News

USIS Washington 
File

10 June 1998

TEXT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S REMARKS TO STIMSON CENTER JUNE 10

(Urges SFRC chairman Helms to bring CTBT before panel) (4230)



Washington -- Secretary of State Albright has again urged the US
Senate to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that would
ban all future nuclear tests.


But this time, she specifically urged Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina) "to bring
the CTBT before his Committee."


She made the appeal during a June 10 address to a Henry L. Stimson
Center conference in Washington.


Albright noted that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has been
the goal of all US Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower and has
"consistently commanded the support of no less than 70 percent of the
American people.


"Now more than ever," she said, "the CTBT is relevant to American
security and world peace."


On other matters, she expressed regret that Russia's Duma has voted to
postpone consideration of START II (the second phase Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty.) This, she noted, prevents any effort to move
forward with efforts to negotiate the third phase START III treaty,
which she says is still "a vital goal."


She also discussed other efforts to limit the spread of nuclear
weapons and fissile materials, stressed the need for the US Congress
to pass legislation implementing provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the need for "enforcement teeth" for the Biological
Weapons Convention.


She also scornfully noted that the "payoff" India and Pakistan got
from exploding nuclear devices was "mutual insecurity, decreased
prosperity, a harvest of fear at home and condemnation abroad. "They
really hit the jackpot, didn't they?" she asked.


Following is the State Department text, as prepared for delivery:



(begin text)



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Office of the Spokesman



Secretary's Remarks to Stimson Center



(As Prepared for Delivery)



June 10, 1998



Thank you, Michael, for that introduction and thank you all for being
here.


I especially want to recognize my friend Barry Blechman; my old
colleague Ambassador Bob Gallucci; Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, who earned
the world's gratitude during his years at UNSCOM; Professor
Goldemberg; members of the Nuclear Roundtable; excellencies from the
diplomatic community; friends from Capitol Hill; NGOs and the press.


There is such a wealth of experience, expertise and wisdom in this
room. It would take a cynic to ask why, if we're all so smart, the
world seems to be in such shaky condition.


Fortunately, none of us are cynics, but I think we all know we have
some hard issues with which to grapple. It is to that end I want to
address my remarks today. And there could not be a more appropriate
occasion on which to do so.


The Stimson Center is dedicated to the rigorous and nonpartisan
pursuit of knowledge. It focuses on the tough problems and the
difficult questions. And it does so in the spirit of Henry Stimson,
who served in the cabinet under four Presidents, two Republican and
two Democrat.


What I like most about Mr. Stimson's career is the precedent he set.
After serving as Secretary of War from 1911 to 1913, he returned to
the same job in 1940. So I figure that when I leave this great job as
Secretary of State -- after 27 years, I can come back.


I have a special place in my heart for Henry Stimson and all those who
led the Allies to victory in World War II. Their heroism altered my
life and brought me to live in this nation, whose leadership carried
the world through its darkest trials. Today, I am proud to say that
American leadership continues to shape events in every region on every
continent around the globe.


We exercise this leadership not out of sentiment, but out of
necessity. For we Americans want to live and we want our children to
live in peace, prosperity and freedom. But as we look ahead to the
21st century, we know we cannot guarantee these blessings for
ourselves if others do not have them as well.


In recent weeks, at commencement speeches at the University of
Maryland and the Coast Guard Academy, I have discussed steps we are
taking to sustain our prosperity and to help keep Americans safe from
international terror and crime.


Today, I want to set out the diplomatic framework guiding our efforts
to prevent the spread and limit the dangers of the world's deadliest
weapons.


In fulfilling this mission, diplomacy is an important, but not our
only, tool. When we negotiate arms control and nonproliferation
agreements, we hope others will act in good faith. But we never count
on this. We insist instead on the most thorough possible verification
measures. We exercise our treaty rights to the full. And we maintain
the world's strongest, best-prepared and best-equipped armed forces.


We pursue arms control because our citizens and military will be more
secure if certain weapons arc eliminated or at least kept out of the
wrong hands.


