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Letter of Submittal
Department of State,
Washington, September 20, 1997
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The President:
I have the honor to submit to you the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty (the Treaty, or CTBT), opened for signature at
New York on September 24, 1996, and signed by the United States
of America and 145 other countries to date.
The Treaty includes as integral parts, two Annexes and a
Protocol (on verification) with two Annexes. Accompanying this
Report for the information of the Senate, is an Article-by-Article analysis of the Treaty.
The President,
The White House.
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty represents the culmination of nearly four decades
of efforts, beginning during the Eisenhower Administration, to
ban completely all nuclear weapon test explosions, and any other
nuclear explosions, wherever they might be carried out. Since
1963, the carrying out of a nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, in outer space or
underwater has been prohibited by the Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
(the Partial or Limited Test-Ban Treaty, or LTBT), done at Moscow
August 5, 1963. More than 120 states are party to the LTBT, but
importantly two of the formally acknowledged nuclear weapon
states, China and France, are not. During the 1977-1980 time
frame, trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban were
carried out by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union. These negotiations reached an impasse over a
number of issues, including seismic monitoring. They continued
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in early December
1979 and were adjourned in November 1980.
In the decade that followed, efforts to explore the
verification needs for a comprehensive test ban were undertaken
by the Group of Scientific Experts, a group of the Conference on
Disarmament (the CD), while strong calls were made for
negotiations on a test ban by many non-nuclear weapon states. In
making their case for negotiation of a test ban, these non-nuclear weapon states repeatedly
referred to the preambular
expressions of support for continued negotiations on a test ban
contained in the LTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), done at Washington, London, and Moscow
July 1, 1968.
Since December 11, 1990, the United States and the Russian
Federation (as successor to the Soviet Union) have been legally
precluded from conducting nuclear explosions with yields greater
than 150 kilotons in the one environment to which the 1963 LTBT
was not applicable, beneath the surface of the earth, by the
Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests
(TTBT) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for
Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed on July 3, 1974 and May 28, 1976
respectively. Following signature of these Treaties and pending
their entry into force, the United States and the Soviet Union in
1976 each publicly stated its intention to observe the 150
kiloton limit, provided that the other did likewise. Following
agreement on new verification Protocols, the two Treaties were
ratified and entered into force on December 11, 1990.
The CTBT will prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions and
any other nuclear explosion, however small, and it does so in
each and every environment, without exception.
The text of the Treaty was negotiated in Geneva, between
January 1994 and August 1996, in the CD. Nearly all of the member
states of the CD, initially numbering 38, but subsequently
expanded to 61 in June 1996, participated actively in the
negotiations. On behalf of the United States, representatives of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of State,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Intelligence
Community, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the
Department of Energy all played important roles in the
development of the Treaty through participation in the
negotiations in Geneva and the development of policy in
Washington. Throughout the negotiating process, the United States
consulted and worked closely with its Western Allies in the CD,
as well as with Israel and with the non-Western nuclear weapon
state members of the CD, Russia and China.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
When the United States made the decision in mid-1993 actively
to pursue conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty it did so
in an environment, both international and domestic, significantly
different from that in which negotiations of a test ban had taken
place from 1977 to 1980. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and
the appreciation of the magnitude of the security threat posed by
the possible proliferation of states having nuclear weapon
capabilities fostered a new look at the impact a comprehensive
test-ban could have on constraining such threats. Additional
factors included the redress of the major imbalance in
conventional forces in Europe brought about by the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), -- done at
Paris December 19, 1990, which greatly reduced the levels of
tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack aircraft, and
helicopters, -- and the major reduction in the strategic forces
of the United States and the former Soviet Union resulting from
the START negotiations. Finally, it was determined that the
United States had no current military requirement for new-design
nuclear warhead production. Accordingly, the constraints of a
test ban could be accepted. In contrast to earlier comprehensive
test ban negotiations, all the negotiating parties were willing
to accept relatively intrusive verification measures, including
extensive in-country sensors and on-site inspections.
