INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING
The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles, Together with the Memorandum of Understanding
and Two Protocols, Signed at Washington on December 8, 1987
The White House, January 25, 1988
To the Senate of the United States:
I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection regarding the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty, together with the MOU and the two Protocols, was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. The Report of the Department of State on the Treaty is provided for the information of the Senate.
In addition, I am transmitting herewith, for the information of the
Senate, the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom
of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
(the Basing Country Agreement), which was signed at Brussels on December
11, 1987.
The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called
for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries.
The Report of the Department of State discusses in detail the terms
of the Basing Country Agreement. Also attached
for the information of the Senate are the notes exchanged between both
the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and the United States.
The notes acknowledge that these countries agree to the United States'
conducting inspections, under the Treaty, on their territory. Identical
notes also are being exchanged
between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries.
The Treaty is an unprecedented arms control agreement in several respects.
It marks the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union
have agreed to eliminate, throughout the world, an entire class of their
missile systems. Significantly, the elimination will be achieved from
markedly asymmetrical starting points that favored the Soviet Union.
The Treaty includes provisions for comprehensive on-site inspections,
including the continuous monitoring of certain facilities, to aid in
verifying compliance. To a much greater extent than in earlier arms
control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, detailed
information has been, and will continue to be, exchanged by the Parties
in order to facilitate verification of compliance. Finally, the United
States and the Soviet Union have agreed on cooperative measures to enhance
verification by national technical means.
The missile systems to be eliminated consist of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles having a range capability between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The launchers for such missiles and unique elements of their related support structures and support equipment also will be eliminated. The shorter-range missiles to be eliminated under this Treaty are those with a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers. They must be eliminated within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Intermediate-range missiles, having a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, are to be eliminated in two phases within three years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Elimination will take place at designated locations and will be subject to on-site inspection as an aid to verifying compliance.
In the MOU, the United States and the Soviet Union have provided detailed information on the location of all missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty. Each Party is required to provide updated information on a routine basis after the Treaty enters into force.
The Treaty provides that on-site inspections are permitted at specified locations in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as in the Basing Countries in Western and Eastern Europe where U.S. or Soviet missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty are or have been located. The different types of "short-notice" on-site inspections for which the Treaty provides are designed to contribute to our ability to verify Soviet compliance, while protecting all U.S.
and Allied nuclear and conventional forces not subject to the Treaty as well as other sensitive intelligence and defense facilities.
In addition to "short-notice" on-site inspections, the Treaty provides for other types of on-site inspections, including the continuous presence of U.S. inspectors at the Soviet facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, and a continuous Soviet presence at the identified facility at Hercules Plant #1, located at Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced.
The Treaty is the culmination of six years of negotiations with the Soviet Union. To a large extent, the Treaty is the result of Allied solidarity in support of the fundamental objectives established by NATO's "dual-track" decision in 1979. Our Atlantic and our Asian and Pacific Allies have been closely involved throughout the period of negotiation, and they fully support the Treaty. The Treaty enhances our collective security by eliminating an entire class of Soviet missile systems that has been a major concern for over a decade. Our European Allies will continue to be well protected by the significant U.S. nuclear forces remaining in Europe, by the independent British and French nuclear deterrents, and by conventional forces, which include over 300,000 U.S.
troops.
I believe that the Treaty is in the best interests of the United States and represents an important step in achieving arms reductions that strengthen U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, I urge the Senate's advice and consent to its ratification.
The White House, January 25, 1988
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
Department of State, Washington.
The President, The White House.
The President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection establishing procedures for the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. I recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
In addition, accompanying this Report is the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement). The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. Also enclosed are the Notes that were exchanged between the United States and both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections that will be carried out on the territory of those two countries. The Basing Country Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987, and the Notes were exchanged on December 23, 1987, between the United States and the German Democratic Republic and on January 5, 1988, between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Identical notes are also being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries. I recommend that the Basing Country Agreement and the Notes be provided to the Senate for its information.
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate, throughout the world, their shorter-range (500 to 1000 kilometers) and intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with the launchers for those missiles and unique support equipment and support structures. This marks the first time that the two principal nuclear powers have agreed to the elimination of an entire class of weapon-delivery systems.
The Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS- 20s threatening our Allies in Europe and Asia. It was negotiated in Geneva and at ministerial meetings in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva. In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles in its development.
