ARTICLE V - MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE
Article V consists of four paragraphs that identify methods that the CTBT Organization may utilize to ensure compliance with the Treaty.
Paragraph 1 of Article V obligates the Conference to take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraph 2 (restriction or suspension of rights and privileges) and paragraph 3 (collective measures), to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of the Treaty. This paragraph requires the Conference, when taking such measures, to take into account, inter alia, any recommendations submitted by the Executive Council. The use of the phrase "inter alia" indicates that the Conference must also take into account other information brought to its attention. Paragraph 41 of Article II grants the Executive Council broad authority to consider and take action on concerns raised by States Parties about possible non-compliance with the Treaty. Thus, in addition to providing its recommendations to the Conference in accordance with subparagraph (c) of paragraph 41 of Article II, the Executive Council could also submit information to the Conference that it obtained through the IMS, formal or informal consultations with States Parties, or on-site inspections.
Paragraph 2 of Article V authorizes the Conference, inter alia, to restrict or suspend a State Party's rights and privileges under the Treaty if the State Party has failed to fulfill a request by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance with the Treaty. Note that, pursuant to paragraph 41 of Article II, the Executive Council may, as appropriate, require a State Party to fulfil its request within a specified time. This enables the Conference and the Executive Council, in a timely manner, to bring pressure to bear on a State Party that is suspected of non-compliance with the Treaty.
Paragraph 3 of Article V states that in cases where damage to the object and purpose of the Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of the Treaty, i.e., the prohibitions set forth in Article I, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures that are in conformity with international law. Thus, the Conference is given the power to recommend collective action by States Parties in cases of a serious breach of the Treaty.
Note that the Conference does not have the power to impose collective measures, only to recommend them. Note also that while the title of Article V refers to sanctions as an example of measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, this paragraph on collective measures, as well as the rest of the text of Article V, does not mention sanctions. However, it is understood that the term "collective measures" is intended to include, but is not limited to, sanctions.
Paragraph 4 of Article V authorizes the Conference, or if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, to bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the UN. Thus, unlike paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, this paragraph also empowers the Executive Council to take action when a situation is particularly urgent.
Negotiators recognized that requiring Conference action in such cases might result in considerable delay, due to practical problems associated with requesting and organizing a special meeting of the Conference. Empowering the Executive Council to submit the concern and relevant information and conclusions directly to the UN will better enable the UN to act in a timely manner. Note that the paragraph does not specifically identify the UN body to which the Conference or the Executive Council may bring a concern about non-compliance. It is anticipated that concerns about non-compliance with Article I would be brought to the attention of the UN Security Council, due to the serious nature of such concerns and the likely need for timely Security Council action. Nevertheless, the Conference or the Executive Council could choose to bring the matter to the attention of the General Assembly rather than the Security Council, or alternatively, to bring the matter to the attention of both the General Assembly and the Security Council.