In addition, legislation was signed into law by President
Bush in 1992 that directed the United States to stop all testing
by September 30, 1996, provided no other state tested after that
date, and to engage in negotiations to achieve a comprehensive
test-ban by that date. In the meantime, the legislation
(sponsored by Senators Hatfield, Exon, and Mitchell) precluded
the expenditure of funds for more than 15 nuclear weapon tests
(including three for the United Kingdom) and permitted the
expenditure of appropriated funds for such tests only if they
were found by the Executive Branch to be necessary for the sole
purpose of maintaining the reliability and safety of the existing
nuclear weapon stockpile.
As regards the international climate that contributed to the
U.S. decision actively to support negotiation and conclusion of a
comprehensive test-ban, the then forthcoming 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the NPT focussed new light on the
importance of a comprehensive test-ban to the member states of
the NPT and to the continued viability of the nonproliferation
regime. The United States was deeply committed to the indefinite
and unconditional extension of the NPT, and it became clear that
a comprehensive test-ban could make a major contribution to
achievement of the NPT's permanent extension. The decision to
support a concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test-ban
was thus based on the careful assessment that any possible risks
were outweighed by the benefits to United States nonproliferation
and other security objectives in constraining the spread and
improvement of nuclear weapon capabilities. However, the U.S.
decision to pursue actively a comprehensive test-ban was
conditioned on having the capability to ensure a high level of
confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile
and to achieve an effective verification regime for the Treaty.
At the same time, the United States sought to ensure protection
of U.S. interests with respect to the scope, membership, and
termination provisions of the Treaty.
The negotiations in the CD continued throughout 1994, 1995,
and most of 1996. The CD was working to meet a target date for
signature of the Treaty in the fall of 1996 set by a United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution unanimously adopted in
December 1995. The objective was for the CD to forward the
agreed-upon text to a resumed 50th session of the UNGA, which
could then request the Secretary-General to open the Treaty for
signature. As the 1996 CD session drew close to an end it became
clear that one state, India, would block consensus action by the
CD to forward the text to the UNGA. The member states of the CD
that supported the text thereupon began to consider other means
by which the text that had resulted from the deliberations within
the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test-Ban might be
forwarded to the UN. Australia took the lead in its individual
capacity, not as a member of the CD, and formally requested that
the UNGA President convene a resumed session of the 50th General
Assembly for the purpose of considering and acting upon the text
of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At its resumed session the
General Assembly adopted the text of the Treaty by a vote of 158
to 3 with 5 abstentions. Thereafter the Secretary-General opened
the Treaty for signature on September 24, 1996. At the same time,
the Signatory States held a series of consultations regarding the
Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization that had been
developed at the CD. At a meeting of Signatory States of the
CTBT on November 19, 1996, the Signatory States, at that time
numbering 130, adopted by acclamation the Text, thereby
establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization.
This document provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory
Commission, which is the entity responsible for preparing
detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and for laying
the foundation for the operation of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the Organization) that is
established by the Treaty and will come into being once the
Treaty enters into force. The Text, which is relevant to but not
part of the Treaty, is enclosed for the information of the
Senate. On November 20, 1996, the Preparatory Commission
convened its first meeting (which was reconvened and concluded in
March 1997), and began the process of developing Rules of
Procedure, Financial Regulations, and other necessary measures
for the future operation of the Organization in implementing the
Treaty.
THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty consists of a
Preamble, 17 Articles, and two Annexes, as well as the Protocol
to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Verification
Protocol) having three Parts and two Annexes. The basic
obligations of the States Parties are set forth in Article I.
Specifically, each State Party undertakes: (a) not to carry out
any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
explosion; (b) to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion
at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and (c) to
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in
the carrying out of any such nuclear explosion by anyone else.
The prohibitions and undertakings thus apply to geographic areas
(i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or control of a State
Party), as well as to the activities of a State Party (e.g., the
carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion) wherever such activity might take place.
ORGANIZATIONAL BODIES
The Treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (the Organization, or CTBTO) located in Vienna,
Austria, as the body that is charged with achieving the object
and purpose of the Treaty and overseeing implementation of the
provisions of the Treaty and the international verification
system described in the Protocol to the CTBT. Each State Party
to the Treaty is a member of the Organization, which itself has
three organs: the Conference of the States Parties, the
Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.
The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference) is the
body responsible for overseeing implementation of the Treaty, the
activities of the Executive Council and the Technical
Secretariat, and the States Parties' compliance with the Treaty's
provisions. It is charged with considering and reviewing
scientific and technological developments that could affect the
operation of the Treaty, and with taking the necessary measures
to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to redress and remedy
any situation that contravenes the provisions of the Treaty.