Throughout the negotiating process, we consulted extensively with our NATO and Asian allies, particularly the Western European Basing Countries in which missile systems, support structures, or other equipment subject to the Treaty are located: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Treaty, the United States negotiated the Basing Country Agreement with these countries, providing for their approval and assistance in the implementation of the Treaty's inspection provisions. We also regularly advised Congress, in Washington and during the Congressional Observer Group's meeting in Geneva, on the progress of the negotiations and on the objectives of the United States in negotiating the Treaty.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Treaty had its genesis in the Soviet Deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles beginning in 1977. The SS-20 is an accurate, three-warhead, ground-mobile ballistic missile, whose deployment by the Soviet Union increased an already existing imbalance in favor of Soviet theater nuclear forces. These Soviet deployments not only directly threatened our NATO and Asian Allies, they also raised questions about the ability of the United States and its Allies, to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In December 1979, after thorough consultations among the Allies, NATO reached what became known as the "dual-track" decision. On the one hand, NATO would proceed to deploy a limited number of U.S.
Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to maintain its deterrent capability. On the other hand, the United States would pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a balance in intermediate- range nuclear missile forces at a lower and equal level.
Under this Administration, the "dual-track" decision was reaffirmed, and on November 18, 1981, the United States proposed the "zero option" to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to this proposal, the United States would have canceled its planned deployments to Europe of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would have agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
Today, more than six years later, the U.S. "zero option" proposal constitutes the basis of the Treaty. The six years of negotiations, however, did not produce this result easily. For example, while the United States emphasized for years its preference for the "zero option," the Soviets at first insisted on retaining a residual force of intermediate-range missiles and on counting the independent British and French nuclear deterrents as though they were forces of the United States. The United States rejected that position. Moreover, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November 1983 when the United States began deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. It was not until January 1985 that the Soviets agreed to return to the negotiations. They did not agree to the "zero option" until July 1987.
Soviet shorter-range missiles--the SS-12 and SS-23--can fulfill many of the same military missions as the Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Therefore, from the outset, the United States insisted upon concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of limits on intermediate-range missiles. In the Summer of 1987, after the Soviets proposed the elimination of shorter-range systems in Europe, the United States proposed that the shorter-range systems of both sides be eliminated on a global basis. In response to the U.S. proposal, the Soviets accepted the "zero option" for shorter- range missiles as well.
For much of the negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that the Treaty should focus only on missile systems located in Europe and that missiles located outside of Europe should be exempt from the Treaty or subject to less stringent restrictions. The United States, however, insisted on a "global" approach in view of the mobility and transportability of the Soviet missile systems. The Soviets eventually agreed to this approach.
During the last months of the negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted that U.S. warheads associated with the Pershing IA missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany be included in the Treaty. The United States had insisted from the beginning of the negotiations that systems belonging to third countries would not be part of, or be affected by, the Treaty. On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty.
Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that period, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation.
THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
The Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range ground- launched, weapon-delivery, ballistic and cruise missiles, their launchers, and specified support structures and support equipment.
The Treaty requires periodic data exchanges and gives each Party the right to carry out verification measures, including on-site inspections.
The Treaty consists of four documents, which set forth the basic obligations and the means of implementing those obligations.
These are: The Treaty Articles, which obligate the Parties to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and 18 months, respectively; not to possess such missile systems after elimination; not to produce or flight-test such missiles in the future; and to carry out provisions to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty;
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which contains the data, including site diagrams and photographs that are integral parts of the MOU, exchanged between the Parties prior to the signing of the Treaty regarding the locations, numbers, and characteristics of each Party's intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems as of November 1, 1987;
The Protocol on Elimination, which sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty; and
The Protocol on Inspection, which sets forth the detailed procedures for conducting on-site inspections, including "short notice" inspections, "baseline" inspections, "close- out" inspections, "elimination" inspections, and continuous portal monitoring.
REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS
The Treaty provides that each Party must eliminate all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. Intermediate-range missiles have a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles have a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.
The existing types of intermediate-range shorter-range missiles are listed in Article III of the Treaty. For the United States, these are the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BGM-109G intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pershing IA shorter-range ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of missiles are the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-12 shorter- range ballistic missile, and SS-23 shorter-range ballistic missile. All intermediate-range missile systems must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. All shorter- range missile systems must be eliminated within 18 months. For ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles not listed in Article III as "existing types," range capability is determined in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.
