CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE APRIL 1997


                                                        S. Hrg. 105-183
                       CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
=======================================================================
                                HEARINGS
                               BEFORE THE
                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                       ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                         Tuesday, April 8, 1997
                              a.m. session

Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald, former Secretary of Defense...............    13
    Prepared statement...........................................    19
Schlesinger, Hon. James R., former Secretary of Defense..........     5
    Letter Submitted by Hon. Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary 
      of Defense.................................................     5
Weinberger, Hon. Caspar, former Secretary of Defense.............     9


TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--A.M. SESSION U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas, Ashcroft, Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Robb, Feingold, Feinstein, and Wellstone. The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I believe it is customary to wait until there is at least one Senator from each party present. I would inquire of the minority counsel. Can you give us some advice as to whether Senator Biden would wish us to proceed? I might explain to our distinguished guests this morning-- and, as a matter of fact, everybody here is a distinguished guest as far as I am concerned--as I just said, it is a tradition, in this committee, at least, to have at least one Senator from each party present before the proceeding begins. Senator Biden is on a train coming in from Delaware, and I am seeking information as to whether it would be his wish that we proceed without him until he gets here. I am told that it is satisfactory with Senator Biden that we do proceed. As is obvious, this morning's hearing is the first of the Foreign Relations Committee's final round of testimony on the Chemical Weapons Convention, or that's right. I think it is fair to say that history is being made here this morning and I believe today is the first time that three distinguished, former U.S. Secretaries of Defense have ever appeared together before a Senate committee to oppose ratification of an arms control treaty. And if ever a treaty deserved such highly respected opposition, it is the dangerous and defective so-called Chemical Weapons Convention. This morning's witnesses include Hon. James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense for President Nixon, Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense for President Ford, and Hon. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan. Further, we will have testimony today in the form of a letter from Hon. Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the Bush administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precluded him from being here in person today. But he has asked Secretary Schlesinger to read into the record Secretary Cheney's strong opposition to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will consist of testimony by and from Defense Secretaries of every Republican administration since Richard Nixon, testimony that will counsel the Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously defective treaty. These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50--more than 50--generals, admirals, and senior officials from previous administrations have joined them in opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention, and if that does not send a clear signal on just how dangerous this treaty really is, I cannot imagine what would. So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your being here today to testify. I regret that we cannot offer you the pomp and circumstance of the Rose Garden ceremony last week, but our invitation to be there got lost in the mail somehow. Your testimony here today will convey to the American people highly respected assessments of this dangerous treaty. Now our precise purpose today is to examine the national security implications of the CWC which is important because the 105th Congress has 15 new Senators, including three new and able members of this committee who have never heard testimony on this treaty. The case against the treaty can be summarized quite simply, I think. It is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will not work. Otherwise, it is a fair treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention will do absolutely nothing to protect the American people from the dangers of chemical weapons. What it will do is increase rogue regimes' access to dangerous chemical agents and technology while imposing new regulations on American businesses, exposing them to increased danger of industrial espionage and trampling their constitutional rights. Outside of the Beltway, where people do not worship at the altar of arms control, that is what we call ``A bum deal.'' We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from the proponents of the treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from the face of the earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No supporter of this treaty can tell us with a straight face how this treaty will actually accomplish that goal. The best argument they have mustered to date is yes, it is defective, they say, but it is better than nothing. But, in fact, this treaty is worse than nothing for, on top of the problems with the CWC's verifiability and constitutionality, this treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that something is being done to reduce the dangers of chemical weaponry when, in fact, nothing-- nothing--is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the American people at greater risk. More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical weaponry have not ratified the CWC, and more than one-third of them have not even signed it. This includes almost all of the terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical weapons does threaten the United States, countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. Not one of them--not one of them--is a signatory to this treaty and none of them will be affected by it. Worse still, this treaty will increase access to dangerous chemical agents and technology to rogue states who do sign the treaty. Iran, for example, is one of the few nations on this earth ever to use chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory of the CWC. I am going to stop with the rest of my prepared statement today so that we can get to our witnesses, which is what you are here for. But I want to say, once more, that I ask the American people not to take my word for anything that I am saying. I ask the American people to consider the judgments of these distinguished former Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC. I am looking forward to hearing from them about the treaty's scope, verifiability, about its Articles X and XI, and the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the overall potential impact of this treaty on America's national security. That said, we turn to the witnesses. Secretary Schlesinger, we call on you first. [The prepared statement of The Chairman follows:] Prepared Statement of Chairman Helms This morning's hearing is the first of the Foreign Relations Committee's final round of testimony on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I think it is fair to say that history is being made this morning. I believe today is the first time that three distinguished former United States Secretaries of Defense have ever appeared together before a Senate committee to oppose ratification of an arms control treaty. And if ever a treaty deserved such highly respected opposition, it is the dangerous and defective Chemical Weapons Convention. This morning's witnesses include the Honorable James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense for President Nixon; the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense for President Ford; and the Honorable Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan. Further, we will have testimony today, in the form of a letter from the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the Bush Administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precludes him from being here in person today, but he has asked Secretary Schlesinger to read into the record Secretary Cheney's strong opposition to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will consist of testimony by and from defense secretaries of every Republican administration since Richard Nixon--testimony that will counsel the Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously defective treaty. These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50 generals, admirals, and senior officials from previous Administrations have joined them in opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention. If that doesn't send a clear signal of just how dangerous this treaty really is, I can't imagine what would. So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your being here today to testify. I regret we cannot offer you the pomp and circumstance of a Rose Garden ceremony, but your testimony here today will convey to the American people highly respected assessments of this dangerous treaty. Our precise purpose today is to examine the national security implications of the CWC. This is important because the 105th Congress has 15 new Senators, including three new and able members of this committee, who have never heard testimony on the treaty. The case against this treaty can be summarized quite simply: It is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will not work. The Chemical Weapons Convention will do nothing to protect the American people from the dangers of chemical weapons. What it will in fact do is increase rogue regimes' access to dangerous chemical agents and technology, while imposing new regulations on American businesses, exposing them to increased danger of industrial espionage, and trampling their Constitutional rights. Outside the beltway, where people don't worship at the altar of arms control, that's what we call a bum deal. We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from proponents of this treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from the face of the earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No supporter of this treaty can tell us, with a straight face, how this treaty will actually accomplish that goal. The best argument they have mustered to date is: Yes, it is defective, but it is better than nothing. But in fact, this treaty is much worse than nothing. For, on top of the problems with the CWC's verifiability and constitutionality, this treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that something is being done to reduce the dangers of chemical weapons, when in fact nothing is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the American people at greater risk. More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical weapons have not ratified the CWC, and more than one third of them have not even signed it. That includes almost all of the terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical weapons does threaten the United States-- countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. Not one of them is a signatory to this treaty. And none of them will be affected by it. Worse still, this treaty would increase access to dangerous chemical agents and technology by rogue states who do sign it. Iran, for example, is one of the few nations on the earth ever to use chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory to the CWC. Why, you may ask, why does Iran support the treaty? Because by joining the CWC, Iran can demand access to chemical technology of any other signatory nation--including the United States, if the U.S. Senate were to make the mistake of ratifying it. In other words, Iran will be entitled to chemical defensive gear and dangerous dual-use chemicals and technologies that will help them modernize their chemical weapons program. Giving U.S. assent to legalizing such transfers of chemical agents and technology to such rogue nations is pure folly, and will make the problem of chemical weapons more difficult to constrain, not less. For example, if the U.S. were to protest a planned sale of a chemical manufacturing facility by Russia to Iran, under the CWC Russia could argue that not only are they permitted to sell such dangerous chemical technology to Teheran, but they are obliged to do so--by a treaty the U.S. agreed to. Because Iran's terrorist leaders have promised to get rid of their chemical weapons. Is it possible for the United States to verify whether Iran will be complying with its treaty obligations? Of course not. Even the administration admits that this chemical weapons treaty is unverifiable. President Clinton's own Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, declared in testimony before this committee on June 23, 1994, that, and I quote, ``the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an intelligence perspective, that I cannot state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a small scale. So in other words, under this treaty, the American people will have to take the Ayatollahs' word for it. And what about Russia--the country possessing the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapons arsenal in the world? Russia has made perfectly clear it has no intention of eliminating its chemical weapons stockpile. In fact, Russia is already violating its bilateral agreement with the U.S. to get rid of these terrible weapons; It has consistently refused to come clean about the true size of its chemical weapons stockpile; and Russia continues to work on a new generation of nerve agents, disguised as everyday commercial or agricultural chemicals, specifically designed to circumvent this chemical weapons treaty that the Clinton Administration is pulling out all the stops to force the Senate to ratify. All this, sad to say, is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of what's wrong with this treaty. There is a whole array of other problems which I hope we can discuss today. But I think it borders on fraudulent to mislead the American people, as so many other treaty proponents have, into to believing that their lives will somehow be made safer if this treaty is ratified--and that their safety is being put at risk if the Senate refuses to be stampeded by Rose Garden ceremonies and high- pressure tactics. But I ask the American people not to take my word for it. I ask all Americans to consider the judgments of these distinguished former Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC. I am looking forward to hearing from them about the treaty's scope, verifiability, its Articles X and XI, and the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the overall potential impact of this treaty on America's national security. STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset, I will allow Secretary Cheney to join us vicariously. He has sent a letter, as you indicated, and I shall read it into the record. This letter is dated April 7, from Dallas, Texas. Hon. Jesse Helms, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your letter inviting me to join several other former Secretaries of Defense in testifying in early April when the Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Regrettably, other commitments will preclude me from participation. I hope that this correspondence will be sufficient to convey my views on this convention. During the years I served as Secretary of Defense, I was deeply concerned about the inherent unverifiability, lack of global coverage, and unenforceability of a convention that sought to ban production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. My misgivings on these scores have only intensified during the 4 years since I left the Pentagon. The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily concealed, and the international community's record of responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime would actually reduce the chemical threat. Indeed, some aspects of the present convention--notably its obligation to share with potential adversaries, like Iran, chemical manufacturing technology that can be used for military purposes and chemical defensive equipment--threaten to make this accord worse than having no treaty at all. In my judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare capabilities around the globe. Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC even if they do participate. In effect, the Senate is being asked to ratify the CWC even though it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable, and unenforceable. Having ratified the convention, we will then be told we have ``dealt with the problem of chemical weapons'' when, in fact, we have not. But ratification of the CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, totally unjustified given the flaws in the convention. I would urge the Senate to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention. Sincerely, Dick Cheney. The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank the committee for its invitation to testify today on the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I must at the outset underscore my belief that the proper criterion for judging the convention is whether or not it is in the interest of the United States and whether or not it will serve the long- run purposes of the American people. It should not be approved simply for reasons of diplomatic momentum or a gesture toward multilateralism, but as a treaty with which this Nation must live. Mr. Chairman, I start with the interesting and somewhat checkered history of efforts at the control of chemical weapons. The introduction of poison gas in World War I and then its widespread use in the later stages of that war led to a horrified reaction. That reaction, plus the unease concerning its subsequent use by colonial powers, led to the Geneva Convention in 1925, which forbids the use of poison gas by all signatories. In the period prior to World War II, the European powers carefully prepared for the possible use of poison gas. In the actual circumstances of the war, however, the German decision to refrain from using poison gas came not for humanitarian reasons, not for reasons of the treaty, which German diplomats might well have described as ``a scrap of paper,'' but out of concern for the threat of devastating retaliation by the Western allies. Iraq has been and is a signatory to the Geneva Convention. In the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's, Iraq used poison gas as a way of stemming the ``human wave'' attacks of the Iranians. What was our reaction and the reaction of other Western powers at that time? In brief, it was to avert our gaze. Later, as the war died down, Saddam Hussein used gas against Iraq's Kurds. This time, however, the response was slightly more vigorous. An international gathering took place in Paris in January 1989. Not only did the international community fail to denounce Iraq, most participants were reluctant even to name Iraq for using gas. Our own reaction, was to say the least, somewhat muted. After all, Iraq provided protection in the Gulf against the Ayatollah's Iran. For what were regarded as sound geopolitical reasons, we failed to take action to sustain the existing prohibition on the use of poison gas by a signatory--despite Iraq's blatant violation of the Geneva Convention. This manifest failure of the existing arms control regime did stimulate renewed efforts on the Chemical Weapons Convention that lies before you. Aha! Perhaps if we were unwilling to enforce the existing ban on the use of poison gas, we might be more willing to take strong actions against its manufacture. Would we actually do more in enforcement when the evidence is far more ambiguous and the menace more distant? The use of poison gas is readily detectable; manufacture is not. Tapes and photographs were widely available of Kurdish women clutching their children to their breasts in the vain attempt to protect them against the gas. And yet we did nothing--for then it was not regarded as in our interest to intervene. By contrast, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not use poison gas against our troops. In the famous letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein in early 1991 in which we demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, we reminded Saddam that the United States had nuclear weapons. As Secretary Baker has said, we also, ``made it very clear that if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons against U.S. forces, that the American people would demand vengeance and that we had the means to achieve it.'' What are the lessons learned from these episodes? Treaties alone will do little. To prevent the use or the manufacture of chemical weapons requires a structure for deterrence backed by real capabilities. Above all, enforcement will depend upon the will to take action which, if history is any guide, will in turn depend upon a careful geopolitical assessment. Mr. Chairman, let me turn from history to specific problems in this convention. In this brief statement, I can only deal with five problem areas. Nonetheless, I would hope that the members of this committee and your colleagues in the Senate receive clear reassurance in these areas before you approve the convention. First is non-lethal chemicals. Non-lethal chemicals are necessary for crowd control, for peacekeeping, for rescuing downed pilots and the like. In the negotiations on the convention, we were pressed to ban non-lethal chemicals along with lethal chemicals. President Bush, under pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated prior American policy and indicated that use of riot control agents would not be banned. The Clinton administration has been far more ambiguous on this subject, retreating from President Bush's stated exclusion. Sometime it has suggested that such agents could be used in peacetime but not in wartime. That raises the question of defining when the Nation is at war. Was the Vietnam War a war? Just 2 days ago, the New York Times stated that the administration ``has also refused to interpret the treaty in a way that would allow the use of tear gas for crowd control, mainly because the Pentagon has said it has no need to ever use non-lethal gases.'' If the latter is true, it represents a remarkable transformation of Pentagon attitudes, and I recommend that you check this out. The first part of the quotation reflects the continuing ambivalence of the administration on the question of non-lethal chemicals. I trust that the Senate will seek clarification of the administration's position and indeed insist that the use of tear gas will not be banned either in peace or war. Otherwise, we may wind up placing ourselves in the position of the Chinese Government in dealing with the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. The failure to use tear gas meant that that government only had recourse to the massive use of firepower to disperse the crowd. Second is sharing CW technology. Article X of the treaty requires that signatories have a right to acquire CW defensive technologies from other signatories. This may mean that the United States is obliged to share such technologies with Iran, Cuba, and other such nations that may sign the convention. Almost certainly that interpretation will be argued by lawyers in the government. But, even if the Senate were able to prevent such obligatory transfers, it is plain that Article X legitimizes such transfers by other industrial nations which will argue they are obliged to do so by the treaty. Clearly, that undercuts any sanctions directed against rogue nations that happen to sign the convention. And, in any event, there are still other states that do not agree with our judgments in these matters and will acquire such chemical warfare defensive technologies and will share such technologies with rogue nations whether signatories or not. Third is the defense against chemical weapons. Continued and vigorous efforts to develop chemical weapons defenses are required. In the years ahead, various groups, inclined to fanaticism, are likely to use chemical weapons as instruments of sabotage or terrorism. Aum Shin Rikyo, the Japanese religious cult, is but a prototype of these other terrorist groups. To deal with such prospective attacks, it is essential to have continuing efforts on defensive measures to protect our civilian population as well as our forces. In this connection, two points must be made. First, the illusion that this convention will provide protection against chemical weapons will tempt us to lower our guard and to reduce our efforts on defensive CW measures. Such temptations should be formally rejected through safeguards. Second, the sharing of technologies required by Article X will provide other nations with the information that will help to neutralize our chemical weapons defenses and, thus, expose us to greater risk. Fourth is industrial espionage. The convention permits or encourages challenge inspections against any facility deemed capable of producing chemical weapons--indeed against any facility. This exposes American companies to a degree to industrial espionage never before encountered in this country. This implies the possibility of the capture of proprietary information or national security information from American corporations by present or by prospective commercial rivals. To preclude such intrusive inspections requires the vote of three- quarters of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Such super majority votes are unlikely to be forthcoming and will grow less so over time. The committee may wish to inquire how FBI counter intelligence feels about these arrangements. Mr. Chairman, I trust that the committee will delve deeply into this issue because scuttlebutt has it that the White House has indicated to senior FBI officials that they are to say nothing against this treaty. Consequently, you may wish to examine not only present but former counter intelligence officers. The Chairman. We will. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger. This convention is sometimes compared to the arrangements under the Atoms for Peace Agreement. But it should be noted that few of the several mechanisms that provide protection in the nuclear area exist under this convention. Five is how do we respond to violations. Is the convention something more than a feel good treaty? Is it more meaningful than the more explicit and more relevant ban on use in the Geneva Convention? If so, what is its operational significance? Last April, Secretary Perry, reiterating some of the warnings of President Bush and Secretary Baker to Saddam Hussein stated, ``Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction against the United States or its allies must first consider the consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating.'' Administration officials have more recently reiterated that threat. Does this convention oblige us to take actions beyond attacks on ourselves or on our allies? Are we prepared to take action if Iran attacks Tajikistan or even uses gas against its own minorities? If Syria, or Saudi Arabia, or Israel, or South Africa manufactures gas, what are we prepared to do? What actions would we take if we discover that Russia, or Ukraine, or China is engaged clandestinely--or openly--in the manufacture of gas? As the leading world power and as the initial sponsor of this convention, the United States bears a particular responsibility for those signatories who have foregone the right of direct retaliation and who lack the American capacity for a response, both ``overwhelming and devastating.'' The role of the United States visibly transcends that of the Netherlands, or of Sweden, or of other nations that are prepared to sign the convention. I trust, therefore, that this committee will press for clear answers regarding how we might feel obliged to respond in different hypothetical circumstances. Mr. Chairman, as this committee proceeds with its deliberations, I trust that it will carefully examine some of the exaggerated or false claims that have been made on behalf of the convention. This treaty will not serve to banish the threat of chemical weapons. It will not aid in the fight against terrorism. Only effective police work will accomplish that. As the Japanese cult, Aum Shin Rikyo, has demonstrated, a significant volume of lethal nerve gas can be produced in a facility as small as 8 feet by 15 feet. Increasingly, are we aware how vulnerable this Nation may be to terrorist attacks, and this treaty will do little to limit such vulnerability. Nor will this treaty ``provide our children broad protection against the threat of chemical attacks.'' Such statements merely disguise and, thereby, increase our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. To the extent that others learn from international sharing of information on CW defenses, our vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished. Finally, this treaty in no way helps ``shield our soldiers from one of battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As indicated earlier, only the threat of effective retaliation provides such protection. That we would respond in the event of an attack on our troops has great credibility and, thus, serves as an effective deterrent. The Chemical Weapons Convention adds no more to this protection of our troops than did the Geneva Convention. Mr. Chairman, some treaty proponents, while conceding the lack of verifiability, the lack of broad enforceability, and the other inherent weaknesses of the convention, suggest that it should be ratified because whatever its weaknesses, it serves to establish ``international norms.'' If Senators are moved by that last ditch defense of the convention, they should vote for ratification. I urge, however, that Senators bear in mind that most nations do not care a figure for ``international norms,'' and we already have the Geneva Convention as a norm, regularly violated. And they remain relatively free to violate this norm with relative impunity since the treaty is difficult to verify and more difficult to enforce. Proponents have simply ignored the evidence of the past failure to control chemical weapons and have proceeded blithely with a renewed effort at control which disregards the ambiguity and the ineffectiveness of the control mechanism. In the rather forlorn hope to preclude the employment of chemical weapons, they have produced an agreement with an illusory goal and a rather gargantuan and worrisome enforcement mechanism. The manifold weaknesses of the proposed convention deserve careful attention from every member of the Senate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased later to respond to any questions the committee may have. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Weinberger. STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman and Senators, it is always an honor to appear before a committee of the U.S. Senate and I am deeply appreciative of that this morning. I think that both your Chairman's statement and Secretary Schlesinger's very impressive statement also, both together, set out the basic reasons why I think all of us on this Secretary of Defense panel feel so strongly that this treaty should not be ratified. I would like to make a couple of points at the beginning because it is the common practice now for opponents of anything that is desired by the White House to be painted in as unenviable a position as possible. I would like to make it clear that everybody I know detests chemical weapons, particularly soldiers. I have some small personal experiences I might share with you. They stem mainly from the fact of my extreme age. The fact is that, during World War II, I had been assigned to the Australian Anti-Gas School. The Australians used very spartan methods and very rigorous methods of instructing, and they instructed by showing us the actual effects on our own persons of mustard gas, a blister agent. They gave us all kinds of information with respect to the required defense and defensive equipment. I was then later appointed one of the gas defense officers to the 41st Infantry Division, conducted a lot of training with the soldiers in the gas protective equipment which, as anybody who served in the armed forces knows, is extremely difficult to operate in, and this leads, without any question whatever, to this detestation of these weapons. So people who oppose this treaty are not people who favor poison gas. I think it is important to make that rather obvious point at the beginning because we have heard so much about the motives of opponents of this treaty. My motive is the security of the United States, with which I had the honor to be associated for 7 years as Secretary, and which I think, as a country, should be maintained, even in the face of very strong support of a treaty which purports to outlaw and ban the production of these terrible weapons. Everybody likes the aims of the treaty. Everybody will admit, I think, that it is a well intentioned treaty. Everybody that I know including many of the proponents, admit that it is a very badly flawed treaty, and it is with those flaws that I am concerned today. Primarily the flaws, as Secretary Schlesinger just mentioned, are that it cannot be verified and it cannot be enforced. The enforcement mechanism involves going to the United Nations Security Council, of which Russia and China are members. It does not require a very big stretch of the imagination to indicate that they would probably veto any kind of enforcement action proposed against them. So you would have not only the lack of verifiability, you would have, very much like with the Geneva Convention, a very nice statement of the proper intentions of humankind which simply cannot be enforced and which basically, sadly, accomplish nothing. Now there has been a great deal of discussion also about the enforcement mechanisms, the international inspectors and what they can do and their powers. This is not just academic discussion, Mr. Chairman. These inspectors, under this treaty, under Articles X and XI, would have powers that basically American enforcement agents do not. Even the IRS and even the Department of Justice cannot wander around the country without search warrants and demand to see anything they want to see in thousands of factories. There are varying estimates of the number of factories and commercial plants involved, but they are all in the thousands. I won't attempt to say which one is right or wrong, but they are in the thousands. The treaty gives the right to these inspectors to see what they want to do, to make analyses and tests, and the other articles of the convention require that we share any late technologies we might develop--and we should be working on them; I hope we are; we always used to--defensive technologies to improve the masks, the protective equipment, and all of the other things. As we make some progress in this field, that would have to be shared and, therefore, would be, consequently, far less valuable, to put it mildly, in the event that any of our troops should be attacked with a gas attack. These inspections are a two-way street in some ways. We have the right of inspection under what I consider to be the worst appeasement agreement we have signed and that has been presented since Munich, and that is the North Korean Agreement under which we promised to give them two very large nuclear reactors which can produce plutonium--although it is always said not to worry, they can't. But, of course, they can. And we are permitted also to have all kinds of inspection under that appeasement agreement. We have not been granted this to the extent that we need it. What we are allowed is to go where North Korea wants us to go. It's exactly as with the agreement with Iraq that ended that war. We are permitted to go where the Iraqis let us go and after long delays in which they are given the opportunity to remove any incriminating kinds of evidence. That is one way that these inspections can work, and those would be probably the ways that countries like Iran, that have signed the agreement, would interpret it. But the permitted inspections and the way we would do it, because we carry out our word as a country and we do allow these things once we sign an agreement, would be as intrusive as anything previously imagined and far more intrusive than our own officials are allowed under our own laws to investigate violations of American law. Jim Schlesinger has covered very adequately and thoroughly the industrial espionage problems that are involved in this and in the sharing of these not only offensive, but defensive technologies that we may be working on. And it is important that we work on these defensive technologies because, even if all the countries sign this agreement, the possibilities that it would be treated as Geneva is always treated are always there. Indeed, we know that Iraq is stockpiling this VX nerve agent, which is a rather nasty piece of equipment, and Russia has been developing the nerve agent A-223, which is purported to be something like 7 times as fatal as the VX nerve agent. These are things that are going on now, after these treaties have been signed and while the whole discussion is there. The idea that these countries would give up these newly developed agents on which they spent a great deal of money, some of it, in Russia's case, our money that we sent over for economic development, does not seem to me to be very credible. The requirement that we share all of these technologies also would remove any kind of deterrent capability that we might have if we carry out the treaty in full. And one of the deterrent capabilities is retaliation. We have had many indications not only in World War II but in the Gulf and elsewhere, that the fact that we were spared a chemical attack there simply stems from the ability that we would have to retaliate. If we give up that retaliatory capability, along with all but four or five nations, the four or five nations would still not be nearly as worried about launching an attack as they were in the case of the Gulf War. We already know that there is at least a possibility. We don't know it and I would not claim it as a fact, but there is at least a possibility that Iraq's storage of these chemical weapons is resulting in disease and illness to American forces now. People talk about who is to blame and all of that. The only important issue, I think, there is that we should remember, and I hope we always will, that we have an absolute obligation to take care of these people who did fall ill from whatever cause in that war for the rest of their lives and take care of their families. I hope we are prepared to honor that. All of these are things that have happened with nations that have either signed or refused to sign the treaty. Iran is one that has signed. Iran, therefore, would be able to see and inspect any one of several thousand companies. They would have to share their technologies and we, as a country, would have to share our technologies with Iran. Strong supporters of the treaty, including General Schwarzkopf, when reminded of the fact, when asked if that is what he really wanted, said of course not. He said the worst thing in the world would be to share any knowledge with a country like Iran in this field. So there has been, I think, a lack of understanding, and I congratulate the committee on holding these hearings, because I hope that we can get a full understanding of how a well intentioned treaty, the goals of which everybody of course supports, cannot possibly reach those goals if we are going to have the kind of provisions that remain in this treaty. We also have a situation in which we are repeatedly told that the April 29 deadline must be met, otherwise we will have no influence in administering the treaty. Mr. Chairman, we are going to bear 25 percent of the cost of this treaty, and I suspect any 25 percent owner, so to speak, to use corporate terms, is going to have a little influence in it. I think that it is absurd to say that we must rush to judgment simply because April 29 is the deadline. There was plenty of opportunity last fall when the treaty was before the Senate, and was withdrawn by the administration, to have the kind of discussion that we are now having and that we should have. If it takes a little past April 29, and if by any chance we are able, through reservations or other changes, to make any of these things to which we object so strongly slightly more acceptable, that would certainly be worth a few days or a few months delay. The costs involved, of course, are not just the 25 percent of the costs of administering the treaty and of all of the inspections that we would find so intrusive and so violative of what we believe to be our constitutional rules against unreasonable search and seizure, seizing property without due process, and all the rest. We could add the $70 million that we have already given Russia under the so-called ``Bilateral Destruction Act'' to start destroying their weapons. And they have announced publicly and in writing--I guess it has been released; it's been printed all over the country--that they will no longer be bound by it, that it no longer serves their best interests and, therefore, they are not paying any more attention to it. They are a signatory of this Chemical Weapons Convention and they have been held up as a country that is essential to get into the international order and is willing to destroy these weapons. But certainly the record thus far is slightly less than modest. I think it is important that we emphasize again, as I did at the beginning, that our opposition to these kinds of weapons is well known. We were instrumental in getting the Geneva Agreement approved many, many years ago. We have signed the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which had a great deal of hope behind it, and practically no realization. And now Russia has walked away from it. We have showed that we would, of course, not only if we sign this convention comply with it, but that we would be a leader in financing it. All of that I think is an ample demonstration to the world, if any is needed, that we don't like these weapons. But we don't have to sign a flawed and an ineffective, unenforceable, unverifiable convention to prove that; and I don't think that we should worry so much about being tarred as being pro chemical weapons that we would disregard completely the flaws in this treaty and ratify it anyway just to make a statement. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much having had the opportunity to express these views before you and your committee, and as Secretary Schlesinger has said, I will be glad to try to answer questions at an appropriate time. The Chairman. We thank you, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld. STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to express concerns about this convention. Rather than read my entire statement, I would like to touch on some of the more important points, and I ask that my entire statement be included in the record. The Chairman. Without objection. Mr. Rumsfeld. Certainly, one of the most serious problems facing our country and our friends and allies around the world is, indeed, the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention before the Senate would appear to fit in that category. But in my view, it has serious flaws. I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this and, indeed, that a number of our friends and associates that we have worked with on these problems over the years find themselves on opposing sides. As a former Member, I also recall the difficulty of finding oneself in the position of opposing a position that is strongly supported by a President. It is not an attractive position to be in or a pleasant one. My inclination was always to try to support the President on these matters. Certainly in this case, being positioned as appearing to favor chemical weapons, is also not an appealing position. So let me be very clear: Were there pending before this committee a convention that was verifiable and global and that would accomplish the elimination of chemical weapons in the hands of nations most likely to use them, I would be appearing before the committee as a supporter. Unfortunately, I do not believe that it meets those tests. First, I don't believe that this is verifiable, nor have I met a single, knowledgeable person who believes that it is verifiable. It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in some countries, but it is debatable whether the treaty would reduce chemical arsenals in any of the nations potentially hostile to the United States. Countries identified by the United States as possessing chemical weapons that have not signed the CWC, let alone ratified it, include Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. Certainly these countries are among the most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens, our soldiers, and our allies. In addition, there are countries that might sign the convention which would not be reliable with respect to compliance. Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not a trivial problem, it seems to me. For example, even if Iran does ratify the agreement, we really cannot rely on them to comply with its terms. Also, it is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its obligations under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, as Secretary Weinberger pointed out. Also, Washington newspapers and Jane's have recently reported that the Russians have developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner that would make discovery next to impossible in that they are apparently comprised of common commercial chemicals. This raises the question as to the likelihood of their complying with the convention. As a Wall Street Journal article recently put it, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, members to the convention could look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the Netherlands but not in North Korea, Libya, or Iraq, which are countries that could be chemical warfare threats. Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the convention would result in real arms control accomplishments, nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the world to have standards and values, as Secretary Schlesinger mentioned. This is the ``speed limit'' argument. My friend, Dr. Kenneth Adelman, a former Director of ACDA, recently argued, supporting the agreement, that standards and values violated are better than no standards and values at all. I personally think that is probably the most persuasive case that can be made for the convention. However, I do not believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the scales. While standards and norms are important, there is a real risk that in ratifying the convention and in setting forth high standards, the U.S. would be misinforming the world by misleading people into believing that we had, in fact, done something with respect to the international controls over the use of chemical weapons, despite the certainty, in my mind, at least, that this convention cannot provide that assurance. Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only potential benefits of the convention, such as standards and norms, but also its burdens and costs. It seems to me clear that any advantages of setting forth such standards by ratifying the convention are more than offset by the disadvantages. I note that there would be considerable cost to the taxpayers in that the convention provides for the use of a U.N.-style funding formula, which calls for the United States to pay some 25 percent of the total. In addition, there would be costs to private industry, which I do not believe can be properly quantified at present in that it is not possible yet to know how the mechanisms to police this convention would actually work. This is to say nothing of the cost to companies of trying to protect proprietary information from compromise. These costs would amount, in a real sense, to unfunded mandates on American enterprise. These were among the concerns that were expressed by a number of government, civilian, and military officials in a letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott late last year, which I signed, and I ask that a copy of that letter and the signatories be placed in the record at this point. The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The information referred to follows:] September 9, 1996. Hon. Trent Lott, Majority Leader, United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510. Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with considerable experience in national security matters, we would all support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among others. The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S. aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then, given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected. The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned. The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable. Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however, is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime. What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens' constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000 companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that has been a key national security principle for the United States. Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and verifiable. Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m. Former Cabinet Members: Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September 10) John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10) Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense Additional Signatories (retired military): General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Aviation General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9) Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9) Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander, Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd Fleet (signed on September 10) Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Additional Signatories (non-military): Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (signed on September 9) Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on September 10) Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs, National Security Council Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on September 10) Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed on September 9) Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy, U.S. Department of Defense Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science and Technology Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security Council Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security Council Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy, Department of Commerce Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee) J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on September 10) Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in Iraqi affairs Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security Council Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing Staff, Department of State Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and Technology William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy Coordinator to the President Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy, Department of Commerce Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Mr. Rumsfeld. Over the coming days, the members of the committee and the Senate will be faced with two important questions relating to the convention. First is, can the Senate responsibly oppose the President on this important foreign policy issue? Second is, what will happen if the Senate does reject the treaty and the United States seemingly stands essentially alone in the world, ex- cept for the rogue states with whom we would be associated as non-signatories? Let me address those questions in order. First is the issue of not supporting the President. As I indicated, my inclination has always been to try to do that. However, we know the Constitution did not grant sole authority to the President of the United States in the area of foreign policy. Indeed, it does not provide for a simple majority to ratify a treaty but, rather, for a two-thirds vote, so that it would have to be almost beyond doubt that a given treaty is in our national security interest. So it is certainly within the right of the Senate to disagree. Also, not surprisingly, there have been a number of treaties, conventions, and agreements where the Senate has disagreed over our history. The second question, as to what might happen if the U.S. stands alone, is an important one and one that I suspect will be a principal focus of the debate over the coming days. One result of the Senate not ratifying the treaty will be, admittedly, expressions of concern by some of our friends and allies around the world that have. But I suspect there will be no smiles from the rogue states. And the world will be spared the deception which would follow ratification, because the world will not be led to have erroneously believed that the threat of chemical weapons has been effectively dealt with. I submit that we will be spared the complacency that Secretary Schlesinger mentioned, which I think would follow ratification. Further, small and medium sized companies will be spared the costs and the risks to their proprietary information which would result from U.S. participation. You know, big companies seem to get along just fine with big government. They get along with American government, they get along with foreign government, they get along with international organizations. They have the staying power, they have the resources to wait things out. They have the ability, with all their Washington representatives, to deal effectively with bureaucracies. Indeed, that talent and skill, that capability on the part of big companies actually serves as sort of a barrier to entry to small and medium sized companies that lack that capability. So I do not suggest for a minute that the large American companies are not going to be able to cope with these regulations. They are. They will do it a whale of a lot better than small and medium sized companies. But if you look at that opening round with the Department of Commerce's regulations and requirements, and having been a regulator in the Federal government at one point in my life, I know that if you start with this, you end up with this (indicating). It does not take long. That problem of regulation on small and medium sized companies literally sucks the energy out of those companies. They are not capable of waiting and finding out the answers to all those things. They are trying to make money. That is the area of our society where the energy, the vitality, and the creativity is. They are the ones who are creating jobs in our country--not the large companies, which have been downsizing for the most part. So the fact that a number of large companies are not concerned about this does not surprise me the all, I must say. What would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well, we did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had very different views as to what the appropriate relationship between the American people and their government ought to be than other countries did. Would we be abdicating leadership on this issue of chemical weapons and the threat by not ratifying, as some have argued? I say no. I think not. I say this because the threat of chemical weapons will remain despite the fact that this agreement gets ratified by a number of nations. And the world will--must--look to the United States for leadership in dealing with that threat. Because of our capacity, our resources, our knowledge, our credibility, we will retain a significant leadership role. So, despite the argument, the power of the argument, that the U.S. would be standing alone, I think the truth is that we have done it before and it has worked out rather well. Not every country has the ability to stand alone, but the U.S. is not just any country. With our resources, our weight, our capabilities, we can not only afford to provide leadership, but we have a special obligation to provide that kind of leadership and not just go along with the current diplomatic momentum. Because we are the United States, we have a singular responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such as this and then to set about the task of fashioning a better solution. Other countries look to us for that kind of behavior. I hope the Senate will decide to take its time and work to achieve the changes necessary to improve this in material ways. The proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to the reduce the chemical and biological weapons threat is a practical place to start. Mr. Chairman, I commend you and your committee for your efforts to give such careful consideration to the matter and I appreciate the opportunity of participating. Thank you very much. Prepared Statement of Donald Rumsfeld Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning. Let me say at the outset that I am not an expert on chemicals, nor am I a lawyer. I have been in and around the subject of Arms Control since my service in the Congress in the 1960s, as U.S. Ambassador to NATO during the early 1970s when we were working on MBFR and SALT, as well as my service in the Pentagon. So, I am here today not as an expert on chemicals or international law, but rather as one with a long interest in U.S. national security. One of the most serious problems facing the United States, our friends and allies, and indeed the world is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Surely among the most important treaties of the decades since World War II are those which effectively enhance U.S. national security by addressing this problem. The Chemical Weapons Convention now before the Senate would appear to fit in that category, but, in my view, it does not. I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this issue. Indeed, a number of the people many of us have worked with on these subjects over the years and respect, find themselves on opposing sides. Furthermore, as a former Member of the Congress, I well understand the difficulty in finding oneself in the position of opposing a treaty that the President of the United States strongly supports and that has such broad appeal. Being posi- tioned both as opposing our President and as favoring poison gas, which seems to be what happens to those who oppose this convention, is not an attractive position. Let me be clear. Were there pending before the Senate a convention that was verifiable and global and which would accomplish the elimination of chemical weapons in the hands of the nations most likely to use them, I would be appearing before this committee as a supporter, asserting that ratification would be in our national interest. Unfortunately, I do not believe this convention meets these tests. Interestingly, the preamble of the convention states in the first paragraph: ``The states parties to this convention * * *. Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction * * * .'' That is a goal that can only be described as monumentally ambitious. More to the point, it is not clear to me that that is today the agreed policy of the U.S. government or even that it is realistic. The history of mankind suggests that the achievement of ``complete disarmament'' is not a likely prospect, and the idea of ``strict and effective international controls'' to assure compliance with ``complete disarmament'' is, to put it mildly, a stretch. I do not believe that this convention is verifiable. Nor have I met or heard a single knowledgeable person who believes it is verifiable. The U.S. intelligence community has acknowledged in congressional testimony that we cannot have high confidence that violation of the CWC will be detected. It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in some countries. It is debatable, however, whether this treaty would reduce the chemical arsenals of any of the nations potentially hostile to the United States. Countries identified by the United States as possessing chemical weapons, that have not signed the CWC let alone ratified it, include Libya, Syria, Iraq and North Korea. Certainly, these countries are among the most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens, our soldiers and our allies. In addition there are countries that might well sign the convention, but which would not be reliable with respect to compliance. Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not a trivial problem. For example, even if Iran does ratify can we really rely on them to comply? Also, it is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its obligations under the 1990 U.S.-Russian bilateral destruction agreement. The Washington Times and Jane's have reported that the Russians have developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner which would make discovery next to impossible, in that they are comprised of common commercial chemicals. This raises the question as to the likelihood of their complying with this convention. It appears that this convention is proceeding in a way that it could conceivably disarm democratic, friendly, non aggressive nations, that either do not have chemical weapons, or if they have them would be most unlikely to use them against us, while it will not effectively apply to totalitarian, enemy and aggressive nations that would be most likely to use them against the U.S. and its allies. As a recent Wall Street Journal article put it, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, members to the convention could look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the Netherlands, but not in North Korea, Libya or Iraq-- countries which could be chemical warfare threats. Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the convention would result in real arms control accomplishments, nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the world to have standards and values. Dr. Kenneth Adelman, former director of ACDA, recently argued in supporting the agreement that ``standards and values violated are better than no standards or values at all.'' That is the most persuasive argument for the convention I have heard. However, I do not believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the scales. While standards are important, there is the real risk that in ratifying the convention and setting forth high standards, the U.S. would be misinforming the world by misleading people into believing that there were reasonable international controls over the use of chemical weapons, despite the certainty that this convention cannot provide that assurance. The use of various gases during World War I led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned first use of chemical weapons in war. Despite that high standard, that ban has not been observed, witness Iraq's use of such chemicals. Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only any potential benefits of the convention, but also its burdens and costs. It seems clear that any advantages of setting forth laudable standards and values by ratifying the convention are more than offset by the disadvantages. I note that there would be considerable cost to U.S. taxpayers in that the CWC provides for use of a U.N.-style funding formula, which as I recall bills the U.S. to pay some 25 percent of all costs. Personally, I think that percentage is too high and I cannot see why we would wish to extend it to still more international organizations. In addition, there would be costs to private industry, which I do not believe can be quantified at present, in that it is not possible to know yet how the mechanisms to police the convention would work. And this is to say nothing of the costs to companies of trying to protect proprietary information from compromise. These were among the concerns expressed by a number of former U.S. government civilian and military officials in a letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott late last year, which I signed. (I have attached a copy of the letter to my remarks, and ask that it be made a part of the record at this point.) [The letter referred to by Mr. Rumsfeld appears on page 15.] Other concerns expressed in the letter included: The risk that the convention would lead to the creation of a new U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy at great cost to the American taxpayers; that the CWC could undermine the standard of verifiability that had been a key national security principle for the U.S.; and that the convention could prevent the use of non-lethal riot control agents, to the disadvantage of U.S. forces. Over the coming days members of the committee and the Senate will be faced with two important questions. First, can the Senate responsibly oppose the President on this important foreign policy issue; and second, what will happen if the Senate does reject the treaty, and the U.S. seemingly stands essentially alone and apart in the world. Let me address those questions in order. First, is the issue of not supporting our President on a key foreign policy matter. As one, with a background in the executive branch, I begin with a strong preference to support the President on such matters. Indeed, I felt that pull even as a Member of Congress with Presidents of the other party. And I so voted. So that is my inclination. However, we know the Constitution did not grant the President sole responsibility in foreign affairs. Indeed, it provides not for a simple majority vote for the Senate to ratify a treaty, but a two-thirds vote, so that it would have to be beyond doubt that a given treaty is in the U.S. national security interest. So, it is not only well within the right of the Senate to disagree with a treaty as its best judgment may dictate, but it is its constitutional obligation. In exercising that responsibility, there have been a number of treaties, conventions, and international agreements that have not been approved by the U.S. Senate over our history, and in each case the sun came up the next day and the world did not end. The second question as to what might happen if the U.S. stands apart on this issue, is also an important one, and one which I suspect will be a principle focus of the debate over the coming days. One result of the Senate not ratifying this treaty will be expressions of concern by some of our friends, but there will likely be no smiles from the rogue states. Next, the world will be spared the deception which would follow ratification, because the world will not be led to believe erroneously that the threat of chemical weapons had been effectively dealt with, and the complacency which would follow. Further, small and medium sized U.S. companies will be spared the costs and the risks to their proprietary information which would result from U.S. participation. Big companies seem to get along well with big governments, foreign governments, and international organizations. They have the resources, the time, and the Washington representatives to work skillfully with governments. These capabilities of larger companies serve as an advantage over smaller companies, which lack the staying power and resources to cope with national and international regulations, inspections and the like. Next, U.S. taxpayers will be spared the cost of the convention. That is not a reason to reject it alone, but it is a fact. The U.S. would be spared the time and effort of implementing, complying with, and trying to enforce an agreement which in any event doesn't cover the nations most likely to use chemical weapons. So what would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well, we did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had very different views as to the appropriate relationship between the people and their government. Also, President Ronald Reagan did it with the Law of the Sea Treaty, notwithstanding the fact that most every nation in the world had signed that agreement. He did so because he found objectionable certain provisions relating to the seabed mining provisions. He refused to sign that treaty and asked me to serve as his Special Envoy to alert key countries of the dangers of going forward with that portion of the treaty. Would the U.S. be abdicating its leadership on this issue by not ratifying the convention, as some have argued? The answer is no. I say that because the problem of chemical weapons will remain despite this agreement, and the world will look to the U.S. for leadership in dealing with that serious threat. So despite the power of the argument that the U.S. would be standing alone, the truth is, we have done it before and it has worked out rather well. Not every country has the ability to stand alone. But the U.S. is not just any country. With our resources, our weight, our capabilities and our credibility the United States not only can afford to provide leadership, but it has a special obligation and ability to not just go along with what seems popular at the moment, but to stand up for what is right. Because we are the United States we have a singular responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such as this, and then set about the task of fashioning a better solution. I hope that the Senate will decide to take its time and work to achieve the changes necessary to improve it in material ways. The proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to reduce the chemical and biological weapons threat is a practical place to start. Mr. Chairman I commend you and your committee for your efforts to give the most careful consideration to this matter. I appreciate this opportunity to express my views and my concerns about the convention. Thank you. The Chairman. I thank all three of you. Senator Biden was necessarily detained because of the train this morning, and we were authorized to begin without him. So he missed his opportunity, as the ranking member, to make a statement. I would just say for perhaps his guidance that I took 14 minutes and he might want to consider that same neighborhood. Senator Biden. I will try to do less than that, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee for its indulgence and I would like the record to show that, although I am late, it will not add to the total time. Had I been here, I would have used the time. And the only manifest failure this morning that I have observed, to use Secretary Schlesinger's words, is the train schedule. That has been my most manifest failure this morning. I may reveal others as I speak, though. