In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, have agreed on the following measures relating to its implementation.

1. The Parties understand the requirements contained in paragraph 2 of Article IX and paragraph 2(a) of Article XIII of the Treaty to mean that all updates of data shall be exchanged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC).

2. The Parties understand that the updated data required pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article IX of the Treaty shall include data only for those elements of the missile systems and the facilities that have changed since the preceding data exchange or are in the process of being changed.

3. The Parties agree that when the notification required pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty is provided, the Party making such a notification shall also provide a site diagram of the new facility to the other Party through diplomatic channels.

4. The Parties understand that each Party shall be permitted to reschedule activities notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty. The Parties agree that such changes shall be made in accordance with the principle of minimizing hardship on the inspecting Party. The Parties understand that if the scheduled date referred to in paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty is delayed for more than five days, then the Party that has provided the notification referred to above shall provide an additional notification specifying the new scheduled date to the other Party within a short period of time. The period of time between the transmission date of the additional notification and the new scheduled date indicated in that notification shall not be less than ten days.

5. The Parties understand that each Party shall be permitted to change information contained in a notification provided pursuant to paragraph 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty.

6. The Parties understand that notifications provided by each Party pursuant to paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, specifying the number of missile systems eliminated as well as the date and location of their elimination, shall be provided by each Party after it has completed the process of elimination of all systems declared in a particular notification pursuant to paragraph 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty. Such notifications shall also be provided after completion of the inspection report compiled in accordance, with paragraph 1(d) of Part F of Section III of this Memorandum.

7. The Parties agree that in the case of a delay of an activity notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty:

(a) If the delay is five days or less and the inspection team is either en route to the point of entry or has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall decide whether the inspection team should be located at the point of entry or at the inspection site for the period of the delay.

(b) If the delay is more than five days and the inspection team has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, then such an inspection team shall leave the territory of the inspected Party unless the Parties agree otherwise.

8. The Parties understand that in the course of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to weigh and measure each item listed in Section VI of the memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, to confirm its technical data. A list of specialized equipment and procedures used to conduct these inspections is contained in Annex VI to this memorandum.

9. The Parties understand the term "calendar year" as used in paragraph 5 of Article XI and paragraph 3 of Article XII of the Treaty and paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as ,the Protocol on Inspection, to mean a period of 12 months commencing at entry into force of the Treaty.

10. The Parties understand that the obligation contained in paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, which concerns ensuring that the inspecting Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system within six months after entry into force of the Treaty, does not preclude the installation of agreed equipment for the permanent continuous monitoring system either before or after the end of the sixth month after entry into force of the Treaty, or the replacement of it with new agreed equipment after that time.

11. The Parties agree that in conducting inspections of the former SS-20 missile launcher production facility, one of the features allowing the inspecting Party to distinguish SS-20 missile launchers from launchers of other types of missiles shall be the number of axles of the chassis, with the understanding that the chassis of the SS-20 missile launcher has six axles.

12. The Parties agree that all notifications transmitted through the NRRC shall be made with reference to Greenwich Mean Time.

13. The Parties agree that, unless otherwise specified in this Memorandum, the Parties shall use the NRRC for all notifications referred to in this Memorandum.

1. The Parties, referring to paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Elimination, agree upon different procedures for eliminating the front section and of the SS-20 missile, and the front sections of the BGM-109G missile the SS-4 missile, and the SSC-X-4 missile. Such procedures, while differing from the procedures contained in subparagraph (c) of the BGM-109GV SS-20 and SSC-X-4 missile elimination procedures and subparagraph (d) of the SS-4 missile elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination, achieve the same result as the procedures contained in those subparagraphs.

(a) Different procedures for the elimination of the front sections of the BGM-109G missile and the SSC-X-4 missile are as follows: front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces.

(b) Different procedures for the elimination of the front section and the instrumentation compartment of the SS-20 missile are as follows: front section including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be destroyed by explosion.

(c) Different procedure for the elimination of the front section of the SS-4 missile is as follows: front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be destroyed by explosion.

2. The Parties agree that in implementing the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination for eliminating the BGM-109G missile and the SSC-X-4 missile, the inspected Party shall be permitted to separate the missile airframe into sections before it is cut longitudinally into two pieces.

3. The Parties understand paragraph 2 of section IV of the Protocol on Elimination to mean that transportable propellant tanks for the SS-4 missile are considered to be eliminated when removed from the SS-4 missile operating bases and the SS-4 missile test range launch site that are indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. The Parties understand that equipment and structures that are located at training sites and are not related to systems covered by the Treaty are not subject to elimination and may stay at these sites after the completion of elimination of the facility.

A. Pre-Inspection Requirements

1. The Parties understand that each of the three lists exchanged pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection may contain fewer than 200 individuals and may be supplemented pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection.

2. The Parties agree that inspection team members shall wear civilian clothes throughout the in-country period and shall wear unique badges while at the inspection site and while at other locations as agreed by the inspection team leader and the in- country escort team leader. The inspecting Party shall provide its inspectors with such badges.

3. The Parties agree that the United States of America shall provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with unique baggage tags and that both Parties shall use such unique tags to identify the baggage of both the inspection team and the aircrew members.

4. The Parties agree that the standing diplomatic clearance numbers for inspection airplanes, which are required pursuant to paragraph 8 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, shall be those indicated in Annex I to this memorandum.

5. The Parties agree that since, as is indicated in paragraph 8 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, inspection airplanes shall arrive at and depart from the point of entry along established international airways, representatives of the inspected Party need not be on board such airplanes as escorts. The Parties shall use the airplane routes which are listed in Annex II to this memorandum to and from each of the points of entry. Alternate airfields shall be designated in accordance with International Civil Aviation organization regulations.

6. The Parties agree to have on board their inspection airplanes navigation equipment of the types listed in Annex II to this Memorandum.

7. The Parties agree that-inspection airplanes may include military transport airplanes with standard markings and paint schemes, to include camouflage. The inspection airplanes which may be used are:

(a) for the United States of America, airplanes known as the C-130# C-141, C-9 and T-43; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, airplanes known as the IL-62, TU-134 and TU-154.

8. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that the United States of America shall be permitted to use the airplane known as the C-5 as an inspection airplane and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be permitted to use the airplane known as the AN-124 as an inspection airplane. The Parties agree to use these airplanes only for flights into and out of Moscow and San Francisco points of entry; such flights shall not be routine and shall be used for the delivery or removal of inspection equipment listed in Section I of Annex V to this Memorandum. Whenever either Party deems it necessary, these airplanes shall be permitted, at the same-time that they are delivering or removing inspection equipment, to carry inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. In order to use the C-5 and AN-124 airplanes as inspection airplanes:

(a) Each Party, not later than 20 days prior to the scheduled date of arrival of the airplane at the point of entry, shall notify the other Party of its intention to carry out such a flight and shall provide lists of the aircrew members and inspectors for the scheduled flight.

(b) The Parties agree that the limit on aircrew members set forth in paragraph 1 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that the number of aircrew members for each of such flights shall not exceed 25. This number shall include personnel for loading and unloading the cargoes that are being transported.

(c) The Parties agree that the period for conveying agreement to the designation of each aircrew member set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that each Party, within 15 days after receipt of the notification of the intention of the other Party to carry out such a flight, shall review the proposed list of aircrew members for this airplane and inform the other Party of its agreement to the designation of each aircrew member proposed.

(d) The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the fulfillment of the provisions of subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, the overall limit on the number of aircrew members, that is 200 individuals, set forth in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights.

(e) The Parties agree that the visa requirements set forth in paragraph S of section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that the inspected Party, within the 15-day period provided for in subparagraph (c) above, shall ensure the granting of a single-entry visa to each aircrew member to whose entry it has agreed on the basis of the submitted list of aircrew members.

(f) The Party carrying out a flight for delivering equipment to a continuous monitoring inspection site shall so notify the other Party in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Part D of this Section.

The Parties agree that, except as provided for above, the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection and this memorandum that apply to inspection airplanes also shall apply to flights of the C-5 and AN-124 airplanes.

9. The Parties understand that they shall be permitted to use regularly scheduled commercial flights to deliver inspectors to those points of entry that are served by airlines. The Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to regularly scheduled commercial flights or to aircrews serving such flights used for delivering inspectors to points of entry.