The Executive Council is composed of 51 member states,
elected by the Conference of the States Parties. Annex 1 to the
Treaty assigns each potential State Party to one of six
geographical regions. Each region will present to the Conference
designations of States Parties for seats on the Executive
Council. Designations will be based, inter alia, on a State
Party's nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as well as
the number of monitoring facilities and financial contributions
to the Organization. The United States expects to serve
continuously on the Executive Council. The Executive
Council is the executive body of the Organization, responsible
for the supervision of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive
Council serves as the liaison with the National Authority of each
State Party, and carries out the preparatory and follow-up work
for sessions of the Conference. The Executive Council has
important functions with respect to verification and compliance:
it is directed to facilitate cooperation among the States Parties
through the exchange of information; to facilitate consultations
among States Parties; to receive, consider, and act on requests
for on-site inspections; and to take action on the reports of
such inspections. It may make recommendations to the Conference
based on the results of on-site inspections, or, if a case is
urgent, take a matter directly to the United Nations.
The Technical Secretariat is responsible, inter alia and most
importantly, for supervising the operation of the International
Monitoring System (the IMS), operating the International Data
Center (the IDC), and the conduct of on-site inspections. It is
headed by a Director-General, appointed by the Conference, who
will serve a four-year term and not more than two terms. Data
from the monitoring stations in the IMS is provided by States
directly or through their own national data centers, to
the IDC, where it is processed, analyzed and stored, and made
available to all States Parties. The IDC products that will be
made available to all States Parties at no cost include: standard
screened event bulletins, executive summaries of data acquired,
and integrated lists of all signals detected by the IMS.
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
In addition to the implementing organs established by the
Treaty itself, the Treaty requires each State Party to establish
a National Authority to serve as a focal point for liaison with
the Organization and with other States Parties. States Parties
are also expressly required to take the steps necessary to
prohibit natural and legal persons on their territory and natural
and legal persons in any other place under their jurisdiction or
control, from undertaking any activity that the State Party
itself is prohibited from undertaking. In addition, they are
required to prohibit their nationals from undertaking such
activities anywhere. These prohibitions complement the basic
obligation of each State Party under Article I to "prohibit and
prevent" nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction
or control.
VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
The verification regime established by the Treaty has four
separate but interdependent components: an international
monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The Protocol
to the Treaty contains the specific objectives, authorities,
functions, and requirements for the international monitoring
system, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures.
The Treaty also provides for the States Parties to take measures
necessary to ensure compliance and to redress a situation that
contravenes the Treaty, including the possibility of the
imposition of sanctions. In conjunction with States Parties'
obligations to provide data and accept on-site inspections,
provision is made for the protection of sensitive facilities and
confidential information and data provided by States Parties.
The Treaty also specifically recognizes States Parties' rights to
use information obtained by national technical means in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of international
law, including the respect for the sovereignty of states, for
purposes of verification generally, and in particular, as the
basis for an on-site inspection request.
Each State Party is required to maintain and operate, in
accordance with agreements or arrangements between it and the
Organization, those facilities for seismological, radionuclide,
hydroacoustical, and infrasound monitoring comprising the IMS, as
well as laboratories and related communication facilities, listed
in Annex 1 to the Protocol, located on its territory or for which
it is otherwise responsible. The Organization is also authorized
to enter into similar agreements or arrangements with states not
party to the Treaty as necessary.
For the purpose of clarifying whether a nuclear explosion has
been carried out in violation of the Treaty, each State Party has
the right to request an on-site inspection. Within specific time
frames an inspection request must be processed and referred to
the Executive Council, which must take action within 96 hours
from the time the request is first received. Approval of the
request requires at least 30 affirmative votes of the 51 members
of the Executive Council. If the request is approved, the
inspection team must arrive at the point of entry no more than
six days following the Executive Council's receipt of the
request. Following the inspection, an inspection report is
provided to all States Parties, and the Executive Council reviews
the report and must address any concerns expressed by a State
Party as to whether any non-compliance with the Treaty has
occurred and whether the right to request an on-site inspection
has been abused. If the Executive Council determines that
further action may be necessary, it may make recommendations to
the Conference on measures to redress the situation.
