CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1991
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:36 a.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Dixon, Warner, Lott, Mack, and Smith.
Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; and Lucia M. Chavez, research assistant.
Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., Richard D. Finn, Jr., Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, and Michael J. McCord.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Judith A. Ansley, Brian D. Dailey, Georgd W. Lauffer, and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.
Staff assistants present: Camden Jones Flick and Julie W. Kemp.
Committee members' assistants present: David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Leon S. Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Jefferson B. Seabright, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Melvin G. Dubee, assistant to senator Byrd; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Thomas G. Moore, assistant to Senator Wallop; Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats; Ross Lindholm, assistant to Senator Mack; and Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman NUNN. The committee meets this morning to conclude its hearings on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Last Monday, we received testimony from Under Secretary of State Bartholomew and Ambassador Woolsey on the details of the agreement and on the procedural issues relating to the continuing dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Today, we will hear a military perspective on the treaty from Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Adm. David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Wolfowitz has recently returned from the NATO summit in Rome, so today's hearing affords a welcome opportunity to learn more about the agreements that were reached on that occasion. I would mention as well that all members' offices have been notified that Members of the committee are invited to attend classified hearings on the treaty in the Intelligence Committee tomorrow afternoon and Thursday morning. I saw no need to duplicate those hearings, but I would encourage all Members to go to those hearings and ask any questions that they have on classified matters.
If I might ask the forbearance of our witnesses for a moment, I would like to outline for the benefit of my colleagues the procedure I would suggest we follow in wrapping up our review of this CFE accord. The Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled a markup on the treaty for next Tuesday, November 19, and has asked our committee to advise it of our views by the end of this week. I think this can best be accomplished in the form of a letter from Senator Warner and me to Senators Pell, Helms, Biden, and others, which, following consultation with our own Members, would state the consensus views of this committee. Before we prepare this letter, I want to make sure all Members have an input. Following consultations with Senator Warner, I will circulate a draft of the letter to Members later today or early tomorrow, and I would encourage all Members or staff to make any points that they would like to make.
We do not have direct jurisdiction over this treaty, so there will not need to have a formal vote on it. If anyone has any suggested alternative procedures, the chair would certainly recognize them.
Senator Warner, you and I have not had a chance to talk about this in any depth at this juncture, but we will certainly be doing so as the day proceeds. Do you have anything at this time?
Senator WARNER. No, Mr. Chairman. I am confident that the work of this committee and the other committees of the Senate, will conclude in a manner that the Senate may act upon this treaty before adjournment.
We are fortunate today to have these two outstanding individuals, who have had a long association with these treaty processes, and particularly this one, and I welcome their comments this morning.
Chairman NUNN. We will have about a 10-minute break. We have a roll call vote right now and we will come back and proceed with your opening statements.
Thank you. [Recess.]
Chairman NUNN. We had two votes rather than one, so I regret the delay.
Mr. Secretary, I think we had completed our introductory remarks and we were down to your opening statement, followed by Admiral Jeremiah, and then we will have questions.
Before you proceed, I will enter into the record the prepared statements of Senators Dixon and Thurmond.
[Prepared statements by Senators Alan Dixon and Strom Thurmond follow:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN DIXON
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today such a distinguished panel consisting of Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz and Adm. David E. Jeremiah to discuss the proposed Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.
I applauded the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Warsaw Pact. The Communist/Soviet 40-year economic and military program precipitated a political crisis which acted as the catalyst for these historic events. In turn, these developments vindicated our democratic values. I also welcomed the proposed treaty on military force reductions in Conventional Forces in Europe, a treaty which will significantly reduce the United States military presence in Europe.
I am concerned about the threatening instability of the Soviet Union and how this instability might Impact enforcement of the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe. Additionally, I am concerned by ethnic rivalry and hostility in this region and their potential destabilizing effect on international security.
I look forward to exploring these and other issues as we hear testimony from the members of this distinguished panel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STORM THURMOND
Secretary Wolfowitz, Admiral Jeremiah: I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you to this important hearing on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Your views as the representatives of the Department of Defense, are especially critical to the ratification process of this historic but in my opinion outdated treaty.
The coup attempt in August and the assertion of independence by the various republics in the Soviet Union have raised questions in regard to the CFE Treaty. Among them are: Will the treaty be applicable to the republics that are declaring their independence? Does the Soviet Union have the technical and economic ability to destroy the vast quantities of equipment that are identified for destruction under the treaty? Finally, there is the question of the Soviet Union's compliance with the treaty.
Past violations of agreements, such as the INF Treaty, the ABM Treaty radar violation, which were publicly acknowledged by the past two administrations raise grave concerns in regard to this treaty. We have already seen several instances such as the transfer of equipment east of the Urals and the redesignation of units to naval infantry" and "coastal defense," that should heighten our concerns in regard to compliance to the CFE Treaty. My concerns are further heightened by the disintegration of the Central Government in the Soviet Union, which may no longer have the power to enforce the treaty.
I hope this series of hearings will resolve these questions. If they do not, I question the value of this treaty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here this morning to testify in support of ratification of this very important agreement.
In July of this year, Secretary Cheney testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in support of ratification of the CFE Treaty, and I am here this morning to reiterate his support for CFE ratification. As you are all aware, in the intervening period, extraordinary changes have transformed and are continuing to transform what was once the Soviet Union. These changes are of much a magnitude that we can state confidently that the alliance's original objective for negotiating CFF---to reduce the threat of surprise attack or large---scale offensive action on the part of a united Warsaw Pact led by the U.S.S.R.---has been largely accomplished.
But it would be a great mistake to leap to the conclusion that CFE is no longer relevant or that failure to ratify the treaty would have little consequence. Despite the enormous changes that have taken place-indeed because of those changes---CFE ratification remains important as a way of helping to address the security consequences of a time of great uncertainty and transition in the eastern half of Europe.
The basic benefits that the treaty provides to the United States and its allies were stated very clearly by Secretary Chene and General Powell in their July 16 testimony and were reviewed most recently before this committee last week by Under Secretary of State Bartholomew and Ambassador Woolsey. The treaty's basic limitations create a hedge or a barrier against the remilitarization of the region to a level that would again threaten NATO. Such remilitarization could not occur without breaking the treaty limits, and such treaty violations would be detected.
NATO's response to the treaty includes the important new program for military modernization through the transfer of treaty-limited equipment within the alliance. This program will help NATO maintain peace and security under its new strategic concept, while easing our own CFE implementation requirements. We support it; and we urge Congress to enact legislation enabling it to begin this fall.
But CFE is proving to be an instrument that is useful for more than just its original purpose of reducing the threat of a large-scale military offensive against Western Europe. In a time of great change and uncertainty, CFE makes two other important and more immediate contributions to enhancing security and stability for the emerging new democracies of Eastern Europe.
First, the treaty supports efforts of democratic forces in the region to carry out a far-reaching demilitarization of the political and economic life of the lands of the former Soviet Union. Second, it provides basic limitations, verification provisions, and data exchange provisions that will help to make the transition to a new military balance in this region more transparent and predictable.
This morning I would like to address these two contributions of the treaty in greater detail, as well as the issues that these changes in the region raise for ratification and implementation of the treaty.
First, on the subject of demilitarization. For the long-term peace and stability of Europe as a whole, as well as to relieve the terrible burden on their economies, it is important, indeed it is essential, that the people of the former U.S.S.R. make a radical break with the Soviet past. There must be a thoroughgoing demilitarization of political and economic life, including radical reductions of forces and of production of military equipment.
Last week, Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood returned from a 10-day trip to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev. Traveling with him was a group of U.S. industrialists. They were seeking ways to help transform the heavily militarized state-owned economy of the former U.S.S.R. to a commercially-oriented private economy.
This group surveyed existing production and design facilities, examined the status of economic reforms and legislation designed to create market incentives, and talked with a wide range of government and industrial officials who are working with great urgency to try to make this decisive break with the Soviet past.
The CFE Treaty can help to support this process. Significantly, that role is recognized by the states of Eastern and Central Europe themselves. It is not an accident that three of these states-Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria-were the first to ratify the treaty.
CFE establishes both overall and regional limitations that require a significant cut in military forces of the former Warsaw Pact. Such limitations support the efforts of economic reformers to reverse the wasteful and gargantuan Soviet military expenditures that are a major obstacle to constructing healthy economies.
If it should come to more radical changes in the region, where large TLE-holding republics like Russia or Ukraine become independent, the limitations and reductions of CFE would provide a ceiling under which the redivision of forces could take place. The limits that CFE imposes on military competition will assist and strengthen the progress of political and economic reform. This is an additional reason why it is important to keep republics with significant TLE holdings, like the Ukraine, within the CFE framework.
There is every reason to expect the emerging democratic leaders in the former Soviet Union to welcome the limits provided by CFE. Indeed, it will be very much in their interest to reduce their military burdens still further. CFE limits provide for a more than adequate level of conventional military forces to meet the legitimate requirements of self-defense.
Most recently, for example, during Deputy Secretary Atwood's visit, Ukrainian leaders indicated that they would respect CFE levels in the creation of their armed forces and that the eventual outcome could be much less than the publicly proclaimed figure of 450,000 military personnel.
We should support and encourage this trend in the republics toward lower military expenditures and force levels by ratifying the CFE Treaty ourselves.
The second large contribution that the CFE Treaty makes to this new era that we are entering is it provides a variety of provisions that could make the transition to a new military balance in the region more predictable and transparent.
It provides for the exchange of detailed information on command structure, locations and holdings of major units, and changes in holdings over time. Information exchange of this type is important at a time of great change, particularly for those states in the region that do not have access to the kinds of national intelligence means that the United States enjoys.
There may come into being new chains of command, redeployments of existing forces, or the disbandment of some units and the formation of others. The provisions of CFE help to ensure that these kinds of changes take place in a more open environment. Neighboring states will receive detailed information on the forces around them each year. Important changes will be notified specially.
In addition, in response to the great changes that took place in 1989, the CFE Treaty permits states belonging to the same group of parties to carry out on-site inspections on one another's territory. Most importantly, that is, it permits Hungary or Poland or other former members of the Warsaw Pact to inspect the former Soviet Union. This gives neighboring states the right to examine ongoing developments for themselves through on-site inspections.
Finally, the treaty's Joint Consultative Group is a multilateral forum where states may address serious concerns raised by the actions of other parties with respect to treaty obligations. It provides these states a forum to discuss the information they obtain and to resolve ambiguities against the backdrop of the treaty's explicit limitations and obligations.
Mr. Chairman, some have asked whether we can be sure that our ratification of the CFE Treaty will lead to CFE's ratification and implementation on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. No one can be absolutely sure, but what we know at present gives us great grounds for optimism. But clearly it is in the interest of the United States and of Europe and in the interest of reform in the Soviet Union for CFE Treaty limits to be accepted.
I believe that CFE ratification by the United States will help to move events in the former U.S.S.R. in a positive direction and provide additional encouragement for those who already want to carry out reforms and demilitarize their society. It will send a signal that we regard the CFE Treaty limits as an important part of the developing security environment west of the Urals. Failure or hesitation on our part to ratify would send the opposite signal and introduce uncertainty in an area where it is not desirable.
The United States should also follow through, beyond simply ratifying, to try to foresee, to respond to, and to shape developments in a way that preserves the security benefits of the treaty.
We should be prepared to help officials in the region understand their obligations under the treaty and to demonstrate how the treaty contributes to a more stable and secure environment in the region and in Europe as a whole.
We must make it plain to the leaders of the new Union, republic officials, and, where appropriate, new national authorities, that the United States regards CFE ratification and implementation as an important step in the integration of these states into the new European security structure.
Finally, we must also be prepared, where necessary, to adapt the treaty to change, whether through the Joint Consultative Group or by formal amendment. The treaty contains the necessary mechanisms to adapt and respond to change.
Mr. Chairman, the changes in the former Soviet Union represent a unique opportunity to escape from a centuries-old pattern of state centralization and militarization. CFE can be part of the package of incentives that we have to move in this new direction. It provides basic limitations that nonetheless recognize the need for residual forces in the region. It supports efforts under way by reformers to demilitarize their economies and redirect assets to civilian needs. It provides a forum to engage the new governments in the region on the direction of their military policies.
For all these reasons, and also for the very important direct benefits that the treaty brings to our security and the security of our NATO allies, the Department of Defense continues its strong support of the CFE Treaty and urges the Senate to proceed with ratification.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL WOLFOWITZ,
UNDER SECITETARY OF DEFENSE POLICY
RATIFICATION OF TVIE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in July of this year, Secretary Cheney testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of ratification of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I have come before this committee to reiterate his support for CFE ratification.
As you are all aware, in the intervening period extraordinary changes have transformed and are continuing to transform what was once the Soviet Union. These changes are of such amaritude that we can state confidently that the alliance's original objective for negotiating CFE-to reduce the threat of surprise attack or large scale offensive action on the part of a united Warsaw Pact led by the U.S.S.R.-has been largely accomplished.
But it would be a great mistake to leap to the conclusion that CFE is no longer relevant or that failure to ratify the treaty would have little consequence. Despite the enormous changes that have taken place-indeed because of them--CFE ratification remains important as a way of helping to address the security consequences of a time of great uncertainty and transition in the eastern half of Europe.
The basic benefits that the treaty provides for the United States and its allies were stated very clearly by Secretary Cheney and General Powell in their July 16 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and were reviewed most recently by Under Secretary of State Bartholomew and Ambassador Woolsey before this committee last week. The treaty's basic limitations create a hedge against the re-militarization of the region to a level that would again threaten NATO. Such remilitarization could not occur without breaking the treaty limits; and such treaty violations would be detected.
NATO's response to the treaty includes the important new program for military modernization through the transfer of treaty limited equipment within the alliance. This program will help NATO maintain peace and security under its new strategic concept, while easing our own CFE implementation requirements. We support it; and we urge Congress to enact legislation enabling it to begin this fall.
But CFE is proving to be an instrument that is useful for more than just its original purpose of reducing the threat of a large scale military offensive against Western Europe. In a time of great change and uncertainty, CFE makes two other important and more immediate contributions to enhancing security and stability for the emerging new democracies of Eastern Europe: (1) the treaty supports efforts of democratic forces in the region to carry out a far-reaching demilitarization of the political and economic life of the lands of the former Soviet Union; and (2) it provides basic limitations, verification and data exchange provisions that will help to make the transition to a new military balance in this region more transparent arid predictable.
This morning I would like to address these two contributions of the treaty in greater detail, as well as the problems these changes in the region raise for ratification and implementation of the treaty.
Last week Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood returned from a 10 day trip to Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kiev. Traveling with him was a group of U.S. industrialists. They were seeking ways to transform the heavily militarized, state-owned economy of the former U.S.S.R. to a commercially-oriented, private economy. This group surveyed existing production and design facilities, examined the status of economic reforms and legislation designed to create market incentives, and talked with a wide range of governmental and industrial officials. Our long term aim must be to find ways of helping the people of the former U.S.S.R. who are working with great emergency to try make the decisive break with the Soviet past.
The CFE Treaty can help to support this process. That role is recognized by the states of Eastern and Central Europe themselves. It is not an accident that three of these states-Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria-were the first to ratify the treaty. CFE establishes both overall and regional limitations that require a significant cut in military forces. Such limitations support the efforts of economic reformers to reverse the wasteful and gargantuan Soviet military expenditures that are a major to reverse the wasteful health economies.
