CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE APRIL 1997


                                                        S. Hrg. 105-183
                       CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
=======================================================================
                                HEARINGS
                               BEFORE THE
                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE
                       ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              P.M. SESSION

Albright, Hon. Madeleine Korbel, Secretary of State..............    61
    Prepared statement...........................................    64


CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ---------- TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--P.M. SESSION U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feinstein, and Wellstone. The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Madam Secretary, I was delighted late yesterday to learn that you wanted to appear before this committee today to give the benefit of the administration's perspective on the treaty again. I think it is clearly a matter of public record that the entire Helms family admires you. I think they are going to score some points by having you up here this afternoon. Now, if Senator Biden will agree, this is the first time you have appeared as Secretary of State formally. Secretary Albright. That is true. The Chairman. And this being such an important issue, I know that the Senators will have questions either in writing or in person that they want to ask directly of you. I know, knowing you, that you will respond to these written questions, realizing the Senators have commitments to other places. I and the other members of the committee will forego our statements, unless Senator Biden wishes to make one. Senator Biden. I will be happy to place mine in the record, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:] Prepared Statement of Senator Biden Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Secretary Albright this afternoon for appearing on such very short notice and making time in her busy schedule to be with us this afternoon because she recognizes the central importance of this issue for our national security. I appreciate the opportunity to take a few minutes again to address perhaps the most important issue to come before the 105th Congress to date: The Chemical Weapons Convention. This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: This treaty outlaws poison gas weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention would make it illegal under international and domestic laws for a country to use, develop, produce, transfer or stockpile chemical weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention represents a significant step forward in our efforts to contend with the greatest immediate threat to our national security: The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The CWC will help protect our citizens from the use of poison gas weapons by terrorist groups. It will benefit our military by requiring other nations to follow our lead and destroy their chemical weapons. It will improve the ability of our intelligence agencies to monitor chemical weapons threats to our armed forces and our Nation. The convention has the strong support of the American chemical industry, which was centrally involved in the negotiation of the CWC. It also takes into account all of the protections afforded Americans under our Constitution. The CWC will make pariahs out of states that refuse to abide by its provisions. Through the sanctions required by the convention, it will make it more difficult for those pariah states to obtain the precursor chemicals they need to manufacture poison gas. It will create international pressure on these states to sign and ratify the CWC and to abide by its provisions. The CWC will create a standard for good international citizens to meet. It will brand as outlaws those countries that choose to remain outside this regime. The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support for the important american objective of containing and penalizing rogue states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction. we need to disregard arguments that are superfluous to the core reality of what this convention will accomplish: It outlaws poison gas, period. The United States is already committed to destroying its chemical weapon arsenal. By ratifying the CWC, we can hold other countries to the same standard we have set for ourselves. In this morning's testimony, we heard three very distinguished former Secretaries of Defense tesify on this treaty. Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states, including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement. Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through mechanisms like the australia group. In reviewing the treaty, we find both claims are false. With regard to sharing defensive technology, paragraph seven of article ten states that: ``Each state party undertakes to provide assistance through the organization and to this end to elect to take one or more of the following measures.'' Let me emphasize: ``Elect to take one or more.'' Among the options, the option I expect the United States would choose, is that we could: ``Declare, not later than 180 days after this convention enters into force for [us], the kind of assistance we might provide in response to an appeal by the organization.'' That's right: We would declare what we might provide. The Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a condition that would require the executive branch not to provide any assistance to a rogue state beyond medical antidotes and treatment. And that would be fully in keeping with article ten of the CWC. As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place. Article eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this convention.'' But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our Australia Group allies. I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on chemical weapons. I will be interested to hear how the officials in the administration today view these provisions. I understand that Secretary Albright must leave after her statement today, and I welcome the opportunity to hear her testimony and the statements and responses of all of our witnesses here today. The Chairman. And we will print any statement that you wish to make for the record, and that will give you an opportunity to summarize if you wish. In other words, you are a free agent and you are welcome. Madam Secretary, the stage is yours. STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE KORBEL ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to see you here, as I enjoyed our trip to North Carolina. The Chairman. We enjoyed it. Secretary Albright. I had a good time. Senator Biden and Senator Brownback, I am very glad that you were able to make time for me to testify on such short notice. I am also delighted to note the return of Admiral Nance, who just walked through the door. I wish him continued recovery, and I say that sincerely on behalf of the entire Department and not simply those whose names are scheduled to come up before you for confirmation. Mr. Chairman, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is one of the President's top foreign policy priorities and, this afternoon, I would like to explain why. I begin with the imperative of American leadership. The United States is the only nation with the power and respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, we have used our influence wisely to gain the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan. We have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear program. We have maintained sanctions against Iraq. We have joined with others in controlling the transfer of dangerous conventional arms. In these and other efforts, we have counted on the support and counsel of this committee and your Senate colleagues. American leadership on arms control is not something we do as a favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for Americans and to protect our allies and friends. We have now another opportunity to exercise leadership for those ends and, once again, we look to this committee for help. The CWC will enter into force on April 29th. For reasons I will discuss, we believe it is essential to ratify the agreement before then, so that America will be an original party. Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly, massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable than the wind. We decided years ago to renounce the use of these weapons and to begin destroying our own chemical weapons stockpiles. Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others, but it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us. In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal. The gas Saddam Hussein used a decade ago to massacre Kurdish villagers was legally produced. In most countries, terrorists can buy chemical agents, such as sarin gas, legally. Countries such as Iran and Libya can buildup their stockpiles of chemical weapons legally. If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must begin by making not only their use, but also their development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. This is fun- damental. Making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the CWC. The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and effective tools for enforcing that standard. This will not eliminate all danger, but it will make chemical weapons harder for terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build, or conceal. Under the treaty, parties must give up the chemical weapons they have and refrain from developing or acquiring them in the future. To enforce these requirements, a comprehensive inspection regime will be in place. The treaty will give us the tools we need to learn more about chemical weapons programs. It will also enable us to act on the information we obtain. In the future, countries known to possess chemical weapons and who have joined the CWC will be forced to choose between compliance and sanctions. Countries outside the CWC will be subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to possess chemical weapons. These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to produce them. Over time, I believe that if the United States joins the CWC, most other countries will, too. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if America stays out, keeps them company, and gives them cover. We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the treaty being violated. The core question here is, who do we want to set the standards? Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed, because we cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. To me, that is like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, we should enact no law against drug smuggling. When it comes to the protection of Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by which all should be judged. Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April, we would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive Council for at least 1 year, thereby losing the right to help draft the rules by which the Convention will be enforced; we would lose the right to help administer and conduct inspections; and because of the trade restrictions imposed on nonmember states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they would risk serious economic loss. Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. The convention itself is the product of years of effort by leaders from both parties. The treaty has strong backing from our defense and military leaders. I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this morning from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not favor approval of this convention. Their arguments deserve consideration. I would point out, however, that other former Secretaries of Defense from both parties support the treaty, and that every former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, going back to the Carter administration, has endorsed it. Just this past week, we received a letter signed by 17 former four-star generals and admirals, including three of the former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and five former service chiefs. Let me quote from that letter: Each of us can point to decades of military experience in command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defense against them. The quote continues: Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC. I also note, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that your witnesses this morning have not had the benefit of the dialog we have been conducting with Senators, including yourself, the Ranking Member and other members of this committee. We have attempted, in the course of this dialog, to address the major issues treaty opponents have raised. For example, some believe the CWC will require its members to exchange manufacturing technology that could then be used to make chemical agents. In fact, the CWC prohibits members from providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical weapons proliferation. There are those who suggest that if we were to ratify the CWC, America would then become complacent about the threat that chemical weapons pose. This, too, is false, and this body can help ensure that it remains false. The President has requested an increase of almost $225 million over 6 years in our already robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and biological attack. Some have expressed the view that the inspection requirements of the CWC could raise constitutional problems here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional process. Another fear is that the CWC could become a regulatory nightmare for small business. But after reviewing the facts, the National Federation of Independent Business concluded that its members ``will not be affected'' by the treaty. Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really need not act before April 29th. But, as I have said, there are real costs attached to any such delay. The treaty has already been before the Senate for more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 pages of testimony and reports have been provided and hundreds of questions have been answered. The Senate is always the arbiter of its own pace; but from where I sit, a decision prior to April 29 would be very welcome and, Mr. Chairman, I believe very much in the best interest of the United States. Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a future of greater security and safety for us and for all who share our commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that future is through the maintenance of American readiness and the expansion of the rule of law. We are the center around which international consensus forms. We are the builder of coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader in separating acceptable international behavior from that which cannot be tolerated. This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden by some, but I think, to most of our citizens, it is a source of great pride. It is also a source of continuing strength, for our influence is essential to protect our interests, which are global and increasing. If we turn our backs on the CWC after so much effort by leaders from both parties, we will scar America with a grievous and self-inflicted wound. We will shed the cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for others to pick it up. But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as Generals Powell, Mundy and Schwarzkopf, and thoughtful public officials such as former Senators Nunn, Boren and Kassebaum- Baker, we will reinforce America's role in the world. By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who refuse to give up those poisonous weapons. We will provide an added measure of security for the men and women of our armed forces. We will protect American industry and American jobs. We will make our citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal. This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. It reflects existing American practices and advances enduring American interests. It is right and smart for America. It deserves the Senate's support and it deserves that support now. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:] Prepared Statement of Madeleine K. Albright Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you this afternoon. As evidenced by the bipartisan show of support at the White House last week, timely approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is one of the President's top foreign policy priorities. This afternoon, with the help of my colleagues, I would like to explain why. I begin with the imperative of American leadership. The United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, we have used our position wisely to gain the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. We have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear program. We have maintained sanctions against Iraq. And we have joined forces with more than two dozen other major countries in controlling the transfer of dangerous conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. In these and other efforts, we have counted on the strong support and wise counsel of this committee and your Senate colleagues. Your consent to ratification of the START II Treaty made possible the agreement in Helsinki to seek further significant reductions in cold war nuclear arsenals. And the Nunn-Lugar program set the standard for forward-looking bipartisan action to promote nuclear security. American leadership on arms control is not something we do as a favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for Americans and to protect our allies and friends. We have now another opportunity to exercise leadership for those ends. And once again, we look to this committee for help. The CWC will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to ratify the agreement before then so that America will be an original party. By so doing, as the President said last Friday, we ``can help to shield our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers * * * and we can bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, and proliferation around the world.'' Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly, massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable than the wind. That is why the United States decided--under a law signed by President Reagan in 1985--to destroy the vast majority of our chemical weapons stockpiles by the year 2004. Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others; but it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us. In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal. The gas Saddam Hussein used to massacre Kurdish villagers in 1988 was produced legally. In most countries, terrorists can produce or procure chemical agents, such as sarin gas, legally. Regimes such as Iran and Libya can buildup their stockpiles of chemical weapons legally. If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must begin by making not only their use, but also their development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. This is fundamental. This is especially important now when America's comparative military might is so great that an attack by unconventional means may hold for some potential adversaries their only perceived hope of success. And making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the CWC. The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build or possess a chemical weapon, and gives us strong and effective tools for enforcing that standard. This is not a magic wand. It will not eliminate all danger. It will not allow us to relax or cease to ensure the full preparedness of our armed forces against the threat of chemical weapons. What it will do is make chemical weapons harder for terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build or conceal. Under the treaty, parties will be required to give up the chemical weapons they have, and to refrain from developing, producing or acquiring such weapons in the future. To enforce these requirements, the most comprehensive and intense inspection regime ever negotiated will be put in place. Parties will also be obliged to enact and enforce laws to punish violators within their jurisdictions. Of course, no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but this treaty provides us valuable tools for monitoring chemical weapons proliferation worldwide--a task we will have to do with or without the CWC. CWC inspections and monitoring will help us learn more about chemical weapons programs. It will also enable us to act on the information we obtain. In the future, countries known to possess chemical weapons, and who have joined the CWC, will be forced to choose between compliance and sanctions. And countries outside the CWC will be subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to possess chemical arms. These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons, and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to produce them. Over time, I believe that--if the United States joins the CWC--most other countries will, too. Consider that there are now 185 members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and only five outside. Most nations play by the rules and want the respect and benefits the world bestows upon those who do. But the problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if America stays out, keeps them company and gives them cover. We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the treaty being violated. The core question here is who do we want to set the standards? Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed because we cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. To me, that is like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, we should enact no law against drug smuggling. When it comes to the protection of Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by which all should be judged. Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April: We would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive Council for at least 1 year, thereby costing us the chance to help draft the rules by which the convention will be enforced; We would not be able to participate in the critical first sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which monitors compliance; We would lose the right to help administer and conduct inspections; and Because of the trade restrictions imposed on nonmember states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they would risk serious economic loss. According to a letter signed by the CEOs of more than fifty chemical manufacturing companies, the American chemical industry's ``status as the world's preferred supplier * * * may be jeopardized if * * * the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC.'' According to those executives ``we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying American jobs.'' Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. The convention itself is the product of years of effort by leaders from both parties. And the treaty has strong backing from our defense and military leaders. I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this morning from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not favor approval of this convention. There is no question their arguments are sincerely held, and deserve consideration. I would point out, however, that other former Secretaries of Defense from both parties are on record in support of the treaty, and that every former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, going back to the Carter Administration, has endorsed it. Just this past week, we received a letter of support signed by 17 former four star generals and admirals, including three of the former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five former service chiefs. In their words: Each of us can point to decades of military experience in command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defenses against them. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC. I also note, Mr. Chairman, that the former officials who testified before the committee this morning have not had the benefit of the intensive dialog we have been conducting with Members of the Senate leadership, including yourself, the ranking Member, and other key members of this committee. We have attempted, in the course of this dialog, to address the major issues the opponents of the treaty have raised, and to provide appropriate assurances in binding conditions to accompany the resolution of ratification. For example, critics have asserted that the CWC obliges member states to exchange manufacturing technology that can be used to make chemical agents. This is untrue. The CWC prohibits members from providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical weapons proliferation. Nothing in the CWC requires any weakening of our export controls. Further, the United States will continue to work through the Australia Group to maintain and make more effective internationally agreed controls on chemical and biological weapons technology. And, as I have said, the CWC establishes tough restrictions on the transfer of precursor chemicals and other materials that might help a nation or terrorist group to acquire chemical weapons. Opponents also suggest that if we ratify the CWC, we will become complacent about the threat that chemical weapons pose. This, too, is false--and this body can help ensure it remains false. The President has requested an increase of almost $225 million over 5 years in our already robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and biological attack. We are also proceeding with theater missile defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat. Some critics of the treaty have expressed the fear that its inspection requirements could raise constitutional problems here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional processes. Another issue that arose early in the debate was that the CWC could become a regulatory nightmare for small businesses here in the United States. But after reviewing the facts, the National Federation of Independent Business concluded that its members ``will not be affected'' by the treaty. Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really need not act before April 29. But as I have said, there are real costs attached to any such delay. The treaty has already been before the Senate for more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 pages of testimony and reports have been provided, and hundreds of questions have been answered. The Senate is always the arbiter of its own pace. But from where I sit, a decision prior to April 29 would be very much in the best interests of the United States. Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a future of greater security and safety for us and for those who share our commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that future is through the maintenance of American readiness and the expansion of the rule of law. We are the center around which international consensus forms. We are the builder of coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader in separating acceptable international behavior from that which cannot be tolerated. This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden by some, but I think to most of our citizens, it is a source of great pride. It is also a source of continuing strength, for our influence is essential to protect our interests, which are global and increasing. If we turn our backs on the CWC, after so much effort by leaders from both parties, we will scar America with a grievous and self inflicted wound. We will shed the cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for others to pick up. But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as Generals Powell, Mundy, and Schwartzkopf, and thoughtful public officials such as former Senators Nunn, Boren, and Kassebaum-Baker, we will reinforce America's role in the world. By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who refuse to give up these poisonous weapons. We will provide an added measure of security for the men and women of our armed forces. We will protect American industry and American jobs. And we will make our citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal. This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. It reflects existing American practices and advances enduring American interests. It is right and smart for America. It deserves the Senate's timely support. Thank you very much. The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Let us see, we have nine, and you need to leave here by about 4:15 or 4:20? Secretary Albright. That is correct, sir. The Chairman. I think we will have to confine ourselves to about 3 minutes per Senator. Let me just say to you, as your well-advertised friend, that during the 103d Congress, both the Congress and the administration were controlled by the political party to which you belong and to which I once belonged. The CWC was submitted in November 1993 and it lay absolutely fallow for the entire remainder of the 103d Congress, with no action even hinted by the Senate. During the 104th Congress, with the Senate controlled by Republicans, we passed the treaty from this committee and were prepared to vote for it--or vote on it--on September 14, 1996. But, what do you know? On the very day that the vote was scheduled, the administration panicked and asked the Senate not to vote on the treaty. Now I read in the press that members of the administration are either openly stating or insinuating that some of us are to be blamed for blocking passage of the treaty. Now, that kind of thing will not do. I have said repeatedly, and I will say it to you again--and as we discussed when you were good enough to go to North Carolina--if some in the administration will stop stonewalling and let us look at some of the important changes that I think need to be made in this treaty, I think you might be surprised at the outcome. But as long as the administration stonewalls, I can stonewall, too. I am going to reserve the balance of my time. I think I have about a minute and a half remaining. Senator Biden. Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I will adopt your practice and yield to my colleague from California, since I get to speak to the Secretary all the time on this issue. Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator. Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. I very much appreciated your comments. Let me ask you a question that is somewhat speculative, but I hope you will answer it. I have been really very puzzled. I have read all of the analyses, all of the discussions that I could find between our Ranking Member and our Chairman over why this situation seems to have become so polarized. It is hard for me to understand it. I see the argument made on verification. It seems to me, though, that we are a step ahead whenever we make illegal the manufacture of some of these gasses. I think the important points you made in your speech were that the Iraqi gasses were legally made, and the degree to which nations will conform to an international concordat which simply states these are illegal and that the verification is based on the constitutional methodology of each country, that still we accomplish something. Have you been able to pinpoint more definitively any of the rationale for the opposition to this? Secretary Albright. Senator Feinstein, you ask, I think, a very important question. Because from the perspective of those of us who believe that this Chemical Weapons Convention is a tool for those countries, especially the United States, that have already given up the use of chemical weapons, to get insight and control over what is going on in other countries in chemical weapons programs, it seems mighty strange that we would want to deprive ourselves of what is clearly a very good method for checking up on what others are doing. I must say that as I have read testimony by the others or, frankly, have listened to my friend, the Chairman, who I think is a true patriotic American, there is something that makes one wonder what is the problem with this. I think that the issue comes down to the fact that we would all very much like to have perfect arms control treaties. That is, those that are completely and totally verifiable, that limit everybody else and leave us some options. This is not possible. This treaty does have certain issues raised about verification. But our estimation is that the treaty can verify and does verify problems where there can be a massive problem or a large military problem for the United States. Therefore, we can go through other parts, but I think that the reason that good Americans are concerned about this is that they want perfection, and what we have is a treaty that is excellent and very good and a useful tool for the United States. I would, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, like to enter into the record two letters that I have for you--one from the Secretary of Defense and one from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs--that really, I believe, address in a very cogent and coherent way some of the questions that have been raised. If I might just take one more minute and deal with the verification issue--and this is in Secretary Cohen's letter. He says: Critics have argued that the CWC's verification regime is not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our ability to monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation, which we must do with or without the CWC. As you know, the military use of any weapon typically requires significant testing, equipping, and training of forces. These activities would be more difficult to hide in the face of the CWC's comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection rights. Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this regime should enable us to more readily detect significant violations before they become a real problem for U.S. national security. So the point is the same--that it is impossible to have perfection. But with this convention, it is a huge step forward for America. [The material referred to by Secretary Albright follows:] The Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC 20501. The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510. Dear Mr. Chairman, Thank you for the opportunity to provide the views of the Department of Defense on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). I sincerely regret that my duties as Secretary of Defense have taken me out of the country and thereby, have precluded me from testifying before your Committee on this most important national security treaty. As you very well know, as we approach the next millennium, we face the prospect of regional aggressors and others seeking to use chemical weapons to achieve what they cannot achieve through conventional military means. Dealing with this threat requires a coherent, multi- faceted national response involving: active and passive defenses against chemical weapons; strong unilateral and multilateral export controls to limit the spread of chemical weapons technology; improved intelligence collection and threat analysis; well-coordinated civil defense capabilities and an international standard barring the production and possession of chemical weapons. The CWC is a necessary component of this response. It strengthens our hand in achieving effective limits on the spread of technology that could be used against us, supports our intelligence and civil defense efforts, and holds others to the standard that Presidents Reagan and Bush and previous