B. Notifications

1. The Parties understand paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection to require the inspecting Party to file the flight plan for an inspection airplane in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization procedures and to notify the inspected Party of the content of that flight plan.

2. The Parties agree to assign the call sign "info-XXX" (three digits) to inspection airplanes. Odd hundred call signs shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the United States of America (for example, 1XX, 3XX, 5XX) and even hundred call signs shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (for example, 2XX, 4XX, 6XX).

C. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. The Parties, referring to paragraph 1 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection, understand that the diplomatic aircrew escort shall meet and accompany an inspection team arriving on a regularly scheduled commercial flight. The Parties understand that the diplomatic aircrew escort shall not be permitted to accompany the inspection team beyond the point of entry.

2. The Parties agree that if an inspection team arrives at the San Francisco point of entry on an inspection airplane, it shall land at Travis Air Force Base. The diplomatic aircrew escort, comprised of one or two accredited diplomats assigned to the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet socialist Republics in San Francisco, shall be permitted to travel to and have access to Travis Air Force Base for the purpose of meeting the inspection airplane, aircrew members and inspectors arriving there. In order to gain access to the Base, the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco:

(a) shall contact the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone and report the name or names of the personnel involved and the license plate number of the vehicle involved; and

(b) shall ensure that such information is provided not less than four hours before the estimated time of arrival of the inspection airplane at Travis Air Force Base.

The diplomatic aircrew escort shall not be permitted to leave the free movement zone, as that zone is defined in the Notes of the United States Department of state of March 18, 1983, and of November 16, 1983, en route to Travis Air Force Base more than four hours before the estimated time of arrival of the inspection airplane. If such notification is made in accordance with these procedures, then the diplomatic aircrew escort shall be granted access to Travis Air Force Base not less than 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the inspection airplane at the Base.

3. The Parties agree that if an inspection team arrives at San Francisco International Airport on a regularly scheduled commercial flight, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to Travis Air Force Base. In this case, the diplomatic aircrew escort, comprised of one or two accredited diplomats assigned to the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco, shall be permitted to accompany the inspection team to Travis Air Force Base. In order to gain access to the Base, the Consulate General of the union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco:

(a) shall contact the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone and report the name or names of the personnel involved and the license plate number of the vehicle involved; and

(b) shall ensure that such information is provided not less than two hours before the arrival of the inspection team at San Francisco International Airport.

If such notification is made in accordance with these procedures, then the diplomatic aircrew escort accompanying the inspection team from San Francisco International Airport to Travis Air Force Base shall be granted access to the Base along with the inspection team.

4. If during the course of the examination of inspection equipment pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection the inspection team leader disagrees with the conclusion of the inspected Party that an item of equipment either (a) is not equipment agreed by the Parties pursuant to paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection or (b) can perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty, and thus should not be cleared for use, the inspection team leader shall be permitted to explain to the in-country escort the appropriateness of the item of equipment to the inspection requirements contained in Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties agree that if the in-country escort remains unconvinced, such equipment shall not be taken to an inspection site by the inspection team, both the in-country escort team leader and the inspection team leader shall record their views in writing, and each of them shall transmit both views for review by appropriate authorities.

5. The Parties agree that if the inspected Party establishes that the equipment can perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty and the explanation referred to in paragraph 4 above is not persuasive, then the disputed item or items of equipment shall be returned to the inspection airplane. If no such airplane is available, the equipment shall be impounded and shall be stored in the secure facility provided for storage of inspection equipment at the point of entry.

6. The Parties understand the term "tamper-proof containers" as used in paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection to mean containers used to transport and store inspection equipment that are locked and sealed by means of locks and seals belonging to the inspecting Party. Such seals may be, for example, tamper- indicating tape seals.

7. The Parties understand paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection to mean, with respect to inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, that:

(a) The inspecting Party shall provide routine medical care for inspectors and that the inspected Party shall ensure availability of emergency medical care for inspectors.

(b) If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, the inspected Party shall provide emergency evacuation services for inspectors from the inspection site to a point of entry.

(c) If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, it shall evacuate at its own expense inspectors out of the territory of the inspected Party.

8. The Parties understand that the meals provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection for the inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol, including at the sites where elimination occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be paid for by the inspected Party. These meals shall be in the form of prepared meals either in a dining facility or at a location agreed to by the inspection team leader and the in-country escort team leader.

9. The Parties understand that the lodging provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection for the inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol shall be paid for by the inspected Party, and that such lodging can be of various types depending on the location and kind of inspection. The Parties agree that:

(a) The lodging provided for inspectors and aircrew members at the point of entry, and for inspectors conducting inspections of the process of elimination at sites where elimination occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be hotel-like accommodations.

(b) The lodging provided for inspectors conducting inspections in accordance with Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, and for inspectors conducting inspections of the process of elimination at elimination sites not subject to subparagraph (a) above, shall be sufficient to permit inspectors to sleep and need not be separate from the work space provided at the inspection site.

10. The Parties agree that the lodging provided for inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on a temporary basis, shall be in existing buildings and, on a permanent basis, shall be in buildings that will be built by the inspected Party for the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 5 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection. In this regard, the inspected Party shall permit inspectors at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna to remain in their temporary housing until construction of their permanent housing is completed.

11. The Parties understand that the transportation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection for inspectors conducting inspections in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol shall be paid for by the inspected Party and shall encompass transportation at the point of entry, to and from the inspection site, and at the inspection site. In this regard, the Parties agree that, at the inspection site, the inspected Party shall provide a sufficient number of vehicles to transport the entire inspection team as well as up to five vehicles, depending on the number of subgroups into which the inspection team leader divides the inspection team.

12. The Parties understand that transportation between the point of entry and the inspection site for inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of that Protocol, shall be provided by the inspected Party at the expense of the inspecting Party. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that the inspected Party shall provide at its own expense transportation at the point of entry and at the continuous monitoring inspection site for inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section IX of that Protocol. In this regard, all expenses associated with the transportation of inspectors at the point of entry and within 50 kilometers of the continuous monitoring inspection sites at Magna and Votkinsk shall be borne by the inspected Party, and the drivers of the vehicles shall be considered to be in-country escorts.

13. The Parties understand that, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspecting Party shall bear all expenses associated with the construction of the structure for installation and operation of its non-damaging image producing equipment at its continuous monitoring inspection site.

14. The Parties agree to follow the current practices used by their embassies in Moscow and Washington, D.C., both for reimbursing expenses that are incurred by the inspected Party and that are subject to reimbursement pursuant to paragraph 5 or 6 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, and for reimbursing other expenses as agreed by the Parties.

15. The Parties agree to use the list of inspection sites and their associated points of entry contained in Annex III to this Memorandum in order to fulfill the requirements in paragraph 7 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection.

16. The Parties agree that in conducting sequential inspections as permitted by paragraph 16 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, they shall inspect only those inspection sites associated with the point of entry from which the inspection team commenced inspection activities.

17. The Parties, referring to paragraph 7 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, understand that:

(a) Although the inspecting Party shall be permitted to indicate the inspection site prior to the time for specification of the inspection site provided in the notification of the intention to conduct an inspection, the nine-hour period for transporting the inspectors referred to in paragraph 2 of section VII of the Protocol on Inspection shall commence at the time for specification of the inspection site that was provided in the notification.

(b) The indication referred to in subparagraph (a) above shall be transmitted in written form by the inspection team leader to the in-country escort team leader.

(c) If the indication referred to in subparagraph (a) above is made at the time for specification of the inspection site provided in the notification rather than before that time, then it shall be made at the airport associated with the point of entry. If, however, such indication precedes this time, the inspection team leader shall be permitted to indicate it elsewhere.

18. The Parties agree to permit representatives of the mass media to take photographs of inspection teams at the points of entry and to be present at one of the first eliminations of missiles. The Parties agree to organize the presence of representatives of the mass media so that it does not interfere with either the inspection activities or the process of elimination. The United states of America shall permit representatives of the mass media to be present at the entrance of an inspection site in its basing countries during the first inspections, and opportunities for photographs might be provided in such cases. The Parties agree that representatives of the mass media shall not be permitted to accompany inspectors during inspections.