If it should come to more radical danger in the region, where large TLE-holding Republics like Russia or Ukraine become independent, the limitations and reductions of CFE would provide a ceiling under which the re-division of forces could take place. The limits that CFE imposes on military competition will assist and strengthen the progress of political and economic reform. This is an additional reason why it is important to keep republics with significant TLE holdings like Ukraine within the CFE framework.
There is every reason to expect the emerging democratic leaders in the former Soviet Union to welcome the limits provided by CFE. Indeed, it will be very much in their interest to reduce their military burdens still further. CFE limits provide for a more than adequate level of conventional military forces to meet the legitimate requirements of self defense. Most recently, for example, Ukrainian leaders told Deputy Secretary Atwood that they would respect CFE levels in the creation of their armed forces and that the eventual outcome could be much less than the publicly proclaimed figure of 460,000 military personnel. We should support and encourage this trend in the republics toward lower military expenditures and force levels by ratifying the CFE Treaty ourselves.
Conclusion. Some have asked whether we can be sure that our ratification of the CFE Treaty will lead to CFE's ratification and implementation on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. No one can be sure, although what we know at present gives us pounds for optimism. But clearly it is in the interest of the United States and of Europe and in the interest of reform in the Soviet Union for CFE Treaty limits to be accepted.
I believe CFE ratification by the United States will help to move events in the former U.S.S.R. in a positive direction and provide additional encouragement for those who want to carry out reforms and demilitarize society. It will send a signal that we regard the CFE Treaty limits as an important part of the developing security environment west of the Urals. Our failure of hesitation to ratify would, I believe, send the opposite signal and introduce uncertainty in an area where it is not desirable.
The United States should also follow through beyond ratification to foresee, respond to and shape developments in a way that preserves the security benefits of the Treaty.
The changes in the former Soviet Union represent a unique opportunity to escape the centuries old pattern of state centralization and militarization. CFE is part of the package of incentives we have to move in this new direction. It provides basic limitations that nonetheless recognize the need for residual forces in the region. It supports efforts underway by reformers in the region to demilitarize the economy and redirect assets to civilian needs. It provides a forum to engage the new governments in the region on the direction of their military policies. For these reasons, as Well as the more direct benefits that the treaty brings to the security of NATO, the Department of Defense continues its strong support of the CFE Treaty and urges the Senate to proceed with ratification.
Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM. DAVID E. JEREMIAH, USN, VICE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCOMPANIED BY: GEN. ADRIAN ST.
JOHN AND GEN. ROLAND LAJOIE
Admiral JEREMIAH. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I have previously submitted a statement for the record. I will parallel the points made in that statement with this oral statement.
Chairman NUNN. Without objection, your entire statement will be part of the record.
Admiral JEREMIAH. I would like to take the opportunity at this time also to introduce two associates: General Adrian St. John and General LaJoie, both of whom have spent a considerable amount of time in the arms control and verification and inspection process. Admiral St. John was in Vienna throughout all of the negotiations and is an expert arms controller. I asked him if lie wanted to be introduced that way and he said: "Absolutely not. Introduce me as a soldier."
Chairman NUNN. We are glad to have both of you here. We are pleased to have you and we thank you for what you have done.
Admiral JEREMIAH. Thank you, sir.
I strongly support the prompt ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. I think it is a major success story. An implemented CFE Treaty will strengthen security in Europe by reducing armed forces to much lower levels. It will also remove the disparities between the East and West in terms of military equipment holdings.
Notwithstanding the ongoing changes in the Soviet Union, the treaty will also eliminate any future possibility of a successful short-notice attack from Soviet territory. The treaty places limits on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Those are the primary combat systems that would be used in any offensive operations.
A total of 54,000 of those systems will have to be reduced by the Group of Six. On the NATO side, we'll have to dispose of approximately 16,000 pieces of equipment, much of which comes from the former GDR, the former East German equipment now held by the Federal Republic of Germany. In talking to my counterparts in the German army, they are dealing with an element of disposal of 350,000 tons of munitions, and the environmental problems associated with that are going to be significant. Those are totally outside the requirements of the treaty. It's a very massive reduction effort that we are undertaking with former GDR equipment-or rather, the Germans are.
An implemented CFE Treaty does more than reduce equipment holdings. It also helps codify Europe's incredible political and military changes of the past 2 years. For all that progress, the next few years I think are going to be turbulent ones in Central and Eastern Europe. This treaty provides reassurance to all during what will be an increasingly difficult time.
We are confident that the treaty is verifiable. While we do not presume to assure the detection of minor treaty violations involving a single tank or a single artillery piece, we have very high confidence in our Nation's ability to detect militarily significant treaty violations.
I know that some of you have questions about how ongoing changes in the Soviet Union will affect this treaty. Regardless of the future distribution of power between Moscow and the republics, CFE ratification is, in my opinion, in our best interests. Let me take a moment or two to explain that.
Treaty-mandated equipment reductions, regional limits, information exchanges, and on-site inspections will impose very few serious constraints on the NATO side, but they place military restraints on any central government succeeding the current Soviet Union. That government would inherit what are still the largest military forces in Europe.
CFE limits will assure these will never again become an instrument of aggression or intimidation against Western Europe. We would prefer to see the military forces in any new independent republics held accountable under the CFE Treaty. However, from a military perspective, small republics are unlikely to have militarily significant quantities of TLE. We do need to ensure that all TLE remaining under the control of a central government, but still located on territories of newly independent republics, are subject to treaty provisions.
We already have a precedent for this. Last month in the Joint Consultative Group meetings in Vienna, the Soviets agreed that all TLE belonging to Moscow but which is currently located in the three Baltic States will remain fully accountable under the treaty. NATO inspections of those forces will, of course, have to be arranged with the Governments of those three nations. Similar arrangements could be made concerning the TLE belonging to the central government located in any other small republics that may yet secede from the Union.
As independent republics, the large republics of Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia present a more difficult problem. Let me just put before the committee what has been termed in other hearings "the mother of all charts."
When we talk about the Ukraine-well, first, Byelorussia is this entity here. When we talk about the Ukraine, we are talking about basically the Carpathian, the Odessa, and the Kiev military districts, and there are some wrinkles around the edges, but those are the districts that we are talking about.
You can see that they are precisely between the former front line states and the mainland of the Soviet Union, defined basically east of this line here.
Each of those republics could have significant military potential in its own right. Their locations and military potential make it a virtual necessity that they adhere to the CFE Treaty. But we should not hold up U.S. ratification of the CFE Treaty until all center-republic relationships within the former U.S.S.R. are clarified. The central government, as a treaty signatory, is held accountable for fulfilling treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics and with respect to its forces located elsewhere in the treaty area.
Those republics leaving the Union, but which accede to the treaty, can be held separately accountable. Independent republics acquiring their own military forces should be strongly encouraged to participate in the treaty regime. The treaty provides the flexibility and mechanisms, such as the Joint Consultative Group, to accommodate those kinds of situations.
In the process of implementing the treaty, we particularly benefit from the continued viability of NATO. Last week's NATO summit statement specifically emphasized the significance of the CFE Treaty to future peace and stability in Europe and called for its prompt ratification.
NATO has also developed plans for implementing CFE among the western allies. Any discussion of NATO's implementation plans requires a brief explanation of how the alliance is allocating TLE holdings and how transfers of TLE are planned to fit the destruction schedule.
In 1989, NATO began its talks on national allocations in each category of treaty-limited equipment. General Jack Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, suggested that NATO members with treaty-required reductions of modern equipment in the central zone transfer this equipment to other NATO nations with less modern equipment in other zones. The final plan transfers modern tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles, over 4,000 pieces of TLE, from the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands, to six other NATO allies.
The transfer plan allows the United States and its NATO allies to avoid the high costs of equipment destruction, while improving the overall military capabilities of the alliance. The United States fart of the transfer plan is approximately 2.900 pieces of treaty-limited equipment. Most of that equipment would otherwise have to be destroyed under the treaty's reduction protocol.
As you know, we need legislative authority to participate in the transfer plan. The Germans and the Dutch are already transferring equipment to their designated recipients. We would very much appreciate expeditious consideration of the bill before you to allow us to proceed with our part of this important program.
Today I have explained our conviction that we have a goof treaty before us. We are confident we can verify the treaty. We have a solid process for implementing the treaty and for monitoring Soviet compliance. Five nations--the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Netherlands, and Belgium-have already ratified the treaty. Most of the other signatories, including the Soviet Union, have pledged to ratify before the end of the year.
An American failure to ratify could weaken the incentive for others, including any newly independent republics from the former Soviet Union, to comply with the treaty. Prompt ratification here will encourage ratification efforts elsewhere and hasten the treaty's entry into force.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly encourage you and your colleagues in the Senate to provide the President your unreserved advice and consent to ratification of this historic treaty.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Jeremiah follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. DAVID E. JEREMIAH,
VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to testify in support or prompt ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The military remains firmly committed to the early ratification and implementation of this historic treaty.
This treaty is a major success story for the Atlantic alliance because it achieves all the initial objectives of our negotiations. An implemented CFE Treaty will strengthen stability and security in Europe by reducing armed forces to much lower levels and removing past disparities in military equipment holdings. It will thus eliminate on the continent the capability of the Soviet Union to launch a successful surprise attack and to initiate large-scale offensive operations.
The treaty places limits on battle tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. These are the primary combat systems used in offensive operations to seize and hold terrain. A total of 54,000 such systems will have to be reduced by the Eastern Group of six. By contrast, NATO's required reductions will be approximately 16,000 pieces of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE), much of which is former East German equipment now owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.
An implemented CFE Treaty not only reduces the offensive combat equipment holdings of the Soviet Union, but also helps codify Europe's incredible political and military changes of the past year. Already, there are no Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia or Hungary and all Soviet forces will have completed their withdrawal from Germany and Poland by 1994. The next few years are likely to be turbulent in Central and East Europe and this treaty will provide security and stability to the emerging democracies during a difficult transition period.
When the treaty enters into force, how will we know the force reductions have been made and the TLE destroyed? The combination of information exchange requirements, on-site inspection provisions, and continued monitoring by national technical means give us a high degree of confidence that this treaty is verifiable. While we cannot assure the detection of a treaty violation involving a single tank in excess of treaty limits, we can, with high confidence, detect a militarily significant treaty violation. We consider a violation to be militarily significant when it gives the Soviets an advantage to which NATO would have to respond militarily.
In view of all the changes of the last year and especially the past few months, we find it difficult to identify a cheating scenario that is logical or has any probability of being successful. However, our past studies have suggested that treaty cheating, at a militarily significant level, would have to be of such a magnitude that it would surely be detected in sufficient time for NATO to adequately respond.
I know some of you have questions about the viability of the CFE Treaty given the changes in the Soviet Union since August of this year. These changes have been dramatic and considerable uncertainty remains regarding the eventual configuration of the former Soviet Union. Regardless of the outcome of the crucial debate between Moscow and the republics, CFE ratification remains in the best security interests of the United States. Let me take a few moments to explain this point.
Treaty-mandated equipment reductions, regional limits, information exchanges, and on-site inspections will impose few constraints on NATO while placing major limitations on a Soviet successor who will likely continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe. We would prefer to see the military forces in and newly independent successor or successor states emerging from the former Soviet Union remain accountable under the CFE Treaty. However, from a military perspective, if smaller republics opt out of a new union, it is unlikely that the amounts of TLE which they might hold would be militarily significant. We do need to ensure that all TLE remaining under the control of the central government, but still located on the territories of the newly independent republics, remains subject to treaty provisions and associated agreements.
We already have a precedent for this. Last month the Soviets agreed, in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna, that all Soviet (i,e. central government) TLE in the three Baltic States will remain fully accountable under the treaty. NATO inspections of Soviet forces in the Baltics will have to be negotiated with the governments of those three nations. Similar arrangements could be made concerning the TLE belonging to the central government located in any small republics that may opt for total independence from the Union.
The large republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia present a somewhat different problem. Each of these republics has the potential to Field significant military forces and are positioned in more strategic locations. Their locations and potential military size make it almost certainly a necessity that they participate in the CFE Treaty. I believe there are powerful political, military, and economic incentives for these republics to participate in the CFE Treaty.
To sum up, there are no advantages to holding up U.S. ratification of the CFE Treaty until all center-republic relationships within the former U.S.S.R. are clarified. The central government, as treaty signatory, should be held accountable for fulfilling treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics and with respect to its forces located elsewhere in the treaty's area of application (ATTU). Those republics which opt out of the union and accede to the treaty can be held separately accountable for obligations under the treaty. Independent republics acquiring indigenous military forces in the region will be encouraged to participate in the treaty regime. The treaty provides the flexibility and mechanisms such as the Joint Consultative Group, to accommodate these changing situations.
In the process of implementing the treaty, we particularly benefit from the continued viability of the NATO alliance. The alliance collectively can hold half the TLE in the ATTU while the sufficiency rule restricts the former Soviet Union-and now its successor-to one-third of the TLE. While we will not permit U.S. security interests in Europe to rely solely on the CFE Treaty, it does allow us to reduce our force levels with far less risk. The combination of our allowed holdings and continued POMCUS stocks gives us the capability to reinforce our forward-deployed forces. As you know, we will reduce U.S. military stationed forces in Europe to 160,000 by fiscal year 1995. The expected enhanced security and stability in Europe along with the continued viability of NATO will allow us to make this major force adjustment.
Last week, NATO's leaders announced the development of a new strategy; this new strategy is directly linked to the new security which the CFE Treaty, when ratified, will provide. While acknowledging the significant changes in Europe the summit statement emphasized the continuing relevance of the CFE Treaty and calls for its prompt ratification.
Any discussion of NATO's implementation plans requires an explanation of how the alliance is harmonizing TLE holdings and planning transfers of TLE to fit a destruction schedule. In 1989 NATO initiated the Harmonization Plan to reach agreement on national allocations of maximum levels for holdings in each category of TLE. SACEUR suggested a concept whereby alliance members with treaty required reductions of modern equipment in the central zone transfer this equipment to other nations with less modern equipment in other zones. The final plan transfers modern tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles, over 4,000 pieces of TLE, from the United States, Germany and the Netherlands to six other NATO allies.
U.S. participation in the Transfer Plan is approximately 2,900 pieces of TLE. Most of this TLE would otherwise have to be destroyed under the CFE Treaty's reduction protocol. The Transfer Plan allows the United States to avoid the high costs of destruction while enhancing NATO's defense capabilities. All the equipment we have offered in the plan will be completely excess to U.S. military requirements by fiscal year 1995.
As you know, we need legislative authority to participate in the transfer plan. German end Dutch equipment is already being shipped to recipients. We would appreciate expeditious consideration of the bill before you, allowing us to proceed with this important program.
Today, I have tried to explain your military's conviction that we have a good treaty before us and a solid process for alliance implementation and monitoring Soviet compliance. However, some suggest we delay U.S. ratification of the treaty to see what develops in the Soviet Union. I repeat that no responsible military officer can see any advantages in delaying. To the contrary, delaying U.S. ratification only delays the advantages that will be gained when the treaty comes into force. If we fail to promptly ratify we will fail to set the leadership example needed to encourage potential successor states to the Soviet Union to enter the new European security and stability order. With a ratified treaty in place, we can better influence developments throughout the region of the former Warsaw Pact.
Five nations--the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Belgium, and Netherlands--have ratified the treaty. Most of the signatories, including the Soviet Union, have pledged to ratify before the end of the year.
Next week, on the 19th of November, will be the first anniversary of the signing of the CFE Treaty. Positive action here in the U.S. Senate will undoubtedly speed ratification efforts elsewhere and hasten the treaty's entry into force.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly encourage you and your colleagues in the Senate to provide the President your unreserved advice and consent to ratification of this historical treaty. Thank you.
