during the year prior to this treaty's signature, that movements were much more rapid than during a fairly stable period through 1988. It became a little bit looser in 1989. After that, a torrent of movements led to these discrepancies in estimates.

So it certainly raises a question, I suppose, as to how great these discrepancies were. Would they have qualified, if we had been trying to verify the treaty. or track this treaty post signature, as large movements, or medium, or small? How would you classify them?

Mr. KERR. Sir, if I could answer your question slightly in this way and I can expand on it I think in the other session, I think the difference-the question you are really asking is trying to compare, I think, our ability on the one hand to watch this withdrawal plus our ability to watch a change in the reversal of that.

I think those are rather different kinds of situations involving different kinds of activities, sufficiently different that our capability to watch a force growing into an alert capability and preparing for activity is fundamentally different and we have much more capability in that area than in following the way the Soviets withdrew forces, which is not trying to upgrade capabilities but trying to get people out quickly in a rather different way than you go on higher alert.

So I think those are different in kind. Our judgment and our abilities to follow a reintroduction of significant forces I think are quite different.

Senator LUGAR. I think that is a very important piece of testimony, because the ordinary person looking at this would say, "easy come, easy go."

Mr. KERR. That is right. These are fundamentally different operations.

Senator LUGAR. YOU are saying these are qualitatively different kinds of movements. The kind of movements that you lost track of occurred in the midst of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and large changes in the relationship of the Warsaw Pact countries with the Soviet Union and the desire of many of these countries to expel Soviet forces and equipment as fast as they could.

What you are saying, I gather, is that if ever the Soviets wanted to reintroduce this equipment, at least into the Warsaw Pact countries, this would be easier to detect. Now, does that also pertain to movements of equipment within the Soviet Union?

I can foresee, as you can, that as we all wander around Poland and Czechoslovakia and Hungary these days as tourists, it is fairly easy to discern military movements. It is not as restricted as it used to be.

Now, that may be so in some republics of the Soviet Union. Is there not a qualitatively different situation there, in terms of the intelligence problem?

Mr. KERR. I think there is a different setting just in terms of the likelihood of the local population and the opportunities there. They are fundamentally different, including the onsite inspection, so there is a different setting that we are involved in.

Senator LUGAR. This is maybe not precisely an argument for the treaty per se, but it certainly is for security in Europe in the long run. But it seems to me that in the event that this inspection regime works, that people in various countries make hundreds of inspections year-in, year-out, that they are into each other's faces all of the time intrusively, then obviously this is a very different kind of situation that we have ever had before. Now whether this results from this treaty or any other treaty, clearly this makes for a sense of openness that is highly desirable. It just does not pertain, yet, to the Soviet Union. It may, at some point, but much of the rest of the territory is getting liberated.

Mr. KERR. I think you are right. INF began a process which changes in a very fundamental way the opportunities and the openness and the ability to conceal activities of major importance. So I think it does change things in a very fundamental way. I think your observation is very accurate.

Senator LUGAR. Finally, just in terms of the nitty-gritty of verification, I can remember some of the conversations when the treaty was being negotiated, as people tried to think through, just physically, how to monitor the provisions-with low-level aircraft, for instance. Do you have sheds that open in the front and in the back so that as planes fly over it, you can see all the trucks or guns or whatever it is?

In the final minutiae of the treaty as it developed in the pertains to the verification procedures, is there a lot of this? In other words, have you described physically what people do day-by-day who want to inspect intrusively and want to cover a lot of territory?

Mr. KERR. We certainly are defining the regime, the inspection regime very precisely.

Senator LUGAR. Is that written now as a protocol to the treaty?

Mr. KERR. It is not part of the treaty, but it is being worked out right now. We might describe that in a little more detail later.

Senator LUGAR. I hope so. These sorts of things, I know, take time. And the experts are always "working it out."

It is not that every member of the Senate wants to know each of these details. We want to know that somebody has done it, has thought it through and that at least a few people in the Senate read it and shared it with somebody.

In other words, our colleagues come to Senator Biden or me or to Senator Helms and they ask if anybody actually read this inspection regime , does it exist, do you have confidence in it. And somebody finally says, "yes," I have read it and I have confidence.