D. General Rules for Conducting Inspections 1. The Parties, referring to the phrase "and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties" contained in paragraph 9 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to add to the list of agreed equipment the following: hand-held flashlights and batteries for such flashlights, and hand-held magnetic compasses. A description of the equipment to be used is contained in Annex IV to this Memorandum.

2. The Parties, referring to paragraph 9 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to use linear measurement devices, cameras, portable weighing devices and radiation detection devices in accordance with the procedures, set forth in Annex IV to this Memorandum. The list of agreed equipment, including its characteristics, is contained in Annex IV to this memorandum.

3. The Parties agree that during an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups. The Parties agree that such means of communication shall be under the control of the inspected Party.

4. The Parties agree that the result of each measurement of the weight or dimensions of a missile, missile stage, launcher, support structure or an item of support equipment subject to the Treaty that deviates, by less than three percent from the relevant technical data provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty shall be considered acceptable.

5. The Parties understand that, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspected Party shall conduct a safety briefing for the inspection team in the inspected Party's language. This briefing shall be translated into the inspecting Party's language.

6. The Parties understand that the pre-inspection movement restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 of Section VII of the Protocol on inspection shall remain in effect until the pre- inspection procedures referred to in paragraph 14 of Section VI of that Protocol are completed.

7. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that in order to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, each continuous monitoring inspection team shall be permitted to have up to four deputy team leaders rather than the one deputy team leader provided for in paragraph 15 of Section VI of that Protocol.

8. The Parties agree that for inspections conducted sequentially, as provided for in paragraph 16 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection:

(a) The inspection team, before departing the point of entry to conduct an initial inspection, shall be permitted to declare that it intends to conduct sequential inspections.

(b) In the event that inspection sites are in close proximity to one another, the inspection team shall not normally return to the point of entry before conducting sequential inspections, but the inspection team shall be permitted to return to the point of entry when, in the judgment of the inspection team leader, circumstances require it.

(c) In the event that after returning to the point of entry from an inspection site the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team shall so notify the inspected Party within one hour of its return to the point of entry and shall indicate the time of the specification of the inspection site. The time of the specification of the inspection site shall be not less than four hours and not more than 24 hours after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry.

(d) During sequential inspections, the inspected Party shall provide modest sleeping accommodations for the inspection team at the site where an inspection has been completed, at the sequential inspection site, or at another site that is mutually agreed.

9. The Parties agree that the inspection team shall be permitted to store equipment during the course of its stay at the inspection site in the work space for inspectors at that site. Such equipment shall be under the direct control of the inspection team for the period of inspection.

10. Cargoes of inspection equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites, or for maintenance or repair of equipment already installed, which are on an airplane indicated in paragraph 7 or 8 of Part A of this Section, shall be subject to examination in accordance with paragraph 11 below. individual items of inspection equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites or for maintenance or repair of equipment, already installed, which are brought onto the territory of the inspected Party by an inspector and which thus are not part of a shipment, shall be subject to examination only in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of Part C of this Section.

11. In accordance with paragraph 10 above, the Parties agree to use the following procedures for delivering and examining cargoes of equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites or for maintenance or repair of equipment already installed throughout the entire period during which such inspections are conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty:

(a) Not less than ten days before the delivery of equipment and supplies to the point of entry for a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party, through the embassy of the inspecting Party in the capital of the inspected Party, an inventory of the equipment and supplies, with an indication of the following: (i) the weight and dimensions of each separate palletized or oversize unit of cargo, including modular structures;

(ii) whether modular structures are being shipped to the inspection site;

(iii) the contents of each shipping container on a pallet and of each modular structure, by means of the description set forth in section I of Annex V to this memorandum, so that the inspected Party is able to correlate each item to a specific entry in that Annex; and

(iv) the location at the portal or at the exits where each major item on the inventory of equipment and supplies, as set forth in Annex V to this Memorandum, is to be installed or used.

In addition, if it is necessary for facilitating transportation of equipment, of oversize items, or of any other items from the point of entry to a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with black-and-white photographs or clear facsimile copies of photographs of such equipment and items.

(b) Each separate shipping container on a pallet included on the inventory mentioned in subparagraph (a) above shall be marked with the appropriate freight marking and shall have a complete packing list attached. One copy of such a packing list shall be appended also to the inventory mentioned in subparagraph (a) above.

(c) The inspected Party shall examine cargoes containing equipment and supplies delivered to the point of entry. At the discretion of the inspected Party, specific items of equipment and specific supplies may be examined either at the point of entry or at the continuous monitoring inspection site. If the examination is carried out at the point of entry, it shall be carried out in the presence of the aircrew members. Inspectors shall be permitted to be present during all such examinations.

(d) If the examination of the cargoes is carried out at the point of entry, upon completion of the examination procedures the inspecting Party shall repack the equipment and supplies, using the same type of packing material and the same markings referred to in subparagraph (b) above. The inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall assist the inspecting Party in packing the equipment and supplies, in providing for their security during loading and unloading operations, and in fastening the cargoes for shipment. Upon completion of packing procedures, cargoes shall be sealed with seals of both the inspecting and the inspected Parties. At the continuous monitoring inspection site, the seals shall be examined jointly and afterwards the inspectors shall open each shipping container and modular structure in the presence of the in-country escort.

(e) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe palletized cargoes and modular structures at the point of entry and at each point where they are transferred from one vehicle to another, including: observation of them being loaded onto the vehicle that will transport them to the inspection site or to an intermediate transfer point, observation of the transfer of them at an intermediate transfer point, and observation of them at the inspection site once the vehicle carrying such cargoes arrives there. In the event of unforeseen delays, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe the palletized cargoes and modular structures inside the vehicle while they are in transit.

(f) The contents of each shipping container, including modular structures, shall be checked against the description contained in Section I of Annex V to this memorandum and provided in accordance with subparagraph (a) above. Based on the results of the examination of the contents of all of the shipping containers, including modular structures, a joint inventory shall be drawn up, and if the equipment included on the inventory corresponds to the equipment described in section I of Annex V to this Memorandum, the inventory shall be signed by both Parties. When the inventory is signed, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to begin installing and using the equipment and supplies at the continuous monitoring inspection site. Until the document is signed, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing security for the, cargoes and protecting them from inclement weather.

(g) The inspected Party shall be permitted to observe the equipment during installation, testing and operation at the continuous monitoring inspection site.

(h) If at any time during the examination, installation, testing or operation of inspection equipment at the point of entry or at the continuous monitoring inspection site it is established that the inspection equipment can perform, or does perform, functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty, then either such equipment shall not be installed or its use shall be discontinued, and it shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party.

12. The Parties agree to use the following procedures for examining radiation detection devices at the point of entry as provided for in paragraph 4 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection:

(a) Prior to the conduct of the benchmark radiation measurements required by paragraph 2 of Part D of Section III of Annex IV to this Memorandum, the inspecting Party shall bring into the territory of the inspected Party three radiation detection devices whose composition is listed in paragraph 1 of Part A of Section II of Annex IV to this Memorandum. The inspected Party shall select one of those devices to purchase. The two other devices intended for use in conducting benchmark radiation measurements shall be stored at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph (d) below. Thirty days after the inspected Party has received the device it purchased, it shall inform the inspecting Party whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use such devices for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(b) The examination of the two radiation detection devices that are intended for use in taking the benchmark radiation measurements shall commence on a date agreed by the Parties, which shall be not less than 30 days and not more than 90 days after delivery of the devices referred to in subparagraph (a) above to the inspected Party. This examination shall be completed within five days after the date agreed for its initiation.

(c) During the examination referred to in subparagraph (b) above, as well as during subsequent examinations of radiation detection devices, the inspected Party shall be permitted in the presence of the inspecting Party to dismantle partially such devices and examine them using non-damaging methods. Such examination must not impair the capability of the radiation detection devices to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Prior to departing the point of entry to conduct benchmark radiation measurements or an inspection, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to test the radiation detection devices to be used to establish that their capability to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty has not been impaired by the inspected Party's examination of the radiation detection devices.