Chairman NUNN, Thank you very much, Admiral. The legislation you mentioned is in the Foreign Relations Committee and I think it will be considered in context of the treaty itself.
In a major address to the Russian Parliament 2 weeks ago, President Boris Yeltsin said: "If, against our wishes, the process of creating national armies in the republics goes ahead, we will have no alternative but to form our own army." If indeed we do end up with a Ukrainian army, a Russian army, a Georgian army, no Soviet army or only remnants of a Soviet army, what kind of difference, Mr. Secretary, would that make in terms of the military threats from the East?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think in terms of threat it probably further reduces the threat that we have worried about for 40 years: that of a deliberate invasion of Western Europe. It probably takes it to the vanishing point.
It probably increases the new kind of danger that people talk about, of instability and uncertainty, or at least it might contribute to that. But one should not, I think, view those kinds of statements in an alarmist context.
By and large, what these leaders are talking about is that, if they become sovereign countries, they insist on having means of self-defense. But if you look at what they are actually talking about in terms of size of armed forces, the consistent theme is that they have far too much now, far in excess of reasonable needs of legitimate defense, at levels that in fact jeopardize economic success. And I think they all want to come down.
That, it seems to me, is one of the strongest arguments for pushing ahead to get them to accept the CFE limits, because that is a framework within which they can begin those reductions.
Chairman NUNN. If we end up with, let us say, a large standing Ukrainian army, what would be your general recommendation? What would be your thoughts in terms of the course of action we should take if that takes place? Would you think in terms of convening an extraordinary conference? Would you think in terms of renegotiating the treaty? What would be your approach?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think there is no question that we would want to move, and move expeditiously, to assure their adherence to the CFE regime, and I think there is every reason to expect that we would be successful. There have been repeated statements by Ukrainian officials that I mentioned in my opening statement, comments that Deputy Secretary Atwood heard recently on his visit to the Ukraine.
What we are bearing consistently is a willingness to be part of the CFE regime. I am not certain exactly by what procedure one would implement that. I think it would depend a bit on the circumstances. I do not think it necessarily requires an amendment to the treaty, and our hope would be that in fact it can be done without that.
Chairman NUNN. Let us take another example. Let us say the Ukraine becomes independent or quasi-independent, depending on the economic relationship, and has an army of its own, but announces its willingness to be part of CFE, as you just mentioned you think may be the case. In this circumstance, would the JCS- and I will ask this to Admiral Jeremiah-have a view as to whether the Ukraine's treaty-limited equipment holdings should come out of the Soviet allotment or should the Ukraine receive its own separate allotment based on some pro-rated decrement taken from each of the countries in the Group of Six, in other words considering entitlements taken from Hungary, Czechoslovakia?
What would be the general approach in terms of what size forces the Ukraine could have if it is going to be under the CFE Treaty?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Generally speaking, I think it would come under the requirement of that portion of the Soviet Union's allocation of TLE, that they would have their shares comparable to what would be in those military districts.
Chairman NUNN. You think it would be coming out of the Soviet portion?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Yes, sir.
Chairman NUNN. Would there be a formula based on population, geography, or previous military deployments?
Admiral JEREMIAH. It is agreed among the participating parties on the Group of Six as to the allocations. Within the Soviet Union, were I the person who was doing the negotiations, I would base it upon those allocations within the military districts, and the most likely thing would be the current allocations that the Soviets have for the Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa military districts, recognizing that Odessa has a portion of the flanks and that is a different kind of sub-limit.
Chairman NUNN. Would we view each of these republics about the same, Admiral, in terms of military threat, or would the location of the Ukraine make it distinguishable, for instance, from Moldavia or Georgia?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Moldavia would be a considerably different kind of threat, tucked away down there across from Romania. Byelorussia and the Ukraine would be a considerably different kind of problem.
Right now, for instance, the Ukraine has, I think, on the order of 1.2 or 1.3 million troops of the Soviet Union and the associated equipment. And they are obviously in what one would look at as the main path of movement across Europe between Soviet Russia and Western Europe, so they would be significant parties as far as we are concerned.
Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, in his address to the NATO summit last week President Bush said it was premature to think of NATO membership for the former Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe. In a television interview Saturday, Secretary Cheney said he thought these countries "may eventually end up as members of NATO."
Those are not necessarily inconsistent statements, but do we have anything in mind in terms of conditions precedent in considering East European countries that have indicated a desire to be a part of NATO? Are there certain conditions, other than the passage of time?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think there is no consensus at this point on what the conditions - would be. That is one of the reasons why I think the President says it is premature. One can speculate about the kinds of concerns that we Would have about the nature and stability of the regimes, about their ability to deal with one another on essentially the terms of the CSCE. Issues like border revisions would have to be resolved peacefully.
I think the passage of time certainly is something that would inspire greater confidence about that. And I suppose it is also the question of need and urgency. But at the moment, I think there is a consensus, and it's a very healthy one, a very constructive one, that was expressed in the Rome Declaration: that it is important for NATO to reach out to these East European countries, to help give them a forum in which their security concerns can be addressed and discussed, to give them assistance on questions such as, how do you go about organizing the relationship between democratic authorities and the military, how do you go about planning military budgets in a democracy, how can you go about converting these bloated, excessive defense industries?
Those are all matters on which some very immediate cooperation is in order, and I think how well all of those procedures proceed is something that would be another factor one would take into account.
Chairman NUNN. In a speech at the Rome summit, Mr. Secretary, the President told our European allies rather bluntly: "If, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide individually for your own defense, the time to tell us is today."
I certainly understand the President's desire to find out what is in the minds of the Europeans, particularly with some of the things that have been done over there without consultation with the United States. But I am curious about the President's use of the word "ultimate." Does this mean that we foresee no day or desire no day at any point in the future, 10 years, 20 years, 40 years, 50 years, 100 years, when we would not be part of the defense of Europe, no matter what the threat may be or not be?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, I think it is focused on a slightly shorter range question.
Chairman NUNN. "Ultimate" to me is pretty open-ended, could you narrow it down.
WOLFOWITZ. Fair enough. But what the President was addressing was specifically the ultimate aim of European defense cooperation, and in particular, whether that cooperation is aimed at making Europe simply independent of the United States or whether it is to be part of our continuing collective defense efforts.
I think we would all wish for the day when none of us have to worry about security and when Europe is such a stable place that it is not a problem. But what the President really is saying is, if there are major security problems, are we working together as partners or is the purpose of European cooperation designed to displace and weaken NATO?
Chairman NUNN. Do you think he was warning them that, in effect, we want to be a part of this forever, and if we are not going to be let us know right now, because we want to defend you forever?
"Ultimate" is a pretty broad word. You do not interpret it that way? You interpret it more of a near-term?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think it has to be interpreted in the context of the efforts that we anticipate over the next 5 or 10 years for the Europeans to develop what they call the European security and defense identity, and the basic question of whether in doing that the goal is going to be to develop something that is independent and therefore weakens NATO or something that is integrated and part of NATO.
That is a pretty long-term question, also. It is not quite as ultimate, though, as the one that you raised.
Chairman NUNN. Do you really believe the context of that is somewhere in the 5 to 10-year framework? We are not talking about something going on forever? I do not assume any of us want to tell our constituents that the United States will be in Europe with a large number of forces forever.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. That certainly was not what the President was saying. I think what the President was saying is that it has to be understood in this context of efforts at greater European defense integration. We need to know at the outset, are those efforts designed to displace us and weaken NATO or are they designed to strengthen NATO?
If the answer is the latter, we support them, we want to encourage them. If the answer is the former and they are really hell-bent on going ahead with them, then obviously we would have to draw some implications for ourselves.
Chairman NUNN. I agree with the question if it is in that context.
Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to just follow up. Of course, all of us followed the events of the NATO meeting. But if you go back and look historically, the NATO charter was drawn against a very clear threat picture and it was designed to deal with that threat picture, emanating in the immediate aftermath of World War II.
That threat picture is long since gone. I am worried about a situation we have on the floor of the Senate every year. We draw up a statute, the statute is pretty clear, but then once the regulators get a hold of the statute they write it and tell the people to do certain things that were never in the minds of the Congress.
Do you feel it is time for us to go back and re-examine the charter of NATO? Because it is written, of course, in very general terms, but given the fact that the charter is drafted against a threat situation that no longer exists, is it time for us to go back and re-examine that charter?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I guess at times like these one should not glibly say that anything does not deserve re-examination, but I think the basic charter of NATO really has demonstrated clearly its adaptability and its relevance over a very long term. It is based on the basic principle that nations that share common democratic values have a common interest in meeting their security requirements collectively, that doing so not only reduces the economic burden for everyone, it also reduces the kinds of tensions and problems that arise when individual countries try to take care of their security needs all by themselves.
That principle of how democratic countries can successfully go about meeting security needs I think is as applicable today, when the security needs are vastly different, as it was at the height of the cold war. We have gone through a major revision---
Senator WARNER. I am not questioning that the history of it, it has worked as envisioned, it has worked well. It could well have prevented a major confrontation between the East and the West.
My only question is, you have got a charter that was drawn at a time there was a different threat situation which bears very little, if any, resemblance to the threat situation of today, and therefore 3hould we go back and re-examine that charter, given the fact that the American taxpayers annually are footing a very heavy bill?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I guess what I would just emphasize, senator, is how much we have re-examined. We have re-examined and changed the entire NATO strategy.
Senator WARNER, It is in the nature of a regulation under the charter.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, it is a charter that allows for enormous change. It has allowed for enormous change in our nuclear posture. We are going to be down by 1995 to 10 percent of the levels of the early 1980s.
Senator WARNER. I can see you and I will need to talk about this a little bit more.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would be glad to, Senator.
Senator WARNER. I will address this one to you, Mr. Secretary. The treaty permits a 40-month period for completion of reduction obligations under the treaty. If the Senate does not complete its work on the CFE Treaty and the CFE-related cascading legislation prior to the adjournment this year, what impact, if any, will the delay have on the cascading program? Either witness is fine.
I will just follow up. Will the passage of time create any additional costs or impose any additional restrictions on the implementation of NATO's cascading initiative?
Admiral JEREMIAH. I think that the two pieces are interrelated, Senator. If we do not proceed, if we pass the treaty without the cascading legislation, then we will incur costs because of the requirement to destroy the equipment. On the order of $20 million to $25 million is what we expect. The costs presently associated with the cascading process are absorbed by NATO and our share of that is about $27 million or $28 million. The cost of the destruction is about $48 million.
With respect to passing neither the cascading legislation nor the treaty, I think that puts us in a very difficult position both with our allies and in terms of being able to move the treaty forward. We basically will not be providing the leadership that the United States has typically exerted in these documents, we undercut the nations that have already ratified, two of which are our allies and three of which are emerging eastern democracies.
So there would be some consequences. As for legal consequences, I do not have the answer to that one.
Senator WARNER. You can supply that for the record.
[The information follows:]
There would be additional costs to the United States if we fail to receive legislative authority to participate in the NAT0 cascading program. The U.S Army in Europe pays over $6 million per year to store and maintain the equipment we plan to transfer. If we do not transfer the equipment we will continue to store it until the treaty enters into force and then be required to start the destruction phase.
Since the United States will use the cascade program to cover all its treaty reduction liabilities, we need to complete all transfers prior to 16 months after treaty entry into force. This is required due to a treaty interpretation which would require us to destroy equipment we would otherwise transfer. If in fact, the sooner we begin the transfers the better it is for the United States, the recipient nations, and treaty implementation.
NATO is ready to initiate the U.S. portion of the cascading project. We expect the U.S. equipment to begin moving within 2 months of enactment of the enabling legislation.
The only legal problem associated with the cascade program is the U.S. requirement to have enabling legislation in order to participate. Without the legislative authority, we legally cannot fulfill our part of the NATO plan.
Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, would you add anything?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I strongly endorse everything Admiral Jeremiah said. I think also in some cases a considerable part of what we are talking about cascading is equipment that will before long be excess to our needs, and if we do not have the provisions that allow us to transfer it, we have an additional burden of simply having to maintain it in storage, which is hardly the ideal arrangement.
Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, in your prepared statement you make the assertion that: "The implemented CFE Treaty not only reduces the offensive combat equipment holdings of the Soviet Union, but also helps codify Europe's incredible political and military changes of the past year." You further asserted that: "With a ratified treaty in place, we can better influence developments throughout the region of the former Warsaw Pact."
The treaty, as you know, was structured during a time when the cold war bloc alliance system existed in Europe. The treaty was meant to achieve a limit on Soviet and other Warsaw Pact countries. That situation no longer exists, as we well know.
In retaining the bloc to bloc structure of the CFE Treaty, are we not leaving countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia at the hands of the Soviets, or a Russian central authority of some type, with respect to determining the defense requirements of former Warsaw Pact countries?
In other words, in the event that Poland or Czechoslovakia feel that their defense requirements are lacking against a possible future threat to them by, say, the republic of Germany or Soviet Russia or a republic, by retaining the bloc to bloc structure of the CFE Treaty are we allowing the Russian republic, or whatever is the successor, or some other former Soviet Union system the right to veto increases in treaty-related equipment by denying them increases in their allotment under the equipment levels of the treaty?
Admiral JEREMIAH. I think that, first, it is fair to say that in the final negotiations within the bloc, the Group of Six, that the Eastern European democracies were stronger in their negotiations than the Soviet Union was. Many of the provisions in the final treaty were those that were proposed by the Hungarians and I think the Czechoslovaks, that were intended to provide them with a greater ability to control their own fate in the distribution of armed forces.
So under the current circumstances, I think the Eastern European countries have shown a political strength that would make it very difficult for the Soviet Union to dominate.
Second, we have provisions that limit the upper limit to which the Soviet Union force allocations could go, so that it is a zero sum game. If you reduce Poland's requirements, then you have to, presumably you would have to increase someone else's requirements. I do not think that is in anyone's best interests.
I think that the Eastern European democracies would tend to keep things at the status quo and by and large depend upon their ability to influence the treaty and use the treaty as a vehicle to cap and prevent the Soviets from taking stronger action.
Senator WARNER. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.
I think Senator Levin is next.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First a couple of technical questions about the treaty. Using that map, if you would, can you tell us what republics are either totally or partly west of the Urals?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Russian, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, I think, Armenia, and Georgia.
Senator LEVIN.- And Georgia. Now, is there treaty-limited equipment now in all of those republics?
Admiral JEREMIAH. The great bulk of it is in Byelorussia and in the Ukraine. There are trivial, not trivial but minor, amounts in the remainder.
Senator LEVIN. Is there more in the Ukraine and Byelorussia than there is in Russia itself? I think part of Russia is west of the Urals, so that counts, too.
Admiral JEREMIAH. Yes.
Senator LEVIN. So on a comparative basis, is there more equipment in the Ukraine than there is in Russia west of the Urals?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Slightly more in the Ukraine than there is in Russia, but it does not include the Russian equipment to the west.
Senator LEVIN. You mean to the east?
Admiral JEREMIAH. No, west.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. To the west.
Admiral JEREMIAH. Poland.
Senator LEVIN. Oh, to the west of Russia, okay.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. In other words, the equipment that is still coming out of Eastern Europe, is about 50 percent roughly of the levels that are presently in Russia or the Ukraine.
Senator LEVIN. And you said there are about 1,200,000 troops in the Ukraine, I think. Now, are those troops and is that equipment still under central control as far as we know?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN. When Yeltsin the other day said he was going to send troops into that area which was seeking independence within Russia, were those troops under his command to do that?