Recognizing that signals from non-nuclear explosions might
create ambiguities, the Treaty calls upon each State Party, on a
voluntary basis, to participate in a number of confidence-building measures, including the provision of information
relating to any chemical explosions using over 300 metric tons of
TNT-equivalent blasting material that it intends to carry out.
ENTRY INTO FORCE, DURATION, AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
TREATY
Annex 2 to the Treaty names the 44 states that are members of
the Conference on Disarmament and that are also listed in Table 1
of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of
"Nuclear Power Reactors in the World" or listed in Table I of the
IAEA's December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the
World." Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the Treaty,
these 44 states are those whose ratification is required for the
Treaty to enter into force. Once those states have ratified the
Treaty will enter into force 180 days following the deposit of
the last instrument of ratification by the 44, or two years after
September 24, 1996 (the date on which the Treaty was opened for
signature), whichever is later.
By virtue of this Article XIV provision, each of the 44 named
states could effectively block the entry into force of the
Treaty. The Treaty therefore provides that three years after the
opening of the Treaty for signature, if it has not yet entered
into force, a majority of the states that have deposited their
instruments of ratification can request the Secretary-General of
the United Nations (the designated Depositary for the Treaty) to
convene a conference to consider what measures, consistent with
international law, might be undertaken to accelerate the
ratification process in order to facilitate the Treaty's entry
into force. This conference would not, however, have the
authority to waive the requirement for ratification by the 44
designated states.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty
contains a "supreme interests" clause, in accordance with
which a State Party may withdraw from the Treaty upon six
month's notice to all the other States Parties, the Executive
Council, the Depositary, and the United Nations Security
Council, if it determines that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests. A State Party exercising this right is required to
provide, along with its notice of withdrawal, a statement of the
extraordinary event or events that it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.
RESERVATIONS AND AMENDMENTS
Reservations may not be taken to the Articles of the Treaty or
the Annexes to the Treaty. Reservations may be taken to the
Protocol and the Annexes thereto so long as they are not
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.
The procedures for amendment of the Treaty, the Protocol or the
Annexes to the Protocol provide that any State Party may propose
an amendment, which, if considered and adopted at an Amendment
Conference by a majority of States Parties and without a negative
vote by any State Party, shall enter into force for all States
Parties 30 days after deposit of an instrument of ratification or
acceptance by all those States Parties that voted for the
amendment at the Amendment Conference.
In addition, the Treaty provides that, for the purpose of
ensuring the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, the
Parties may make changes of an administrative or technical nature
to Part I (dealing with the International Monitoring System and
the International Data Center) and Part III (Confidence-Building
Measures) of the Protocol, as well as the Annexes to the
Protocol, in accordance with a separate procedure and without
going through the formal amendment process.
COSTS
The expenses of the Organization are to be borne by the
States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of
assessments, adjusted to take into account differences in
membership between the United Nations and the Organization. It
is anticipated that the United States share will be approximately
25 percent. The Treaty provides that each State Party
establishing or upgrading International Monitoring Facilities
(IMS) may reduce its annual assessed contribution by up to 50
percent pursuant to agreement with the Organization and, if
applicable, the state(s) on whose territory the facility is
based. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission are to be
divided in the same manner as the expenses of the Organization,
and provision is made for giving credit to States Parties for
their contribution to the Preparatory Commission as offsets
against their assessed contributions for the regular budget of
the Organization.
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
As noted above, the Treaty requires that each State Party
establish a National Authority that will function as its liaison
with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party
is required to inform the Organization of its National Authority
upon entry into force of the Treaty for it.
In order for the United States to ensure full compliance with
its obligations under the Treaty, implementing legislation will
be required. Such legislation will be submitted separately to
the Congress. In addition, any environmental documentation that
may be deemed appropriate will be forwarded separately to the
Senate for its information.
CONCLUSION
I believe that this Treaty, by banning all nuclear weapon
test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as described
above, and by establishing a comprehensive verification system to
monitor compliance and assist States Parties in making compliance
decisions, will significantly strengthen the national security of
the United States and its Allies and will contribute to global
and regional security as well. I therefore recommend that the
Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification at the earliest possible time.
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Respectfully submitted,
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT |
Enclosures: As stated.
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