Upon entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or launchers of such missiles. The Parties are prohibited from conducting any launches of shorter- range missiles. During the first six months following entry into force of the Treaty, however, each Party may launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of destroying them. Once all intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems have been eliminated, neither Party may thereafter possess any intermediate-range or shorter-range missile systems.
Also, the Treaty takes account of the fact that the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is not subject to the Treaty, is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is subject to the Treaty. The Parties are permitted to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), having a range such that it is not subject to the Treaty, that uses one stage, and only one stage, outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile that is subject to the Treaty. However, to strengthen the ban on missile production, the Parties are prohibited from producing any other stage that is similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of any existing type of intermediate- range ground-launched ballistic missile. In order to help verify compliance with this provision, the United States has the right to establish a portal monitoring system, including resident inspectors, to monitor continuously the portal of each facility at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled. Currently there is one such facility at Votkinsk. For its part, the Soviet Union has the right to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at a former U.S. intermediate-range GLBM production facility at Magna, Utah.
VERIFICATION OBLIGATIONS
The scope and intrusiveness of verification called for in this Treaty are unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Verification obligations fall under five basic categories:
LOCATIONAL RESTRICTIONS
In order to facilitate verification, the Treaty imposes a number of restrictions on activities relating to intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems during the elimination periods.
For example, pending elimination:
ELIMINATION REQUIREMENTS
Article X of the Treaty sets forth the basic requirements regarding the elimination of specific items and facilities and obligates the Parties to carry out the required elimination activities in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in the Treaty and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection. The locations at which elimination takes place are specified in the MOU or in subsequent updated data. The Protocol on Elimination sets forth detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, launch canisters, shelters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks, and training items, as appropriate, for each Party. Techniques such as burning, demolition, crushing, and flattening are specified for eliminating transportable items at designated elimination facilities. Techniques for eliminating fixed structures in situ are specified, including dismantlement, excavation, and demolition. Provisions governing elimination of missiles through launch, static display, and loss or accidental destruction are also included.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
The Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere with such means of verification. With a view to enhancing the utility of national technical means, concealment measures are strictly limited. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is required, up to six times a year during the period of elimination, to open on short notice the roofs of SS-25 garages in order to help U.S. national technical means ensure that SS-20s are not deployed at SS-25 strategic missile bases that are not subject to on-site inspections.
DATA EXCHANGES
The Treaty requires detailed exchanges of data and notifications. Each Party is required to notify the other each time a missile or launcher is moved and of any changes in the data base originally set forth in the MOU. Each Party must advise the other of the scheduled date of elimination activities, the movement of items that are to be eliminated from the area specified in the MOU to elimination facilities, and the completion of elimination activities. Such notifications are required to be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. The notifications are designed to provide a continuously updated data base, which will serve as a baseline against which other observations can be measured.
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
The Treaty provides for a wide variety of on-site inspections.
The scope of the inspection measures is unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements. The on-site inspections to be carried out include:
The specific procedures for the conduct of these inspections, including provisions governing access for on-site inspections and the infrastructure for a continuous portal monitoring system, are set forth in the Protocol on Inspection.
Inspectors and their supporting aircrews will be designated by each Party in advance by means of lists submitted to the other Party. Specific grounds on which a Party may object to a particular individual are set forth. The Annex to the Protocol on Inspection specifies the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members during the inspection process, including immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability of their person.
The Protocol on Inspection designates certain "points of entry" for each country in which missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. A Party intending to carry out an inspection must notify the other Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, not less than a specified number of hours before the inspection team will reach the point of entry. Within a specified time after arrival at the point of entry, the Inspecting Party must indicate the specific site to be inspected. An inspection team must depart the point of entry for the inspection site within a specified number of hours from its arrival at the point of entry.
The Inspected Party must provide transport for the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. In the case of "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections, the Inspected Party must ensure that the inspection team arrives at the site within nine hours of its specification of the inspection site.
In general, one hour after notification of a specific inspection site has been provided, the Inspected Party may not remove any Treaty-limited item from that site prior to inspection. Except for continuous portal monitoring and "elimination" inspections, the period of time an inspection team may remain at an inspection site for a given inspection is 24 hours, with one eight hour extension if agreed to by the Inspected Party. There is a limit on the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously. Inspection procedures vary depending upon the specific type of inspection involved.