Congresses set for the United States. As I have stated before, the United States does not need chemical weapons to protect our security interests. Our robust military response capabilities and increasingly robust defensive capabilities provide an effective deterrent and allow us to inflict an effective, devastating and overwhelming response should we be attacked. We have a strong national security interest in seeing other nations eliminate their chemical weapons stockpiles and capabilities, since that elimination will reduce the risk that our troops will face chemical weapons on the battlefield. Critics of the CWC have made several assertions regarding the implications of the CWC for our national security that I urge you to reject. Chemical Defense: Critics suggest that if the United States ratifies the CWC, it will reduce our support for defensive measures. Nothing could be further from the truth. DOD not only maintains a robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and biological attack, but I have asked Congress to increase our budget for chemical and biological defenses by almost $225 million over the next six years. Moreover, I place a high priority on our theater missile defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat U.S. Response Capability: Critics charge that the CWC, by constraining riot control agents, will reduce our options for responding to an attack against our troops, including our ability to rescue downed pilots. In fact, the Chemical Weapons Convention does not limit our options in the situations in which our troops are most likely to be engaged and pilots might be downed: peacetime military operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict in which the U.S. is not a party to the conflict (such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda); consensual peacetime operations when the receiving state has authorized the use of force (including UN Chapter VI operations); and peacekeeping operations under the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council. In all such cases, the CWC's restrictions on the use of RCAs against combatants apply only when U.S. forces are engaged in a use of force of a scope, duration and intensity which would trigger the laws of war. These are situations in which other options normally would be used and for which I am accelerating the development and fielding of non-chemical, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with the CWC. The CWC also does not limit our options in normal peacekeeping operations and other likely scenarios, such as law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, counterterrorist and hostage rescue operations and noncombatant rescue operations outside of internal or international armed conflict. Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Some have argued that by ratifying the CWC, we would be contributing to chemical weapons proliferation. This is because they believe that the CWC would require us to provide to other member states our most advanced defensive equipment and manufacturing technologies, which some of these states would then use to build up clandestinely their chemical weapons capabilities. In fact. nothing in the CWC requires that we share our advanced chemical weapons defensive capabilities or chemical manufacturing technologies. Indeed, quite the opposite is true. The CWC prohibits any member from providing any assistance to anyone if that member believes that doing so would contribute to chemical weapons proliferation. Further, it establishes strict trade restrictions on precursor chemicals and requires that member states ensure that their internal regulations, which would include export controls, also are consistent with the object and purpose of the CWC. We will continue to work in the Australia Group to maintain effective internationally-agreed controls on chemical weapons- usable elements and technology. Rogue States: While some critics argue that it is meaningless since only law-abiding nations will respect it, the reality is that the CWC will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogue states and impose trade restrictions that will curb their ability to obtain the materials to make chemical agents. This is clearly better than the status quo. Verification: Critics have argued that the CWC's verification regime is not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our ability to monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation--which we must do with or without the CWC. As you know, the military use of any weapon typically requires significant testing, equipping and training of forces. These activities would be more difficult to hide in the face of the CWC's comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection rights. Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this regime should enable us to more readily detect significant violations before they become a real problem for U.S. national security. U.S. Industry: Some critics have claimed that the CWC will impose costly burdens on U.S. industry that could potentially erode our technological edge and, by eroding our edge, affect our national security. The reality is that the American chemical companies most affected by the CWC view its requirements as reasonable and manageable. Small chemical businesses who were initially troubled by critics' claims now also agree that abiding by the CWC will be manageable. The reality also is that, if the United States fails to ratify the CWC, it will be U.S. industry that is penalized with trade restrictions that industry estimates could cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Mr. Chairman, in the 1980s, I led the Congressional fight to build binary chemical weapons to deter Soviet chemical use in Europe. With the end of the Cold War, the world has changed. Regional aggressors can be deterred by our vow to respond with overwhelming and devastating force to a chemical attack. Our military commanders agree that threatening a chemical weapons response is not necessary and they support the CWC. The safety of our troops and the security of our nation will be strengthened by the CWC. But, the clock is ticking. So that we can reap the full security benefits of the CWC, it is imperative that the Congress act on this national security treaty before the treaty goes into force on April 29. If we ratify in time, the U.S. will have a seat at the table during the first critical days of implementation of the CWC and be assured that American citizens will be able to ensure the fullest and most rigorous compliance with this treaty. I urge your Committee to report the Chemical Weapons Convention out favorably to the Senate and the Senate to act now to ratify the Convention before it enters into force on April 29. Sincerely, William S. Cohen cc: Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 20510-3301, 8 April 1997. The Honorable Jesse Helms Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510-3301 Dear Mr. Chairman, Thank you for the opportunity to provide you, and through you to the United States Senate, my military appraisal of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Let me state that the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention by as many nations as possible is in the best interest of the Armed Forces of the United States. The combination of the nonproliferation and disarmament aspects of the Convention greatly reduces the likelihood that US Forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional conflict. The protection of the young men and women in our forces, should they have to go in harm's way in the future, is strengthened not diminished, by the CWC. The United States has unilaterally commenced the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile--under the CWC, all other chemical weapons capable State Parties incur this same obligation. While no verification regime is perfect, the Convention's regime allows for intrusive inspections while protecting national security concerns. The CWC enjoins the world community to forego these heinous weapons, implements a regime of enforcement, and impairs the ability of those outside the Convention to obtain the materials to make chemical agents. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders are steadfast in support for a strong chemical defense posture. We will maintain a robust chemical defensive capability supported by aggressive intelligence collection efforts, but will not rely solely an these measures. As Secretary Perry testified in March 1996, if any country was foolish enough to use chemical against the United States, the response will be overwhelming and devastating. We do not need chemical weapons to provide an effective deterrent or to deliver an effective response. It is important to emphasize that the CWC permits the use of riot control agents under most scenarios that the United States will likely face during future operations. If US Forces are deployed during peacetime to intercede in an internal or international armed conflict, such as under a UN mandate, the CWC will not affect our use of RCAs unless US or UN Forces become engaged in a use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect to these forces. Until that time, the United States is not restricted by the CWC in its RCA use options, including against combatants who are parties to the conflict. If we are a party to an international armed conflict, the CWC prohibits the use of RCAs only in specific situations where combatants are present. In these particular situations, options other than RCA exist. As one example, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with the CWC could be employed. The CWC permits RCA use in riot control situations under direct and distinct US military control, such as controlling rioting prisoners of war, and in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civilian disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. The ability of our forces to defend themselves will not be reduced by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Nothing will override our commanders' inherent authority and obligation to use all legal means available and to take all appropriate action, including the use of lethal force, in self defense of their units and personnel. In my military judgment, we are better served as an original member of the Convention. I strongly support this Convention and respectfully request the Senate's advice and consent. Sincerely, John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Copy to: The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Ranking Member The Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee The Honorable Carl Levin, Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Lugar. Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, two of the strong points of the convention are that our own intelligence will be enhanced-- namely, we know a lot about chemical weapons, or believe we do now; but, given the network of inspections and a network of finding out about the shipment of chemicals and their precursors, we will have a better lead as to who is active and where the materials are going. The question that arises, and I suppose arose this morning, is: Is there value to us in terms of having international law behind us; that is, a norm in which clearly the production of chemical weapons is illegal in the world? I just ask you from your standpoint of your previous work in the United Nations, dealing with other nations. If the charge is made that we might let our guard down, would not be active, is it not your experience that in fact, if we have international law going for us, plus an international set of inspections and intelligence collection, we are more likely not only to act, but to act effectively, and maybe even, in some cases, unilaterally? Specifically, if Libya had a situation that we felt was undesirable, we could now, I presume, send aircraft there and demolish the facilities before they knew what we were doing? Are we more likely, however, as a Nation, to do that if we have international law going for us, plus the intelligence apparatus of all other nations going for us likewise? Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, I believe that we gain greatly by having, first of all, the added intelligence capability that comes from having an international regime and, second, the force of being part of an international regime. Though it is not exactly the same situation, I would say that we have multiplied our own effectiveness through something like the IAEA--the way to inspect and have safeguards on nuclear weapons, by having a regime that puts the force of the entire international community behind an inspection or behind a determination to take action and provide international sanctions. So this is a force multiplier for us, the country that no longer plans to use chemical weapons ourselves and knows that others still have them. Senator Lugar. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Biden. Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, it seems to me--and I will not take the time, in part, because I do not have the time-- that everything that the critics say is wrong with this treaty is worse without the treaty, beginning with verification and I think, literally, every major criticism. Let me ask you a question. This is a strange-sounding question, I guess. But let us assume we either bring this treaty up--hopefully, we will have an opportunity to do that by April 29th and vote on it--we bring it up and it is defeated or we do not bring it up. What do you say? I mean what happens? Describe to us what happens when you attend the next meeting of your counterparts, where the Secretaries of State, your counterparts in France and Germany and Great Britain, et cetera--I mean our allies, our friends, the Australia Group-- not all of whom are European, obviously--what happens at that meeting? I am not being facetious when I ask the question; I am being serious. Secretary Albright. I would hope very much that I would never have to be in that position; because I truly do think that it would be not just a major embarrassment for the leading country in the world to be in a position of having decided not to become a part of what is now a hugely ratified convention, but I think it would also hurt us, Senator, in other ways. Because we see ourselves as the leaders of creating international norms and regimes. I think I have said to some of you that I believe that there are four groups of countries in the world, and the largest one are those countries of which we are the leader, that are basically those countries that abide by international norms, that provide--because they establish a better way of life for our citizens--rules of the road. It would lessen our credibility not only in this obviously important regime but across the board if we decide, for some reason, not to become a part of what is clearly a step forward in limiting weapons of mass destruction. I think it would hurt our credibility across the board, and not just on this issue, Senator Biden. Senator Biden. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary. The Chairman. Senator Coverdell. Senator Coverdell. Madam Secretary, I know that there have been extensive discussions about conditions between the administration, the Chairman, and others. Could you characterize your assessment of the progress, your general feeling at this hour, as we are embedded in the debate? Is there an optimism on your part with regard to this process? Have we gone as far as we can and we are down to our differences? Do you characterize it as still being a viable process that might move to an agreement? Secretary Albright. Senator Coverdell, first of all, I think that there has been a great deal of goodwill as the process has gone forward and through a variety of meetings. There has been, I think, considerable movement on dealing with a variety of questions that obviously are legitimate, given our process of government and the importance of having you all, as the representatives of the people, understand more about how this treaty is being carried out. I do think that I am optimistic, because that is my nature. I do think that while there are still a number of points on which we disagree, that we are moving forward in a good way. What I do think is absolutely important is for the time to come for the Senate to vote. There have been, as I have stated--13 hearings that have been held before this one was, 1,500 pages of testimony, lots of back-and-forth, in terms of trying to exchange information. I think that if we cannot agree on some of the differences within informal groupings, that there must be some way that we can vote--you all can vote--on the differences that still exist. I cannot stress enough the importance of having the vote before the time expires to be an original party. I think we are definitely cutting off our nose to spite our face if we do not ratify before that deadline. Our request to all of you is to vote. Senator Coverdell. If I have just a second, just as a matter for clarification and not necessarily related to the overall aspect of our position in the world, but has Israel signed this treaty, do you know? Secretary Albright. Israel has signed, but not ratified. Senator Coverdell. But not ratified? Secretary Albright. Right. The Chairman. The Senator from Minnesota. Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank you. I guess, in the limited amount of time that we have, almost more than asking the question, I just would like to amplify or build on a point you made about the importance of our hoping to have an agreement and moving this forward and having a vote. I am on the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and General Schwarzkopf, when he testified before our committee dealing with the illness of the Gulf veterans, was really poignant in also expressing his support for this agreement. Just to quote from not just General Schwarzkopf, but any number of other military leaders: ``On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security against chemical weapons.'' I think that was your point. You did not come here to argue it is perfect. We must continue to support robust defense capabilities and remain willing to respond through the CWC or by unilateral action to violators of the convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations but, instead, on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops, it significantly improves our intelligence capabilities, and it creates new international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will be able to have an agreement and bring this to the floor. I do believe we owe it to people in the country to have an up or down vote, and I hope it will be a favorable vote. Secretary Albright. I must say that I was very impressed with the testimony that General Schwarzkopf gave earlier, in which he basically said that, by our not ratifying, we put ourself on the side of Iraq and Libya and on a different side from our allies. I think, when Senator Biden said, how would I feel in meetings, I would find it mighty strange to be on the same side of the table as Iraq and Libya. The Chairman. Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Madam Secretary, always nice to see you. Secretary Albright. Thank you. Senator Hagel. Since I last saw you, I know you have become much more enlightened in many areas. You have played baseball. You have gone to North Carolina. Secretary Albright. That is true. Senator Hagel. I know we can expect even greater things from you now. Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, picking up on the Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria issues, those are the real threats. Those countries are the real threats. I do not believe the threats of chemical warfare to our troops or civilized nations' troops are within the signatory countries of the CWC. So my question is: How do we get to the real threat, those countries that we fear most, who we either suspect or know now possess chemical weapons and are not afraid to use them? Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that it is exactly because of our concern over the rogue states that we have to try to use the tools that the international regime puts before us. I think that what happens here is, first of all, that it becomes even more clear that the rogue states are isolated politically and that they are subject to trade sanctions that put pressure on their economies and limit their ability to obtain the ingredients for chemical weapons. If, for instance, there is also a concern, I think, by some that they will sign in a cynical way, well, if they sign up and then try to cheat, the rogue states will be subject to the CWC's unprecedented verification measures, and they will probably get caught. When they are caught, they will be subject to international pressure and other CWC sanctions. I think that by not putting ourselves in a position of being one of the original ratifiers of CWC, we weaken the convention itself, and then weaken our own ability and deprive ourselves of this force multiplier to try to get at the rogue states. This is the single best tool we have to try to get a handle on the Iraqs and Libyas, because this will provide an eye into their system. Senator Hagel. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Smith. Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank you for coming. There is an old saying in politics that to get a vote, you have got to ask for a vote. I appreciate your being here, because no one from the administration has ever asked for my vote on this. I have had many people from the other side asking me for my vote on this. Senator Biden. Ask him, will you, now, quick. Ask him. Secretary Albright. Give me a minute. I was going to do it with drama. Senator Smith. And all I have heard is from the other side. So my question, which has already been asked somewhat before, is: Is this the best we can do? And Senator Helms' comments earlier, which were that there are three points he wants to work out. Is it too late to work anything else out in this treaty? Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me say officially, openly, publicly, I am asking you for your vote. Senator Smith. Thank you. Secretary Albright. And let me also say that there are some areas, I think, that the Chairman has concern about that I think we can still work on. I think there are some where we may not be able to work something out. You all will have to vote on that. Senator Smith. And would that be done in the OPCW decisionmaking process, which means the April 29 deadline and U.S. participation in the process are important? Is that where we address questions like nonlethal chemicals that our police may need for riot control and things of that nature? Secretary Albright. Well, let us talk specifically about the riot control issue. I think that difference, if I may be so bold, is based on a misunderstanding about what the treaty provides in terms of riot control. If I might just take a minute while asking you for your vote to explain fully what happens to the riot control agents. The CWC does not limit our ability to use RCA's, riot control agents, in the situations in which U.S. troops are most likely to be involved. I think there is a concern that we are robbing ourselves of a tool. What I am going to tell you is how we are not doing that. The CWC does not limit our options in such likely scenarios as law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations, and noncombatant rescue operations outside of armed conflict. The CWC also does not limit RCA use under normal peacekeeping operations. That includes peacetime operations within an area of ongoing conflict, to which the U.S. is not a party, such as Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda, or in consensual peacetime operations, when the receiving State has authorized the use of force--that is including Chapter 6 operations under the U.N. peacekeeping operations under Chapter 7. So the CWC restrictions on riot control agents apply only when combatants are present and U.S. forces are engaged in the use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would trigger the laws of war. Now, the reason I read this to you in such detail is that I think this is an example of where we may have a misunderstanding of fact and as one of the areas where there are still discussions, which we believe could be dealt with. In the letter that I introduced into the record, written by General Shalikashvili, I think more of this is addressed. So I am hoping, in the intervening days we have here, that we can address in a factual way some of the problems that still exist. Senator Smith. Thank you. I hope that we can do that. My time is up. We are discharging our constitutional responsibility to vote on this treaty. One of my concerns you answered earlier in your testimony, which was that we are not in fact voting for something that is unconstitutional or violates the constitutional rights of Americans. Finally, I hope at some point here you can address an implication that Secretary Schlesinger made that some in the FBI are being muzzled right now, not to speak unfavorably about this treaty. I wonder, at some point, if you could comment on that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Grams. Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, a pleasure to see you. Just to kind of clarify the last question that Senator Smith asked, dealing with riot control chemicals. On February 2nd, an article in a column by John Deutch, who served as Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of Defense for President Clinton, wrote the following. He said: We should reject interpretations of the CWC that prohibit the use of tear gas or other nonlethal chemicals so that we do not put ourselves in the bizarre position of having no choice but to rely on guns and bullets when we face situations like driving off noncombatants who might be threatening a downed pilot. Now, do you agree with that statement? And do you believe that is what the CWC is stating clearly? Secretary Albright. I think that the CWC does not prohibit it. As I said, the restrictions apply only when combatants are present and U.S. forces are engaged in the use of force of the scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the laws of war. I think we would have to see what the situation is. But, basically, it is possible for us to use various new kinds of chemical agents in order to rescue hostages and to deal with isolated issues. We always have a third choice in a war, which is to use nonlethal weapons. We are not left only with the possibility of using chemical weapons or riot control agents. Senator Grams. So, generally then, you would agree with the statement that Mr. Deutch made? Secretary Albright. Well, I would have to see it within its overall context, but I generally agree with the statements that he made. Senator Grams. And just one other quick question dealing with Russia. The recent record on arms control agreements has been less than impressive for Russia. It has not implemented the Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical weapons which it signed with the United States several years ago. There have been reports that Russia has developed a chemical weapons program specifically designed to evade the CWC. In addition, Russia has not even ratified the START II Treaty on nuclear weapons, which I and many other Senators strongly support. So does the administration believe that Russia should agree to fully implement the Bilateral Destruction Agreement before the U.S. would join the CWC? Secretary Albright. Senator, let me just take a little minute here to explain something. We just finished our meetings in Helsinki with the Russians. We went there with the idea of issuing a number of joint communiques. One which had not been part of our original intention, because we were dealing with Russia--NATO and with START and other issues--but the Russians came to us and we then issued a joint U.S.