(d) Except as specified in subparagraph (f) below, any additional radiation detection device delivered to the point of entry for the purpose of conducting benchmark radiation measurements or inspections shall be subject to examination within five days in accordance with the procedures set forth in subparagraph (c) above and shall be stored at the point of entry for use in conducting benchmark radiation measurements or inspections. These devices shall be stored in tamper-proof containers, provided by the inspecting Party within a dual-key secure facility pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring replacement batteries and a neutron calibration source into the point of entry for use during each inspection and these shall be examined pursuant to paragraph 4 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection.

(e) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to commence the process of conducting benchmark radiation measurements within 48 hours after completion of the examination referred to in subparagraph (b) above.

(f) The radiation detection devices stored at the point of entry, as required by subparagraph (a) above and pursuant to subparagraph (d) above, shall be used for conducting inspections in accordance with section VII of the Protocol on Inspection. The inspecting Party shall store no fewer than two radiation detection devices, the use of which is permitted pursuant to subparagraph (a) above and which have been examined pursuant to subparagraph (b) or (d) above, in the tamper-proof containers referred to in subparagraph (d) above. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team shall be permitted to examine, in the presence of the in-country escort, the tamper-proof containers in which the radiation detection devices are stored, and the devices in those containers, for a period not to exceed four hours:

(i) If the inspection team determines that the containers for at least one of the radiation detection devices have not been tampered with, and that this device is functioning properly then this device shall be used for conducting the inspection.

(ii) If either Party determines that the containers for all stored radiation detection devices have been tampered with, then a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team and examined by the inspected Party according to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection shall be used for conducting the inspection.

(iii) If either Party determines that all containers that have not been tampered with contain devices that are not functioning properly, then a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team and examined by the inspected Party shall be used for conducting the inspection. In this case, the time for specification of the site to be inspected provided pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection shall be delayed, if necessary, until the inspected Party completes its examination of the radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team. In no case shall that delay exceed 12 hours or require the inspection team to delay the date and time for specification of the site to be inspected beyond the 24-hour limit set forth in paragraph 2(a) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection. Once the inspected Party completes its examination of the radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team, the inspection team shall provide, within the above-mentioned 24-hour time limit, the inspected Party with a new date and time for specification of the site to be inspected.

(g) If there is no evidence that containers have been tampered with, and the radiation detection device stored in them is not functioning properly, then the inspecting Party shall return this device and its containers to the territory of the inspecting Party and inform the inspected Party of the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to preclude such malfunctions in the future. If a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team is not used for conducting the inspection, then it shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers and removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspecting Party once the inspection has been completed.

13. In order to ensure that the inspecting Party is able to exercise its right at a continuous monitoring inspection site to install and operate a permanent continuous monitoring system pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that:

(a) During the installation of equipment at a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspection team shall provide the inspected Party, as soon as they are available to the inspection team at that continuous monitoring inspection site, with installation drawings, installation manuals and other documentation, including any changes to that documentation as they occur, to be used by the inspection team at that site to install or test the equipment there. such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party as the installation work proceeds, but prior to the commencement of the work described by that documentation.

(b) The inspection team shall provide the inspected Party, at that continuous monitoring inspection site, with manuals and any other documents, including any changes to that documentation as they occur, to be used by the inspection team at that site to operate, maintain, repair or perform additional testing of the equipment there. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to its use at the site.

E. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties understand that when the pre-inspection movement restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection cease to be in force, that is, not later than one hour after the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the inspection team leader shall designate not less than one subgroup from among the members of the inspection team to inspect vehicles that are leaving the inspection site so that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, the operation of the inspected facility shall not be hampered or delayed.

2. The Parties agree that in carrying out their obligations under paragraph 6 of section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, when an inspection team arrives at a missile operating base, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team of all missiles, missile stages, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at the missile operating base being inspected, as well as the missiles, missile stages, launchers and support equipment associated with that base and located in the deployment area within which that missile operating base is located.

3. The Parties agree that roads joining non-contiguous areas of a missile support facility are part of that facility. In this connection:

(a) movement along such roads of intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, does not mean that such systems have left the missile support facility and does not require notification pursuant to paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of the Treaty.

(b) During inspections of the missile support facility, the inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle on such roads that is capable of containing:

(i) for the United States of America, the second stage of the Pershing II missile, or the BGM-109G cruise missile;

and (ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the first stage of the SS-12 missile, the stage of the SS-23 missile, the SSC-X-4 cruise missile or the launch stand of the SS-4 missile.

(c) Vehicles capable of containing items listed in subparagraph (b) above that cross roads joining non-contiguous areas of a missile support facility, and vehicles that travel on such roads without entering the non-contiguous areas of the missile support facility these roads join shall not be considered to be leaving an inspection site, as is indicated in paragraph 12 of Section VII of the Protocol on inspection, when they exit from such roads.

4. The Parties agree that for the purpose of paragraph 7 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, the dimensions of a structure, container, vehicle or covered object shall be deemed to be greater than the dimensions of a missile, missile stage, launcher or item of support equipment subject to the Treaty, if each of its measured linear dimensions (length, width, height, diameter) is determined to be 99 percent or more of the corresponding dimensions of the missile, missile stage, launcher or item of support equipment indicated in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding. Such a structure, container, vehicle or covered object shall be subject to the inspection procedures set forth in paragraphs 8 through 14 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The Parties understand that if the inspection team is unable to carry out the measuring or weighing procedures set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection either because it has failed to bring agreed equipment to the inspection site or because through no fault of the inspected Party, that equipment cannot function, then the inspected Party shall not be required to demonstrate through other agreed procedures, including by visual observation of the interior, that a container sufficiently large to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty does not contain such a missile or missile stage.

6. The Parties agree that for the purpose of paragraphs 8 and 14 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, except in a case when a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty is declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5(a) of Article XI of. the Treaty, the in-country escort shall permit the use of portable weighing devices in those cases where the inspected Party decides not to permit visual observation of the interior of a container declared not to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty.

(b) A container or covered object that is large enough to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain such a missile or missile stage shall be deemed heavy enough to contain such a missile or missile stage,if its weight is determined to be 97 percent or more of the weight of such a missile or missile stage that it is large enough to contain. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty, containers that are deemed to be heavy enough to contain such a missile or missile stage shall be subject to inspection by interior visual observation.

F. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties agree that during inspections conducted in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection, each Party shall be permitted to replace inspectors conducting an inspection of the elimination of missile systems in accordance with a schedule determined by the inspecting Party. In so doing, the Parties shall be guided by the following provisions:

(a) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out not more than once every three weeks and the number of inspectors subject to rotation in each case shall not be less than 50 percent of inspectors present at the inspection site.

(b) The inspecting Party shall notify the inspected Party of its intention to rotate inspectors not less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of new inspectors at the point of entry. This notification shall contain the information specified in paragraph 1(b) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection, with an indication of whether the inspection team leader is being rotated. In a case when the inspecting Party cannot provide in that notification the information required by paragraph 1(b)(iv) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection, it shall notify the inspected Party not less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of such inspectors at the point of entry of the list of inspectors and aircrew members arriving on that flight.

(c) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out at the elimination site or, if necessary to ensure that not more than 20 inspectors are present at the site at any one time, at the airport nearest the elimination site.

(d) Before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader, the Parties shall complete an inspection report covering the period since the arrival of that inspection team leader, with an indication of the number of items of each type for which elimination procedures have been completed. To facilitate the preparation of the inspection report by the outgoing inspection team leader, the specific procedures for eliminating the items undergoing elimination at that site shall be completed before the time the outgoing inspection team leader departs the inspection site.

(e) The inspected Party shall not initiate elimination of items until pre-inspection procedures, referred to in paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, for the newly arrived inspectors have been completed. Any delay in the initiation of elimination procedures for the above-mentioned items caused by the arrival of a new inspection team leader shall not exceed three hours.

2. The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the exercise of the duties of inspectors pursuant to paragraphs 1(c) and 1(d) of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspected Party shall provide binoculars to inspectors at those sites where missiles are being eliminated by means of launching, burning or explosive demolition, and agree that visual observation of the indicated processes shall be ensured by means of adequate binoculars. The Parties understand that during such elimination, the inspection team shall observe the elimination procedures from a safe distance indicated by the inspected Party.

G. Inspection Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties understand that:

(a) at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, the portal has one rail line and one road, and there is no other exit; and

(b) at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, the portal has one road, and there are two other exits.