RATIFICATION
The Treaty will enter into force when the constitutional procedures for ratification of the United States and the Soviet Union have been satisfied and the instruments of ratification have been exchanged. The MOU, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty and upon exchange of the instruments of ratification will enter into force as part of the Treaty. The U.S.-GDR and U.S.-Czechoslovak Notes, which are included herewith for the information of the Senate, will also enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. The Basing Country Agreement will do so as well, following completion of the constitutional procedures of each of the Parties to it and notification thereof to all other Parties.
AMENDMENTS
Amendments to the Treaty are subject to the same ratification procedures as the Treaty itself. However, some of the provisions and procedures contained in the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are highly detailed and technical. It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust some of them to take into account unforeseen situations. Accordingly, the Protocols provide that the Parties may, in the Special Verification Commission established by the Treaty, agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocols. The Protocols provide that such measures, which would be technical in nature and would not affect the Parties' basic obligations, would not be considered to be amendments and thus would not require ratification.
NON-CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS
The Parties commit themselves not to assume any international obligation or undertaking that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision will not in any way affect existing or future patterns of defense cooperation with U.S. Allies in other areas, including strategic forces, short-range nuclear forces (with a range capability below 500 kilometers), or conventional forces.
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
The Treaty is of unlimited duration. As an exercise of its national sovereignty, a Party may withdraw following six months' notice to the other Party if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT
The Basing Country Agreement is a necessary complement to the Treaty. The Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection provide for on- site inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty not only in U.S. and Soviet territory, but also in the countries in which U.S. and Soviet missile systems are located.
Many of the items that the United States must eliminate are within the territory of our Western European Allies. By means of the Basing Country Agreement, the five Allied Basing Countries, on whose territory U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located, consent to inspections at facilities subject to the Treaty within their territory by Soviet inspectors conducted in accordance with the Treaty and its Protocols. This formal consent on the part of the Allied Basing Countries provides the legal basis for the United States to make its commitment to the Soviet Union that Soviet inspections can be carried out on the territory of the Allied Basing Countries.
EXCHANGES OF NOTES
Each Basing Country is exchanging diplomatic Notes with the Party that will conduct inspections within its territory. The Notes record the acknowledgement of each Basing Country and the Inspecting Party that the Basing Country has agreed to inspections within its territory conducted in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, and that the Inspecting Party has obligated itself to comply with the terms of the Treaty and to respect the laws and regulations of the Basing Country during the inspections. The Notes state that they do not in any way affect the reciprocal obligations between the United States and the Soviet Union under the Treaty. The countries that base U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the Basing Countries for Soviet systems are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.
INSPECTIONS OF SS-4 SILOS
In addition to the Treaty documents discussed above, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to an exchange of letters between Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov, dated December 7, 1987, relating to the U.S. inspections of silo launchers for Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This agreement gives the United States the right to conduct a total of up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers of SS-4 missiles. Organizational matters relating to such inspections will be arranged through the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the Treaty.
CONCLUSION
Accompanying this Report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols. Also, attached is an article-by-article analysis of the Basing Country Agreement.
I believe this Treaty will significantly enhance the security of the United States and our Allies. It will eliminate an entire class of weapon-delivery systems in which the Soviet Union has established a clear advantage. I therefore strongly recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE P. SHULTZ.
The Treaty consists of a Preamble and 17 Articles. The associated Memorandum of Understanding on Data (the MOU), Protocol on Elimination, and Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.
THE PREAMBLE
The Preamble identifies the United States and the Soviet Union as the Parties to the treaty and contains four paragraphs that set forth the general goals and objectives that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed are advanced by the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems.
The first paragraph recognizes that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.
The second paragraph notes that the Parties are guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability.
The third paragraph states the Parties' conviction that the measures set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security.
The fourth paragraph acknowledges the obligations of the Parties set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
ARTICLE I--BASIC OBLIGATIONS
Article I sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in accordance with the Treaty's provisions, not to have such systems after their elimination, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty. This Article also establishes that the MOU and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.
ARTICLE II--DEFINITIONS
Article II sets forth the definitions of terms used in the Treaty. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) ballistic missile and ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), (2) cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), (3) GLBM launcher, (4) GLCM launcher, (5) intermediate-range missile, (6) shorter-range missile, (7) deployment area, (8) missile operating base, (9) missile support facility, (10) transit, (11) deployed missile, (12) non-deployed missile, (13) deployed launcher, (14) non-deployed launcher, and (15) basing country.