Admiral JEREMIAH. They were KGB forces, as I understand it. And also as I understand it, I think that Russia has absorbed the great dominant portion of the structure of the KGB. That is to say, the central KGB is very small now and Russia has tens of thousands of KGB personnel and equipment and units under their control.
But that is what would go in internal security forces, not army.
Senator LEVIN. All right, so that most of the KGB forces, which amounts now we believe to tens of thousands of troops, and their equipment---
Admiral JEREMIAH. Personnel, I will say.
Senator LEVIN. Personnel and their equipment-has been transferred to the command of the Russian President?
Admiral JEREMIAH. That is my understanding.
Senator LEVIN. Are there any troops or personnel, KGB personnel, under the command of the Ukrainian President?
Admiral JEREMIAH. I do not know the answer to that question. I will provide it.
Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary? And if so, about how many? I do not mean just a few units to protect the presidency. I mean is there any significant number of troops?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I am not sure we have the answer. We may have to give you a classified one for the record, Senator.
[The information follows:]
We believe that there are new no regular army, air force, or naval units under the command of the Ukrainian President or any other Ukrainian authorities, despite the Ukraine's claim to Soviet military forces in the republic. The Ukraine does, however, apparently control a limited number of Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, formerly subordinate to Moscow.
The status of KGB personnel is less clear. It is our understanding that KGB components in the Ukraine, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, are in the process of being resubordinated under various other organizations. The border guards, for example, have apparently been separated from the KGB and are reportedly under joint republic/center control, with the exact status yet to be worked out. Certain other forces of the former KGB apparently have been transformed to the Soviet Ministry of Defense.
Senator LEVIN. All right.
The other day NATO declared a new strategic doctrine and it said that the Soviet military threat has disappeared and that the biggest risks now come "from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe."
That is now NATO doctrine, that the biggest risks now are from adverse consequences from instabilities that may arise from those economic, social, and political difficulties. Now, what would be the effect on those instabilities of our failure to ratify the CFE Treaty?
Mr. WOLPOWITZ. I think it would introduce additional instability in an environment that desperately needs some stability. I think the limits of CFE---and frankly I think most of the countries involved probably need to go further in reducing their military equipment---it at least take them in the right direction in terms of reductions.
A significant question came up earlier, I think from Senator Warner, about whether the treaty's bloc to bloc framework did not impose some onerous restrictions on new Eastern European democracies. I think it is significant that they came to a rather speedy conclusion with the Soviet Union on the division of allocations, and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria were the first three countries to ratify.
So I think the treaty is a very needed element of stability. I think if we ourselves sit back and say that for some reason, given how little we have at risk-and we really have very little at risk in ratifying-we cannot see our way clear to ratifying, it seems much harder to go to the Ukrainians and argue that they should go ahead.
Senator LEVIN. Relative to those instabilities, which are now recognized officially by NATO as the greatest threat we face, would you both agree that it is in our national security interest to have Soviet nuclear weapons withdrawn to the Russian republic, under the control of one central identified authority, rather than dispersed among several republics whose governments and whose relationships to each other are in a state of flux?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would agree with most of that statement. That is to say, I think it is in our interests to see them under the collective control of a single authority. And I think it is in the interest not only of us, but of all the peoples of the Soviet Union.
But I do not believe that pushing to have them all withdrawn to Russia and all put under Russian control, in effect establishing a Russian monopoly, is the right way to go about it. I think pushing them all into some kind of collective mechanism has got a much greater chance of success. It is significant, I think, that the Ukrainians, who on the one hand have indicated great opposition to having weapons removed from the Ukraine to Russia, for fairly obvious political reasons, nevertheless indicated great willingness to see them dismantled on Ukrainian territory by some kind of international mechanism.
Senator LEVIN. Well, if you will tell us for the record, because my time is up, why it is that you believe that it is not in our interest to have them not only secure and under one apparatus, but also to have them centralized in a secure place, I would appreciate that for the record. My time is up.
[The information referred to follows:]
Ensuring the safety, security, and responsible control of Soviet nuclear weapons is a high priority of the administration. Indeed, it was a key objective of the President's September 27 Nuclear Initiative and his proposal to gin discussions on these issues.
Responsible control can best be preserved if the weapons are placed under the collective control of a single authority. Pressing for the consolidation of weapons and their control in one republic-Russia-may not be as prudent, particularly given the positions adopted by other republics such as the Ukraine.
Senator EXON [presiding]. Senator Levin, thank you very much. Senator Lott.
Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Jeremiah, for being here and for presenting your very fine statements. I have had a chance to review them and I am inclined to agree with them. But, like a lot of others, I do have some questions about the viability of the CFE Treaty in view of all that has transpired over the past year.
But I think you very directly and quite well addressed that concern, Admiral Jeremiah, both of you. But I do have a couple of questions I still must ask.
It worries me that in effect we are being asked to go ahead and ratify quickly, for a lot of good reasons, while we still see these changes under way, and in effect we are saying let us ratify it, but we will keep the books open and there can be necessary subsequent changes. That bothers me, because we are agreeing to something, we are ratifying it, acknowledging that we may have to make changes as we go along.
We may have the capability to do that, but with this moving target we see in Europe and in the Soviet Union I do not know whether that is practical or not, whether they can be as adroit at making those changes as we might be.
How do you respond to that, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The Admiral may want to add his own views, I think it is in our interest to put maximum pressure on everyone to see this process go through without changes. For us that is relatively simple. We have, I think, much less at risk in ratifying. The reductions that the treaty imposes are mainly on other countries. And in any case, of course, it does not go into effect until all parties have ratified it.
I do not think we want to encourage whatever entities emerge on the territory of the former Soviet Union to renegotiate the treaty limits or to start thinking about forces larger than the treaty limits. I think we have every interest in getting them to realize that the treaty provides them ample room to provide for legitimate needs of self-defense and that, as a matter of fact, they ought to be looking below the treaty limits, not above the treaty limits.
So I think there is every reason to think that in fact we can use this as a way to shape change and to control change, not that we have to write a blank check for something that is going to have to be completely revised later.
Senator LOTT. Admiral, I think in your statement you referred to this concern. The United States has historically supported arms control agreements, even in light of some violations by the Soviets. But you infer that with the CFE and the communication and the monitoring and all the things that are included in it that there would be less a chance for any substantial violation maybe than with other treaties.
Is that the point you make?
Admiral JEREMIAH. I think I make the point that we have a very good capability to monitor and determine militarily significant changes. I do not know that I want to put it on a scale with other treaties that we have.
But I think, going back to your question to Secretary Wolfowitz, I think it is important that we move with the treaty because when you have the kind of instability that we see in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union, rather, not Eastern Europe so much, I think it is useful to have that yardstick out there.
When we have the treaty and the provisions are codified in that treaty, then we know we have a yardstick out there to measure change against and to measure performance against, whatever the political structure is. So far as I can tell, the treaty provides us the ability to move within the existing arrangements to deal with, and consciously so, to deal with some of the changes in the political structure that may take place.
But we have the yardstick out there. We have the vehicle to measure performance against, and in fact the performance that is required is dominantly on the part of the Soviet Union, much less so on the part of the United States. We have the same requirements, but they are less difficult for us to accomplish.
Senator LOTT. Are they going to have the capability to meet the requirements of the treaty, to deal with all the changes politically and economically and militarily that they are having to cope with?
Admiral JEREMIAH. I think, within that context, with the exception of economics perhaps, that they have the capability to meet the requirements. The one question I think that is an open one for many people, and to which I alluded earlier, is over the environ- mental problems associated with the destruction of some of this equipment. All of us are going to have to pay a lot of attention to that.
The Russians and the union are increasingly subject to that kind of pressure from their environmental organizations.
Senator LOTT. I realize this is a very complex treaty, with a lot of exchanges of information and numbers and everything. But one thing that keeps catching my attention, getting into the technicalities of how it is going to be done, is the on-site inspection. I think one of you even referred in your statement to the possibility that Hungary or Czechoslovakia could inspect in the Soviet Union.
How is that realistically going to work? I mean, that has got to be a pretty complicated process of notification. I just cannot imagine everybody being willing to have a free flowing across the border, regular, whenever they feel inclined to have an inspection.
What is the process for, say, an on-site inspection from Hungary into the Soviet Union?
Admiral JEREMIAH. The process is not simple. It was worked out in great detail during the course of the negotiations. It follows the regimes that we have in other treaties, INF and other places. We have in fact practiced these kinds of inspections among the NATO nations in order to be prepared to accommodate them.
If I may, I might ask Generals LaJoie or St. John to contribute to that, since they have had previous inspection in the OSI regime. Roland, Adrian?
General ST. JOHN. Actually, it was worked out also and the Soviet Union accepted these rules. Of course, there are quotas, first of all, based on the number of passive inspections that you have to accept. So there are quotas divided up between the groups of state parties, 16 and 6.
There has to be an advance notification. There are worked out points of entry and exit. There are criteria for, when you arrive at a point of entry you must, within 6 hours, designate which point you are going to go to. It must be within a certain circumference.
It is a very complex thing, but all these details are worked out in the protocol on inspection and have been accepted, including the inspection by Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was Hungary's initiative to go after the Soviet Union. Initially, the treaty was worked out that there would be no inspections within the groups of treaty parties. Hungary insisted on it. The Soviets finally accepted it and it is in the treaty.
But there are provisions and I think it will work. It is complex, but that will not be an obstacle.
Senator LOTT. That is my basic question: Will it work?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Yes, sir, it will work.
Senator LOTT. I believe my time has expired.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, if I could just add. The complexity that you correctly note is precisely the reason why we think it would be a big mistake to invite people to reopen these issues and to try, in a more uncertain and chaotic situation, to renegotiate all of those rules.
It is rather remarkable that we made the progress we did in 2 years.
Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator EXON. Senator Lott, thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral, let me join my colleagues in welcoming you here. Just let me start out by saying as one Senator I think that we should go ahead and confirm this treaty from what we know of it to date.
There will be this hearing today and another hearing this afternoon that I intend to attend with the Intelligence Committee on this matter, with probably a little more background information.
But having said that, I want to get your opinion as to whether or not all of the changes that have taken place in geography and governments since the treaty was worked out and signed and sent to the Senate for confirmation-I simply mention for background the dramatic developments in the Soviet Union, especially the recent coup, the now independence of the Baltic States, and those things.
In this context, which recognizes that a great deal has happened since the treaty was negotiated, are there any significant changes that maybe would have been made or now should be made with regard to the treaty, given the uncertain situation in the Soviet Union today and other things such as the independence of the Baltic States?
Or looking at it in retrospect, if we had our druthers, would there have been anything of any significant difference that you would have recommended as representatives of the administration on the treaty that is now before the Senate or soon will be before the Senate?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think I would say, broadly speaking, that what we have is an agreement that is very useful in spite of the extraordinary changes. You are correct, we are looking at a situation that is totally different from when we first tabled these proposals in early 1989.
But I think what is quite impressive is the degree to which that basic framework has been useful for entirely new situations. We have mentioned earlier this morning the fact that the former countries of the Warsaw Pact were able to work out, within the framework of the treaty agreements, their respective allocations, what their force levels would be.
I think without the pressure of this treaty, they might never have come to such an agreement. And I think it can provide the same kind of framework for any new independent countries that may emerge in the former Soviet Union to work out those relationships.
My own feeling is that on the whole you are going to find that many countries, including perhaps an independent Ukraine, if it emerges, will find that they can live with equipment holdings that are even lower than those imposed by the treaty. We ourselves will probably end up doing that. But I do not think you will find anyone who will say that the treaty limits should have been higher, that they should have been different, that they should have allowed for more forces.
So I think it is very important to get on with the process of implementing the reductions that the treaty calls for. The fact that this new environment may permit people to go further, the treaty does not prevent that.
Senator EXON. Admiral?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Senator, I think within the context of the Baltics as the example, the Joint Consultative Group and the procedures that exist within the treaty, which we basically complied with in working through this procedural problem in the Baltics, worked extremely well and that is not an issue among any of the parties.
Going directly to the question you asked, I guess if you ask me today what you would do differently in order to recognize the changing circumstances around this, I do not know what I would do to-the treaty to change it, because the circumstances are not to the point where I can look back and decide yet.
What we have today is a treaty that will deal with what we need, and it so far has all the mechanisms to accommodate the kinds of changes that we can project, that we see. So I do not know what I would-do to change it without making it more complex and perhaps introducing-and it is sufficiently complex already, as the testimony earlier suggested.
I do not know what I would do to change the treaty today to accommodate the events that are around us.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Could I add another?
Senator EXON. Certainly.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I do not mean to go on too long on this, but it is a very important question that you raise. It seems to me that if you think about where we would be today, if we did not have this treaty and ask what would we do, I think the first thing we would do is scratch our heads and say: How can you possibly negotiate anything in the chaos and uncertainty that exists, with governments that may not expect necessarily to be around in a few months, that have overwhelming problems on their plate?
I think the answer is that whatever you tried to negotiate would take an extraordinarily and hopelessly long time. But what you have, I think, is a willingness-and we are seeing this in the kind of statements that we have quoted from Ukrainian leaders--by a lot of these new leaders to say: okay, this is the framework that all European countries or the major European countries seem to have accepted as a reasonable framework; we will live with that framework.
It is a kind of gift at this time of uncertainty to have that kind of agreement, which would be very hard to fashion today.
Admiral JEREMIAH. All of those parties see it in their self-interest, I think, to proceed with the CFE, whatever their political form.
Senator EXON. Would it be fair, then, gentlemen, to draw this conclusion, that while the treaty does not address some possible problems east of the Ural Mountains, there has not been any significant change with regard to the main thrust of the treaty, which was to help delineate by specific withdrawals the tension points between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe?
In other words, notwithstanding the legitimate questions that could arise from some conflicts west of the Ural Mountains, this treaty as it has been presented to us still maintains the basic thrust of the treaty, and that is to minimize the dangers or flash points of a conflict between West and East in that area. Is that a fair summation of what your position is?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It is absolutely correct, Senator. That, I think, describes the heart of why we believe it is in the U.S. security interest to ratify this treaty. I only add one point beyond that and that is that we never envisioned when we started out-when we put an overall limit on Warsaw Pact forces which was designed to minimize the threat to the West-that this overall limit would also provide the framework in which new emerging democracies would work out the balance between them and the Soviet Union, or in which I believe now the Ukraine and Russia may work out the balance between them.
But in fact it has acquired that new function. So in addition to the absolutely rock bottom core function that you correctly described, it has acquired a new value in shaping the developments in the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.
Admiral JEREMIAH. If I could just quote from General Powell's statement in the Foreign Relations Committee, because I think it is relevant, he said: "The establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at a much lower level, the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack." Those are three fundamental objectives of the treaty and they are still provided by the treaty under the circumstances today.
Senator EXON. Gentlemen, let me ask one question that looks to the future just a little bit. It has no direct bearing on whether or not the treaty should be ratified. But the recent NATO nuclear planning group, as I understand it, apparently left the door open For a new air-to-ground long-range nuclear missile development program to replace the canceled SRAM-T.
This year the Armed Services Committee supported the SRAM-T, although let the record show it was over the strong opposition of this member. Then, after the Appropriation Committee deleted funding for the program, we saw the SRAM-T canceled by the President in his September 27th speech without any prior consultation or even notification to this committee.
Given this history, does the administration really think there is a prospect that this committee or the full Senate would vote to authorize any future R and D funds for a new NATO type missile along the lines of the SRAM-T?
Admiral JEREMIAH. Sounds like heavy sledding to me. [Laughter.]