2. The Parties agree that, on the basis of reciprocity, the telephone lines provided pursuant to paragraph 5(e) of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection shall include:

(a) for the United States of America, two dedicated direct telephone lines for communications between the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk and the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow, and one non-dedicated telephone line for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, two dedicated direct telephone lines for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington, D.C., and one non-dedicated telephone line for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco, the AMTORG Corporation in New York, and the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna.

All expenses associated with the use of the non-dedicated telephone lines shall be borne by the inspecting Party. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that all expenses associated with the installation and operation of the dedicated direct telephone lines shall be borne by the inspected Party.

3. The Parties, referring to paragraph 6 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to use the equipment listed in Annexes IV and V to this Memorandum, and agree to use this equipment as indicated in Annex V to this Memorandum.

4. The Parties agree that either Party is permitted, at a later date, to install data authentication devices, as provided for in paragraph 6(f) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, at the continuous monitoring inspection site on the territory of the other Party. Before installation of such devices, their characteristics and methods of use shall be agreed by the Parties.

5. In accordance with paragraph 9 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree to the following arrangement for using systems of radio communication to permit inspectors patrolling the perimeter of a continuous monitoring inspection site to communicate with the Data Collection Center:

(a) Inspectors shall, while inspecting the perimeter of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, use their own systems of radio communication that do not contain components permitting them to operate on other than a single, agreed operating frequency.

(b) Inspectors shall, while inspecting the perimeter of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, use their own systems of radio communication that do not contain components permitting them to operate on other than a single, agreed operating frequency.

(c) The Parties shall agree upon the frequencies to be used for the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above prior to the use of such systems.

(d) The inspected Party shall be permitted to examine the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above at any time, including at the points of entry and at the continuous monitoring inspection sites, to ascertain that they are capable of operating only on the single, agreed operating frequency.

(e) Until such time as the inspection teams are provided with the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, the inspected Party shall make systems of radio communication available to the inspection team but shall maintain such systems under its own control.

6. The Parties agree that, on the basis of reciprocity, the inspected Party shall provide temporary portal facilities for the inspectors conducting continuous monitoring inspections prior to the completion of construction or installation of the permanent buildings provided for in paragraph 6(a) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection. Such temporary facilities shall be provided at the expense of the inspecting Party.

7. The Parties agree that the building for storage of supplies and equipment referred to in paragraph 6(a) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection shall, on the basis of reciprocity, be constructed by the inspected Party, not the inspecting Party.

8. The Parties agree that:

(a) The inspection team shall notify the inspected Party in advance of its intention to conduct an inspection of the agreed perimeter of a continuous monitoring inspection site.

(b) During such an inspection of the agreed perimeter, the inspection team shall only:

(i) ascertain that the integrity of the agreed perimeter is maintained by the inspected Party and that the inspected Party does not take non-agreed actions to change the agreed perimeter, including repair, of the fence; and

(ii) ascertain that the inspected Party has not moved or attempted to move objects over or through the agreed perimeter.

9. The Parties agree that:

(a) In accordance with paragraph 15 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, there shall be not more than 30 inspectors at a continuous monitoring inspection site at any one time.

(b) The schedule for the rotation of inspectors at a continuous monitoring inspection site shall be decided by the inspecting Party.

(c) The inspecting Party shall notify the inspected Party not less than seven days in advance of its intention to rotate inspectors, with an indication of the number and the names of the inspectors rotating into and out of the continuous monitoring inspection site.

(d) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out at the airport nearest the continuous monitoring inspection site, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Izhevsk and in the United States of America at Salt Lake City.

10. The Parties agree that the inspected Party shall bear the expenses of the construction at a continuous monitoring inspection site on its territory of a temperature-controlled and humidity- controlled inspection building to be used for visual observation conducted pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection and this Memorandum.

11. The Parties agree that in order to implement the procedures related to the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna set forth in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of Part G of this section and those contained in Part A of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum, the inspected Party shall use 3.25 meters, not the length of the longest stage of an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party as specified in section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding, as the length criterion for making the declaration referred to in paragraph 11 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

12. The Parties agree that at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk:

(a) vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall not be weighed; and

(b) all railcars with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a cargo section with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be opened for visual observation of the interior in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 6(c) of Part B of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate this arrangement upon six months' notice. Provided that the Parties have agreed on the characteristics and methods of use of weight sensors, six months after such notice is given, such vehicles shall no longer be opened, except as is provided for in section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, and the Parties shall begin to use weight as a criterion for inspection for vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk.

13. The Parties agree that at the-continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna:

(a) vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall not be weighed; and

(b) all vehicles that can contain cargoes with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be opened for visual observation of their interior in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraphs 5(e) and 5(f) of Part A of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate this arrangement upon six months' notice. Provided that the Parties have agreed on the characteristics and methods of use of weight sensors, six months after such notice is given, such vehicles shall no longer be opened, except as is provided for in section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, and the Parties shall begin to use weight as a criterion for inspection for vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at magna.

14. The Parties, referring to the declaration required by paragraph 11 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection that begins the inspection process at the portal of a continuous monitoring inspection site, agree to permit the inspecting Party to measure, using the linear measurement devices listed in Section I of Annex IV to this memorandum, missiles and missile stages not contained in launch canisters or shipping containers, as well as those that are contained in launch canisters or shipping containers opened for visual observation of their contents pursuant to paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section, that leave through the portal of its continuous monitoring inspection site, that are declared by the inspected Party to be missiles or missile stages, and that have the following dimensions:

(a) for the United states of America at its continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, missiles and missile stages that have a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at its continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, missiles and missile stages that have a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters.

15. The Parties agree that:

(a) the inspecting Party shall be permitted to have access to all missiles and missile stages with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna for visual observation and, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Part G of this section, dimensional measurement of them if the vehicle transporting such a missile or missile stage has been declared to contain a missile or missile stage of those dimensions; and

(b) non-damaging image producing equipment shall not be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate the arrangement set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Parties agree that the provisions contained in subparagraph (a) above shall cease to be in effect either nine months after the Party making the decision to terminate it notifies the other Party of such a decision or after non-damaging image producing equipment installed at the portal of the continuous monitoring inspection site at magna becomes operational, if such equipment becomes operational more than nine months after the aforementioned notification has been provided.

16. The inspecting Party shall use the time period specified in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section for installation, pursuant to paragraph 6(d) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, of non-damaging image producing equipment having the technical characteristics set forth in paragraph 1(j) of Part B of section I of Annex V to this memorandum at the portal of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. The installation of such equipment shall commence as soon as the following requirements are met:

(a) The inspecting Party has provided information on the design features of the non-damaging image producing equipment that permits the inspected Party to ascertain that the imaging equipment to be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty and to ascertain that it meets all applicable safety standards. In particular, such information shall include the following:

(i) a description both of the features incorporated into the design of the equipment and into its operation that preclude it from imaging portions of a missile or missile stage that the Parties have excluded from imaging as well as a description of the system for storing and reviewing the data collected by the equipment; and

(ii) a description of the safety features of the imaging system, including complete descriptions of safety control and interlock systems, personnel protection and warning systems, and shielding design requirements.

(b) The Parties have agreed on the methods of use of the non- damaging image producing equipment referred to above.

(c) The building for the use of the non-damaging image producing equipment has been completed.

17. Not later than nine months after the notification referred to in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section is provided, the Parties shall agree on the methods of use of the non-damaging image producing equipment to be installed pursuant to paragraph 16 of Part G of this Section. Such agreed methods of use shall be applied to types of missiles and missile stages.the inspecting Party is permitted to image pursuant to paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, unless the Parties agree upon different methods of use.

18. The inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with a detailed description of the requirements for the building in which the non-damaging image producing equipment shall be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. Such a description shall include the documentation needed to design and construct the building in which the proposed non-damaging image producing equipment shall be housed, including information on the distance from the source to the detectors, the geometry and size of the detector array, the overall dimensions of the system, and the requirements for electrical and mechanical connections between the non-damaging image producing equipment of the inspecting Party and systems provided by the inspected Party. Once the notification referred to in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section is made and the detailed description referred to above of the requirements for the building is provided, the inspected Party shall design and then, after reaching agreement with the inspecting Party on the design, shall construct the aforementioned building.