-Russian statement on chemical weapons. It was basically done because of President Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Primakov's interest in making clear that they wanted to go forward in order to expedite ratification. So the second paragraph says: The Presidents reaffirm their intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries. President Clinton expressed his determination that the U.S. be a party. Then President Yeltsin noted that the convention had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation for prompt ratification--I am not reading it all. The Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential and to gain experience with procedures and measures for verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, et cetera. So I would say that there is a major push on behalf of President Yeltsin, who is going to use this document to make sure that they go forward with ratification of the CWC also. Senator Grams. How much cost will there be to the U.S. For the Russian program to destroy its chemical weapons? Secretary Albright. I will have to get that for you for the record. [The information referred to was unavailable at the time of printing.] Senator Grams. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes. Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think I first ought to give you the opportunity--because the question was simply left hanging out there by one of my colleagues--that people within the administration were being muzzled with respect to commenting on this treaty. I think the specific reference was to the FBI. Could you address that? Secretary Albright. Senator, I am completely unaware that something like that would be taking place. I have heard nothing like that. I have no reason to believe that that is true-- absolutely none. Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, the Joint Chiefs are in favor of this treaty, are they not? Secretary Albright. They are, sir. Senator Sarbanes. And I think they have been very clear in indicating, not just the chairman, but all the other members of the Joint Chiefs, as well, is that correct? Secretary Albright. That is correct. Then, earlier, there was a letter submitted, or a statement, by 17 other former generals and former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and other generals very much in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Senator Sarbanes. I do not quite understand--and I addressed some questions this morning directed toward it--this notion that unless the rogue states sign up, the rest of the world should not approve and ratify this treaty and the United States ought not to be part of it. Do you understand that argument? Secretary Albright. I do not, sir, because my own feeling is that it is as if we had been provided with a brand-new mechanism for looking inside potential violator societies to find out what they are doing. We are eschewing that tool mainly because the rogues, or those who are not part of the system, do not want to sign it. As I said in my statement, it is like saying that you are not going to have laws against drug smuggling just because all the drug smugglers have not signed up to it. What you do is you try to develop the best possible regime, and not allow the lowest common denominator to determine what the will of the international community and the majority of nation-states would like to have happen. Senator Sarbanes. Would not the convention in fact make it possible to put into place a more rigorous regime against the rogue states than is possible under the current situation? Secretary Albright. Absolutely. What it does is provide a system for intrusive inspections into their societies, and then a system for also having more stringent sanctions against them, with the force of having international law and the international community behind them. So, by deciding not to take action until they do, I think we are cutting off our nose to spite our face. The Chairman. Madam Secretary, we are within 2 or 3 minutes of fulfilling what I hope was a commitment. Before you leave, let me suggest that you mention to the administration that it would clear up the whole thing if a statement were issued in the name of the President or the administration, saying that nobody in the FBI nor anybody else employed by the Federal Government must not speak disapprovingly of the treaty. Now, that will clear it up. Now, there is one other thing. The Chemical Manufacturers' Association was claiming that $600 million in sales would be lost if this treaty is not ratified. We discussed that when you were here. They have since cut that number down by more than half, and even their new figures are highly suspect. It was said here this morning that the Chemical Manufacturers' Association does not represent the small manufacturers--only a few big ones. During your confirmation hearing, you may recall that I asked that you supply the committee with a detailed list of chemicals that would be affected if the United States were not to ratify the CWC. You told me then, in good faith I am sure, that such a list would be forthcoming. It has not come. I certainly understand why. Would you tell your people to get that list to us? Secretary Albright. Yes, absolutely. The Chairman. I know you have another meeting. I thank you for coming to see us. Do you have further comments to make? I see notes being passed around. I figured there is one more thing they want you to say. Secretary Albright. Yes. Apparently the list has been sent to you this morning in response to that question. The Chairman. This morning. Very well. Secretary Albright. So the check is in the mail. The Chairman. If there be no further business to come before the committee---- Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further business for the Secretary. I want to just publicly thank you. I was a bit of a pain in the neck in attempting to see you and ask you to accommodate. I guess I was a pain in the neck to Secretary Albright, as well, to come up here this afternoon. I thought it was important. With regard to tomorrow's hearing, Mr. Chairman. I realize that the committee has a rule that I am just learning. Back in the good old days, when my team was in charge and I was Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, we used to have a one-to- one rule. That is, the minority and majority could have the same number of witnesses. I have learned subsequently that is not the rule here. The Chairman. It never has been. Senator Biden. I understand that. But yesterday we were going to have--I wanted to have Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Deutch. Mr. Deutch had to go out of town. I said to my staff--there was a bit of a misunderstanding--that Scowcroft could come tomorrow, along with General Rowny and Admiral Zumwalt. I am now told by my staff that they may not be able to appear tomorrow because of a rule. I would like you to consider accommodating a rookie ranking minority member here and allow them, since I have asked them to change their schedules, so that I do not find myself--this is probably the only thing I have ever agreed with General Rowny on and Admiral Zumwalt. And I do not want to completely ruin my credibility with them. So I would like to publicly ask you to consider allowing an exception to the rule. I will give up two future draft choices at a later date if you would consider allowing me to have them tomorrow, notwithstanding the committee tradition of a 2- or 3-to-1 majority. So I am going to publicly ask you if you would consider that. I am not asking for an answer now. If the answer is no, do not give it to me now. If it is yes, I would take it now. The Chairman. Well, as Mr. English back in my home town of Monroe used to say, I will study about it. Senator Biden. All right. Good. The Chairman. There being no further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess. [Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 2:11 p.m., April 9, 1997.]