Senator EXON. Would you state that again? I did not hear it.
Admiral JEREMIAH. It sounds like heavy sledding to me.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Clearly, Senator, I think that any such program would have a very high hurdle to get over in terms of convincing not only the Congress, but also our allies, of the need for the program. But I think the reason we have stated it the way we have is that as long as NATO places its reliance for the very small residual theater nuclear deterrent that it maintains on dual-capable aircraft it is important to keep our options open for modernizing those aircraft, depending on what future needs may require.
I do not think anyone has a specific program in mind, certainly not one that would justify the kind of expenditure that would have been needed to keep SRAM-T alive once the SRAM-II basic program was canceled. And it is obvious from your remarks we would have a very skeptical audience up here to convince.
I think one cannot rule out, the world being as uncertain a place as it is, that in very different circumstances at some point in the future we may want to have that option. That is really all we were saying.
Senator EXON. So the best way to answer the question, I guess, that I raised in this regard is that at the present time there is no inclination within the administration to proceed along the lines of a SRAM-T or something similar to it, but you are simply saying that you do not foreclose that possibility as something that might be given consideration at some point in time in the future?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Correct, Senator.
Senator EXON. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I do thank the administration for canceling the SRAM-T program that I --- [Laughter.]
For once you did something right in my view, in any event.
I have four questions that Senator Nunn, who had to leave, asked that I question you about. So let us proceed with that as briefly as we can, Mr. Secretary and Admiral.
Mr. Secretary, before the extraordinary developments of this fall, which included the failed coup and the continuation of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the administration strongly supported General Galvin's position that 150,000 troops should be maintained in Western Europe. Is that a floor, that is, the minimum level that we can reduce to if we are still to have a seat at the table in NATO and exert political influence?
Does the administration still think that we can go no lower than 150,000?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, I think there were some basic military considerations that went into arriving at that number: we wanted to have a credible fighting force that could fight effectively without reinforcement. We wanted also to have the capability to accept reinforcements that might come, to maintain the infrastructure for doing that; also, to be capable of deployment outside of Europe; and we also had some political requirements to meet to maintain an acceptable level of U.S. influence in Europe and to provide evidence of our commitment to reinforce.
I think, obviously, speaking about the political requirements at least, those might change in the future. But I would stress very strongly that, as has been said over and over again here, we are at a time of enormous uncertainty and change in Europe. I think one of the fundamental factors that contributes to stability and confidence is the conviction that the United States is going to remain as a significant power in Europe.
We are already cutting our forces very, very fast and very, very deeply just to get down to the 150,000 level, and I think we do not want to send a signal to anyone, least of all to the new democracies of Eastern Europe, that the United States is pulling out.
Senator EXON. Mr. Secretary, with the pressures of force reduction that we are facing today because of a reduced global threat and budget considerations, I happen to feel that we could well consider reducing that from 150,000 down to, say, 75,000 to 100,000 troops.
But does what you are saying have more to do with political considerations rather than military considerations as we look forward to whatever our role will be in NATO and Europe in the future?
Admiral JEREMIAH. While Secretary Wolfowitz made the point for political purposes, I think that the Secretary of Defense consistent with Goldwater-Nichols has also taken the advice and counsel of his commander in Europe, and in the discussions that we have had, and they have been extensive discussions, on the military requirements there, it is necessary to have a credible corps to maintain the capability to do the work in Europe that we anticipate we may be faced with.
That credible corps, as you know, involves several divisions, tactical fighter wings necessary to support those divisions, and the infrastructure and support, combat service support necessary to make that a credible and sustained fighting force should it be necessary.
The circumstances in Europe may very well change in the future, as Secretary Wolfowitz has suggested. But for the moment we think that this is necessary to engage fully in what goes on in NATO and carry the share that the United States has historically carried,
Senator EXON. Well, gentlemen, why does not our nuclear superpower status and our demonstrated ability to project substantial military capabilities to deal with distant crises, such as the one that we handled very well in Iraq, carry with it an adequate political influence?
I guess from the standpoint of whether we need 75,000 to 160,000 troops, fully manned and supported, could we not project forces to bring stability in Europe from the United States, as we obviously are moving to a position of projecting our forces from the United States without having people scattered all over the world?
Why is Europe different as far as projection of forces are concerned, than the Middle East or other places where we have obligations?
Admiral JEREMIAH. The magnitude of what might be the potential threat I think is probably part of the equation. Second, to use Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a point, Europe was a major contributor---rather, U.S. forces in Europe, and with the support of our NATO allies, were major contributors to the forces that were further deployed to the Middle East.
As we move downstream and acquire the means to more rapidly lift our forces, certainly we will have a greater capacity to deploy those forces from the United States in a rapid way, to inject ourselves when necessary.
But forces on the ground, the ability to receive forces from the United States and to work with our allies on a day-to-day basis are extremely important. Those lessons learned in NATO policy and doctrine were applied in the Persian Gulf and made a significant difference in our ability to operate with other forces. If we are not there, it is very difficult to understand how to do the interoperability.
Senator EXON. But Admiral, I do not suspect the Europeans as a community would look kindly, would they, on a proposition of justifying the stationing of U.S. forces inside Europe as a part of NATO to project our influence and power into the Middle East?
I mean, I do not think that the Europeans look at NATO as that type of an arrangement, do they?
Admiral JEREMIAH. They do look at U.S. forces in Europe in that context.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We just did exactly that, Senator, in Desert Storm. We took an entire corps out of Europe and took it to the Persian Gulf, and that was the corps that performed the end run around Kuwait. And, in fact, I do not think we heard a single question or criticism from the Europeans. To the contrary, they helped us move it. We probably could not have gotten it there nearly as fast without the logistics that the Germans and other allies provided.
We have been making this point over and over again. In a variety of contexts, as we go down to a much smaller force, and you correctly noted we are going down 25 percent-in Europe, in fact, we are going to go down 50 percent-that force has to be usable for our requirements, wherever they may arise. We cannot afford to have something that is committed solely to Europe.
I think our allies understand that. In fact, the whole thrust of the new NATO strategy that was agreed to in Rome is toward greater flexibility because of the uncertainty of where threats can come from.
Senator EXON. I only cite the fact, gentlemen, that the general cooperation that we had on Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm was considerably different, I suggest, than the way the European Community as a whole looked at our raid previously on Libya.
Are those not in the same context, or have European countries changed their mind when some of them did not endorse or in fact placed some problems in our way with regard to the raid on Libya? Has there been a change in climate in Europe in this regard, or was just the unfortunate situation that we had with some of our "allies" on the raid on Libya simply an aberration?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think it is going to depend on the circumstances. There will be some cases where there is more agreement, more consensus about what we are trying to achieve. I think the disagreements about Libya or the issues about Libya of which I am aware arose over use of allied territory for overflight or for basing. I think they would take the view that the use of their territory is something within their sovereign right to decide, but I think they acknowledge that the use of our troops is something within our sovereign capability to decide, and that if we have troops in Europe and we need them somewhere else, I do not think they would make an issue about our doing so.
Senator EXON. Yes, but we did not have any trouble with overflight problems, did we, as far as those same countries were concerned with regard to Operation Desert Storm?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, we did not, Senator. In fact, I think without the cooperation we had from them on overflight and basing we could not have gotten the force there.
Senator EXON. One last question, Admiral, and I address this to you on behalf of Senator Nunn. The President decided to unilaterally remove nuclear weapons from all of the U.S. Navy fleet except for those on strategic missile submarines. President Gorbachev responded with a similar move shortly thereafter.
What will this change have on the overall maritime balance of power? Does this mean that we now need more ships, fewer ships, or different ships?
Admiral JEREMIAH. I think that, in terms of the balance of power, it has been an historic position of the United States Navy that nuclear weapons have tended to favor the opposition rather than the United States. Therefore, from our perspective I think we would feel more comfortable with the balance under the circumstances that we will obtain when these changes are fully implemented.
To translate that directly into numbers of ships does not necessarily follow, because you are generally determining ship force structure on requirements that involve conventional warfare, presence, and the like, rather than on direct nuclear warfare.
Senator EXON. Gentlemen, on behalf of the committee I thank you very much for being here and your excellent testimony. There may be some additional questions for the record, and if you could respond to those questions, if received, as promptly as possible for inclusion in the record, we would appreciate it very much.
With that and with our thanks, we are adjourned.
[Additional prepared material for the hearing record follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050
November 18, 1991
The Honorable Claiborne Pell
The Honorable Jesse Helms.
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senators, Pell, Helms and Biden:
The Committee on Armed Services has completed its review of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and has concluded that the Treaty promotes the national security interests of the United States, our allies in NATO, and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. The Committee recommends that the Committee on Foreign Relations report the Treaty favorably to the Senate, subject to certain conditions.
First, the Committee believes that the CFE resolution of ratification should condition the Senate's advice and consent on its understanding that the June 14, 1991 side agreement resolving the naval infantry dispute has the same legal force and effect as the Treaty itself. In a February 5, 1991 letter to Secretary Baker, the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on intelligence urged the Administration not to submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate until the naval infantry dispute and certain other post-signing discrepancies were resolved. In a March 7 reply, Secretary Baker stated that the Soviet interpretation of the application of the Treaty to naval infantry units "flatly contradicts the language of the Treaty and has no basis in the negotiating record." Secretary Baker's letter also stated: "This is an issue of principle, a clear-cut case of the Soviet Union failing to fulfill a Treaty obligation. We have repeatedly made clear to Soviet officials, at very high levels, that they should abandon this wholly unsupportable position."
Notwithstanding its original demand that the Soviet Union recant its unacceptable interpretation of Article III, the Administration elected to deal with this problem through the mechanism of a side agreement that establishes obligations outside the frame work of the Treaty. While that approach will result in Soviet equipment holdings under CFE at the same level as if they had never asserted that naval infantry equipment was exempt, the decision to resolve this dispute through a separate side agreement has the disadvantage of leaving the Soviet Union in disagreement with the 21 other CFE signatories over the interpretation of a key provision in the Treaty. As noted in the State Department's Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty: "... it should be noted that the Soviet Union, in contrast to the other 21 Signatories to the Treaty, does not subscribe to the analysis of the scope of Article III counting rule described above."
It is highly unusual for an administration to submit a treaty for advice and consent by the Senate with an open acknowledgement that the parties are in disagreement over a fundamental point of treaty interpretation. This anomaly is only tolerable to the Senate due to the corrective effect of the June 14, 1991 side agreement; however, this makes it all the more important that the Senate act within the resolution of ratification to ensure that the side agreement is afforded the same legal force and effect as the Treaty. A Condition making this explicit will help guarantee that any Soviet action inconsistent with or in violation of the June 14, 1991 side agreement is treated by the United States with the same gravity as any Soviet action inconsistent with or in violation of the Treaty.
The June 14, 1991 side agreement raises another point of concern to the Committee: the Executive Branch's continuing practice of using legally binding side Agreements and political commitments to establish obligations outside the framework of an arms control treaty. President Bush's July 9 letter of transmittal for the CFE Treaty describes the June 14 side agreement on naval infantry as associated with, but not part of, the Treaty. The practice of relying upon agreements and commitments outside the framework of treaties began with the Soviets' "political commitment" on Backfire bomber issues in SALT II, was repeated in the case of various definitional and verification issues in INF, and has now been repeated with regard to a variety of issues related to CFE and START. The Committee believes that the practice of relegating "too hard to solve" negotiating issues to side agreements, rather than resolving them within the confines of the treaty proper, threatens to detract from the Senate's role under the Constitution as a co-maker of treaties. Absent a change in ad-roach, the Committee believes that it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the resolution of ratification that predicate the Senate's advice and consent to arms control treaties upon the understanding :hat the various side agreements have the same legal force and effect as the treaties.
Second, the Committee recommends that the CFE resolution of ratification also condition the Senate's advice and consent on its understanding that the October 18, 1991 side agreement dealing with the accountability and inspectability of Soviet forces in the independent Baltic nations has the same legal force and effect as the Treaty. The Committee recognizes that this side agreement responds to a development (the Soviet Union's formal recognition of Baltic independence) that arose well after the Treaty was signed. Nonetheless, the Committee would note that the Administration chose to address this development through the mechanism of a side agreement that established obligations outside the framework of the Treaty, rather than as an amendment or protocol to the Treaty that would have required formal approval by the Senate. As with the naval infantry side agreement, failure to affirm the legal force and effect of this side agreement in the resolution of ratification would detract from the Senate's Constitutional role in the treaty-making area.
Third, the Committee recommends that the resolution of ratification include a Condition addressing the possibility that the Ukraine or some other republic of the former Soviet Union with large military forces or a significant military potential might achieve independence and elect not to be bound by or accede to the Treaty or for other reasons remain outside the CFE regime. in response to a question we submitted in advance of our first hearing, Secretary Baker stated:
It is the view of the Administration that in order to safeguard the integrity of the Treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for Ukraine and Byelorussia, if they were not bound as part of the USSR or any successor state, and retained significant amounts of equipment in Treaty categories, to accede to CFE.
During our November 4 hearing, Ambassador Woolsey testified that should such a scenario play out, it would provide grounds for U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty, "Certainly a country the size of the Ukraine, if it had substantial military forces, could, I would think, also be regarded as a fundamental change of circumstances under the Treaty, the old doctrine of 'rebus sic stantibus.'"
The Committee recognizes that-there have been many signals emanating from the Ukraine, including the October 30 Kiev communique between the Ukraine and Russia, indicating that the Ukraine Intends to observe the CFE Treaty. Nonetheless, many issues remain unsettled, including the question of which current CFE state or states in the Group of Six would yield entitlements of Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) to the Ukraine to establish I Ukrainian TLC allotments in the event the Ukraine joins CFE as a sovereign state.
The Committee believes the uncertainties in the current situation are such that the resolution of ratification should include a Condition requiring certain actions in the event former republics become independent and decline to be bound by the CFE Treaty or, assuming that they are not bound under international law In the absence of any action on their part, decline to Ve accede to ihe Treaty. In such a Condition, such developments with respect to the Ukrainian, Belorussian or Russian republics would be recognized as a militarily significant changed circumstance -- a point that was acknowledged in our hearings by numerous Administration witnesses.
In the event of such developments with these three republics, the Condition should require the President to consult immediately with the Senate as to whether the United States should exercise its withdrawal rights under the Treaty. If, after such consultation, the President elects not to exercise withdrawal, the Condition should, at a minimum, require him to request the Treaty Depository to convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties pursuant to Article XXI, with representatives of the new state in question invited, to assess the continued viability of the Treaty and whether amendments are necessary and appropriate to deal with these changed circumstances.
If, following such a conference, the new state in question still refuses to accede to or be bound by the Treaty, the Condition should require the President to immediately transmit to the Senate any amendments agreed to during such conference, or if no such amendments have been agreed to, a recommendation as to whether the United States should continue to be bound by the Treaty or to withdraw from the Treaty and his explanation of his reasons for such recommendation.
Finally, we would note that we have reviewed the draft legislation on CFE "cascading" that has been negotiated between the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defense Department, and we have no objection thereto assuming it is not amended. We recognize that this CFE implementing legislation, which would amend the Arms Export Control Act to permit certain specified weapons transfers within NATO for the purpose of modernizing our allies equipment, is under the jurisdiction of your committee, but we would-recommend that you act on this matter before the Senate adjourns.