19. The Parties agree that in order to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, the leader or any one of the deputy leaders of each continuous monitoring inspection team shall be permitted to make trips between the continuous monitoring inspection site and the embassy of the inspecting Party and to be accompanied by any other member of the inspection team such trips shall be organized upon request of the inspecting Party and shall be made not more than once a week. The Parties understand that during such trips only the papers of the inspectors shall enjoy inviolability; all personal baggage shall be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the inspected Party shall bear responsibility for the organization of such trips, and that expenses associated with such trips shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

20. The Parties agree that the delivery of supplies to the continuous monitoring inspection sites shall be carried out without unreasonable delay. 21. The Parties understand that the portal and exit monitoring areas at the continuous monitoring inspection sites shall have sufficient lighting to permit monitoring functions to be carried out at night. At the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, such lighting systems shall be provided by the inspecting Party. At the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, such lighting systems shall be provided by the inspected Party.

1. Annexes I, II, III, IV, V and VI to this Memorandum are an integral part of, and have the same force as, this Memorandum.

2. This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Memorandum. Agreed amendments shall enter into force on the date of their signature.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Agreement.

Done at Geneva on December 21, 1989, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the For the Government of the United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative of the Representative of the United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist to the Special Verification Republics Special Verification Commission Commission

I. For United States of America's Flights to: The Union of Soviet AI 1988 (89 et cetera) Socialist Republics The German Democratic ET 400 Republic The Czechoslovak CZ-444444 Socialist Republic II. For Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Flights to: The United States INF 88-1, 2, et cetera of America 89-1, 2, et cetera The Kingdom of the INF 89-1 (for 1989) Netherlands The Kingdom of CD 2-16-89 (for 1989) Belgium The United Kingdom USSR/001/100 of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The Federal Republic INF-429-4001 (for 1989) of Germany The Republic of Italy ITFNI-289 (for 1989)

I. Navigation Equipment

The airplanes listed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Part A of Section III of this Memorandum are equipped with on-board navigation systems of the following types:

A. For the United States of America:

1. ILS--Instrument Landing System;

2. INS--Inertial Navigation System;

3. TACAN--Tactical Air Navigation System (short-range and medium-range radio air navigation system);

4. ADF--Automatic Direction Finder; and

5. VOR--Very High Frequency OMNI Range Station.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. IL-62 and IL-62M. airplanes:

(a) Navigation set:

(i) Precision heading system, TKS-P2;

(ii) Doppler velocity and drift indicator, DISS-013;

(iii) Air data system, SVS-PN-15;

(iv) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-7s;

(v) Short-range navigation system and localizer, KURS MP-2;

(vi) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67; and

(vii) Navigation computer, NV-PB-Ir series 04.

(b) Individual navigation systems and instruments:

(i) Inertial navigation system, I-11;

(ii) Airplane radio reception display, ONS-7;

(iii) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15;

(iv) Radar, GROZA-62;

(v) Radio altimeter, RV-5;

(vi) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(vii) Barometric altimeter, VEM-72 or UVID-30-15; (viii) Barometric altimeter, VM-13 or VD-20;

(ix) Jeger barometric altimeter;

(x) Combined velocity indicator, KUS-730/1100;

(xi) Velocity indicator, US-I;

(xii) Mach number indicator, MS-IK;

(xiii) Magnetic compass, KI-13;

(xiv) Rate-of-climb indicators, VAR-30MK and VAR-75; and

(xv) Outside air temperature indicator, TNV-15.

2. TU-154 airplane:

(a) Navigation set NK-154:

(i) Precision heading system, TKS-P2;

(ii) Doppler velocity and drift indicators, DISS-3P
or DISS-013;

(iii) Air data system, SVS-PN-15-4;

(iv) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-2SA;

(v) Short-range navigation system and localizer,
KURS MP-2; and
(vi) Navigation calculator, NVU-53.

(b) Individual navigation systems and instruments:

(i) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15;

(ii) Radar, GROZA-154;

(iii) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(iv) Radio altimeter, RV-5;

(v) Barometric altimeter, VM-15;

(vi) Altimeter, UVID-15F;

(vii) Velocity indicators, KUS-730/1100 and US-I;and
(viii) Magnetic compass, KI-13.

3. TU-134 airplane:

(a) Navigation equipment:

(i) Heading system, KS-8;

(ii) self-contained navigation system, NAS-lA or
NAS-1A 6K;

(iii) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-2s;

(iv) Automatic radio compass, ARK-11;

(v) Radar, ROZ-1;

(vi) Navigation and localizer equipment, KURS MP;

(vii) Velocity indicator, KUS-1200 or KUS-730/1100;

(viii) Altimeter, VD-20;

(ix) Altimeter, UVID-30-15;
(x) Rate-of-climb indicator, VAR-30M;

(xi) Low-altitude radar altimeter, RV-UM; and
(xii) Magnetic compass, KI-13.

(b) Depending upon the modification of the airplane,
the following additional equipment may be
installed:

(i) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(ii) Self-contained navigation system, NAS-1-134;

(iii) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15; and
(iv) Low-altitude altimeter, RV-5.

4. AN-124 airplane:

(a) Navigation-piloting set, A-820;

(b) Self-contained navigation system (three-channel
inertial, system), A-826M;

(c) Short-range navigation system and localizer,A-827M;

(d) Long-range radio-navigation system, A-723; and
(e) Two on-board radars, A-822-10 and A-822-20.

II. Airplane Routes

A. For United States of America's Inspection Airplane Flights
to:

G.T.LEMUR;

G.T.NALIM, Vitim;

G.T.RAMIS, Kirensk;

G.T.PIKET, Bratsk;

G.T.DOMOR, Osa, Irkutsk,
Bol'shoye Goloustnoye,
Mukhino

The German To Leipzig: Same as inbound
Democratic G.T.SEGAL, TRT, FLD,
Republic ANKER, STENA, FWE,
NUF, RSF, Schkeuditz

The Czechoslovak To Prague: Same as inbound
Socialist Cheb, Rakovnik,
Republic Ruzyne

B. For Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Inspection
Airplane Flights to:

Missile Operating Bases:

Postavy, Vetrino, Polotsk, Smorgon', Lida, Gezgaly, Slonim,
Ruzhany, Zasimovichi, Mozyr', Petrikov, Zhitkovichi,
Rechitsa, Slutsk, Slutsk, Lutsk, Brody, Chervonograd,
Slavuta, Belokorovichi, Lipniki, Vysokaya Pech', Korosten',
Lebedin, Glukhov, Akhtyrka, Sovetsk, Gusev, Malorita, Pinsk,
Vyru, Aluksne, Ostrov, Karmelava, Ukmerge, Taurage, Kolomyya,
Stryy, Skala-Podol'skaya, Lapichi, Kattakurgan, Stan'kovo,
Tsel', Slobudka, Bayram-Ali.

Missile Support Facilities:

Votkinsk, Volgograd, Postavy, Gezgaly, Mozyr', Lutsk,
Belokorovichi, Lebedin, Kolosovo, Zherebkovo, Sarny, Bataysk,
Kapustin Yar, Serpukhov, Krasnodar, Lesnaya, Kazan', Kamenka,
Petropavlovsk, Stan'kovo, Jelgava, Aral'sk, Sverdlovsk.

B. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry Ulan Ude:

Missile operating Bases:

Novosibirsk, Drovyanaya, Barnaul, Kansk, Pashino, Gornyy,
Novosysoyevka, Semipalatinsk, Saryozek.

Missile Support Facilities:

Novosibirsk, Drovyanaya, Kansk, Barnaul, Chita, Balkhash,
Saryozek.

II. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry Washington,
D.C.:

Missile Support Facilities:

Martin Marietta, Middle River, Maryland; Redstone Arsenal,
Huntsville, Alabama; Ft. Sill, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma; Complex
16, Cape Canaveral, Florida; Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant,
Marshall, Texas.

B. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry San Francisco,
California:

Missile Support Facilities:

Hercules Plant #1, Magna, Utah; Air Force Plant 19, San
Diego, California; Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah; Ft.

Huachuca, Ft. Huachuca, Arizona; Pueblo Depot Activity,
Pueblo, Colorado; Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona.