Consider, for example, that millions of Americans and Europeans sleep
safer every night because the START and INF Treaties have eliminated
thousands of Russian nuclear weapons.


Consider that Saddam Hussein has been kept in a strategic box because
UNSCOM has ferreted out and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction
capacity than was destroyed in the entire Gulf War.


Consider that 37,000 American troops in Korea are safer and Asia is
more stable because the Agreed Framework has frozen North Korea's
dangerous nuclear program.


And consider what the modern world would be like if poison gas and
deadly viruses were viewed as legitimate weapons.


Former Secretary of Defense William Perry had it right when he said
that effective arms control is "defense by other means."


Through the decades, we have served this goal through formal Treaties
such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons
Convention.


We have pursued agreements to limit the transfer of dangerous
technologies, while maintaining rigorous controls on our own exports.


We have developed early warning and detection capabilities -- which we
are always striving to improve.


We have backed fully the inspection activities of the IAEA and the UN
Special Commission.


And we have worked steadily to expand the circle of nations that abide
by the rules of nonproliferation, while not hesitating to expose and
confront those who cheat.


Especially in recent years, we have made great progress. More nations
in more parts of the world have been signing up and following through.
Increasingly, countries that had been contributing to the
proliferation problem are becoming part of its solution. More and
more, the understanding has spread that a world in which the most
dangerous weapons are under, not out of, control, will be more secure
for all.


Unfortunately, that understanding has not taken sufficient hold in
South Asia.


The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests dealt a blow to the
nonproliferation regime. But let me be clear. Those senseless blasts
beneath the ground do not, as some suggest, discredit that regime. To
the contrary, they illustrate its logic and its necessity.


Indian leaders, especially, predicted that the decision to test would
make their country more respected, more secure, and more firmly, in
control, of events in South Asia. Those leaders were wrong.


A month ago, India and Pakistan could look forward to improved
relations with the United States and other major powers; to steadily
increasing outside investment and beneficial trade; and to serious
consideration of their membership on the UN Security Council. Today,
those prospects have been demolished.


A month ago, the people of India and Pakistan were living -- as they
had lived for decades with bitter tensions over Kashmir. But those
tensions did not pose a clear and present danger to most of either
nation's population.


Today, both Indians and Pakistanis are less safe. In 1993, a
devastating earthquake claimed 20,000 lives in central India; it was
an unforgettable tragedy. But a nuclear exchange of even a limited
nature would kill not thousands, but millions. Depending on the winds,
even a unilateral attack could destroy untold lives on both sides of
the border.


For both nations, the strategic environment is now far more
complicated and grave. Both face the prospect of an arms race neither
can afford. Each faces the risk of nuclear missiles being pointed at
their cities. Neither can be confident it will have early warning of
what the other will do. And the risk of misinformation leading to
miscalculation leading to disaster is high.


For both India and Pakistan, then, this is the payoff for exploding a
nuclear device: mutual insecurity, decreased prosperity, a harvest of
fear at home and condemnation abroad. They really hit the jackpot,
didn't they?


Obviously, the nuclear tests cannot be undone. But the resulting risks
and disruptions can be minimized if cooler heads and clearer thinking
now prevail.


We hope that is beginning to occur. The rhetoric in New Delhi and
Islamabad seems to be quieting. Calls for renewing their bilateral
dialogue are increasing. And both sides say they have no present plans
for further nuclear tests. But these steps are nowhere near enough.


The world community is urging leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad to
forswear any future tests, and to refrain from deploying nuclear
weapons or from testing missiles capable of delivering them.


Further, we have called upon both countries to join the CTBT, without
conditions; to stop producing fissile material and join in negotiating
a worldwide pact; to refrain from deploying missiles; and to formalize
their pledges not to export any materials or technology that could be
used to build nuclear weapons or their delivery systems.


India and Pakistan should take such measures not as a favor to the
world community, but because it is in the security interests of each
to do so.


And in considering their next steps, they should realize that the NPT
will not be amended to include them as nuclear weapon states.