We have consulted with all Members of the Committee on the recommendations outlined above and no objection has been raised. However, certain Members of the Committee have identified in the attached Additional Views other proposed Conditions, including one on the issue of the Soviet declaration of TLE in the area of application on November 19, 1990 -- a declaration that is disputed by U.S. intelligence. While the other Members of the Committee agree that this is an issue of serious concern, they have deferred to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in making recommendations to your Committee on an appropriate Condition on this subject.
John W. Warner
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WARNER, HURMOND, COHEN,
WALLOP, LOTT, COATS, MACX, AND SMITH
We agree with the Committee's letter report on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and endorse the recommended conditions to any Senate approval of ratification of the CFE Treaty in at least the specific areas addressed in the letter. We believe, however, that further recommendations are necessary to protect the Senate's Constitutional prerogatives in the Treaty-making process and to assure future U.S. national security interests.
Specifically, the inaccuracy of Soviet data declarations of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) in the area of application at the time the CFE Treaty was signed on November 19, 1990 is a serious concern. while the Administration has attempted to resolve this issue, significant differences still exist between the Soviet data declaration and U.S. intelligence estimates of the number of Soviet TLE in the area of application. These differing estimates range in the thousands of pieces of TLE above the amount included in the Soviet declaration.
We believe this discrepancy represents a significant question about Soviet probity and good faith with respect to their obligations under the terms of the CFE Treaty. While the Administration has expressed its intention to continue to work to achieve a resolution of this data dispute, it has not yet been able to do so. The June 14, 1991 resolutions of the Article III dispute and the issue of Soviet equipment transferred to locations east of the Urals do not resolve this issue.
We do not believe this is necessarily an issue over the military significance of the unreported Soviet equipment, and we make no judgment as to the military significance of this equipment or which U.S. intelligence estimate of unreported TLE is most accurate. Instead, we believe there is a very important principle associated with this issue with respect to maintaining the integrity of the arms control process, particularly as it might set a dangerous precedent for START. Consequently, we believe this issue must be resolved before the United States assumes responsibility for its obligations under the terms of the Treaty.
In order to resolve this issue in a manner consistent with U.S. national security interests and what we view as the national interests of other State Parties to the Treaty, we propose the following reservation to the CFE Treaty which should be included in the resolution of ratification. The reservation would read as follows:
"Whereas, data supplied by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pursuant to Article XIII and the Protocol on Information Exchange, regarding its equipment holdings in the Atlantic to the Urals area as of November 19, 1990, differed from United States estimates of such equipment, the United States shall not be bound by the terms of the Treaty unless and until--
Additionally, while the Committee letter suggests a general condition designed to deal with the possibility of the Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian Republics becoming independent and not agreeing to the Treaty, we believe we should provide our views on a specific reservation designed to deal with this situation.
We believe that the resolution of ratification should provide for very specific procedures to be followed in the event that the Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Russian Republics were to become independent and not agree to be bound by the terms of the Treaty. Administration officials consistently testified that, if such a circumstance-should arise, it would amount to a militarily significant changed circumstance and would seriously bring into question the continued validity of the Treaty. While we recognize the possibility exists that other Soviet republics might well become independent in the future and might, for whatever reason, not agree to be bound by the provisions of the CFE Treaty, it is less likely that such situation would amount to militarily significant changed circumstances.
Therefore, we suggest that the Foreign Relations Committee include in the resolution of ratification two conditions dealing with the creation Of new states in the Treaty area of application: one condition applicable with respect to the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and the Russian Republics, and another condition applicable with respect to the creation of new states in any other area. Furthermore, we suggest that the Foreign Relations Committee include a condition relating to creation of new states in the Ukrainian, Belorussian, or the Russian Republic that might go so far as to mandate U.S. withdrawal unless the President resubmits to the Senate for its advice and consent the Treaty or amendments to the Treaty which are designed to deal with the changed circumstances.
Additional Views of Senators Smith, Wallop, and Mack
Concerning the CFE Treaty
We, as members of the Armed Services Committee, have reviewed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and share the view of our colleagues that, with the inclusion in the Resolution of Ratification of certain conditions to the Senate's advice and consent, the Treaty would promote U.S. national security interests. In our opinion, however, further clarification on a variety of issues is needed before the Senate discharges its constitutional prerogatives.
We recognize that the Administration considers prompt ratification of CFE an urgent priority. It is neither our wish nor intent to prevent timely disposition of this matter. However, the Warsaw Pact dissolution and subsequent disunion of the USSR are extraordinary transformations which have injected great uncertainty into the legal, political, and military foundations of the Treaty. We are concerned that precipitant consideration, prior to resolution of technical discrepancies, and ongoing political proceedings among the Group of Six, particularly the former Soviet Union, could severely undermine the Senate's province and contribution to the ratification process.
For instance, with respect to treaty limited equipment (TLE) within the ATTU zone, there exist significant disparities between U.S. intelligence estimates and the Soviet data declaration provided at the time of Treaty execution. Although numerical estimates of unreported TLE differ among elements of the intelligence community, there is consensus that some TLE, and quite possibly a substantial amount, was not reported. Under-reporting of TLE would significantly diminish Soviet reduction obligations under the Treaty, and could prove to be militarily significant. Yet, to our knowledge, this matter remains unresolved. In our ooinion, ratifying CFE prior to resolution of data base discrepancies would imperil Treaty efficacy and set a dangerous precedent for consideration of the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty.
Furthermore, the abortive August 1991 coup has triggered unprecedented political and military discord within the former Soviet Union. Rising nationalism and sovereignty claims among the republics have eroded internal symmetry, and shifted the power balance within the Group of Six. At present, it is unclear how these developments will transform the Soviet political and military framework, and whether the individual republics will, in fact, accede to the Treaty. Both Secretary Baker and Ambassador Woolsey have affirmed that Treaty viability hinges on participation by the republics, particularly Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia.
We share this view, and believe it would be premature for the United States to act on the Treaty prior to the impending referendums on independence in Ukraine and Belorussia.
Moreover, we are concerned that, in the wake of the Warsaw Pact dissolution, the bipolar structure of the Treaty may actually jeopardize the long term security interests of emerging East European democracies, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. It merits note that many East European nations have expressed interest in affiliating with NATO. it is not inconceivable that, in the future, these nations may determine a need to augment their armed forces in response to unforeseen regional security threats. However, within the existing bloc-to-bloc Treaty structure, larger TLE holders, such as the Russian republic or some other former Soviet state system, could exercise a de facto veto over such augmentations by refusing to lower their own equipment allocations. We believe this matter warrants consideration.
The fundamental objective of the Treaty has always been to eliminate the massive disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels, and to reduce the threat of surprise attack or large scale offensive action against western Europe. This imperative has been largely accomplished, irrespective of CFE, through the demise of the Warsaw Pact and disunion of the USSR. Nonetheless, we believe that, with the inclusion of certain conditions, the Treaty would retain a degree of flexibility and efficacy necessary to promote U.S. and NATO security interests.
In our opinion, the national security interests of the United States, and our NATO allies, would be best served by resolving the aforementioned issues Prior to ratification. While we understand the Administration's desire to secure prompt approval of the accord, it should be noted that formal transmittal and subsequent Senate action were unduly delayed because of Soviet Article III violations. Given present uncertainties regarding the legal, political, and military foundations of the Treaty, we recommend the Senate defer action until these questions are resolved. However, should the Senate elect to proceed with ratification at this time, we believe the suggested conditions of the Republican Armed Services Committee members should be wholly incorporated to condition Senate advise and consent.
Malcom Wallop (R-WY) Bob Smith (R-NH)
Connie Mack (R-FL)
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN
IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Senator LEVIN. Can you describe what the impact would be on our national security and military planning if political transformations in the Soviet Union result in the formalization of multiple nuclear-capable states?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The former Soviet Union is undergoing a dramatic political and military transformation, the outcome of which is uncertain, Clearly, the future disposition and control of nuclear weapons in whatever states succeed the Soviet Union could have significant implications for the security of our country and our allies. To reduce the potential for instability and miscalculation inherent in this situation, leaving the nuclear weapons or the former Soviet Union under the collective control of a single authority is in both our interests and the interests of the Soviet people.
Senator LEVIN. Do you believe that there is a window of opportunity right now to get these weapons under such control?
Mr. WOLFOLWITZ. Yes. The President in his September 27 Nuclear Initiative sought to take advantage of what he considered an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Seizing this opportunity, one of the President's objectives was to help the leaders in the Kremlin and the republics get under control their enormous nuclear stockpile, which now seems less an instrument of national security and more of a burden.
CENTRAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Senator LEVIN. Could you tell us what the Pentagon proposes to do to enhance the possibilities for central control of nuclear weapons? Are the Soviets in need of any technical or logistical assistance in consolidating control over these weapons, for instance in transporting them or constructing storage for them? Have they asked us to provide such help? What has been our response?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The President proposed, and Mr. Gorbachev accepted, joint discussions on nuclear command and control arrangements and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. There is also agreement to explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads. These discussions have begun.
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Senator LEVIN. Recently before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, whether it was in our national security interest to see that democracy prevails in the Soviet Union. He said yes, and agreed that the causes of civil unrest would have to be addressed in order to make that possible. Do you believe that chaos in the Soviet Republics threatens our long-term national security?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The continuing erosion of Soviet state authority without question presents a new get of potential security challenges to the United States and our allies, including the prospect of militarization of ethnic or political conflict within the Soviet Union. As Secretary Baker said before the CSCE in September, the United States urges support for democracy and the rule of law in the Soviet Union, and we strongly believe that any changes within the Soviet Union should occur only by peaceful means. The United States has urged the Soviet central government and the various republics to seek to resolve their differences though peaceful dialogue.
SOVIET MILITARY THREAT
Senator LEVIN. The conferees on the DOD Authorization bill are trying to include provisions that would give the Pentagon more authority to reduce the Soviet military threat while we have a chance, and to assist in reducing chaos there. Wouldn't you welcome this authority as precisely the kind of program we urgently need to take in our own security interest?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Providing humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union, and assisting the Soviets in trying to demilitarize their economy and convert defense industries, are certainly programs which DOD supports. Our concern regarding the proposed legislation was that important DOD programs might be affected in the effort to fund Soviet-related assistance. Secretary Cheney indicated that DOD would not oppose the authority which the conferees were addressing, provided that such authority was discretionary.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER
SOVIET UNDER-REPORTING OF TREARY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT (TLE)
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, at the time of a nature of the CFE Treaty in November 1990, the Soviet Union reported significantly less treaty-limited equipment (TLE) within the ATTU zone than had been-estimated by U.S. intelligence agencies. While there remains some disagreement over the exact numbers of TLE omitted from the Soviet data declaration, there is agreement within the intelligence community that at least some TLE as not reported. Some analysts believe that the amount of unreported TLE is significant and that more than half of this equipment remains within the ATTU.
The under-reporting of TLE significantly reduced the Soviet Union's reduction obligations under the treaty. Secretary Baker indicated in his July testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee that this was a serious issue and that discussions with the Soviets were underway to resolve this issue.
Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, to your knowledge, what is the current status of these discussions, and in what forum and with whom are such discussions being conducted? Are either of you or representatives of your offices participating in these discussions?
What do you believe to be the correct amount of under-reported TLE in the ATTU at the time of signature? Of this amount, how much do you believe remains in the zone today? Is this an Intelligence Community estimate, and if go, are there dissenting views within the administration as to the estimated amount of Soviet TLE undeclared at time of signature or remaining in the zone today?
Is it your view that the Soviets should be required to revise upward their previous data declarations in order to accurately reflect their TLE holdings in the ATTU at the time of signature, with a corresponding increase in their reduction obligations?
JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Discussions concerning the accuracy of Soviet data submissions continue to take place in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna, as well as bilaterally. The JCG was established under the CFE Treaty as the primary forum to address issues such as this. Representatives from the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff participate in these discussions.
The Intelligence Community has provided the information and estimates regarding the amount of under-reported Soviet TLE, its current status, and other facts and estimates concerning this question. Their information has been provided to the Senate in a classified response to previous questions. Please refer to those responses for the second part of this question.
We will continue to address data questions with Soviet representatives both in the JCG and bilaterally. These discussions have already resulted in two agreements signed on June 14,1991: first, a politically binding statement by the Soviets agreeing to the destruction or conversion of an additional 14,500 pieces of TLE located east of the Urals, and second, the resolution of the Article Ill dispute by a legally binding commitment to include within original treaty ceilings the amounts of TLE in naval infant and coastal defense divisions, thereby further increasing the amount of Soviet TLE to be destroyed or converted.
Admiral JEREMIAH. Discussions concerning the accuracy of Soviet data submissions continue to take place in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna, as well as bilaterally. The JCG was established under the CFE Treaty " the primary forum to address issues such as this. Representatives from the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff participate in these discussions.
The Intelligence Community has provided the information and estimates regarding the amount of under-reported Soviet TLE, its current status, and other facts and estimates concerning this question. Their information has been provided to the Senate in a classified response to previous questions. Please refer to those responses for the second part of this question.
We will continue to address data questions with Soviet representatives both in the JCG and bilaterally. These discussions have already resulted in two agreements signed on June 14, 1991: first, a politically binding statement by the Soviets agreeing to the destruction or conversion of an additional 14,500 pieces of TLE located east of the Urals, and second, the resolution of the Article III dispute by a legally-binding commitment to include within original treaty ceilings the amounts of TLE in naval infantry and coastal defense divisions, thereby further increasing the amount of Soviet TLE to be destroyed or converted.
TLE IN THE UKRAINE AND OTHER SOVIET REPUBLICS
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, a significant amount of Soviet TLE is located in the Ukrainian republic. The Ukraine is generally expected to vote its independence from the Union on December 1, and Ukrainian officials have declared jurisdiction over this Soviet equipment in order to support an independent military organization, perhaps as large as 460,000 troops.
What would be the military significance of the existence of an independent Ukraine in the ATTU zone, which is a party to the CFE Treaty and which possesses significant amounts of former Soviet equipment which was to have been limited under the treaty?
Lesser amounts or Soviet TLE remain in several other republics which are within the ATTU-Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belorussia. If any of these republics were also to become independent and gain control over the Soviet equipment within their borders, what would be the possible military significance if these republics chose not to accede to the CFE Treaty?
In short, what is your overall assessment of the impact on European security if large amounts of TLE formerly controlled by the Soviet Union and limited under the CFE Treaty are suddenly controlled by new nations not party to the treaty? In this type of situation, do you believe the CFE Treaty would continue to serve U.S. national security interests?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ and Admiral JEREMIAH. Obviously, we would prefer to see all newly emergent states on the European territory of the U.S.S.R. remain accountable under the CFE Treaty. However, from a military perspective, if the small republics opt out of a new union, it is unlikely that the amounts of treaty limited equipment which they might hold would be militarily significant. In any event, we would need to ensure that all treaty limited equipment remaining under the control of the central government, but still located on the territories or the newly independent republics, remains subject to treaty provisions and associated agreements.
With regard to the Ukraine and Belorussia, my assessment is that if either or both of these large republics retain significant amounts of equipment in treaty limited categories, their participation in the CFE Treaty almost certainly would be necessary. Because this treaty is seen by European states as the cornerstone of a new European security system, we believe that there would be powerful political, military, and economic incentives for both of these republics to participate in CFE.
ELIMINATING THE DISPARITY OF FORCES IN EUROPE
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, in the Secretary of State's letter to the President recommending that he submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, he stated that the Treaty ". . . will eliminate the enormous conventional forces disparity that has existed between the East and West since World War II." If the West does not exercise its right to maintain forces at the levels allowed for under the treaty, does this statement still hold true? I ask this question because it is becoming apparent that many Western countries, including the United States, may not maintain forces even at the levels agreed to by the Group of 16.