Paragraph 1 of Article II defines a "ballistic missile" as a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. In addition, "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" is defined as a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon- delivery vehicle.
There are three factors that determine whether a ballistic missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the ballistic missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the ballistic missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all ballistic missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLBMs are those types of ground-launched ballistic missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon- delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the ballistic missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLBM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.
Paragraph 2 of Article II defines a "cruise missile" as a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. In addition, a "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" is defined as a ground-launched missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.
There are three factors that determine whether a cruise missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the cruise missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the cruise missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all cruise missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLCMs are those types of ground-launched cruise missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the cruise missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability for intermediate- range and shorter-range GLCMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLCM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.
Paragraph 3 of Article II defines a "GLBM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM. The technical data for each type of GLBM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.
Paragraph 4 of Article II defines a "GLCM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLCMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLCM. The technical data for each type of GLCM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.
Paragraph 5 of Article II defines an "intermediate-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers. The existing types of intermediate-range missiles are specified in paragraph 1 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, III, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. The criteria for determining the range capability of intermediate-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VIII.
Paragraph 6 of Article II defines a "shorter-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers. The existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties are specified in paragraph 2 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, IV, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. Criteria for determining the range capability of shorter-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.
Paragraph 7 of Article II defines a "deployment area" as a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, may operate and within which one or more missile operating base are located. All deployment areas of inter-mediate-range missiles contain, by definition, at least one missile operating base. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all deployment areas be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. Each deployment area is described by name and boundaries in Section III of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article II, an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area is considered to be deployed. An intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area is considered to be a non-deployed missile in accordance with paragraph 12 of Article II. As provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII, intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as stages of such missiles, must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile, stage of such a missile, or launcher of such a missile in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty. There are no "deployment areas" for shorter-range missiles; rather, such missiles are deployed only at missile operating bases in order to restrict them to much smaller geographical areas and thus further constrain their operational capability. This additional constraint works to the advantage of the United States since the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles.
Subparagraph 8(a) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to intermediate-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located within a deployment area: (a) at which intermediate-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, (b) in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located, and (c) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile operating bases be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. The location of each intermediate-range missile operating base is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section III of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support structures and support equipment necessary to operate intermediate-range missiles. Definitions of the term "support equipment" and "support structure" are provided in paragraphs 10 and 11, respectively, of Section I of the MOU. In addition, since all missile operating bases for intermediate-range missiles located at missile operating bases are counted as deployed missiles in accordance with paragraph 11 of Article II [sic.].
Subparagraph 8(b) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to shorter-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located at any place: (a) at which shorter-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, and (b) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. The location of each shorter-range "missile operating base" is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section IV of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support equipment necessary to operate shorter-range missiles. The definition of the term "support equipment" is provided in paragraph 10 of Section I of the MOU. Since there are no deployment areas for shorter-range missiles, deployed shorter- range missiles are considered to be those shorter-range missiles located at missile operating bases. Paragraph 3 of Article VIII specifies that shorter-range missiles and their launchers may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit from such locations to elimination facilities. A shorter-range missile or launcher in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty.
Paragraph 9 of Article II defines a "missile support facility" as a missile production facility, a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility, a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility, a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility. These terms are defined in Section I of the MOU. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile support facilities be specified in the MOU and that their locations, except for elimination facilities, cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 or Article X. The location of each such facility and its center coordinates are specified in Sections III, IV, and V of the MOU. A site diagram of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU. Intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as shorter-range missiles and their launchers, located at these facilities are considered to be non-deployed missiles and non-deployed launchers, respectively.
Paragraph 10 of Article II defines "transit," with respect to an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, as movement between: (a) missile support facilities, (b) a missile support facility and a deployment area, or (c) deployment areas. With respect to a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, "transit" is defined as a movement from either a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility. Thus, the only permitted movement of shorter-range missiles is to elimination facilities. Restrictions on the transit of shorter-range missiles complement the other measures that are intended to reduce as quickly as possible the Soviet advantage in the numbers of shorter-range missiles. Pursuant to paragraph 5(f) of Article IX, notifications of transits and information relating to the transit must be provided within 48 hours after the transit is completed. Such notifications will assist in determining whether there has been a violation if a missile is detected outside of deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities. All transits must be completed within 25 days in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article VIII. Intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in transit are counted as non- deployed missiles.