2. Portable weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection
team):

(a) 4 Heavy-duty portable scales, General
Electrodynamics, Model 500B (9 metric-ton load
capacity);

(b) 1 Readout device; and
(c) 1 Cable set.

3. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack;
(b) 1 Exposure meter, Gossen, Lunasix-3;

(c) 1 Tripod, Susis, Model 520 with carrying case
Model Number 251; and
(d) 1 Assortment of photographic film.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Model FKB-2M;

(b) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(c) 1 Sealing device with a set of tamper-indicating
wire and seals; and
(d) 1 Officer's Ruler.

B. For the United States of America:

1. Linear measurement Devices (quantity for each
inspector):

(a) 1 30 meter measuring tape, Lufkin, Model HY30cm;

(b) 1 3 meter measuring tape, Lufkin, Model RY23cm;

(c) 1 24 ounce (680 gram) plumb bob, Thorpe-Smith;

(d) 1 50 yard (46 meter) plumb-bob cord, Duraplex;

(e) 4 Plumb-bob target, Leitz, model 126-25; and
(f) 1 pi tape, pi Tape Corporation.

2. Portable Weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection
team):

4 Heavy-duty portable scales, General
Electrodynamics, model 500B (9 metric-ton load
capacity).

3. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 Camera body, Polaroid, Model 60OSE;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack;
(c) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;
(d) 1 Flash, Vivitar, 285-HV;

(e) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter;
(f) 1 Spare 6OOSE film back, Polaroid, 601-008;
(g) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release;

(h) 1 20 inch (51 centimeter) cable release, Velbo,
Model Vel-27-1035;

(i) 8 Eight-pack of photographic film, Polaroid,
Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 1 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and
exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz, Model 8078-42;
(l) 1 Aluminum case, Zero-Halliburton, 110-121;
(m) 1 Package of lens paper, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5 meter range rod, Leitz, model 8078-42; and

(p) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Kidde Bright Star (safety
approved);
(b) 1 Magnetic compass, U.S. Lensatic; and
(c) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals.

II. Additional equipment for use during inspections conducted
pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The following equipment shall be used only to inspect launch
canisters associated with a type of missile not subject to the
Treaty that are declared by the inspected Party to contain such a
missile.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Radiation detection device for use during inspections
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI
of the Treaty consisting of:

(a) 2 Neutron detector with signal/power cables;
(b) 2 Electronic counter with instruction manual,
Eberline, model ESP-2 modified,
(c) 10 Plastic bag for weather protection;

(d) 1 Coordinate grid and aluminum frame;

(e) 1 Calibration source;

(f) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;

(g) 30 Miscellaneous spare batteries, sizes C and D;

(h) 1 Tripod, Airlift, model BG modified;

(i) 1 Measuring tape;

(j) 1 Plumb bob and line, Thorpe-smith;

(k) 1 9 inch (23 centimeter) level, master mechanic,
model 9MTT-9;

(l) 2 Battery-powered light, Maglight, Model ML-2;

(m) 3 Programmable calculator with instruction
manual, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27S; and
(n) 2 Thermometer.

2. Equipment for use during benchmark radiation
measurements conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Part
D of Section III of this Annex:

(a) 2 Radiation detection device, the composition of
which is indicated in paragraph 1 above;
(b) 2 Portable computer (Toshiba, Model T1100 Plus)
with printer (Diconix, Model 150), with
instruction manuals and voltage changers,
Interpower; and
(c) 1 Software package, Golden Software, surfer
(graphics program for contour maps).

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Radiation detection device, SRPS-2, consisting of:

(a) Neutron detector unit;

(b) Electronic unit; and
(c) Voltage changer and charger unit.

2. The SRPS-2 shall have the following basic
characteristics:

(a) Sensitivity to fission spectrum neutrons is not
lower than 100 pulses per neutron per square
centimeter;
(b) Three periods of exposure: 0.5 second, 5 seconds
and 50 seconds;

(c) Error in exposure time: 4 percent;

(d) Time of collection of background pulses for each
period: 8 seconds, 80 seconds and 50 seconds,
respectively; and
(e) Power source: 24-30 volt direct current (battery)
or 220 volt alternating current, 50 hertz.

3. The Parties agree that, prior to use by an inspection
team of the radiation detection device, the Parties
shall agree on additional characteristics of that
device.

III. Methods of Use of Equipment

A. The Parties agree to use linear measurement devices in the
following manner:

1. Linear measurement devices shall be used to determine
length, width and height of objects by measuring the
straight-line distance between the extreme points of
such objects or, if it shall be required, between
tangents drawn perpendicular to the direction of
measurement from the outside points of curved surfaces.

2. The diameter of a missile, a missile stage or any other
cylindrical object shall be determined by measuring the
circumference, by directly measuring the diameter, or by
measuring the distance between parallel lines that are
vertical tangents to the cylindrical surface of the
object and that lie in a plane perpendicular to the
axis of the object. Such measurements shall be taken at
several points along the length of that object.

3. In determining the dimensions of an object, each
dimension shall be measured at least two times. If the
results of the first two measurements are within one
percent of each other, then the results of these two
measurements shall be averaged to determine the
dimension of the object. If the results of the first two
measurements are not within one percent of each other,
additional measurements shall be taken until results
from two measurements are obtained that are within one
percent of each other. The results of these two
measurements shall be averaged to determine the
dimension of the object.

B. The Parties agree to use cameras in the following manner:

1. The Parties understand the phrase "camera systems which
are capable of producing duplicate, instant development
photographic prints contained in paragraph 9 of Section
VI of the Protocol on Inspection, to allow the use of
one camera mounted on a tripod and the taking of two
photographs in sequence with that camera.

2. The Parties agree that before the inspected Party takes
photographs, one copy of which shall be given to each of
the Parties, the inspected Party shall be permitted to
take test photographs that shall be the property of the
inspected Party.

3. The Parties agree that photographs taken during an
inspection shall show a range rod next to the object or
building being photographed.

4. The Parties understand that the procedures agreed upon
with respect to the taking of photographs shall apply at
all inspection sites, including at continuous monitoring
inspection sites.

C. The Parties agree to use portable weighing devices in the
following manner:

1. The inspected Party shall facilitate the inspection
team's use of the portable weighing devices.

2. Before weighing an object during an inspection, the
inspected Party shall be permitted to test and calibrate
the portable weighing devices of the inspecting Party by
using them to weigh its own calibrated reference load.

3. The equipment of the inspected Party shall be used to
lift the object being weighed and to position it on the
portable weighing devices. The inspected Party shall
operate such equipment.

4. In determining the weight of an object first a test
weighing of the object shall be conducted. Then that
object shall be weighed two times. If the results of
these two weight measurements are within two percent of
each other then the results of these two measurements
shall be averaged to determine the weight of the
object. If the results of these two weight measurements
are not within two percent of each other, the portable
weighing devices shall be calibrated and the object
shall be weighed two more times. If after this the
difference between the results of the two weight
measurements still exceeds two percent, then the
portable weighing devices shall be replaced and the
weighing procedures shall be repeated.

5. The inspection team shall be permitted continuous visual
observation of portable weighing devices, calibrated
reference loads and the object weighed throughout all
testing, calibrating and weighing processes.

6. If weighing is done by the compression method using the
portable weighing devices listed in Section I of this
Annex, then the inspected Party shall position the
object being weighed on the portable weighing devices.
Before taking any reading from a portable weighing
device, the inspection team shall ascertain that
the entire weight of the object being weighed is borne
by the platform of the portable weighing device, or in
the case of the use of several devices, that the entire
weight of the object being weighed is borne by the
platforms of those portable weighing devices. If the
object being weighed is a launcher or other vehicle,
then before the inspected Party positions that launcher
or other vehicle on the portable weighing devices, it
shall ensure that the tires are inflated to the maximum
air pressure for which the tires are designed.

7. If while weighing an object by the compression method
using the portable weighing devices listed in Section I
of this Annex more than one portable weighing device is
used, the weight of the object shall be determined by
adding together the readings indicated on all portable
weighing devices. To the extent possible, the readings
of all portable weighing devices shall be taken
simultaneously.

8. If the inspected Party decides that an object must be
weighed on a weight-bearing device, then it shall be
weighed together with the weight-bearing device, and
then removed from it. Then the weight-bearing device
shall be weighed separately. The weight of the object
shall be determined by taking the difference of the
results of these two weight measurements.