This is the most important part of my questions. Assuming that the future direction of a new Soviet Union will be settled one way for another in the next few years, isn't it important that the Group of 16 maintain forces at a level relatively equal to the treaty allotments?
Admiral JEREMIAH. While it would be preferable for all members of the group of 16 to maintain TLE at their maximum levels for holdings, fiscal realities preclude this optimum situation. However, it should be noted that, under the limits that are set forth in Article TV and Article VI of the treaty, the group of 16 can hold up to one-half of the TLE in the ATTU while the Soviet Union can hold only up to approximately one-third of the total TLE permitted by the treaty. Thus, the group of 16 can achieve parity with the Soviet-Union, in a purely quantitative sense, by maintaining force levels of only two-thirds of what their side is permitted to have.
Additionally, we will continue to train and equip ground, air, and supporting naval forces for rapid deployment back to Europe if needed. We must retain the capability to reconstitute forces. This Base Force concept-forward deployed forces, backed up by a capability to reinforce (which could rapidly plus-up our forces in the ATTU to our treaty limits)-will give us the ability to respond to any adverse trends which might require a military response.
BALTIC COOPERATION FOR INSPECTIONS
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, although Soviet authorities have agreed that Soviet military equipment located in the former Baltic republics will be counted against treaty limits, the Baltic states have not yet agreed to inspections of this Soviet equipment, as called for by the treaty.
If we are unable to secure agreement from the Baltic nations for full inspection rights of this equipment, how serious an impact could this loss of inspection rights have on our confidence in the treaty's security regime?
Mr. Wolfowitz and Admiral JEREMIAH. Baltic officials recently told visiting U.S. representatives that they would be prepared to work out such arrangements. While Baltic officials' number one priority is complete Soviet withdrawal in the shortest amount of time, they acknowledged that it is very much in their interest to assure that Soviet forces are subject to treaty monitoring provisions as long as they are stationed on Baltic territory. We thus anticipate no problems in working out such arrangements. Moreover, the amount of Soviet equipment in the Baltics is modest and is unlikely to remain there for an extended period.
DEFINITION OF A "BATTLE TANK"
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, during our hearing on the INF Treaty, this committee identified a problem with the overall definition of the weapons covered by the treaty, specifically with respect to future weapons platforms. I have examined the definitions for the various systems covered by this treaty, and have one question with respect to definition of a tank.
In Article 11, Paragraph (C) it states that: "The term 'battle tank' means a self-propelled armored righting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun, necessary to engage armored and other targets . . ." In the article-by-article analysis for the CFE Treaty, it stated that: "The 'battle tank' definition was drafted in this way in order to provide a procedural mechanism for addressing, in the Joint Consultative Group (in accordance with Article XVI of the treaty) or in conferences (in accordance with Article XXI of the treaty), the deployment of new weapons technologies."
For clarification, how would the parties resolve a new weapons system that meets all the criteria for a "battle tank," but instead of a "high muzzle velocity direct fire gun," it employs a high-power laser or some other non-muzzle weapon system? Is this already covered by the treaty, or would all parties have to agree to include this under the limits set forth for "battle tanks?" If the latter, would this require a consensus of all the parties to the treaty, and if so, could the state party that developed the system veto such an attempt to cover this weapons technology under the terms of the treaty:
I also ask this question because the treaty definition for "combat aircraft" covers weapon systems that use "other weapons destruction technology to cover technologies not known today. Why didn't we use a similar phrase for "battle tanks?"
Were you consulted during the negotiation of this particular provision? What was your position on this issue at the time it was being negotiated? What is your understanding of the meaning of the battle tank definition in the final treaty, as it relates to future weapons systems?
What significance might this apparently lack of clarity have for future U.S. weapons systems?
Mr. Wolfowitz and Admiral JEREMIAH. The equipment definitions are designed to capture within treaty limits any future types of TLE. The signatories agreed that modernization would have to be discussed as it occurred and that the existing treaty definitions provide an adequate vehicle for this purpose. In each definition, the general description takes precedence over specific parameters. Thus, if a country deployed a new laser battle tank, the JCG, which would address this issue, might deem it capable of performing the role foreseen in the tank definition and count It against the treaty's tank ceilings. This approach was fully discussed and coordinated within the U.S. Government and will not have any significance for future U.S. weapons systems.
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, as you know, the CFE Treaty was negotiated and structured during a time when the Cold War bloc alliance system existed in Europe. The CFE Treaty was meant to achieve a limit on Soviet and other Warsaw Pact countries. That situation no longer exists-there is no Warsaw Pact. Indeed, many former Warsaw Pact countries have indicated a desire to join NATO.
In retaining the bloc-to-bloc structure of the CFE Treaty, are we not leaving countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia at the hands of Russian or central authority control with respect to determining the defense requirements of former Warsaw Pact countries? In other words, in the event that Poland or Czechoslovakia feel that their defense requirements are lacking against a possible future threat to them by Germany, for example, or Russia, by retaining the bloc-to-bloc structure of the CFE Treaty are we allowing the Russian Republic or some other former Soviet state system the right to prevent increases in treaty limited equipment for the Eastern European democracies by vetoing increases in their allotments under the equipment levels of the treaty. For example, according to the Group of Six allocation table, the U.S.S.R. is allowed to retain 13,150 tanks out of a total of 20,000, while Poland and Czechoslovakia are limited to 1,730 and 1,436, respectively. Germany, on the other hand, is allowed 4,166 under the Group of 16 allocation for NATO. As currently structured under the CFE Treaty, the only way Poland and Czechoslovakia can increase their tank holdings is by asking Russia for a portion of their allotment since it is unlikely that other members of the Group of 6 states would be willing to forego their already meager share of the allocation.
Are we not in many ways codifying some of the worst elements of the former security structure of the Cold War, by limiting the security requirements of these nascent democracies in Eastern Europe to the will of the Russian Republic or some central Soviet authority?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. CFE ceilings are set by Group but there are no group obligations. All treaty responsibilities fall on individual nations, and independent republics which participate in the treaty would be expected to fulfill those responsibilities. Each participant, e.g., has maximum equipment levels and a quota of inspections which can be conducted against it.
Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as the rest of the Group of Six, agreed to certain equipment levels during the negotiation process. These levels are not necessarily permanent, however, and could be reallocated, as long as they did not violate the over-all zonal limits of the treaty.
The treaty is thus not only well suited to a Europe of independent countries, but is the only legally-binding mechanism readily available for regulating security relations in this new, more uncertain environment. The basic structure of the treaty would not be affected by the addition of new states on the Eastern side; the Group of Six would expand and its equipment entitlements would be reallocated.
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, I would like to ask you about security or peacekeeping assistance to a state party under the treaty in the event such a country requests such assistance. Let's assume, for example, that the Ukraine were to become an internationally recognized independent state and a party to the treaty. Suppose, in 6 or 10 years, that the Ukraine were to become concerned about a civil war in Russia spilling over into the Ukraine, or uneasy about a buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border with extensive logistical support in the rear areas that nevertheless did not breach the Russian allocations or treaty zonal limits. Under these circumstances, could the Ukraine call upon the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to maintain the security of the Ukraine or the region? Specifically, does the treaty preclude the movement of such a peacekeeping force into the treaty's area of application, particularly if the deployment of that peacekeeping force would mean that the Ukraine's equipment holdings would exceed that allowed for under the treaty, the zonal limits, or the overall equipment levels for the former Warsaw Pact countries?
In other words, are there allowances under the treaty for peace-keeping forces outside treaty limits, even though direct threats or aggressive acts have not yet been initiated?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. There are no specific provisions under the treaty to allow for the deployment of peacekeeping forces, but there is nothing in the treaty to restrict such deployments of TLE to the territory of a state party, if it involves equipment of other states parties or of states not party to the treaty including deployments from NATO countries onto the territory of members of the Eastern group, which Ukraine would be), provided that no treaty limits were breached and provided that permission had been given by the state on whose territory such equipment would be located, in this case, Ukraine.
More specifically, however, if the United Nations Security Council had authorized an enforcement action in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, then CFE limits could be exceeded pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, the Soviets must eliminate over 37,000 items of treaty-limited equipment under the provisions of the CFE Treaty and subsequent legal and political commitments. Do you believe the Soviets will be able to meet the schedule for reductions set out in the treaty, in view of both the disastrous economic situation and the continuing political instability in the Soviet Union? What discussions, if any, have you had with the Soviets concerning their reduction obligation under the treaty?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Administration officials have had a number of discussions with Soviet center and republican officials concerning the obligations of the CFE Treaty, including meeting the destruction obligation. They have made several declarations of their intent to implement and abide by the terms of the treaty. We therefore expect them to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.
TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED PEOPLE
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, does the United States have enough language-trained and technically qualified people to carry out the inspection regime of the CFE Treaty, while at the same time continuing inspection activities under the INF and Nuclear Testing Treaties? Will additional assets be required to perform these activities, and what impact will the START Treaty have on our inspection capabilities?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes. Currently, the On-Site Inspection Agency has about 2,500 names in its database of qualified inspectors and escorts for all arms control regimes. Recently, we have augmented our OSIA permanent party inspection and escort teams with specialists from a variety of interagency fields to enhance OSIA's inspection capability and to provide opportunities for U.S. technical experts who have studied CFE Treaty-related TLE. For CFE, OSIA inspection teams consist of a core of six people, including linguists and military members with combat arms or aircrew experience. Core teams are augmented by up to three individuals with Soviet or area CFE, expertise who are assigned to OSIA on a temporary duty basis. The variety of experience on the inspection teams provides the flexibility necessary to conduct inspections of all treaty-limited equipment subject to the CFE Treaty adequately.
By START EIF, OSIA, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence College, will have trained approximately 800 future START inspectors and escorts.
In summary, OSIA has a sufficient number of permanently-assigned inspectors/ escorts, weapons specialists, and linguists to form the OSIA "core teams" in order to execute the INF, START, NIT, CW and CFE missions. Of course, temporary duty augmentation will be required for START, NTT, CW and CFE, as it was for INF.
COST ESTIMATES FOR IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE CFE TREATY
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, would you please provide for the record current cost estimates for implementation of the CFE Treaty, continuing activities under INF and the Nuclear Testing treaties, as well as costs associated with implementation of the START Treaty.
This information should include, for each treaty, all estimated costs to the United States for: destruction or conversion of weapons and equipment; any transportation of weapons or equipment to comply with any treaty, cascading of equipment under CFE, on-site inspections, monitoring and verification activities, activities for which reimbursement is expected from another state, and any other costs associated with implementation of each treaty. Please also provide information as to which agency of the Federal Government is expected to pay these costs. This information may be provided in classified or unclassified form.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The following budget estimates for implementing CFE for USG agencies ire in millions of dollars:
fiscal years 1991 1992 1993 Army ............................6.3 15.191 8.213 Air Force ......................0.0 .33 0.2 OSIA ............................0.0 16.0 11.9 DNA ...........................10.3 13.0 13.5 DIA ............................0.0 6.84 0.0
Further information, and information concerning other treaties is not yet available and will be provided.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE CFE TREATY
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, how does the administration view the "Joint Press Statement" of October 30, 1991, between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which states an intent to take the "necessary steps for early entry into force of these documents?" Is it not simply a statement of intent, or does the administration give it some legal standing?
In the same paragraph, the Ukrainian and Russian delegations went on to underscore "that questions of preparation and implementation on their territories of agreements in the area of arms reduction will be decided with their immediate participation and in consideration of their interests." What do the delegations mean when they say "in consideration of their interests?" Does this mean that they may selectively adhere to the treaty?
Moreover, since Admiral Jeremiah stated in his prepared testimony that the central government is "held accountable for fulfilling treaty obligations," have they commented on the joint press statement? Does the current central government acknowledge and agree to the intent of the joint press statement, particularly with respect to the Ukraine?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. This statement is one in a series of assurances given by the central government and Ukrainian officials that they accept the obligations of the CFE Treaty, and will implement its provisions. The October 30 statement is part of a general trend toward full acceptance of CFE by Ukraine, and the acknowledgement of this by Soviet central government. We welcome these developments and continue to expect all parties to accept and implement fully all CFE provisions.
U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, it has been pointed out that intelligence gathering activities unrelated to CFE could be undertaken by Soviet or other inspection teams who are allowed access to sites under U.S. and allied control in Europe. Do we have sufficient counterintelligence capabilities to cope with this possible threat?
Admiral JEREMIAH. The Department of Defense is both concerned about and alert to the potential for intelligence exploitation posed by granting Soviet inspection teams access to U.S. sites in Europe. The Joint Staff has provided policy guidance and the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and the counterintelligence agencies of the military services have developed a plan for protecting sensitive points while still complying with the requirements of the treaty. Counterintelligence-trained personnel will conduct a variety of defensive measures to protect escort and site personnel from any attempts to cultivate or recruit them. Sufficient counterintelligence capabilities exist to cope with this threat.
SOVIET REPUBLICS' RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER CFE
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, it has been suggested that the Soviet republics have not really come to an understanding of their responsibilities under CFE. What about the responsibilities of U.S. forces under the treaty? Have we come to clear definitions with our NATO counterparts?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We have worked out a series of arrangements and agreements within NATO covering the cost sharing of the harmonization program, the rights and obligations of host and stationing states during CFE inspections, coordination of verification activities, and other issues. These arrangements and agreements have resulted in clearly defined responsibilities among NATO nations in meeting the obligations of the CFE Treaty.
Senator WARNER, Admiral Jeremiah, many have stated that due to the vast changes which have occurred among the former Warsaw Pact countries since the signing of the CFE Treaty, the treaty is no longer a viable instrument. With regard to ratification, are there Specific operational problems for the United States or our allies, which ratification of the treaty would create, exacerbate, or eliminate?
If problems are created or exacerbated, are these problems sufficiently significant to over-shadow the benefits derived from the treaty?
Admiral JEREMIAH. There are no specific operational problems for the United States which ratification of the treaty would create, exacerbate, or eliminate. The reporting requirements of the treaty represent new requirements, but ones that present no operational problems.
NATO HARMONIZATION PROGRAM
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, as a matter of policy, given the Defense Department's current force structure adjustments, are there opportunities created by this treaty to make these reductions-more palatable and perhaps more efficient?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes. Perhaps the beat example of such an opportunity is the NATO harmonization program, under which equipment in excess treaty ceilings and force structure requirements will be transferred to NATO allies, who will then destroy older equipment, resulting in an overall increase in alliance military capability.
THE ROLE OF THE CENTER IN THE FORMER USSR
Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, you state in your prepared testimony that "The central government, as treaty signatory, should be held accountable for fulfilling treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics and with respect to its forces located elsewhere in the treaty's area of application." Is the JCS informing the committee that you expect a central government to be retained in the former Soviet Union? Are you assuring the committee that a central government authority as opposed to a Russian authority is certain to be retained over republics opting to maintain some of Union?
Admiral JEREMIAH. The prepared testimony reflects the administration's position that the United States will hold the new union government responsible for fulfilling treat obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics. It will be up to the central government authorities to work out arrangements with republics which are part of the new union or confederation to achieve compliance with the treaty. It will also be the responsibility of the central government to fulfill all treaty obligations concerning any Of its forces which may be located in the ATTU but outside the territory of its constituent republics. This basic approach does not, of course, apply to republics which may become independent of the union.