Paragraph 11 of Article II defines a "deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile that is located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile that is located at a missile operating base. Article IV requires the reduction and elimination of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles. Article V requires the elimination of deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles.
Paragraph 12 of Article II defines a "non-deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Paragraph 1 of Article VIII requires that an intermediate- range missile may only be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be "non-deployed." An intermediate- range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. As noted above, paragraph 3 of Article VIII states that, until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. A shorter-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be a non- deployed missile. A shorter-range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.
Paragraph 13 of Article II defines a "deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base. Deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. Deployed shorter-range missile launchers are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V.
Paragraph 14 of Article II defines a "non-deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Thus, "non-deployed launcher" is a term based upon the location of a launcher for intermediate- range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Non-deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are those launchers located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. An intermediate-range missile launcher that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. Non-deployed shorter-range missile launchers are those located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V. A shorter-range missile launcher that is neither deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.
Paragraph 15 of Article II defines a "basing country" as a country, other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on whose territory U.S. or Soviet intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or support structures associated with intermediate- range missiles or their launchers, were located at any time after November 1, 1987. For the purposes of this definition, the term "located" does not include missiles or launchers in transit. The Basing Countries in which U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located are Belgium, the Federal Republic of German, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The Basing Countries in which Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.
ARTICLE III--EXISTING TYPES OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES
Paragraph 1 of Article III lists the existing types of intermediate-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the types of intermediate- range missiles listed as existing are the Pershing II ballistic missile and the GBM-109G cruise missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of intermediate-range missiles are the RSD-10 (SS- 20) ballistic missile, the RS-12 (SS-4) ballistic missile, and the RS-14 (SS-5) ballistic missile.
Pursuant to Article IV, all intermediate-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers, support equipment, and support structures, must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that intermediate-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the Soviet Union must eliminate all of its RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and their associated support equipment and support structures are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.
Paragraph 2 of Article III lists the existing types of shorter-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the type of shorter-range missile described as existing is the Pershing IA ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of shorter-range missiles are the OTR-22 (SS-12) ballistic missile and the OTR-23 (SS-23) ballistic missile. Pursuant to Article V, all of the existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers and support equipment, must be eliminated within 18 months after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that shorter-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the United States must eliminate all of its Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating shorter-range missiles are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.
ARTICLE IV--REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES
Article IV sets forth the basic obligations for the reduction and eventual elimination of all intermediate-range missile systems.
Paragraph 1 of Article IV requires the Parties to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. The types of items to be eliminated are listed in Section I of the Protocol on Elimination, while the numbers of such items as of November 1, 1987, are listed in Sections II and III of the MOU. After the three-year elimination period, such missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment may not be possessed by either Party. The procedures by which each type of missile, launcher, support structure, and support equipment must be eliminated are set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.
Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that both deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, must be reduced and eliminated in two phases. It also provides that such elimination will occur throughout the duration of each phase, thus ensuring that the eliminations will not take place only in the final daysof each elimination phase.
Subparagraph 2(a) provides that by the end of the first phase, which will be no later than 29 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must have completed reductions so that:
Subparagraph 2(a) of Article IV requires that numerical limits for missiles and launchers be calculated using warhead numbers. To facilitate verification, the number of warheads actually deployed on each missile and launcher is not counted; rather, the number of warheads on missiles and launchers is derived by using the counting rules set forth in Article VII. For missiles, the counting rule in paragraph 6 of Article VII of the Treaty provides that the number of warheads a GLBM or GLCM of an existing type carries is the maximum number of warheads for that type specified in Section VI of the MOU. For launchers, paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that the number of missiles that each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is capable of carrying or containing is the number specified for launchers of missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU.
In sum, 29 months after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must not have more deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 171 warheads, not have more deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 180 warheads, not have more combined deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 200 warheads, and not have more combined deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 200 warheads.
Subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV provides that, by the end of the second phase, which will be no later than three years after the entry into force of the Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, support structures, and support equipment of the categories listed in the MOU must be eliminated by the Parties.