Mr. KERR. I think this is again something that I can describe for you in greater detail in our closed hearing. It would probably be more appropriate there.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Kerr, I think that, just so you all know and our chief negotiator knows, to the extent that this treaty will in my view fall under criticism here in this body it will relate more to the questions being pursued by the Senator than anything else in my view.

And to the extent that this treaty is successful and historic, it will relate more to the inspection regimes than any of the individual pieces of equipment, the numbers we agree on, whether they are big, small, medium. And what 'you have, what has been negotiated in my view is the potential for a new security arrangement in Europe that has never, since the nation state emerged, been contemplated.

My question will later come with our negotiator, not now, about CFE-1A, because really that is the next step in determining whether or not you really nail down what, in my view, is a potential long-term security arrangement for Europe in this inspection regime.

But having said all that, I want to pursue two points in open session, because again, by the way, the public that is interested in this is truly interested. I think we have an obligation to the extent that we can discuss in open session, some of these concerns with regard to the inspection regime.

I have taken as much time as I can to go through as much of the 500-page document that has been submitted and to spend as much time with negotiators and the so-called experts who are observing our negotiators, to determine the details of the inspection regime. We went through the process of negotiation early on when we were talking about what zone in a factory one could inspect? The Soviets did not want us wandering through their factories.

On the one hand, we want to know what exactly was coming out of the factories and what porthole we would look through, as well as, would there be a stopping place? And it reminded me of trying to go through a security checkpoint.

You manufacture a tank. Do you drive it out and close the gate behind it? You do not open the other gate before somebody gets to look at everything that is between the gates. That is in layman's terms. Those kinds of things are things that I think are not only for the closed session.

And I would respectfully suggest that when the testimony of our negotiator occurs, we speak with some detail about how you work out some of those things to increase the degree of confidence on the part of the American people and our colleagues. So that this is not just an exercise in rhetoric where we say, hey, look we can have an onsite inspection. You can have an onsite inspection and we will argue later what we can do when we are onsite. That is the kind of thing that I think both of us, or at least I am driving at and I think Senator Lugar is driving at as well.

I want to just raise one last issue. And unless Senator Lugar has questions further in open session, we will go to closed session.

You indicated to Senator Lugar that because of the nature of the movement and the nature of the environment from which the equipment would be moved and the environment into which it would be moved, it would be easier to detect a reversal of the flow of equipment in violation of the treaty than it would be to detect with precision the exodus of material covered by the treaty in the zone and from the zone into an area which is not within the zone.

And you made a distinction between movement from, for example, east of Urals to Poland and east of the Urals to the Moscow district to, I forget the name. Without the map I am not going to remember all of the various districts that are covered. But east of the Urals, west of the Urals, but still in the Soviet Union. So I want to make sure I understand.

You have a greater degree of confidence that they are going to move back 25,000 or 12,000 pieces of equipment east of the Urals into Poland or east of the Urals in Czechoslovakia or wherever. You have a high degree of confidence that you would be able to detect that. Do you have a diminished degree of confidence that if they moved 12,000 pieces of equipment east of the Urals just outside the environs of Moscow 20 miles, which would be west of the Urals, that you would have the ability to detect that?

Mr. KERR. I am not sure I drew that distinction.

Senator BIDEN. That is what I am trying to understand.

Mr. KERR. I did not intend to draw that distinction.

What I would prefer, Senator, if we could, is to talk about our ability to monitor in a closed session.

Senator BIDEN. OK. It just seemed to me that the difficulty the Soviet Union is having vis--vis their constituent republics' relationship with one another gives you equally as much human intelligence. I mean, there are more Armenians that are anxious to tell you what is going on in terms of movement of any Soviet military force in Armenia than there probably are Poles in Poland who are willing to do that.

So I would like to speak about that in closed session.

Is there anything else you would like to raise, Dick, in open session?

Senator LUGAR. No.

Senator BIDEN. Does staff have anything else to add in open session? [No response.]

Senator BIDEN. We will now recess for 5 to 10 minutes so that we can all move from here up to S. 407.

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:10 a.m., July 25, 1991.]

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