That is fundamental -- for the NPT is fundamental to nuclear
nonproliferation. A generation ago it was predicted the world would
have twenty to thirty nuclear states. No measure has done more than
the NPT to prevent that. If we were to allow India and Pakistan to
test their way to nuclear status under that agreement, we would create
an incentive for others to follow their misguided example.


Moreover, we would break faith with those countries -- such as South
Africa, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan -- that have understood the importance to their own
interests of forgoing the nuclear option.


The nuclear tests in South Asia present us with a fateful choice. Some
now say that nuclear nonproliferation is doomed, and the sooner we
accept that, the better off we'll be. Because a standard has been
violated, they would have us accept a world with no standards at all.


I say that is dangerous nonsense.



Efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons do not come with a
guarantee. But to abandon them because they have been dealt a setback
would be a felony against the future. And there are steps we can take
to regain the momentum we have lost.


Step one is to gain Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. For despite the South Asia tests, the CTBT remains essential
to our strategy to reduce the nuclear danger.


This Treaty has been a goal of U.S. Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower
and John Kennedy. If approved and enforced, it will arrest both the
development and the spread of new and more dangerous weapons. It has
been widely endorsed by our military and scientific leaders. And it
has consistently commanded the support of no less than seventy percent
of the American people.


Now more than ever, the CTBT is relevant to American security and
world peace.


Now more than ever, we need to get the Treaty's monitoring and
detection system up and running.


Now more than ever, we need to declare that testing is not smart, not
safe, not right and not legal.


Now more than ever, we need to demonstrate that the world has entered
a new era, in which the greatness of nations is measured not by how
much they can destroy, but by how much they can build.


So I ask the Senate, as the President has asked the Senate, "Do not
stall, do not delay; approve the CTBT." On this critical measure, at
this perilous time, American leadership should be unambiguous,
decisive and strong.


In particular, I urge Senator Helms to bring the CTBT before his
Committee. Examine it on the merits. And if the Chairman wants me to
testify, all he has to do is say the word and I'll be there.


Of course, our strategy for reducing the nuclear danger involves far
more than the test ban. We are working across the board to ensure that
the American people never again have to bear the costs and risks of a
nuclear arms race.


Many Americans assume our arms control relationship with Russia no
longer matters. But it does matter; it matters a lot.


For until we bring our nuclear arsenals and postures into line with
post-Cold War realities, each of us will be forced to maintain larger
arsenals at higher states of alert than would be ideal. And though we
are slicing apart weapons as fast as we can -- with START I
eliminations running two years ahead of schedule -- we cannot move
beyond START II until that Treaty is ratified.


All we can do is prepare the ground for START III negotiations with
preliminary experts' meetings to frame issues. That kind of planning
has begun; but planning is not enough.


Unfortunately, I must report that the Duma today voted to postpone
consideration of START II. I deeply regret that decision, and I hope
that the majority of the Russian legislature will come to understand
what its clearest thinkers already have -- which is that, in light of
the South Asia tests, START II ratification is now more urgent than
ever.


As President Yeltsin has said, START II is manifestly in Russia's
interest as well as our own. It will eliminate the deadliest weapons
ever pointed our way. And it will set the stage for START III cuts in
strategic arsenals to 80 percent below Cold War peaks.


That would be a remarkable achievement in its own right. It would also
provide further evidence that we are serious about meeting our NPT
commitment to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. That is
a worthy goal, embraced by Presidents of both parties -- including
President Clinton. But we cannot build that kind of world alone. And
sadly, it seems more distant today than only a month ago.


START III will be more than a sequel to START II. It will mark a major
qualitative as well as quantitative step forward. For the first time,
it will address destruction of warheads and bombs, not just the
missiles and planes that deliver them.


This past September, we completed the ABM Treaty succession and
demarcation agreements. The Senate will have every opportunity to
examine them closely when they are presented as a package with the
START II extension protocol.