RATIFICATION OF THE CFE TREATY
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, as you know, the Senate is considering attaching conditions to the resolution of ratification of the CFE Treaty. Some of these conditions may relate to the legal status of the subsequent agreements reached in June relating to Soviet reinterpretation of Article III provisions and the removal of Soviet equipment to areas east of the Urals; another condition may relate to the status of the October 18 JCG statement regarding the Baltics and the October 30 press statement regarding the Ukraine.
Please advise whether any of the countries which have already ratified the treaty have attached any conditions to ratification, in relation to the above mentioned issues or any other matters. Is the administration aware of any conditions which may be attached by any other countries to the treaty regarding the above mentioned issues or any other matters?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We are not aware of any conditions attached to ratification by any country that has ratified the treaty.
U.S. CONCERNS WHICH LED TO THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, in his Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 11, 1991, Secretary Baker outlined the following as U.S. concerns which led to the CFE negotiations:
In my view, all of these concerns have been greatly reduced by what has already happened in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. My question to you concerns whether the United States relies too heavily on arms control agreements to maintain stability. Arms control has a very important place in national security planning, but arms control agreements which merely regulate levels of military equipment do not prevent conflicts or wars. We learned very early on during the inter-war period that naval arms control agreements, such as the 1922 Washington Treaty, the 1910 London Treaty, and the 1915 Anglo-German Naval Agreement did nothing to halt the march of war in Europe. In other words, arms control agreements cannot stop a leader whose intention is to use armed force to implement foreign policy objectives.
Can you cite any example in which an arms control agreement prevented the action of any country with aggressive intentions?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No.
Senator WARNER. Do you believe the CFE Treaty could prevent, for example, aggression by the leadership of the Russian Republic against Czechoslovakia or Poland given the numbers of TLE allowed for the former U.S.S.R.?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No.
Senator WARNER. What about the treaty continues to make its ratification and implementation vital to the best interests of the United States and our allies?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We agree that all the listed concerns have been significantly reduced by recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There is, however, a world of difference between a military threat reduced by circumstance---which is always subject to change and a military balance established by treaty obligations. This is one of the key assurances CFE will provide.
The United States and the West can only gain from CFE---even if uncertainties persist about our Soviet treaty partner. The treaty's reductions, limits, information exchanges and on-site inspections will impose minimal constraints on us, but major ones on Soviet successors who will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe.
The CFE Treaty evolved during its negotiation to being far more than a means of establishing an East-West balance of conventional forces at lower levels and of containing the Soviet Union. We believe, in fact, that the treaty is still very advantageous to the United States and to all involved in the more fluid situation existing today.
Above all, CFE will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations. Such a structure is needed especially during unsettled times and to serve as a base for further cooperative developments in the security sphere.
Implementation of the treaty, with ceilings, limits and other provisions intact, will reduce levels of key offensive armaments, limit the amounts of equipment which can be held collectively and individually, vastly increase information about force structure and equipment deployments, permit extensive on-site inspections, and provide a stable foundation for European political and economic developments.
In our view, we would be far better off during these unsettled times if CFE were in force---providing an internationally-recognized framework of constraints on military activities and a forum for addressing questions and disputes.
The Treaty is not only well suited to a Europe of independent countries, but is the only such legally binding mechanism readily available for regulating security relations in this new, more uncertain environment.
Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, operationally, how would you assess the balance of forces which would remain under the CFE Treaty, given the close proximity of Soviet reinforcement equipment east of the Urals, compared to the somewhat more difficult reinforcement situation for NATO? Moreover, how much POMCUS equipment does the United States plan on maintaining in Europe?
Admiral JEREMIAH. The balance of forces under an implemented CFE Treaty will be distinctly better for the United States and NATO than has been the case without the CFE Treaty. I am confident that the United States and NATO will be able to detect any violations of the treaty and respond as needed, to include reinforcing U.S. forces in the ATTU, before the Soviets could achieve a militarily significant advantage from any illegal reinforcement of their forces from outside of the ATTU. POMCUS requirements currently are being examined to meet the new force requirements in Europe. The treaty limits and the U.S. portion of those limits provide sufficient numbers of TLE for the United States to meet foreseen requirements.
U.S. POSITION IN "OPEN SKIES" NEGOTATIONS
Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah or Secretary Wolfowitz, under a possible Open Skies agreement, I understand that limited access to U.S. airspace would be permitted to any other party to the agreement, and that sensor capabilities on aircraft would be relatively unlimited. Can you comment as to whether my understanding is correct concerning relatively unlimited sensor capabilities? If this is the case, do you have any concerns about our ability to protect sensitive sites and facilities from observation under an Open Skies regime? What is the U.S, position on the current negotiations? Specifically, regarding sensors and access to U.S. territory?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The President's concept for Open Skies, which he articulated in May 1989, is that the participating states would have short notice, unrestricted (except for safety) access to the airspace of each of the other participants with any sensors they wished to carry except signals intelligence collectors. Progress toward that goal was unattainable while the Soviet Union refused unrestricted access to its territory. This month (November 1991) the Soviet negotiators in Vienna publicly announced that access to the entire Soviet airspace would be open to Open Skies participants. The current negotiating round specifically concerns the number and quality of the sensors to be made available to participants. The administration believes that the prohibition on SIGINT collectors and the notice provision sufficiently protects U.S. facilities and programs and enables the President's initiative to be truly open.
Admiral JEREMIAH. Open Skies negotiations involving the NATO Allies and former Warsaw Pact members resumed in Vienna, November 5. Progress in earlier rounds was hampered by Soviet efforts to limit coverage of Soviet territory and to minimize the number of overflights and types of sensors used. The Soviets also insisted on using Soviet aircraft to overfly the Soviet Union. In April of this year, NATO approached the Soviets with a compromise proposal meeting the Soviets' aircraft concerns in exchange for Soviet flexibility on territorial coverage, quotas and sensors.
While the Open Skies Treaty will not be a verification agreement per se, it could provide a useful supplement to other monitoring and verification means, particularly for participants with capabilities less advanced than our own. In addition, Open Skies could contribute to monitoring the disposition of Soviet equipment that was withdrawn east of the Ural prior to signature of the CFE Treaty.
Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah or Secretary Wolfowitz, how much equipment will the NATO countries an a whole be required to reduce under the treaty? What is the understanding concerning the cost of eliminating over-coiling TLE?
I understand that the United States will only be required to destroy some very old equipment-640 M-47 tanks and 5 old howitzers. What is the cost to the United States of destroying this equipment? Why has this equipment been returned to the United States, when, and from whom?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The treaty requires countries to reduce in each category the amounts by which their current holdings exceed their maximum levels of holdings. NATO set maximum levels for NATO-member countries in November, 1990. NATO nations' total reduction liabilities are-tanks, 5,523; ACVS, 7,578; artillery, 2,668; combat helicopters, 125; fixed-wing combat aircraft, 118.
Over half of these reductions represent former East German TLE now under the control of the FRG.
Cost of reduction will be determined and born by individual nations that have reduction obligations. If nations' reduction obligations Increase as a result of NATO's equipment transfer ("cascading") program, NATO will commonly-fund reimbursements for the additional costs. Amounts reimbursed will be the minimums as determined by treaty standards and international competitive bidding.
This equipment was provided long ago to allies un er military assistance program agreements which required that it be offered back to us for disposal once the receiving nations no longer wanted it. Under these kinds of agreements, the following countries have offered---and we have accepted-the following equipment during the 1981-88 period:
Italy-633 M-47 tanks
France-7 M-47 tanks
We must destroy this equipment under CFE because it is located in the ATTU and we own it.
We will put destruction contracts out for bid. We currently estimate total costs will be about $6.4 million ($10 thousand each for tanks; $5 thousand each for howitzers).
TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS TO THE FLANKS
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, Article V, paragraph (B) of the treaty allows a State Party to deploy treaty limited equipment on a "temporary basis" in the flanks. In the article-by-article analysis of the CFE Treaty it States that: "It should be noted that Article V does not specify a time limit for such 'temporary' deployments."
Were you consulted during negotiation of this provision? Can you tell us why there is no definition for temporary deployments? What is your understanding of the length of time allowed under a "temporary" deployment? Do the Defense Department and the JCS have a baseline that the United States should use to determine whether another State Party has exceeded the "temporary basis" rule under Article V?
With respect to your answer, Admiral Jeremiah, what would you estimate to be a "temporary", deployment that could potentially have military significance?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Temporary deployments to the flanks are limited in number. For example, a State Party may temporarily deploy no more than 153 tanks, 241 armored combat vehicles, and 140 pieces of artillery to the territory (in the flank zone) of a State Party. The term "temporary" is not defined or explained in the treaty as it relates to the "flank flow rule." However, during the negotiation of this provision, it was made clear that the purpose of the provision was to provide for limited reinforcements in "exceptional circumstances" and for "a limited duration." In view of these qualitative descriptions, the term "temporary" may be construed to indicate a duration of days or weeks or, at most, several months, but not years. Due to the limited quantities of TLE allowed to one State Party for temporary deployment, it is difficult to envision such a deployment that would have military significance.
Admiral JEREMIAH. Temporary deployments to the flanks are limited in number. For example, a State Party may temporarily deploy no more than 153 tanks, 241 armored combat vehicles, and 140 pieces of artillery to the territory (in the flank zone) of a State Party. The term 'temporary' is not defined or explained in the treaty as it relates to the "flank flow rule." However, during the negotiation of this provision, it was made clear that the purpose of the provision was to provide for limited reinforcements in "exceptional circumstances" and for "a limited duration." In view of these qualitative descriptions, the term "temporary" may be construed to indicate a duration of days or weeks or, at most, several months, but not years. Due to the limited quantities of TLE allowed to one State Party for temporary deployment, it is difficult to envision such a deployment that would have military significance.
MAINTAINING TLE AT MAXIMUM LEVELS
Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, in the Secretary of State's letter to the President recommending that he submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, he stated that the treaty ". . . will eliminate the enormous conventional forces disparity that has existed between the East and West since World War II." If the West does not exercise its right to maintain forces at the levels allowed for under the treaty, does this statement still hold true? I ask this question because it is becoming apparent that many Western countries, including the United States, may not maintain forces even at the levels agreed to by the Group of 16.
This is the most important part of my question. Assuming that the future-direction of a new Soviet Union will be settled one way or another in the next few years, isn't it important that the Group of 16 maintain forces at a level relatively equal to the treaty allotments?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ and Admiral JEREMIAH. While it would be preferable for all members of the group of 16 to maintain TLE at their maximum levels for holdings, fiscal realities preclude this optimum situation. However, it should be noted that, under the limits that are set forth in Article IV and Article VI of the treaty, the group of 16 can hold up to one-half of the TLE in the ATTU while the Soviet Union can hold less than one-third of the total TLE permitted by the treaty. Thus, the group of 16 can achieve parity with the Soviet Union, in a purely quantitative sense by maintaining force levels of only two-thirds of what their side is permited to have.
Additionally, we will continue to train and equip ground, air, and supporting naval forces for rapid deployment back to Europe if needed. We must retain the capability to reconstitute forces. This Base Force concept-forward deployed forces, backed up by a capability to reinforce (which could rapidly plus-up our forces in the ATTU to our treaty limits)-will give us the ability to respond to any adverse trends which might require a military response.
MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA DISCREPANCIES
Senator WA?TNER. Admiral Jeremiah, Gen. Colin Powell testified to the Senate Foreign Nations Committee that the return to the ATTU Zone of some 15,000 pieces of TLR-currently located east of the Urals would be "indeed militarily significant." General Powell was not asked for a minimum level of militarily Significant excess TLE in violation of the treaty limits, but he did testify that any single piece of equipment above the ceilings of the treaty should be "a violation of concern."
Do you agree with General Powell's characterization of 15,000 excess TLE returned to the ATTU Zone as militarily significant? Do the JCS believe an amount less than 15,000 excess TLE on the order of perhaps 10,000 items, could be considered militarily significant? In other words, what is the least amount the JCS believe might be militarily significant?
Admiral JEREMIAH. General Powell's judgment is that a militarily significant violation is one that could give the Soviets a discernible advantage to which NATO therefore would have to respond militarily. In making this assessment, we have to look at violations in an operational context and on a case by case basis. We look at operational capabilities and not just numbers of TLE. Equipment does not right wars; fully manned, reasonably trained, and adequately equipped and well led units right wars. Therefore, we need to understand the mobilization process. It is not just a matter of shifting equipment; the Soviets would also have to create and train units, map them up with their equipment, move those units forward into the ATTU an ultimately mass them in a threatening manner.
TLE IN THE ATTU ZONE
Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, in addition to equipment moved out of the ATTU, the Soviets significantly underreported the amount of TLE in the ATTU Zone at the time of signature. Some believe that a large amount of this TLE remains in the zone today. Since this equipment is already in the zone, what amount of such equipment would you consider militarily significant? Would a militarily significant amount be several thousand? Would it be 10,000? What amount?
Admiral JEREMIAH. The Chairman's rationale described in the question above, concerning what constitutes a militarily significant violation, applies equally to this question.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN
ESTIMATE OF EQUIPMENT
Senator MCCAIN. Please provide a detailed analysis of the current U.S. estimate of the equipment holdings of each signator to the CFE for each category covered by the treaty. List any discrepancy between the U.S. estimate, the official NATO futures and the estimates provided by the Soviet Union and other former Warsaw Pact countries.
Provide a detailed explanation of each discrepancy involving the Soviet Union, former Soviet republics, and former Warsaw Pact countries.
Mr. Wolfowitz. [Deleted.]
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN FORCE CUTS
Senator MCCAIN. Please provide a chronological analysis of all Soviet and East European force cuts, withdrawals, and redeployments affecting forces Covered by CFE since 1988. Indicate the size and disposal of the forces involved. In the case of Soviet forces, indicate the Soviet republic where forces or equipment has been moved.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. [Deleted.]
Senator MCCAIN. Provide a detailed explanation of each separate case where any Soviet equipment has been transferred to locations, units, or new designations that would remove that equipment from coverage under the CFE Treaty.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. (a) The June 14, 1991 politically binding statement made by the U.S.S.R. obligated them to reduce 14,500 additional pieces of TLE which had been moved out of the CFE Treaty's area of application shortly before its signature. To a considerable degree this statement resolved that transfer concern. The United States and other nations continue to work to resolve other transfer/data questions with the former U.S.S.R. in meetings of the Joint Consultative Group.
SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF CFE TREATY
Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's view of the Soviet violations of the CFE Treaty affecting the transfer of SS-23 missiles? What is its view of what this indicates regarding potential future violations of the CFE Treaty?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The CFE Treaty places limits on such conventional systems as tanks, ACVS, and combat aircraft. SS-23 missiles are not limited by the CFE Treaty; thus, any possible violation of the INF Treaty regarding SS-23 missiles is not linked to any potential future violation of the CFE Treaty.
MONITORING TLE EQUIPMENT
Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's overall capability to monitor the active and stored holdings of TLE equipment in each Soviet republic?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. [Deleted.]
DESTROYING SURPLUS EQUIPMENT
Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's estimate of Soviet capability to destroy or dispose of each type of surplus equipment?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. [Deleted.)
TREATY LIMITED EQUIPMENT
Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's estimate, by individual Soviet re- public, of the worse case result of non-compliance with the reporting provisions of the CFE Treaty? How would this affect individual equipment types?
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Attached is a breakout of treaty-limited equipment by Soviet Republic (encl. I). These holdings describe for the immediate future the scope of the worst case result of non-compliance. [Deleted.]
Enclosure 1. [Deleted.]
Attached is a breakout of Treaty Limited Equipment by the Soviet Republic (see previous question, encl. 1). These holdings describe for the immediate future the scope of the worst case result of non-compliance.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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