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a defining moment, not only for the United States but, quite frankly, for this committee and in your significant effort to reestablish this committee and its credibility and standing within the Congress. I think our failure to act on this treaty would be a reflection on us, as well as an extremely negative reflection on the United States' role internationally. Twelve years ago, the United States made a firm commitment to destroy 30,000 tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We had made that decision because these weapons no longer had any military value, according to our leaders. President Reagan also initiated an international effort aimed at forcing others to do what we already decided to do unilaterally. Through two Republican administrations, efforts to negotiate a chemical weapons treaty made slow, but steady, progress, and I would go back to that in a minute, but that was all part of that process. The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf War brought home the threat of poison and chemical weapons over 4 years ago. To set the record straight on that, as my friends I am sure know, in terms of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War, Secretary Weinberger alluded to the exposure of American troops to poison gas. That was part of an Iraqi stockpile we destroyed after the Gulf War. I am certain he realizes that there was nothing illegal under any law about stockpiling or producing chemical weapons. The Geneva Convention applies only to the use of poison gas in international conflict. The CWC, on the other hand, bans production and stockpiling of poison gas and would give significant justification in the eyes of the international community had we again discovered another nation was making or storing these weapons or had we used whatever force we chose to use against them. Second, with regard to the issue of the Gulf War, prior to the Gulf War, an example of Saddam Hussein using poison gas against the Kurds, which was alluded to here, is another reason why the CWC is needed, in my view. There is nothing illegal under the Geneva Convention about the use of poison gas in internal conflicts. The proscription applies only to international armed conflict, as I am sure the Secretary knows. So they didn't even violate the Geneva Convention. It is also true the international community failed to act. But you did not fail to act, Mr. Chairman. You led the effort here in the U.S. Senate with Senator Pell and we received a unanimous vote for a sanctions bill on September 1988 soon after this came to light. Unfortunately, the bill died at the end of the Congress, in large measure because of the opposition of the Reagan administration. Indeed, the Reagan State Department, then deluded into believing the United States could cooperate with Saddam Hussein, denounced the Senate bill that you pushed and you got through as premature. So I say that neither this Senator nor would others stand idly by if violations of the Geneva Convention were discovered. But I'm sure the Secretary knew that there was no violation of the Geneva Convention and the point he made was still a very valid one. That is, we did not act. We led the world to the altar, you might say, of attempting to deal with chemical weapons, and I am confident that we will not abandon 160 other nations, for, if we did, it seems to me we would send a signal of retreat, forfeit our leadership, and cripple our ability to forge coalitions against the gravest threats we face as a Nation, as Secretary Rumsfeld referred to. This is the proliferation of weapons, all weapons, of mass destruction. We have not even talked about biological weapons yet. I know that the witnesses this morning do not share my view that this treaty is in our vital national interest. And I know that and we have heard arguments that the treaty is flawed because several rogue states have not signed. We also heard that verification will be difficult and that the CWC will harm U.S. industry and that it will supposedly force us to transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and defenses to dangerous regimes. And, finally, maybe the most strenuous argument we have heard today is that we are going to be lulled into a false sense of security, that we are going to drop our guard. I hope to demonstrate through these hearings today, tomorrow, and the next day that those criticisms are incorrect and the problems they site will only get worse--get worse-- without CWC. From the military perspective, I believe this convention is clearly in our interest. I know that the witnesses do not agree with me. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense and the present Secretary of Defense, not represented here today, do agree with me. Harold Brown, William Perry, and Secretary of Defense Cohen all believe it is in our interest. There is a draft statement from Brown and Perry. It says, ``As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join former military leaders, including past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell, Vessey, Jones, Crowe, and former Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps plus combat veterans like Norman Schwarzkopf in offering our strong support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Treaty.'' I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of their statement be placed in the record in the interest of time, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Without objection. [The information referred to follows:] Draft Statement of Harold Brown and William Perry As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join former military leaders including past chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Generals Colin Powell, John Vessey, David Jones, and Admiral William Crowe, and former chiefs of staff from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, plus other combat veterans like General Norman Schwarzkopf, in offering our strong support for the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We firmly believe that U.S. ratification of the CWC will contribute significantly to the security interests of the United States and the safety of our armed forces. In conjunction with the Department of Defense's other efforts against chemical weapons proliferation, a robust chemical protection program and maintenance of a range of non- chemical response capabilities, the CWC will serve the best interests of the United States and the world community. In light of the decision under President Reagan to get rid of the vast majority of U.S. chemical weapons stockpiles, it is in our interests to require other nations to do the same. The access provided for by the treaty will enhance our ability to monitor world-wide CW activities. We believe the CWC, which was negotiated under Presidents Reagan and Bush and completed by President Bush, to be a carefully considered treaty that serves our national interests well. Failure to ratify the CWC would send a clear signal of U.S. retreat from international leadership to both our friends and to our potential adversaries and would damage our ability to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons. Senator Biden. As the authors of this statement note, every single Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since President Carter's administration has endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Last Friday, 17 distinguished retired military officers sent a letter to the President in which they endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The collection of signatures on this letter is quite impressive. If my colleagues will indulge me, let me just read a few: General Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Admiral Stanley Arthur, General Michael Duggan, General Charles Horner, General David Jones, General Wesley McDonald, General Meryl McPeak, General Carl Mundy, Admiral William Owens, General Gordon Sullivan, Vice Admiral Richard Truly, Admiral Stansfield Turner, General John Vessey, General Fred Warner, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. In this letter they wrote--and I will just read the first paragraph--the following. They say, ``As former members of the United States Armed Forces, we would like to express our strong support for Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This landmark treaty serves the national security interests of the United States.'' I will not read the rest of the letter, but I ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Without objection. [The information referred to follows:] April 3, 1997. The Honorable William J. Clinton, The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500. Dear Mr. President: As former members of the United States Armed Forces, we write to express our strong support for Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This landmark treaty serves the national security interests of the United States. Each of us can point to decades of military experience in command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defenses against them. We all recognize the limited military utility of these weapons, and supported President Bush's decision to renounce the use of an offensive chemical weapons capability and to unilaterally destroy U.S. stockpiles. The CWC simply mandates that other countries follow our lead. This is the primary contribution of the CWC: to destroy militarily-significant stockpiles of chemical weapons around the globe. We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical agents, presents a major national security threat to the U.S. The CWC cannot eliminate this threat, as terrorists and rogue states may still be able to evade the treaty's strict controls. However, the treaty does destroy existing stockpiles and improves our abilities to gather intelligence on emerging threats. These new intelligence tools deserve the Senate's support. On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security against chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust defense capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through the CWC or by unilateral action--to violators of the convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC. Officers who signed the April 3, 1997 letter to the President Admiral Stanley Arthur, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chief of Naval Operations General Michael Dugan, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Homer, USAF (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Space Command General David Jones, USAF (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Wesley McDonald, USN (Ret.), former CINC, Atlantic Command General Merrill McPeak, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret.), former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps Admiral William Owens, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Robert RisCassi, USA (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Forces Korea General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Central Command General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.), former Army Chief of Staff Admiral Richard Truly, USN (Ret.), former Director, NASA Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.), former Director of Central Intelligence General John Vessey, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Frederick Woemer, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Southern Command Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations Senator Biden. Now several of these signatories to the letter I have just read were present at a White House event early on Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from many walks of life joined together to call for early ratification of the treaty. I would like to ask unanimous consent that the text of the remarks made at this event be included in the record as well, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered. [The information referred to appears in the Appendix.] Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, the convention has won the endorsement of several highly respected veterans organizations as well. These include the Reserve Officers Association, the Vietnam Veterans Association, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., the American Ex-Prisoners of War, and I would ask unanimous consent that the statements by these organizations also be placed in the record. The Chairman. Without objection. [The information referred to appears in the Appendix.] Senator Biden. These individuals and organizations, none of whom can be characterized as soft headed or soft hearted, recognize the benefits of the convention for our front line soldiers, who increasingly face the risk of less discriminating and more treacherous weapons like poison gas. We should do the same. I would like to point out that I do not for a moment, nor do I know anybody else who does, question the patriotism, the integrity, or the distaste for poison gas or chemical weapons that is shared by our three most distinguished witnesses today. Anyone who would make such a statement is a damn fool. But the truth of the matter is we just have, as I say, a healthy disagreement among respected women and men about the value of this treaty for the United States. I think the value for those in favor far outweigh those opposed, but not in terms of their intellectual capability but in terms of their number. The argument that the treaty will be ineffective because several rogue states have not signed is, I find, equally perplexing. Today there is absolutely nothing illegal about the chemical weapons programs in these rogue states, and that will change once the CWC comes into force. At least it will be illegal. It will make such programs illegal. It will also provide us with a valuable tool--the moral suasion of the entire international community--to isolate and target those states who violate the norm which my friend, the former Secretary and head of more than one agency, believes--his view is that norms don't matter in international relations. I would like to have a talk with him, if we have more time, about the notion of norms and why I think they do matter. But at any rate, if you disagree and norms don't matter, then it doesn't matter. But most Americans and most people do agree that norms do matter. They do have some impact. They may not solve it all, but they have an impact. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify this afternoon has noted, to say that we should not try to make chemical weapons illegal because there will be cheaters is like saying we should not have laws because we know people are going to break them. Norms are created so that we have standards for civilized conduct by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the rogue countries to behave as free actors. Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight of the world community to take whatever actions are necessary to respond and to prevent them. I acknowledge that we will ultimately take only that action which we view to be in our national interest. We will ultimately take only that action we view to be in our national interest. When my friends were former Secretaries of Defense, they did not recommend actions taken when we knew countries were acting in ways that were beyond our interests without considering the global interest and the interest of the United States relative to other considerations. So I acknowledge that ultimately we will take action or not take action based on whether it is in our interest. Equally importantly, we will place our military might behind the world's threat to act against violators. The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the supposedly onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly intriguing to me. You see, I come from Delaware. If there is any state in the Union that has a greater interest in the chemical industry, I know of none. And I can assure you gentlemen, big or small--and they are both big and small--if they had a problem, I guarantee you I would hear about it. I promise you that I would after 24 years. You were a former member, Secretary Rumsfeld. Do you doubt that the industry would let me know? Do you doubt for one moment? I can tell you that not only do they support it--and, by the way, this impacts on half of Delaware's industrial output, these chemicals. It is one-half. Not only does industry support it, they strongly support it. And in terms of those small outfits, Secretary Rumsfeld may not be aware of this, but Dan Danner of the National Federation of Independent Businesses said the CWC will have no impact on their members. They are neutral on the treaty. Maybe he was unaware of that, but that is their position. What I have heard from the chemical industry is if you don't ratify this convention, the chemical industry, which is the country's largest exporter, stands to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in export earnings; because it would be subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into the treaty to target rogue states. We wrote it in. Now this will be the irony of all ironies. My State will get a kick in the teeth on something we wrote into a treaty, because we do not ratify the treaty. And Germany has already announced that, come April 29, sanctions are going to apply. In fact, we have heard that all non-members will be subject to those German sanctions. By the way, one of our largest competitors is Germany, as you might guess. So there is a little interest there. The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a classic case of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No arms control treaty is perfectly verifiable, and the CWC is no exception to the rule. While there are risks that a State party will hide some covert chemical weapons stockpiles or illegally produce chemical weapons, it will be much more difficult to engage in large scale violations that would pose the greatest danger to U.S. military forces. As one of our witnesses this afternoon, a former colleague of yours, Ambassador Kirkpatrick points out--though she did not mean to point it out this way--she said you know, don't worry about verification. We are going to have to do this verification anyway, even if there is no treaty. That is the point. That is the point. We have to do it anyway. And we can do it less well--less well--without the treaty than with the treaty. George Tenet, the Acting Director of CIA, said, ``In the absence of tools that the convention gives us, it will be much harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and policymakers of where we think we are in the world regarding these developments.'' The intelligence community sees benefits in us ratifying CWC. In addition, there may well be occasions in which on-site inspection will provide evidence of treaty violations. In other words, while we will not catch every violator, we will catch some, and that does act as a deterrent. And without CWC, we won't catch anybody. The allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of export controls on dangerous chemicals is based on a poor reading of the treaty, with all due respect. Article XI of the convention supports the chemical, trade, and technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under the convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this convention.'' The CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of the Australia Group controls which member states use to keep chemical and biological materials out of the hands of rogue states. The executive branch has said this time and again and so have our Australia Group allies. In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of repeating these assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is the decline and failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the gravest threat to the Australia Group, and failure to ratify the CWC would be seen by friend and foe alike as a retreat from that world leadership. Under that circumstance, State and chemical industries might indeed conclude that we should go back to helping the Iraqis and Libyans of the world to build their suspect chemical facilities. If one were to extrapolate the argument treaty opponents make, one would have to conclude that no matter what we do, the Australia Group is a dead letter because on April 29, those Australia Group countries that have joined the convention will be required to begin trading freely in dangerous chemicals, according to the argument made by the opponents. Obviously, this is as preposterous as it sounds. But it is a logical outgrowth of the allegation made by opponents. Finally, I would look forward to engaging the witnesses on their claim that the convention will lull us into a false sense of security. The Pentagon made it clear on numerous occasions that it will maintain a robust chemical capability supported by robust intelligence collection. The commitment to protecting our forces has the full support of the President and the Congress. In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms, assuming this treaty comes up, to a legally binding condition of the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense to insure that the U.S. forces are capable of carrying out our military missions regardless of any foreign threats or use of chemical weapons. Besides, our experience in other arms control agreements shows there is little chance of our becoming complacent about a chemical weapons threat if the CWC is ratified. I just would cite the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and not much more in the interest of time. Article X does not require the CWC defense assistance beyond antidotes and medical treatments. Does that really harm U.S. security? Isn't it a fair trade for getting those countries to forego chemical weapons? If other countries want to provide additional CWC defenses, as the Secretary indicates, how would the U.S. failure to ratify stop that in any way? You made your own argument. You said these guys are going to go out and do this anyway. Well, that's true. If they're going to do it, they're going to do it whether we are a signatory or not. Being a signatory in no way enhances that prospect. Industrial espionage is another question that I will not get into in the interest of time. But I notice that the chemical industry is not making that case, Secretary Rumsfeld, and we will have safeguards requiring the Secretary of Defense to maintain U.S. military capabilities to operate in chemical environments. The riot control agents is another subject that I would like to speak to, which I think we have taken care of. I thank the Chairman for allowing me to make my statement late, and I thank you gentlemen for listening. But then, what else could you do? [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:] Prepared Statement of Senator Biden Mr. Chairman, this is a defining moment in our foreign relations. In my view, the credibility and continued leadership of the United States on arms control and proliferation matters hangs in the balance. Twelve years ago the United States made a firm commitment to destroy the thirty thousand tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We made that decision because these weapons no longer had any military value. We also initiated a global effort aimed at forcing others to do what we had already decided to do unilaterally. Through two Republican administrations, efforts to negotiate the Chemical Weapons Treaty made slow but steady progress. The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf War again awakened us to the threat posed by chemical weapons. Over four years ago, Secretary of State Eagelburger signed the Chemical Weapons Treaty on behalf of the Bush Administration. Having led the world to the altar, I am confident that we will not abandon 160 other nations. For if we did, we would send a signal of retreat, forfeit our leadership, and cripple our ability to forge coalitions against the gravest threat we face as a nation--the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I know that the witnesses today do not share my view that this treaty is in our vital national interest. I know that we will hear arguments that the treaty is flawed because several rogue states have not signed. We will hear that verification will be difficult, that the CWC will harm U.S. industry, that it will supposedly force us to transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and defenses to dangerous regimes. Finally, perhaps their most strenuous argument will be that this treaty will lull us into a false sense of security and cause us to drop our guard. I hope to demonstrate today that these claims are incorrect and that the problems they cite will only get worse without the CWC. From the military perspective, I believe that this convention is clearly in our interest. I know that the witnesses may not agree with me in this regard. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense not represented here today do agree with me. These are Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and William Perry, Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton term. I ask unanimous consent that their statement be included in the record. As they note in their statement, every single Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff since President Carter's Administration has endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Last friday, 17 distinguished retired military officers sent a letter to the President in which they endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The collection of signatures on this letter is quite impressive. I would ask unanimous consent to place the text of this letter as well as an opinion piece by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in the record. Several of these signatories were present at a White House event on Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from many walks of life and both sides of the political fence joined together to call for early ratification of this treaty. I would ask unanimous consent that the text of the remarks made at this event be included in the record. The Convention has won the endorsement of several highly-respected veterans and military organizations as well. This list includes the Reserve Officers Association, the Vietnam Veterans Association, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., and The American Ex-prisoners of War. I would ask unanimous consent that statements by these organizations be placed in the record. These individuals and organizations--none of whom can be characterized as soft-headed or soft-hearted--recognize the benefits of this Convention for our front-line soldiers, who increasingly face the risk of less discriminating and more treacherous weapons like poison gas. We should do the same. Mr. Chairman, the argument that the treaty will be ineffective because several rogue states have not signed is equally perplexing to me. Today, there is absolutely nothing illegal under international or domestic law about the chemical weapons programs in these rogue states. That will change once the CWC enters into force. It will make such programs illegal. It will also provide us with a valuable tool--the weight of the entire international community to isolate and target those states that violate the norm set by this treaty. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify this afternoon, has noted--to say that we shouldn't try to make chemical weapons illegal because there will be cheaters, is like saying that we shouldn't have laws because people will break them. International norms of behavior are created so that we have standards of civilized conduct by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the rogue countries to behave as free actors. Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight of the world community to take whatever action is necessary to respond to, or prevent an adversary from using chemical weapons. Equally important, we will place our military might behind the world's threat to act against violators. The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the supposedly onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly interesting for me to hear. You see, coming from Delaware I know a thing or two about the chemical industry--which is the industry that will be most impacted by this treaty. The chemical industry accounts for over one-half of Delaware's industrial output. If the chemical industry had a problem with this treaty, I assure you that I would have been among the first to hear about it. Instead, what I have heard is that the chemical industry played a key role in negotiating the convention and is among its strongest supporters. What I have heard is that if we don't ratify this convention, the chemical industry, which is this country's largest exporter, stands to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in export earnings because it would be subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into the treaty to target rogue states. In fact, we have now heard that Germany has announced that it will impose trade restrictions on non- members come April 29. The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a classic case of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No arms control treaty is perfectly verifiable. The CWC is no exception to that rule. While there are risks that a state party will hide some covert chemical weapons stocks or illegally produce chemical weapons, it will be much more difficult to engage in large-scale violations that would pose the greatest danger to U.S. military forces. This is because of the CWC's extensive on-site inspection regime. George Tenet, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that: ``In the absence of the tools that the Convention gives to us, it will be much harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and policymakers of where we think we are in the world with regards to these developments.'' The intelligence community wants us to ratify CWC because it will give them additional tools to detect chemical weapon programs in other countries. And that is something we're going to have to do anyway. In addition, there may well be some occasions in which on-site inspection will produce evidence of treaty violations. In other words, while we may not catch every violator, we may well catch some--and that will lead to deterrence. And without the CWC, we won't catch anybody--because there will be no bar on countries producing and stockpiling those weapons. The allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of export controls on dangerous chemicals is based on a poor reading of the treaty text. Article Eleven of the Convention supports chemical trade and technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this convention.'' But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of the Australia group controls, which member states use to keep chemical and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our Australia group allies. In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of repeating those assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is the decline and failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the gravest threat to the Australia group. And failure to ratify the CWC would be seen by friend and foe alike as a U.S. retreat from world leadership in an area that is critical to global security. Under that circumstance, states with chemical industries might indeed conclude that they should go back to helping the Iraqs and Libyas Of the world to build suspect chemical facilities. If one were to extrapolate the arguments of treaty opponents, one would have to conclude that no matter what we do, the Australia group is a dead letter. Because on April 29 those Australia group countries that have joined the Convention will be required to begin trading freely in dangerous chemicals according to the argument made by opponents. Obviously, this argument is as preposterous as it sounds, but it is the logical outgrowth of the allegation made by the opponents. Finally, I look forward to engaging our witnesses on their claim that this Convention will lull us into a false sense of security. The Pentagon has made it clear on numerous occasions that it will maintain a robust chemical defense capability supported by robust intelligence collection. The commitment to protecting our forces has the full support of the President and the Congress and I believe strongly that no future Administration or Congress will abandon our solemn responsibility to our troops in this regard. In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms to add a legally binding condition to the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out military missions regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. Besides, our experience with other arms control agreements shows that there is little chance of our becoming complacent about the chemical weapon threat if the CWC is ratified. For example, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was signed twenty-five years ago, yet we are continually vigilant on the threat of nuclear proliferation. As for defenses against poison gas--troop protection and decontamination training is a function of congressional funding. That equipment and that training will not go away unless Congress lets it go away. I certainly won't allow it, and I don't think my colleagues on the other committees of jurisdiction or on side of this issue will either. I am concerned that the opponents solution to the perceived problem of being lulled to sleep is to allow the threat of chemical weapons to grow even worse. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to a frank and open exchange with our witnesses. I hope that the hearing today moves us one step closer to action on this critical treaty before the impending deadline. Thank you. The Chairman. You didn't take but 18.5 minutes. Senator Biden. Well, then I will forego my questions, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Oh, no, no. You are always very impressive, I will say, one way or another. The Chairman. Since we are playing a name game, Trent Lott got a letter the other day, signed by a few military people, such as Dick Cheney, Bill Clark, Alexander Haig, John S. Herrington, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Edwin Meese, Donald Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger, General Voss, Vice Admiral William Houser, General Kelley of the Marine Corps, General Thomas Kelly of the Army, Admiral Wesley McDonald--is that enough? Senator Biden. That's pretty good, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. OK. We have about 75 other signatories. Without objection, we will put that in the record. [The letter referred to by Chairman Helms appears on page 15.] Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, this is not fair to do, but two of the guys you named changed their mind and signed a letter on April 3 saying that they are for the treaty. Oh, they changed their mind after they signed that. Oh, gosh, all right. There are a lot of guys changing their minds around here these days. Maybe we can change your mind, too. The Chairman. That will be the day. You won't change my mind about this statement made repeatedly about the Reagan Administration, which is not for this treaty. Think about Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, Bill Clark, Ed Meese, Richard Perle, Dick Adams, and on down the list. In fact, I know of no one on the Reagan team, as it is known, who is in favor of it. Sadly, nobody can ask the President himself, President Reagan, how he feels about it. I understand that several Senators are going to return so that they can have their time. We have agreed that 5 minutes for the first round may be the course of wisdom. Secretary Rumsfeld, you served for many years as Chairman and CEO of G.D. Searle and Company, which is, I believe, a large, multilateral pharmaceutical business. You have had quite a bit of experience and expertise in dealing with government regulations, to which you referred. In your expert opinion, why would the Chemical Manufacturers Association be so aggressive in supporting the treaty when I have this many letters (indicating) from chemical companies saying it is a bad treaty and please do not approve it? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I cannot climb into the minds of the executives of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Senator, but certainly an industry like that has, as Senator Biden has indicated, an opportunity to increase the number of chemicals they can export if this treaty is passed. At the present time, a number of chemicals are not permitted for export, which would be made permissible for export by this convention. So it is in their interest to have it passed in that regard. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Rumsfeld. Second, I am not an expert on the association, but certainly they represent the big companies. They don't represent the medium sized and small companies. Senator Biden has said he does not doubt that he would be hearing from small companies if there were a problem. I suspect if this passes he will hear from them. I don't believe that the thousands, whatever the number is, of companies across this country know about this treaty in any detail, believe that the treaty would apply to them, understand that they could be subjected to inspections, appreciate the unfunded mandates that would be imposed on them in the event this treaty were to be ratified. I might just point out that the Aerospace Industries Association has stated its strong concern about the treaty, and I hope that since they have said that they have not changed their mind. But you never know. But they have said it would unnecessarily jeopardize our Nation's ability to protect its national security information and proprietary technological data. I was told yesterday by an individual who is knowledgeable that the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, for example, personnel from there were involved in one of the mock inspections conducted by the U.S. government. They evaluated the inspection results and some weeks later, from outside the facility, using modern technology, were capable of coming away with classified information and proprietary information from the inspection. So I don't think that it would be wise for us to underestimate the risk that would exist to classified information, to a company's proprietary information. There is a third problem. Most of us in business are engaged with joint ventures and partnerships with companies across the globe. We share proprietary information in the same facility. Were these inspections imposed, it is entirely possible that not only your own proprietary information could be compromised but also the proprietary information of joint venture partners to whom you have promised not to permit their proprietary information to be shared. Even cereal companies close their doors and do not allow people to walk through the plant. Why? They don't have classified information. What they have is process information, and the idea of photography or samples leaving their factory would unquestionably concern them deeply. The Chairman. I thank you. My time is up. Without objection, I am going to ask that the letters from industry in opposition to treaty ratification be made a part of this record. [The information referred to appears in the appendix.] The Chairman. I don't have but 30 seconds left, so I will turn to the distinguished Senator from Delaware. I was just handed an interesting little comment that I will say to all of you. One of the letters that I have is from the company which makes the ink for the dollar bill. They are frightened that foreign inspections under the CWC would give counterfeiters some advantage. Mr. Rumsfeld. They are probably incorporated in Delaware. Senator Biden. I hope so. That accounts for the other 50 percent of our business. Actually, that's not true. Chickens are bigger. Dr. Schlesinger. They are incorporated in Virginia and the letter was sent to Charles Robb. Senator Biden. Thank you. Gentlemen, obviously because of the time I am not going to be able to ask you all that I want to, though I am sure my colleagues will do a better job at it than I would. Let me ask you about a few things you have mentioned here and about conditions that have been tentatively agreed to, conditions added to the treaty that have been tentatively agreed to by Senator Helms and me--speaking only for me and not for any other member of the Democratic Caucus or the Republican Caucus. One of the criticisms was that this is unenforceable, this treaty. And one of the conditions we have tentatively agreed on is that the President would be required to consult with the Senate if the treaty is being violated. The President would be required to report to us on what was being done by way of inspections, diplomacy, and sanctions to respond to the violation. And if the violations were to persist for one year, the President would have to come back to the Senate and ask the Senate to decide if we should continue to adhere to the treaty or not. He would have an affirmative obligation. My question is, does this condition in any way, do you view it as positive, not whether it cures the problems of the treaty, but do you consider it a positive condition? Dr. Schlesinger. I think it is a positive condition. Mr. Weinberger. I would suggest, however, that we might want to look very carefully at the content of the report that the President makes to the Senate and see if it, in fact, is as accurate as it should be. Senator Biden. I think that is a valid concern and a valid point raised. There is another condition that we have tentatively agreed on. In response to a piece, an op-ed piece done by you distinguished gentlemen, you said, on March 5, that if the United States is not a CWC member State, the danger is lessened that American intelligence about ongoing chemical weapons operations will be ``dumbed down'' or otherwise compromised. In order to address that concern, Senator Helms and I have agreed to a condition requiring periodic reports and prompt notice to the Congress about chemical weapons programs around the world and the status of CWC compliance. The executive branch would also be required to offer briefings on these issues. This condition would give Congress an active role in advising the President in regard to insuring compliance. The information would be before the Congress and it would be incumbent upon us to review it and define, if we disagreed, when violations were taking place. My question is does this in any way go toward alleviating the concern about dumbing down? Dr. Schlesinger. Well, it helps in some ways and it adds to the problem in others. As you know, there is a proclivity of the executive branch, when it wants to avoid action, to ignore or to dumb down violations by others. There is a long history of this. I need not repeat it. Senator Biden. I'm aware of that. Dr. Schlesinger. You referred to the Iraq case yourself. Senator Biden. Now the other question that several of you have indicated in written material in the past was without a commitment of billions of U.S. aid to pay for destruction of Russia's vast arsenal, they will not comply with this treaty. Senator Helms and I have agreed to a condition to a resolution of ratification in an attempt to address this issue. Our condition states: The United States will not accept any Russian effort to condition its ratification upon the U.S. providing guarantees to pay for implementation. Let me ask you this. Does this in any way help in that problem, although I find it kind of strange? It's like the argument about why the Nunn-Lugar legislation was a bad idea-- this is not an argu- ment on your part, but some here have argued that it was a bad idea because we were paying money to the Russians to destroy nuclear weapons. I always found that an interesting argument, and I don't know why it would be such a bad idea to help destroy their chemical weapons, either. At any rate, we have a condition that says that that can be no condition of ratification. Is that a useful or a destructive addition to this treaty? Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is useful, Senator. It does, however, underscore a fundamental problem that we have in that the bilateral destruction agreement was the foundation for the Chemical Weapons Convention and that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has now said that agreement has outlived its usefulness. That is worrisome. Senator Biden. As you will recall--and this will obviously be my last comment--as you will recall, the reason for that treaty was to prompt this treaty. You will remember that. Second, we did not ratify the treaty nor did they ratify the treaty. Anyway, thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. The Chairman. Before I recognize Senator Lugar, let me say that the distinguished ranking member, Joe Biden, and I have spent several hours together trying to work on details, and we have agreed on about 21 relatively minor defects in the treaty. There are 5 or 6 major things yet to be considered, and the administration up till now--not Joe Biden, but the administration--is stonewalling considering even those defects. Senator Lugar. Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you and members of the committee in welcoming witnesses this morning who are good public servants and personal friends of many of us on this committee. I have listened to their testimony and I have studied the op-ed which they wrote for the Washington Post last month. I believe their contribution was well written, but, at least for me, it was unpersuasive. Critics of the convention often speak as if the concerns they are expressing are being heard almost for the first time and that members of the committee have now taken these issues into account in developing the resolution of ratification. The critics may not be familiar with the resolution of ratification that we passed out of this committee by a vote of 13 to 5 last year or the ongoing negotiations on the ratification issue this year which the Chairman just cited. The resolution is precisely the vehicle through which these matters of interpretation are taken up and conditions added to conform to U.S. domestic law. Instead of working these complex interpretation issues, many critics are repeating many of the same arguments that we have dealt with. I would say, for example, that we are treated to the so- called complacency argument; that is, United States ratification of the CWC will lull the country into a false sense of security and a tendency to neglect its defenses. But this is surely a matter of political will here at home. It has nothing to do with the treaty. There is nothing inevitable about arms control agreements contributing to lessening a perceived need and, therefore, support for defense against such threats. But there is something wrong with the notion that by allowing our potential adversaries to have a chemical weapon situation without norms and international law, that we are sure to be reminded to defend ourselves against them. Rather than whining about complacency, Congress ought to do its job: Authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to provide for a robust chemical defense capability. In addition, Congress has every ability to add or to shift funds to ensure that CWC monitoring remains a priority. Second, we are treated again to the so-called poisons for peace argument; namely, the CWC will obligate member states to facilitate transfers of CWC specific technology, equipment and material to member states of the convention. Further, they charge the treaty commits new member states not to observe any agreements that would obstruct these transfers. That is the Iranian interpretation of Article XI. The United States and others rejected that argument and maintain that interpretation of Article XI did not require them to do so, that mechanisms such as the Australian Group are legitimate under the CWC, and the work of the Australian Group will continue. The resolution of ratification clarifies the American interpretation. The U.S. preserves the right to maintain or impose export controls for foreign policy or national security reasons. But nothing in the convention obligates the United States to accept any weakening of existing national export controls and that the export control and nonproliferation measures the Australian Group has undertaken are fully consistent with all requirements of the CWC. If, as critics state, the CWC would likely leave the United States more and not less vulnerable to chemical attack, then the blame again resides with political leaders in the United States, not with the convention. The treaty in no way constrains our ability as a nation to provide for a robust defense against chemical weapons or to impose and maintain export controls. Third, we are told that if the U.S. is a CWC participant, American intelligence is in danger of being dumbed down or compromised. Again, any dumbing down of intelligence has nothing to do with the convention. It has to do, once again, with political will. We quite predictably get, then, a charge on the Constitution made by critics that U.S. participation could leave U.S. citizens and companies vulnerable to burdens associated with reporting and inspection arrangements and to jeopardizing confidential business information. The critics pose as protectors of American industry, but industry has spoken for itself. U.S. industry would not support the CWC if it posed significant risks to confidential business information. Specifically, the chemical industry has worked intensively to ensure that protections against the loss of confidential information are incorporated in the CWC and the administration-proposed implementing legislation. By the same token, allegations that this will require violation of the Constitution are wrong. The proposed implementing legislation provides for search warrants if routine or challenge inspections are to be carried out without consent. The CWC also allows the U.S. to take into account constitutional obligations regarding searches and seizures, proprietary rights, and providing access through challenge inspections. Finally, there is the argument that we be in no hurry to adhere to the convention and if and when we decide to join other signatories will have no choice but to adjust. Nevertheless, if we are not a party when it enters into force, we will have no role in the governing body and that is important. The Chairman. Senator Dodd. Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I noted when I walked in here the presence of the distinguished Admiral, who has rejoined us here. It is a pleasure to see you again, Admiral. We are glad to have you back with us. Today I thank all three of you for being here as witnesses. All three of you had distinguished careers, and it is a pleasure to see you back before the committee. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings. I respect immensely the concerns that you have raised. You have done so in an appropriate fashion over the last number of months, and we are going to have a chance, as it appears now, in the next few days to actually express our will in the Senate on this, which I think is appropriate and proper given the April 29 deadline. I commend you and Senator Biden for the tremendous effort you have both put in, along with your staffs, to try to resolve some of the outstanding differences. Senator Lugar as well deserves a great deal of credit, having a long-standing commitment to this issue. So I commend all of you for your work. I noted, Mr. Chairman, that you said the Reagan administration team was sort of opposed to this. The name game is dangerous, but the last time I looked, General Vessey, Jim Baker, Ken Adelman, Colin Powell, General Rowny, Paul Nitze and the Vice President were part of the Reagan team and they support the Chemical Weapons Convention. But there is a danger in going back and forth. I think the question has to be raised of what is in the interest of our country here, whether or not this is going to serve our interests in the 21st century. I am struck by a couple of observations. One is that we saw in the 1970's--in fact, Secretary Schlesinger I think was very much involved in this--the Biological Weapons Convention or treaty which President Nixon sent up to us here, which was strongly supported, as I recall, by both parties, both sides of the aisle. It has some 157 signatories, I think. One hundred forty countries ratified it. There is no verification, to the best of my knowledge, in that particular convention, yet it has worked pretty well. It has short comings, obviously. There is not universal adherence to it, but it has worked fairly well. I raise that because this treaty obviously does have verification included in it. One would argue that it actually does a much better job. I am also struck by the fact that in 1985, President Reagan signed into law a bill that would eliminate by the year 2004 the entire existing stockpile of chemical weapons. So we made a decision about a decade ago. One could argue, I suppose, the merits of it, but we made that decision; and we have been about the business not of upgrading or modernizing any of our chemical weapons but to unilaterally--to unilaterally-- eliminate our own stockpiles in chemical weapons. I know of nothing that has been said here, nor has anyone advocated, at least in the last few years that I have been here, that we ought to modernize our stockpiles in chemical weapons. No one has made that suggestion that I know of or offered legislation in that regard. So it seems as a country, in a bipartisan way, going back almost 25 years, more than 25 years, that we have taken a leadership position, both internationally and unilaterally, on the issue of chemical weapons; because we realize the dangers involved and associated with these weapons of mass destruction. The issue now comes down to whether or not this Nation, having authored, championed, and led this effort, whether or not we are going to be able to sit on the Executive Council which will set the rules of the road. We are acting in some way as if, if we don't ratify this, it does not happen. It does happen. If we don't ratify this, it does happen. The issue now becomes whether or not we are going to ratify in such a way that the interests of our country and the interests which we champion, that is, the abolition of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, that we are going to be allowed to sit at the very table to decide the rules of the road to determine whether or not that is going to work, having unilaterally decided that we will take ourselves out of this game by the year 2004. I just wonder, briefly, if our three witnesses here might, in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention of the 1970's, the general success of that, the decision in 1985 by the Reagan administration and Secretary Weinberger to unilaterally get out of this business by the year 2004--that was a Reagan administration decision--why it is not in the best interest of our country to move forward on this convention in light of the decisions we have already made. The Chairman. We will let you answer that on the next round. Senator Hagel. Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I very much appreciate the opportunity to listen and learn this morning. Mr. Chairman, as you suggested, there are 15 new United States Senators. There are 3 new United States Senators on this panel. This is one United States Senator who needs to know more about what we are doing here, and I very much appreciate you and Senator Biden opening the process and giving us a chance to learn and listen. Just as in life where actions have consequences, treaties have consequences. We live with those consequences. I, as a supporter of a ballistic missile defense system, am somewhat struck that we are still captive to the 1972 ABM Treaty in the argument of some why we cannot go forward and construct a ballistic missile defense system. We are not here to talk about the ABM Treaty, but I am here to learn a little bit more about what this chemical treaty is about. Understanding, as the distinguished panel has brought out in rather poignant terms this morning in the questioning and the comments by my distinguished colleagues have added to this enlightenment, first, civilized conduct is not predicated on treaties and is not governed by treaties. Civilized conduct is not anchored by treaties or some esoteric academic kind of parchment. Civilized conduct is anchored by civilized people. One of the concerns I have with this treaty as it is written, not unlike what I have heard this morning--and I must say also what Secretary Weinberger has said, I do not know of anyone who is for chemical weapons or the use of them--and as someone who has understood a little bit about combat, as others on this committee know and some of the direct personal experiences articulated by our panel this morning show they understand a little bit about this business, is this; and I guess my question comes down to this: Should we have a chemical weapons treaty and if we should, what form should it take? I would be very interested in our three distinguished panelists, Mr. Chairman, answering that question. If not this treaty, should we have one? Whatever that answer is leads us obviously to the next question, which is what form, if you agree we should have a treaty, what form should that treaty take. Secretary Weinberger? Mr. Weinberger. I think we have to bear in mind the point that you made at the beginning, that you don't solve the problems of ethics or of use of these weapons by any attempt to impose civilized standards on uncivilized government. I don't think for a moment, in connection with the statements Senator Biden and Senator Dodd made, that it would make the slightest difference to Saddam Hussein whether it was legal or illegal for him to use poison gas. He did violate that treaty, the original agreement in Geneva, when he attacked the Kurds. I think any time it suits his interest, he would do so. Indeed, the old Soviet definition of truth is whatever serves the country. So you have to have in mind that kind of attitude. Against that background, there is no impropriety in setting standards. I think that you can make it clear that the use of poison gas is outlawed by public opinion around the world. You can get statements to that effect. But when you add to that the enormously intrusive processes which require us to share with some extremely potentially hostile countries defensive mechanisms that we may be, and I hope are, working on to improve our capability of defending against this type of warfare, then I think you are neglecting the best interests of the United States. That is one of the reasons why I think this treaty, this convention, should not be ratified. There are all kinds of ways of making international statements. But when you bind yourselves to the situation of preventing the country from having the kind of defensive capability it needs in a world like this, then I think you are not serving the best interests of the United States. That is one of the reasons I think this treaty goes far beyond attempting to set just international standards and speed limits, and all those other comforting terms, because at the same time it requires us to take actions that would weaken us very severely and, I think, increase the chances of chemical warfare being used by rogue nations who would be told very publicly that other nations had no retaliatory capability. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Rumsfeld. Just very briefly, I won't take much time. I see you are on the yellow already. First, obviously a great deal of the problem is with Articles X and XI. Second, the Executive Council is a problem. It is unlike the United Nations, where the United States at least has a veto. Here, in this instance, as I recall, Asia has 9 members, Africa has 9 or 10, Latin America has 7, Eastern Europe has 5, Western Europe has 10, and ``other'' is thrown in with Western Europe. We don't even have a guaranteed seat. So it would be a very different kind of mechanism, even different than the International Atomic Energy mechanism, as Secretary Schlesinger mentioned. So I think those two things stand out by way of problems. Senator Hagel. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Kerry. Dr. Schlesinger. Might I add just a little bit on that point, the last point that Mr. Rumsfeld mentioned? The fact is that, under the IAEA, the United States provides scrutiny of the budget in a way that this budget will not be scrutinized through the internal politics of the IAEA. Second, the Western nations have a blocking vote in the Board of Governors of the IAEA. It requires a two-thirds vote of the IAEA. To prevent intrusions in the United States requires a three-quarters adverse vote. And as Mr. Rumsfeld has just indicated, under the circumstances, the United States is not guaranteed a seat. It is described as ``other.'' That is, I think, a clarification of the remarks by Senator Dodd with regard to our participation in the Executive Council. That may be a transitory device. It may be a permanent device. But there is no indication of it. Finally, there is a facilities agreement under the IAEA so that there is no hunting license to go around in the 10,000 facilities in the United States that are subject to the requirements of this agreement. The Chairman. Now Senator Kerry. Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a number of questions, and I am sure I will not be able to get at them in the short time available. But let me begin, if I can. Gentlemen, I assume you don't believe that chemical weapons manufacturing or chemical weapons threats can be adequately monitored by U.S. technical means alone. Do you agree with that? Mr. Weinberger. That's correct. I agree with that. It cannot be. Senator Kerry. So you need some kind of protocol, some kind of mechanism for the process of adequately providing our intelligence community with a capacity to advise our leaders adequately. Mr. Weinberger. Senator, I see what you are getting at. But the fact of the matter is that the treaty that we are considering here does not have any kind of guarantees or any kind of verifiability that countries that say they are going to do one thing are going to do it. Just because it has a very intrusive mechanism which allows them to go all into these 10,000 or more companies in the United States or similar numbers in other countries of the world does not mean that there is any guarantee that any of the countries that are signatory to it are in effect going to be doing what they say they are going to be doing. Senator Kerry. By that same logic, there is no absolute guarantee for any treaties that we have signed. Isn't that accurate? Mr. Weinberger. That's one of the reasons I was always worried about relying exclusively on an arms control regime, as opposed to a military capability regime along with arms control for insuring our own security. Senator Kerry. If you follow that logic---- Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, could I say something without taking away from the Senator's time? Senator Kerry [continuing]. Can he do it without taking away from my time? The Chairman. Oh, certainly. Senator Kerry. That is a privilege. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, let me try and raise the fundamental question here, which is the loss of sources and methods. When David Kaye was in charge of the inspection in Iraq, he discovered to his chagrin that the Iraqis had been able to hide from Western intelligence their activities. Why--because the Iraqis themselves had been trained by the IAEA in the techniques used by Western, specifically American, intelligence. He had a conversation with an Iraqi official who simply stated we have gotten all of this information. Now the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is engaged in training people from all nations at this juncture. What we are doing in the intelligence area is probably suffering a net loss. As the Senator indicates, we will have greater access and, therefore, we will have increased intelligence of one type. But our techniques for intrusion, our techniques for interpretation will be compromised. This is clearly the case in North Korea, in which the North Koreans have wisely discovered through our revelations that the IAEA's demand to see their waste dumps will compromise information on their production of plutonium. So the Senator's question is quite right with regard to improved intelligence, but it is offset by the compromise of sources and methods. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond, I understand your argument, but I think the logic is lost here for a number of reasons. First of all, Iraq is not a party. So nothing will change with respect to Iraq. In fact, none of the rogue states about which we have the greatest fears are parties. Therefore, nothing with respect to our intelligence gathering or state of anxiety should change with respect to those states. On the other hand, because you have a regimen with respect to everybody else who is trafficking in or legitimately trading in the precursor chemicals, we will have a much greater ability, in fact, according to our own intelligence personnel, to determine the ability of those rogue states to, in fact, get a hold of those chemicals, or the ability to manufacture on their own. What do you say to that? It is interesting that Jim Woolsey said this will give the country an additional tool in the box. Our current CIA Acting Director, George Tenet, says it will. John Deutch said it will. The entire U.S. command structure, almost the entire U.S. command structure for the Persian Gulf, who faced the threat of chemical weapons, say that this will strengthen our hand. It is hard for me to understand why you find their perception of this as an increased tool and as an important protection wanting. Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is easily answered, Senator, and if I may respectfully suggest, you are on the wrong wicket in this regard. For a decade DCI's have come to this Senate, to the House, and stated that this treaty is unverifiable. Jim Woolsey came up and said this treaty is unverifiable. John Deutch, who has been cited by the administration as saying that it is verifiable has stated, ``I've never said it's verifiable. It's clearly unverifiable.'' And in the article with General Scowcroft, he indicated it was unverifiable. The nonsignatories, such as Syria and Libya, are likely to get a little assistance from signatories like Iran and Cuba. That will not be difficult to establish. Senator Kerry. Can I just interrupt you there on the point of verifiability? Dr. Schlesinger. Sure. Senator Kerry. First of all, no treaty is purely verifiable. No treaty. Second, none of them said that this treaty is not verifiable to some degree. They all said this is verifiable to a certain degree. We all understand that. The question before us is are we better off without any protocol which controls precursor chemicals, are we better off being totally outside of the regime that will be set up by the control as of the 29th of this month, and are we better off without all nations, Russia included, coming in to an agreement as to how we will try to track this. Are you better off in terms of verifiability? Are you better off in terms of verifiability without this? That is my question. Dr. Schlesinger. We have to look at the---- Senator Kerry. No. Please answer my question. Are we better off without verifiability? The Chairman. Just a minute. The Chair is---- Senator Kerry [continuing]. I'd just like to get my question answered, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Well, you can do it with a little more discretion than that. Now you are talking with a former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He should know what he is talking about. He deserves better than to be---- Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I'm not trying to do anything except---- The Chairman [continuing]. Please, please. Dr. Schlesinger. Now you can answer the question, sir. Dr. Schlesinger. There will be gains in verifiability and losses in verifiability. The fact that our techniques will be undermined probably will exceed the gains in verifiability. Moreover, we are dealing not only with the verification of chemical weapons, we are dealing with the possible industrial espionage in the United States. And that industrial espionage is going to be a godsend--I repeat, a godsend--to foreign intelligence agencies and to the corporations which will feed on those foreign intelligence agencies. A recent book, ``War by Other Means,'' talks about economic espionage in the United States and how vulnerable we are to economic espionage. That must be included in the total assessment with regard to the performance of the intelligence community. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I worry deeply about the statement that was earlier made by Senator Biden that the intelligence community wants us to ratify the treaty. I heard that statement--and excuse me, Senator Kerry for drifting off your question--I heard that statement, and I am deeply concerned that the intelligence community should not be wanting a decision on any policy matter. The intelligence community is there to provide information, not to provide judgments on policy issues. I hope that that statement did not reflect either the DCI's, the Acting DCI's views or the views of the intelligence community. Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might answer another of Senator Kerry's questions which is do you think we are better off by not signing this protocol. My answer is unequivocally yes, we are better off by not signing it because this particular protocol not only has all of the faults that we pointed out and is not verifiable, but it does require us, and we would carry out our obligations, I am confident, because we always have, it requires us to share both defensive and offensive technological developments that we should be working on to protect our troops. That I think is a very deep flaw. The Senator, I am sure inadvertently, omitted from the list of rogue nations that have not joined the fact that Iran has joined and Iraq has not. So you would be giving an enormous intelligence advantage and an enormous disclosure advantage to a country like Iran. When General Schwarzkopf was asked why he supported the treaty and if he understood that by supporting the treaty he was supporting the sharing of this kind of technical development with Iran, he said of course not. He was horrified. I think that is a fair description of what he felt when this was brought home to him. The Chairman. Senator Grams. Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Grams. Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our distinguished panel, and I appreciate your time here this morning. Some of these you might have already answered. I came in late, so I apologize. But I would just like to go over some of the basics on this. One basic argument, a major argument, that has been made by the supporters of the CWC is that, although it may be far from perfect, that it is better to have some treaty in force rather than none at all; in other words, sign on to be part of this board or Executive Council to enact what may be a troubled treaty. How would you respond to that assertion, that it is better to be a part of this treaty than none at all. Mr. Rumsfeld, may we start with you? Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that when one weighs the advantages and disadvantages, it is clear to me, at least, that the defects vastly outweigh the advantages of establishing a standard or a norm in this instance. Further, I think it is perfectly possible to achieve the advantages that would accrue from this agreement without having to be burdened with the disadvantages. Senator Grams. How would you do that, Mr. Rumsfeld? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, one way, as I mentioned, is the question of Articles X and XI, which I think should not be in there. The way they are written they represent very serious problems. The second way I mentioned was the mechanism of enforcement. The so-called Executive Council I think is flawed and would offer the United States nowhere near the ability to affect decisions that we have in the United Nations or that we have in the IAEA. Senator Grams. Mr. Weinberger? Mr. Weinberger. Well, I think the argument that something is better than nothing depends upon something not being worse than what you have. We don't need to sign this treaty to assert our goodwill or to assert the fact that we are against chemical weapons. I said at the beginning that I have the greatest detestation for these weapons, and I am sure every soldier does. Anyone who took part in any kind of service understands what they mean and what they do. But we don't have to sign a flawed treaty to demonstrate to the world our rejection of these kinds of weapons. We have many times taken actions that indicate that we are opposed to them. So I would certainly agree completely with Don Rumsfeld that you do have great disadvantages and those disadvantages outweigh any possible good that can come from a generalized statement that we, too, dislike these weapons and we, too, are willing to have them abolished. Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger? Dr. Schlesinger. We have a treaty, we have an agreement, we have a convention, the Geneva Convention, which is already in force. So it is not a question that something is better than nothing because we already have something. That something prohibits the use of chemical weapons. It is easier to detect the use of chemical weapons than it will ever be to detect the manufacture of chemical weapons. Consequently, we are far better off not watering down the Geneva Convention in the way that this treaty threatens to. I note that in Article VII or, thereabouts, it says that no way does this current agreement weaken the requirements of the Geneva Convention. We should take a firm stand on the use of weapons, and we need to have the capacity to enforce it. If we look at what will happen after the signing of this agreement, if, for example, China signs--and I have been described as a friend of China. I don't see any reason for us to drift into confrontation with China. But I want to say that anybody who believes that the Chinese will give up their chemical weapons capability or that they will give up the capacity to manufacture must be suffering from hallucinations. If we are prepared to do anything about it, that would require a greater rigor in dealing with Chinese departures from agreed on arms control measures than we have exhibited to this point. Mr. Rumsfeld. May I add one comment or thought that comes to mind? Senator Grams. Sure. Mr. Rumsfeld. In view of both what you and Senator Kerry have asked and discussed, the implication that nothing will change with respect to Iraq goes back to my point on Articles X and XI. I think it will change, even with respect to Iraq, in this sense. Country's that don't sign will be there, and with the dramatically increased flow of information which Articles X and XI require, and transfer of technology, and availability of information, it will get around. There is no question but that the information, particularly with respect to the defensive side, will be available. It will get out into the marketplace. You cannot keep it in. If that many countries have access to it, it will not be secret from the rogue nations. Senator Grams. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Feingold. Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first take this opportunity to thank you and the ranking member, Senator Biden, for the leadership and the dedication you have demonstrated on this issue before us this morning. I also want to recognize the efforts of the White House Working Group and the Lott Task Force to clarify this issue. I know that these negotiations are taking a great deal of time and involve a tremendous amount of technical detail. I want to note that this committee, too, has spent a lot of time on this treaty. In the 104th Congress, the distinguished Chair held three extensive hearings. I was pleased to be able to participate in those hearings, which have given the members of this committee an opportunity to closely examine a number of issues pertaining to this treaty and the consequences of its ratification or of the failure to ratify it. We asked some tough and probing questions and I think received thoughtful responses from the administration and private witnesses who have come before us. Despite all of this hard, hard work, we find ourselves at the 11th hour without Senate debate on this treaty. Even though the United States had the key leadership role throughout negotiations over this treaty, and even though 70 countries have already ratified it, this institution has not yet had a chance to actually consider the ratification of CWC. I just would like to reiterate, in the couple of minutes I have, what has already been said here this morning. Time is of the essence for the full Senate to have this debate. We are all well aware of the looming deadline of April 29, exactly 3 weeks from today. That is the deadline by which the United States must deposit its instrument of ratification of this treaty so that we may be a full participant in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, the governing body that will have the responsibility for deciding the terms for the implementation of CWC. In my view, the United States participation in the OPCW is fundamental to ensuring that American companies and American citizens are treated fairly under the inspection provisions of this treaty. It is precisely because some observers think that these provisions are faulty that Senate consideration is essential. Senators should have the opportunity to debate these concerns, and the American people certainly deserve a chance to hear them. As elected representatives with the constitutional responsibility to provide advice and consent to treaties signed by the President, I think we are obligated to give full consideration to the CWC. With the April 29 deadline looming ahead of us, I think we owe it to the people who elected us to fulfill that duty to do it in a timely fashion and to do it responsibly. This treaty was signed by President Bush in January 1993 and was submitted to the Senate by President Clinton in November of that year. Almost 3\1/2\ years later, the Senate is now faced with a 3-week deadline. The Chemical Weapons Convention is the culmination of a decades-long effort to bring these weapons under international control and work toward their eventual elimination. While I think we would all concede and have said that the CWC remains imperfect, I still believe it is the best avenue available for beginning down the road to that eventual elimination. So, Mr. Chairman, I again commend the tremendous interest you have taken in this issue, but I hope we can vote on the treaty soon. Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of questions for the panel. First, in your March 5 Washington Post op-ed, the three distinguished members of this panel indicated that if the United States decides to become a party at a later date to this convention, perhaps after improvements are made to enhance the treaty's effectiveness, it is hard to believe that its preferences regarding implementation arrangements would not be given considerable weight. I guess I would like to know what improvements you would make. If it is in the interest of the United States to make these improvements, how would you propose that the United States accomplish this if we are not a member of the OPCW? Mr. Weinberger. Well, I don't think that the possibility of our being disregarded exists, Senator. I think if we are expected to pay 25 percent of the costs of this treaty, which are very considerable, we are certainly going to be listened to. As far as changes are concerned, I tried to indicate this morning, in a too lengthy statement, perhaps, all of the things that I think are wrong with it. Certainly Articles X and XI would have to be changed in a major way so that we do not preclude ourselves from having the capability of defending against rogue states who either signed or didn't sign this convention. What we have done in those articles, in my opinion, gives them all of the opportunity to either weaken or basically eliminate any kind of improvements we would make in the protective clothing, the masks, the defensive capabilities against these terrible weapons. It does not prevent rogue states from using them, or from stockpiling them, or from manufacturing them. Senator Feingold. If I may follow up just for a second on that, in effect, then, you are saying that our financial leverage would be sufficient to allow us to change it? Mr. Weinberger. Oh, I would be extremely disappointed if it isn't, Senator. Yes. We have quite a lot of opportunity to observe that in a number of other organizations, and if we are expected to put up 25 percent--and I would suspect that within a couple of years it would be 35 percent--of the cost of this treaty, we would certainly, I would hope anybody who was President at that time or Secretary of State at that time would make it quite clear that we require for our contribution a very genuine decisionmaking role. Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Brownback. Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and for holding the hearing. I am delighted to be here with these three gentlemen who I view as some of the key implementers of our strategy to win the cold war. You gentlemen were allegation three there and were a key part of that, to which our country and my children have an enduring debt to you for doing that. I thank you for it, for all you have done. I have a couple of questions. I am new to this committee and new to the Senate. So this is among the first hearings I have had on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Secretary Weinberger, Russia, of course, has not signed on to the treaty and yet is the world's largest chemical weapons possessor. Do you think we at a minimum should require that they sign on before we would consider signing on to this treaty? Mr. Weinberger. Senator, my understanding is that they have agreed, or ``signed on,'' so to speak, but they have not ratified it yet. Their record is extremely poor in this because, as you said, they have a very large stockpile of these weapons and they have already stepped out of--which is the kind and polite way to phrase it--the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which was widely heralded as one of the great saviors of mankind when it was originally submitted. They have simply said it has outlived its usefulness. So that is a very unfortunate record to have before the world. They are widely reported to have said that they would only sign on if we agreed to pay the full costs of their destruction of their weapons. This is a large sum; and if it ever should happen, I would very much hope that we would have some ability to monitor and follow any money we gave them. We have already given them some sort of token or opening demonstration of our goodwill, and we don't know what that was used for. And we don't know what a lot of the economic aid is used for. So all of these are things that I think would certainly have to be at least far better understood than they are now. It would not bother me at all if Russia were required to have some kind of guarantee that they would take care of destruction of their own weapons and that we should not make our commitment to any kind of agreement to pay for that. Senator Brownback. Now as we have both noted, they have not ratified. Should we require their ratification before we would ratify? Mr. Weinberger. Well, it would certainly be a more comfortable feeling, but it certainly would not remove, in my mind, the objections to the faults and the flaws within the treaty itself. Senator Brownback. So, even really if they do ratify, you would still have the same sort of reservations you do now? Mr. Weinberger. As it stands now, yes, sir, I would. Senator Brownback. And that would depend upon further negotiations with the Russians and their destruction of the chemical weapons they have? Mr. Weinberger. I would just like to find out what the problem is with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement they signed. Why has it served its purpose? Why is it no longer useful for them to adhere to it? Senator Brownback. Secretary Rumsfeld, you had noted that the United States has the ability as a nation to stand alone, to pull something to be a much better document, a much better treaty, than what it is in your testimony. If we did stand out on this and we said we're not going to sign the CWC; because it is such a flawed agreement, how would we be able to, how do you think it would evolve that we would pull that on toward a better agreement? How would you see that evolving into the future to where it would be something that you would like to support? As all of you noted, and as all of us have noted, none of us wants chemical weapons in this world. We are all opposed to those. How would you see that evolve to where we could get a better agreement? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do think that the United States is among the very few countries in this world that do have the ability to not be subject to the kind of diplomatic momentum and to decide what they believe is right and then set about trying to fashion an arrangement whereby what's right can be achieved. If we can't, who in the world can do that? So the idea that we are going to lose our leadership I think is just not true. The way to approach it, it seems to me, would be to start with what is important and what is realistic. As these gentlemen and I have tried to do today, we have pointed out the things that are the problems. What one would do would be to try to avoid those. I must add a comment, however, about the Russians. The fact that recently there is information available suggesting that they have, using everyday commercial chemicals, developed the ability to develop chemical weapons suggests that they or anyone else would be able to shift facilities from making chemical weapons to making commercial chemicals in a very short period of time. We were talking about no treaty is verifiable. It is a lot easier to verify intercontinental ballistic missiles than it is chemicals, commercial chemicals, that can also be used for chemical weapons and things that can be made in very small spaces. So I think even though we have an enormously intrusive regime for policing it, as intrusive as it is, it would not be able to do the job. So I think that we have the cart before the horse in this process, and I would like to see us go back and do it right. Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, you might want to put in the record the Reuters report on what the Russians are doing. It is interesting that the new development avoids any of the precursors that are listed under the existing treaty. So if one uses different precursor chemicals, one can avoid the restrictions of the treaty. The Chairman. Let's go to one more round. I don't want to keep you here all day, but this is a fascinating discussion. Let me reiterate at mid point that I certainly do appreciate your coming here today and cooperating with us. We will make this a 3-minute-per-Senator round. You said something early in your testimony, Mr. Secretary, about people being instructed not to say anything unfavorable about this treaty. Well, we have had the same thing in our committee among the staff, and I had one report saying that the FBI had specifically been instructed to say nothing unfavorable about this treaty. Now you have been Director of the CIA and I need your help. Whom would you recommend, past or present, that we subpoena to testify under oath regarding the CWC and the White House directions that we have had reported to us? Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff, Senator. The Chairman. Pardon? Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff---- The Chairman. Very well. Dr. Schlesinger [continuing]. A list of suitable witnesses--whether or not the subject of subpoena is a decision for the committee and not by me. The Chairman. That will be fine, and I thank you. Now I think it has not been mentioned, except indirectly, about Jim Woolsey's testimony in June 1994, in which he said the chemical weapons problem ``is so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have a high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a small scale.'' Now, Secretary Rumsfeld, I have a letter from the Aerospace Industry Association stating strong concern that the CWC will, and I quote the letter, ``unnecessarily jeopardize our Nation's ability to protect its national security information and proprietary technological data.'' Now this was fascinating to me because back in early January, I think it was, the B-2 was taken to North Carolina, to Seymore Johnson Air Force Base, and thousands of people came to see it. Everybody was proud of it and marveled at the enormity of it, and so forth. But then it occurred to me that chemicals are used in the manufacture of the B-2. Now let me ask you to step back and very quickly say what kinds of risks to our companies are posed by letting foreign inspectors poke around, interview employees, take photographs, and take samples for analysis overseas. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, Mr. Chairman, I must say that I cannot answer it authoritatively, and I am struck by the dramatically different views on this particular issue by proponents and opponents. My personal view is anything I have read or seen in this document and these materials I cannot see how we could avoid allowing classified information to be made available to inspection teams. I have heard statements by Members of the Senate of: ``Don't worry about that, that's not a problem.'' But I have not seen anything in the agreements that suggest to me that it's not a problem, because modern technology enables people to do an enormous amount of analysis some distance in time and space from where the materials were located and still come away with information that is exceedingly important, classified, and proprietary. I don't know how it would be avoided. The Chairman. Very well. Senator Biden. Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, on that particular point, the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons will use as its principal tool the GC/MS, to wit, the gas chromatograph mass spectrometer. That is the tool that was used by the Livermore Laboratory to procure from outside the gates classified information at a missile facility, and that will be the tool of choice. The Chairman. Thank you. Joe. Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I apologize for having left for a few moments. I had to go to another meeting briefly. I understand this issue of defensive technologies made available to rogue states, states that are parties to the convention. I assume we are primarily talking about Iran. We could be talking about China, we could be talking about, in some people's minds, Russia. But paragraph 1 of Article X lists ``medical antidotes and treatments'' as a permissible form of defensive assistance. Now, again, as Secretary Rumsfeld just pointed out, it is amazing how an authoritative and informed people end up on both sides of the issue on the same point. So let me ask you this. Where do any of you find the requirement that a State Party, that is, a signatory to this convention, a ratifier, is required to provide anything more than that--medical antidotes and treatments? Mr. Weinberger. Do you want to look at the third paragraph, Senator, of Article X? Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons. Senator Biden. Has the right. Mr. Weinberger. Yes, the right. Senator Biden. So you believe that paragraph says that we are required to give them, any State, any technology that we have available? Mr. Weinberger. Senator, as was said in another connection, English is my mother tongue, and I can't read it any other way. Senator Biden. Now on Article XI, the chemical trade that the CWC would encourage is only that ``for purposes not prohibited under the convention.'' And the only prohibited trade restrictions are those ``incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this convention.'' Now we don't say we have to undo our trade restrictions and neither do the other Australia Group members. So why do we accept Iran's interpretation of this article over that of our allies and the U.S.? Mr. Weinberger. Precisely because it is so fuzzy that you have all kinds of interpretations, and you will have a big set of arguments as to who is doing what. And any interpretation that we may claim can be denied very easily by all other countries that don't happen to agree with us or don't want to agree with us. You have, what you have set up here is an oral battleground for varying interpretations. It will allow enemies of the United States or potential enemies to make claims that, when we are in the position of denying them, will set us up as being violators of this treaty. Senator Biden. If I can, I would conclude by saying would a condition that would be binding, that a legal declaration we'd make to not provide rogue states with advanced chemical defenses--assurances--would that meet any of your concerns? Mr. Weinberger. Well, I would certainly like to see it written down, Senator. Yes. Senator Biden. OK, thank you. Dr. Schlesinger. Well, the provisional body, the provisional body states that we are obligated to provide these defensive technologies. There was an argument in a recent National Public Radio broadcast between the general counsel of ACDA and the head of the provisional body, Mr. Kenyan, a Brit. He stated and rebuked the proposition that the United States might be able to avoid providing this kind of technology, that it was required underneath the CWC. So I think that you have a clear legitimization. Even if we, for one reason or another, withhold such information, our industrial partners will proceed to provide this because of the legitimization provided by this agreement. As Senator Biden observed earlier, norms are important, and if you provide a norm which allows the Germans or others to provide information to Iran, they will accept that norm. The Chairman. Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Weinberger, you obviously were the Secretary of Defense during most of the Reagan administration. For the record, and for this Senator, much has been made of the fact that the CWC was initiated during the Reagan administration. Could you provide, at least me, somewhat of an analysis as to how it was initiated, why it was initiated, and today why most of the Reagan administration officials during that time are now opposed to it? Mr. Weinberger. Well, I cannot speak for anyone else, Senator, and I don't know what the historic origins of it were all the way back. But I think that everybody was appalled by the use by Iraq of poison gas against the Kurds, and there was an attempt to get some kind of international order to try to prevent that sort of thing. President Reagan is a very compassionate and humane man and obviously shared with the world the distaste and the detestation of these kinds of weapons. I would hesitate very much to say that he had an opportunity to see all of the provisions that emerged from the very lengthy negotiation. He certainly did not have that opportunity. He certainly did not know that four of the principal rogue nations of the world would stay outside the treaty and, therefore, not be banned from doing anything at all and that we would be put in the position of weakening any kind of retaliatory capability we might have. Those are conditions that changed since the initial praiseworthy, humanitarian effort to try to do something about the elimination of these weapons. As Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, we did that after World War I, the Geneva Conference. We did it later on, after President Reagan left office, with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which simply does not work out. There are all kinds of reasons why humane and compassionate people--and I like occasionally to classify myself in that same category--dislike these weapons and would like to do something about it. But the fact of the matter is that what we have done here is not only ineffective, but it is dangerous for the security of our troops, in my opinion. Dr. Schlesinger. I have two quick points, Senator. When George Shultz announced the quest for a chemical weapons agreement, he said that it would be a verifiable chemical weapons treaty. This is not verifiable. Second, the Reagan administration to the very end believed that the United States should retain a 500 aging ton level of binary chemical weapons and should not surrender that minimum capability until such time as other countries came into conformity. I think that the argument that this all originated with Ronald Reagan is not an accurate argument. George Bush was for this treaty, but Ronald Reagan would not be if he were able to comment on it. The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes. Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the first question I want to put to you is that the United States is now embarked on a path of unilaterally destroying our stockpile of chemical weapons. Do you think we should carry through on that? Mr. Weinberger. To the extent that Secretary Schlesinger indicated, with the reservation that was made during the Reagan administration that we should have a minimal deterrent capability and that other nations should know that we do have that, particu- larly rogue nations that are likely to or have indeed used chemical weapons. Senator Sarbanes. So you would keep some chemical weapons? Mr. Weinberger. I think you have to, Senator. Yes. Senator Sarbanes. And that's your position, I take it, Secretary Schlesinger? Dr. Schlesinger. No, sir. The existing stockpile is obsolete, and it is more dangerous. Mr. Weinberger. Excuse me. It's the binaries we're talking about now. Dr. Schlesinger. It's obsolete and dangerous, and I think we must get rid of it one way or another. Mr. Weinberger. The unitary weapons are indeed being replaced. It is the binary weapons that we were talking about under the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. But everyone said that we had to keep some kind of minimal retaliatory capability of the binary weapons. Senator Sarbanes. What is your position, Secretary Rumsfeld? Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that we need some to develop the defensive capabilities that are necessary, so that we know what we are doing. Senator Sarbanes. So you would all keep some chemical weapons. Now the next question I have is what is your position on whether the Senate should have an opportunity to vote on this treaty. I know how you would encourage members to vote as I understand your testimony. But what is your position on whether the Senate ought to be able to take this treaty up and consider it and vote on it. Dr. Schlesinger. The Senate should vote. Mr. Weinberger. Yes, certainly. I thought that's what this process was, that this was the beginning of the process that leads to a Senate vote. Senator Sarbanes. Well, it doesn't always lead to a Senate vote. No. The question I am putting to you is whether you think there should be a Senate vote. Mr. Weinberger. I have no problem with that at all. Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld? Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no problem with it. Senator Sarbanes. Now the other question I want to ask you is this. You have each raised a number of problems or concerns that you have with the treaty. I want to narrow it down and isolate it out. If the rogue nations do not sign the treaty, is that in and of itself, in your view, sufficient grounds not to approve the treaty? Mr. Weinberger. Speaking for myself, Senator, it would seem to me that if you have a ban on the nations that are basically in some form of general agreement with us with respect to democratic values and all the rest of it, and that they carry that out, and that the nations that do not, including specifically the rogue nations outside this treaty at the moment, you would be offering them an invitation to launch a chemical attack. This is because we would have, by a standard that we follow, we would carry out our agree- ment and we would denude ourselves of any capability of retaliating and that is one of the best ways of deterring. It is unfortunate that in this kind of world that has to be the case, but it is. Even the nations, some of the nations that are within the treaty, like Iran, you find that---- Senator Sarbanes. I just want to try to focus this for the moment. Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Yes, I understand what you are saying, Senator, but I would like to complete the answer. The answer basically is that the answer of rogue nations from those who sign would be a source of considerable concern. It is not the only source of concern because many nations which sign---- Senator Sarbanes. I understand that. Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Would not be able, would not keep their word, and we could not verify whether they are doing it or not. Senator Sarbanes. Is the absence of the rogue nations in your view of sufficient concern that you would be against the treaty? Mr. Weinberger. It is one of the reasons that leads me to oppose it, but there are many others. Senator Sarbanes. If the others were not present, would that in and of itself be enough that you would oppose it? Mr. Weinberger. If the others were what? Senator Sarbanes. If the other reasons that you have for opposing it were not present, were taken care of, would the absence of the rogue nations be enough for you to oppose it? Mr. Weinberger. Well, as you put the question, if all of the things I object to are not in the treaty, then almost by definition I wouldn't oppose it. Senator Sarbanes. No, no--the rogue nations are not in the treaty in the question I'm asking. That's all I'm--I'm just trying to determine how critical a factor that is in your thinking. Mr. Weinberger. Let me say that my opposition is based on a large number of reasons and one of them is the absence of the rogue nations from any provisions with respect to compliance. Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Schlesinger? Dr. Schlesinger. No, the absence of the rogue nations in and of itself would not lead me to oppose the treaty. I would regret that absence. But the other problems are much more serious in my view. Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld? Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree with Secretary Schlesinger. The Chairman. Senator Grams. Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have just a quick, brief question. As you know, riot control agents, such as tear gas, have also been used by the U.S. military during search and rescue missions for downed pilots or to handle situations where noncombatants are mixed in with the combatants. My understanding is that the Clinton administration's current interpretation of the CWC is that it would ban such uses of riot control agents by the U.S. military. Mr. Weinberger, when the Reagan administration was negotiating the CWC, was it ever your understanding that the U.S. would have agreed to such a ban or that it was a desired result of this treaty at all? Mr. Weinberger. No. Those were always to be excluded because of their obvious importance and their obvious necessity. We understand that the commitment was made that they would be excluded from the treaty but that the Clinton administration changed its mind in its commitment and now says that they would be banned. There is now some very technical discussion of whether they would be banned in wartime or not; that it might be all right to use them in peacetime crowds, but not in wartime. I would like to use them to protect our soldiers in wartime or in peacetime. Senator Grams. Now if this is not a lethal chemical, does this give you any concern about the broad scope of agents that could be covered under this treaty, which would open the door for more inspections? Mr. Schlesinger? Dr. Schlesinger. I'm not sure I understood the question, sir. Senator Grams. I mean, if this is a nonlethal chemical and this is included, is there a concern that it would be so broad that all chemicals or any definition of a chemical could be part of the reasons for inspections or to come into plants in the U.S.? Mr. Rumsfeld. The very reason for an investigation suggests that there is a question. So ``investigation'' can run to organizations that don't have anything to do with lethal or nonlethal chemical weapons--because someone has to look. If there is an allegation, a charge, a question, they can go in and investigate. That is where you end up with the numbers of companies running into the thousands. Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger, this is the economic warfare that you had talked about earlier, possibly? Dr. Schlesinger. I'd like to clarify one thing. President Ford issued an Executive order which has existed and prescribed U.S. policy on riot control issues for the last 20 years. That has been somewhat obscured now by pressures from our allies and equivocation within the administration. On the question that you put, indeed, inevitably questions will be raised about any chemicals under those circumstances. Senator Grams. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Kerry. Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could just say with respect to my last round of questioning, I want to make it very clear, and I think Secretary Schlesinger knows this, that he is a friend and a man for whom I have enormous respect. I would in no way try to do anything except work this light here, which is our perpetual enemy. We try to get answers rapidly and, unfortunately, sometimes we get witnesses here who are so good at answering only one question. Dr. Schlesinger. I fully understood, Senator, and I tried to protect your time. I was not successful. Senator Kerry. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. If I could just ask you, Secretary Weinberger, I was really struck by your statement about deterrence. Is it your position that you can only deter chemical weapons use with chemical weapons? Mr. Weinberger. No. I thought I was quite clear, Senator, that it is one of the ways of trying to do it. Arms control is another way, and there are probably many more. But it is essential, I think, that a country that has already used poison gas against some of its own people, as just occurred, it is only prudent I think for that country to know that if they launch a chemical attack on some other nation or the United States that they would be met with a comparable, not a proportionate, response in the terms of one of our departments, but a massive response and that they should know that. That is one of the means of deterring, though it is not the only means. Senator Kerry. Wouldn't you say that the Bush administration was, in fact, quite effective at making it clear to Iraq that the nuclear use was, in fact, available and, to the best of our knowledge, there is, as of now, no indication that that was not successful? Mr. Weinberger. Yes. That is my exact point, that we were able to do that. If we denuded ourselves of any capability of making that kind of response, I have no doubt that---- Senator Kerry. But nobody here is talking about that. All we are talking about is continuing to pursue what a number of administrations have pursued, which is reducing our own manufacturing participation in chemical weapons. Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. That's fine. But I don't think at the same time we ought to take away our capabilities of developing new, improved, and better defensive technologies and equipment. Senator Kerry. Defensive, I agree. And the treaty agrees. Mr. Weinberger. No, the treaty doesn't. Senator Kerry. Well, the treaty says very clearly that we are allowed to defend. Mr. Weinberger. That's right, and we have to disclose them completely to any other signatory, and that disclosure in itself weakens them if it does not destroy their effectiveness. Senator Kerry. Well, in point of fact Article I, which you have not referred to, addresses the questions of whether or not you have to, under any circumstances, assist, encourage, or induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited by this treaty. Now all we are talking about under this treaty is chemical weapons. So, therefore, Article I, in fact, most people--see, there is that infernal bell, or light. It is hard to have a dialog here. Most people have argued it supersedes any other clause in here, because the basic intent of this treaty is to preclude the manufacture by anybody of chemical weapons in a way that could be used against another nation. Mr. Weinberger. That is the intent. There are nations outside it who may be manufacturing them, who may be stockpiling, and, in fact, are stockpiling them as we know now. What I am troubled by is the fact that if we develop a so- called fool proof mask and protective clothing that still enables you to take the actions that soldiers have to take in defending themselves and their country, you are going to have to share that. By sharing it, you eliminate its effectiveness. There is a little process called reverse engineering whereby all of the processes which you have to produce that have to be given to other members, other signatories, and those signatory members, as Secretary Rumsfeld suggested, that kind of information, distributed on that kind of scale, one way or another is bound to get into the hands of potential enemies. Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, this is a very, very important point. In effect, what you are saying is that if you were to share it, you would have rendered even more ineffective the capacity to use chemical weapons, which is, in effect, the very purpose of this treaty. Mr. Weinberger. Well, that is not the way I would phrase it. No. Senator Kerry. Let me just finish my thought. Mr. Weinberger. We are talking about defensive equipment now. Senator Kerry. I understand. But if you can defend against something, it has no offensive capacity. If it has no offensive capacity, you have taken away its military value. That is precisely the purpose of this treaty. Mr. Weinberger. You are talking about absolutes, Senator, absolute capabilities and all the rest. But what I am talking about are improvements in an already imperfect defensive capability that we have now. Senator Kerry. But if I were a military leader---- Mr. Weinberger. Sharing those improvements makes them relatively--at least we could phrase it this way if you would like--makes them relatively less effective than if we didn't share them. Senator Kerry [continuing]. I agree. But if I were a military leader, knowing that we had shared our ability to be able to have a foolproof mask, I am not going to use the chemical weapon. And if you don't use the chemical weapon because you know it is foolproof, you have done exactly what you have tried to do with this treaty, which is eliminate the potential for chemical weapons to be used. Mr. Weinberger. I'm sorry, but I don't follow you. I have great respect for you, but I don't follow that. Senator Kerry. Well, I don't think it is that hard to follow. Mr. Rumsfeld. May I respond? Senator Kerry. I think---- The Chairman. Mr. Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Rumsfeld. I just think that the way you have cast it is not correct. First, there is the threat of the use of chemical weapons, which is a terror weapon. It affects people, behavior, and soldiers. Second is the reality that for every offense there is a defense and for every defense there is going to be an offense. There is always going to be an evolution in technology. So the idea of perfection does not exist in this business. But let's say that you had reasonably good defensive capability. Assume that on the part of the other side. You cannot function for long in a chemical environment. You could not function with that kind of equipment. The advantage clearly is in the hands of the aggressor. So I think you are on a track that, to me, does not make sense. In my view, sharing technology about how to defend against these weapons is not anything other than disadvantageous for the defender and advantageous for the aggressor. The Chairman. That is the last word. We have been here for 2 hours and 47 minutes. I have been on this committee for quite a while--otherwise I would not be sitting in this chair, and I do not recall a more significant hearing with more facts and figures being given than you gentlemen have provided. I want you to know, speaking for myself and I think for all of the Senators on this committee, I am enormously grateful for your having made the sacrifice to even be here, particularly Secretary Rumsfeld. You came quite a distance. But I do thank you on behalf of the Senate and the committee. As we close, let me point out once more, in case somebody has forgotten it, that last year this treaty was reported by this committee and scheduled for debate in the Senate. And it was not dropped by my request. It was dropped by the request of the administration, which did some head counting and realized they did not have the votes. Now I presume in saying that you think the Senate ought to vote on this treaty that you mean after the committee has performed under the rules and reported it to the Senate with a majority vote. Is that what you mean? Mr. Weinberger. Of course. Yes. Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, it is. Mr. Weinberger. As I said, Senator, I thought this was part of the process for the Senate. Mr. Rumsfeld. It's for this committee to decide that. Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, if we were ready last year, why aren't we ready this year? Nothing has changed in the treaty. The Chairman. Well, I don't know about that. I thought you and I made some changes in it. Senator Biden. Oh, we know we did. But the point is we were ready before. Dr. Schlesinger. Well, there are two branches of government, Senator, at least. Senator Kerry. But only one does treaties. The Chairman. I'm at a disadvantage with hearing aids, so I had better get out of this one. There being no further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess. Thank you again, gentlemen. [Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 3:30 p.m. the same day]