Meanwhile, these accords will not impede our efforts to develop the
capable theater missile defenses we need. And we know that for Russian
strategic reductions to continue, the ABM Treaty must remain in place.


START III is a vital goal. As we pursue it, we will bear in mind the
need for strict verification, improved intelligence, and greater
transparency.


These advances, in turn, will give us a leg up on the "loose nukes"
problem that rightly worries us all.


We are working hard to keep the critical ingredients of nuclear
weapons -- plutonium and highly enriched uranium -- out of the wrong
hands. It is this fissile material, not the basic design information
for a nuclear device, that is the biggest hurdle facing those who seek
to build nuclear weapons.


That is why we are insisting that North Korea adhere to its
commitments under the Agreed Framework -- and why we are working so
hard with the Congress to ensure that we live up to ours.


That is why our strategy includes working with the New Independent
States to secure nuclear materials -- as we did in transporting HEU
out of Kazakhstan and Georgia to safe storage.


That is why it includes efforts, through the G-8 nuclear smuggling
program, to deal with excess plutonium and make cuts in nuclear
arsenals irreversible.


And that is why the Administration seeks more funding for
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs -- to keep Russian weapons and nuclear
materials secure, and atomic scientists engaged in their home
countries, not in business with rogue regimes.


We are pressing every country in the Conference on Disarmament to
begin negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. We are pleased
that India has now said it is willing to participate in these
negotiations. We believe Pakistan should follow suit.


I am also directing U.S. negotiators to conclude agreements by the
year 2000 to make "excess" U.S. and Russian plutonium permanently
unusable for weapons.


Finally, we should convene a conference this year to amend the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material -- to
increase accountability, enhance protections, and complement our
efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.


The nuclear menace has long been familiar to Americans. But other
dangers, no less real, confront us in the form of chemical,
biological, and destabilizing conventional weapons. Against these
threats, as well, our strategy is to employ a full-court press.


Last year, with bipartisan support from the Senate, America joined the
Chemical Weapons Convention as an original party. Other key countries,
such as Russia, Iran and Pakistan, have since joined, as well.


This year, we are asking Congress to approve legislation to implement
that Convention, and thereby make it harder for terrorists to concoct,
conceal, or conspire to use poison gas in our own country.


This measure is supported by U.S. industry and would bring us into
full compliance with the Convention. While moving forward with it,
Congress should not at the same time move backward by adding
provisions that are not consistent with the Convention and would
diminish its effectiveness.


The Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC, has stigmatized the use of
dread diseases as instruments of war. And its implementing legislation
has helped our law enforcement officials block attempts to acquire or
produce biological weapons.


But the BWC needs enforcement teeth if we are to have confidence it is
being respected around the world. Under President Clinton's
leadership, we have redoubled our efforts to negotiate a compliance
protocol in Geneva this year.


Ideological opponents of arms control say treaties lull us into a
false sense of security. But look at the facts. This Administration
has increased funding for defense against chemical weapons. And the
President has announced a plan to inoculate our troops against
biological threats.


Global conventions are not silver bullets that can stop terrorists in
their tracks. But they are a valuable tool, and we would be foolish
not to use them. For they make the terrorist's task harder and the law
enforcement job easier. They also heighten police and public awareness
-- which can lead to tips that foil plots and save lives.


This same problem-solving perspective informs the President's
initiative to enhance our readiness against unconventional threats. No
President has done more than Bill Clinton to recognize and rectify
potential U.S. vulnerabilities in this area.


Finally, let me address a subject whose inherent difficulties make it
more, not less, worthy of attention -- and that is conventional arms
control.


Legitimate exports of conventional arms can support our interests and
foreign policy goals. But in the wrong hands, such exports can
endanger our people and empower our adversaries.


A prime example is the growing threat to civil aviation posed by
shoulder-fired missiles. Today, I am calling for negotiation of an
international agreement to place tighter controls on the export of
these portable, easily concealed weapons.


I welcome the European Union's recent decision to adopt a Code of
Conduct for arms transfers, and will work to ensure better
coordination of out respective policies.