D. Radiation Detection Devices

1. The Parties agree to use the radiation detection devices
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the
following manner:

Prior to the use of radiation detection devices, the Parties
shall agree on the methods of use of the devices.

2. The Parties agree to use the radiation detection devices
of the United States of America in the following manner:

(a) Radiation detection devices shall be used to
measure fast neutron flux intensity emanating from
a launch canister associated with a type of missile
not subject to the Treaty and declared by the
inspected Party to contain such a missile.

(b) Prior to the use of radiation detection devices
during inspections, benchmark radiation
measurements shall be taken. Such measurements
shall be taken on two SS-20 missiles and two SS-25
missiles contained in their respective launch
canisters. Benchmark radiation measurements shall
be taken on launch canisters chosen by the
inspecting Party from nine launch canisters of each
type presented by the inspected Party. These
measurements shall be used to determine that the
fast neutron fluxes associated with these systems
differ significantly in both level and contour
patterns. The results of each benchmark radiation
measurement on the SS-25 missile shall be used as
the basis for comparison with the result of the
corresponding measurement taken during inspections
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5 of Article
XI of the Treaty.

(c) Before taking benchmark radiation measurements, the
radiation detection devices shall be calibrated
using a standard neutron source. For the SS-20 and
SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch
canisters, benchmark radiation measurements shall
be taken by the inspected Party on a horizontal
plane located at a distance no greater than 0.5
meter below the launch canister, itself in a
horizontal position. The area of this horizontal
plane for both the SS-20 and the SS-25 missiles
contained in their respective launch canisters
shall be that portion of a four-meter-by-four-meter
plane that can, considering the physical
limitations of the type of launcher involved in the
measurement, be utilized for the taking of such
measurements. The center of this horizontal plane
shall be located below the axis of the launch
canister at a point corresponding to the joint
between the front cover of the launch canister and
its body near the location of maximum neutron flux.

(d) Benchmark radiation measurements for both the SS-20
and the SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters shall be taken:

(i) at the 57 points accessible for both the SS-20
and SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters at the junctions
of a 0.5-meter grid on the four-meter-by-four-
meter plane described in subparagraph (c)
above, and at up to 24 additional points on
this plane at positions to be agreed by the
Parties during the taking of such
measurements;

(ii) at 0.5-meter intervals along the top of the
cylindrical portion of the launch canister
from the location of the joint of the front
cover of the launch canister and its body to
a point located at a distance of
approximately-six meters from the front of the
launch canister (a total of nine points); and

(iii) along a vertical line located to the left side
of the launch canister in the plane of the
joint between the front cover of the launch
canister and its body, perpendicular to the
horizontal plane on which measurements were
taken, and no more than 0.5 meter from the
launch canister (a total of seven points).

(e) Two readings shall be taken at each point. If the
higher reading differs by more than 30 percent from
the lower reading, then a third reading shall be
taken. If the third reading differs from each of
the two previous readings by more than 30 percent,
then the radiation detection device shall be
recalibrated. The average of two readings that are
within 30 percent of each other and whose values
are closest to each other shall be recorded as the
measurement for that point. The result of the
benchmark radiation measurement for that point
shall be the average of the corresponding
measurements for the two missiles of each type
selected for measuring.

(f) For the entire period during which the benchmark
radiation measurements are being taken, the
inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe the
measurement process to assure itself that the
process corresponds to the agreed procedures.
Recording, processing, and graphic representation
of data shall be carried out jointly by the
Parties.

(g) upon completion of the measurements on two SS-20
missiles and two SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters, the inspecting Party
shall select one SS-20 missile launch canister and
one SS-25 missile launch canister to be opened. The
inspecting Party, by visual observation, shall
confirm that the corresponding type of missile is
located in each launch canister.

(h) The results of the benchmark radiation measurements
shall be signed by both Parties and each of the
Parties shall retain one copy. If the results of
the benchmark radiation measurements confirm that
the fast neutron fluxes associated with the SS-20
and the SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters differ sufficiently
from each other in both level and contour patterns,
then the result of each benchmark radiation
measurement on the SS-25 missile shall be used as
the basis for comparison with the result of the
corresponding measurement taken during inspections
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of
Article XI of the Treaty.

(i) Before taking measurements during an inspection
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of
Article XI of the Treaty, the radiation detection
devices shall be calibrated using a standard
neutron source, and then measurements shall be
taken on a horizontal plane whose location
corresponds to the location of the horizontal
plane described in subparagraph (c) above. Such
measurements shall be taken on that plane at up to
ten points chosen by the inspection team such
points shall be selected from points common to the
benchmark radiation measurements taken on the SS-20
and SS-25 missiles on the four-meter-by-four-meter
horizontal plane. In addition, measurements shall
be taken at up to four points along the top of the
cylindrical portion of the launch canister from the
location of the joint of the front cover of the
launch canister and its body to a point located at
a distance of approximately six meters from the
front of the launch canister.

(j) Two readings shall be taken at each point. If the
higher reading differs by more than 30 percent from
the lower reading, then a third reading shall be
taken. If the third reading differs from each of
the two previous readings by more than 30 percent,
then the radiation detection device shall be
recalibrated. The average of two readings that are
within 30 percent of each other and whose values
are closest to each other shall be recorded as the
measurement for that point.

(k) If during an inspection conducted pursuant to
paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty the
result of each measurement obtained for a
particular launch canister differs by not more than
50 percent from the result of the corresponding
benchmark radiation measurement on the SS-25
missile contained in its launch canister, then the
missile shall not be considered to be a missile
subject to the Treaty.

(l) If during an inspection conducted pursuant to
paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty the
result of any measurement differs from the result
of the corresponding benchmark radiation
measurement on the SS-25 missile contained in its
launch canister by more than 50 percent, then the
launch canister shall be opened by the inspected
Party in order that the inspecting Party be able to
confirm by visual observation of the interior
portion that the missile inside the launch canister
is not a missile subject to the Treaty. In any
event, after the radiation detection measurements
are taken on all launch canisters subject to
inspection at the inspection site, the inspection
team shall select one launch canister that must be
opened by the inspected Party in order that the
inspecting Party be able to confirm by visual
observation of the interior portion that the
missile inside the launch canister is not a missile
subject to the Treaty. The Parties shall agree on
specific visual observation procedures that permit
this confirmation. Until such time as the Parties
agree to such procedures, they shall, during the
conduct of inspections using radiation detection
devices, use, on all missile launch canisters
opened for visual observation of their interior
portion, both visual observation methods
demonstrated during the taking of benchmark
radiation measurements, that is, the removal of the
front cover of the SS-25 launch canister and the
opening of the portholes in the front section of
the SS-25 launch canister.

1. Portal:

(a) Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment: Infrared
profiler consisting of a horizontal and vertical
array of infrared lights and sensors:

(i) Infrared light and sensor pairs, Pulnix, Model
PH-30, assembled with address boards in
vertical and horizontal arrays;

(ii) Data processing computer, Zenith, Model ZWL
184-02 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy disk
drive (road profiler);

(iii) Data processing computer, Zenith, Model ZWL
0200-04 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy disk
drive (rail profiler);

(iv) Printer, IBM, model Pro Printer II for data of
a parallel type;

(v) Junction box, Hoffman, Model A3OH24DLB with
profiler preprocessor, power supply, heater
and fiber-optic transmitter and receiver; and

(vi) Fiber-optic cable, AT&T Model 3DFX-012
(connecting the junction box to the Data
Collection Center or the inspector's exit
shelter).

(b) weight sensors:

(i) single-axle, weigh-in-motion scales with a
maximum capacity of 91 tons, PAT Equipment,
model DAw 400;

(ii) Data processing computer, Zenith, model ZWL
184-02 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy 'disk
drive;

(iii) Printer, IBM, Model Pro Printer II for data of
a parallel type;

(iv) Portable scales, U.S. Scale, Model 760 RES;
and

(v) Scale transport trailer, U.S. Scale, Model
TLR-7KZ.

(c) Non-damaging image producing equipment:

(i) X-ray imaging system, Bechtel National, Inc.,
CARGOSCAN that includes:

- Imaging