I also want to strengthen the Wassenaar Arrangement, which has not yet
reached its potential. We want that arrangement to be recognized as
the institution where responsible nations take practical steps to
prevent and address the dangers arising from irresponsible arms
exports.


Lastly, I am proposing that we broaden our efforts to crack down on
illicit firearms trafficking. Through the OAS, we have negotiated a
landmark agreement to combat such trafficking in our own hemisphere.
We are now pursuing a global agreement, which we aim to conclude by
1999.


One export control issue much in the news lately has been our policy
of sometimes allowing U.S. satellites to be launched by Chinese
rockets. This issue has been belabored elsewhere, so I will only touch
on it here.


As Secretary of State, I agree with my predecessors from both parties
that such launches can serve American interests. They create
incentives for China to help us stop the spread of missile and other
technology, bolster U.S. competitiveness, and help broadcast western
ideas and values into China.


To those who see this policy as a threat to U.S. security, I would
point out that the practice was initiated by President Reagan at a
time when China's record on proliferation was a good deal worse than
it is today.


These launches involve strictly commercial communications satellites.
All are subject to DOD safeguards to prevent the transfer of
technology that would improve China's missile capabilities, and all
are subject to full review and comment by the Department of State.


In closing, I want to say a word about how we forge arms control and
nonproliferation policies in the Executive Branch and in Congress.
Clearly, there is room for differences of opinion and debate about the
specifics of those policies. But it does seem to me that certain
truths are self-evident.


First, America is stronger and more effective when the Executive and
Legislative branches are working cooperatively, rather than at cross
purposes.


Second, the Administration and Congress need to reach a better
consensus on when, how, and for what purpose to employ the tool of
sanctions. For if sanctions are to work, they must be part of an
overall strategy. And they must provide sufficient flexibility for the
Executive, so that we are able to do good, not just feel good.


Third, we only have one President and Secretary of State at a time. If
they are to do their jobs for America, they need adequate resources,
tools and authority from Congress. But if Congress is to do its job,
it needs information and respect from the Executive.


This morning, I met with a number of Senators to discuss South Asia.
Before leaving for the Beijing Summit, I plan to meet with
Congressional leaders at the Department. I and other Administration
officials will continue to consult regularly.


Our purpose is to develop a stronger partnership on arms control with
our friends on Capitol Hill. This issue is critical to our security
and credibility around the world. We need to be speaking with one
voice, and acting with America's interests -- not partisan interests
-- firmly in mind.


Thirty-five years ago, in this city and on this day, John F. Kennedy
spoke memorably of the new face of war created by nuclear weapons and
of America's commitment both to the defense of freedom and to the
cause of peace.


In so doing, he rejected explicitly both the despair of those who
believed the nuclear danger could never be controlled, and the hopes
of those who placed their faith in "an infinite concept of universal
peace and good will."


He focused, instead, on the hard and practical job of building an
"attainable peace based not on a sudden revolution in human nature,
but on a gradual evolution in human institutions."


He predicted there would be "no single, simple key to this peace," but
rather, "it must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts
... dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenges of each new
generation."


Kennedy's words that day led to a partial ban on nuclear tests, a
measure quickly negotiated and quickly ratified, but only a
downpayment on the comprehensive treaty whose approval we now seek.


Since that day three and a half decades ago, we have learned again and
again that the pursuit of peace and security is a race never won; a
quest never over; a journey always underway.


Today, that journey is our responsibility.



Like Kennedy's generation, we must proceed stride by stride. We must
encourage the constructive involvement of nations from around the
world, including past adversaries.


We must use every tool of diplomacy and law we have available, while
maintaining both the capacity and the resolve to defend freedom.


We must have the vision to explore new avenues when familiar ones seem
closed.


And we must go forward with a will as great as our goal -- to build a
practical peace that will endure through the remaining years of this
century and fix into the next.


To that mission, I pledge my own full energy and commitment, and
respectfully solicit both your counsel and your support.


Thank you very much.



(end text)