ARTICLE V--ELIMINATION OF SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES
Paragraph 1 of Article V provides for the elimination of the shorter-range missiles of each Party, along with launchers of such missiles and associated support equipment, within a single period of 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, there is only one phase for reductions of shorter-range missiles during which shorter-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment must be eliminated. After elimination, the Parties are not permitted to possess any shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or associated support equipment.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V restrict the locations of shorter-range missiles and their launchers during the 18-month elimination period. Paragraph 2 requires that, within 90 days of entry into force of the Treaty, each Party move all of its deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as all of its deployed and non- deployed launchers of shorter-range missiles, to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and retain them there until they are destroyed in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination. Within 12 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall move all of its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and shall retain them there until they are destroyed, in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination, during the 18-month elimination period. The requirement to move shorter-range missile systems to elimination facilities early in the elimination period is commonly referred to as the "corral" concept.
Paragraph 3 of Article V provides that shorter-range missiles and launchers of shorter-range missiles must not be located at the same elimination facility. Elimination facilities for shorter- range missiles and elimination facilities for launchers of shorter- range missiles must be separated from each other by at least 1000 kilometers.
The locational restrictions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V, together, with those in paragraph 3 of Article VIII, are intended to ensure that shorter-range missiles and their launchers are removed from operational status as soon as possible after entry into force of the Treaty. Given the fact that the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles, this provision will contribute significantly to NATO's security with respect to the threat posed by shorter-range missiles during the early stages of the implementation of the Treaty.
ARTICLE VI--PRODUCTION AND FLIGHT-TEST BANS
Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that, upon entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, neither Party may produce or flight- test any intermediate-range missile, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. Paragraph 1 also provides that neither Party may produce, flight-test, or launch any shorter-range missiles, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. The term "produce" in this context means any industrial activity involving the construction of one or more missiles, stages, or launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The obligation not to produce intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their stages and launchers, prohibits the Parties from producing such items for third parties.
A flight-test ban is a natural element in any treaty that eliminates an entire class of missile systems. It serves to strengthen the production ban. Any covertly produced missile could not be adequately flight-tested without likely U.S. detection. Without realistic testing, a Party's confidence in the operational capability of any covertly-produced missile system would be degraded.
The reason launches of shorter-range missiles are prohibited, but allowed for intermediate-range missiles, is that intermediate- range missiles may be launched for the purpose of destroying them. Paragraph 5 of Article X provides that, within the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to eliminate by means of such launching up to 100 of its intermediate- range missiles. This right is limited to this six-month period in order to preclude prohibited flight-testing under the guise of launching to destruction. Restrictions and conditions on eliminations by means of launching are provided for in Articles IX and XI of the Treaty and in Section III of the Protocol on Elimination.
Paragraph 2 of Article VI provides that, notwithstanding the paragraph 1 prohibition against producing stages of intermediate- range GLBMs, each Party has the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by the Treaty even if that missile uses one stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage. Paragraph 2 further provides that a Party may not produce any other stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. This provision takes into account the outward physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the SS-20, which is an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. The effect of paragraph 2 is to make clear that the Treaty does not prohibit the Soviets from continuing to produce the SS-25 ICBM, which is not limited by this Treaty, on the basis that it has a first stage outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS-20. The United States has a reciprocal right with regard to one stage of its own Pershing missile system should it choose to exercise it. Paragraph 2 prohibits the parties from producing more than one stage that is outwardly similar to any stage of an existing type of intermediate- range GLBM.
ARTICLE VII--COUNTING RULES
Article VII contains counting rules and type rules that are critical to the operation of the Treaty. Counting rules in arms control agreements provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that specified items will be counted in a certain way. Type rules provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that once a specified object is counted in a certain way, then all objects of that type will be counted in that same way. Such rules are important because they provide a mechanism for verifying compliance with the provisions of an agreement.
Paragraph 1 of Article VII provides that if a ballistic missile or cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, then all missiles of that type will be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. When read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article II, which defines a ground-launched ballistic missile in terms of a "weapon-delivery vehicle," paragraph 1 of Article VII defines a weapon-delivery vehicle in such a way as to relieve a Party from having to prove that every missile of a particular type has been tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle; rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that merely one missile of that type has been flight-tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle in order to establish for the purpose of the Treaty that all missiles of that type are weapon- delivery vehicles.
Paragraph 2 of Article VII states that if a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, then all GLBM or GLCMs of that type will be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. Similarly, if a GLBM or a GLCM is a shorter-range missile, then all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.
Paragraph 2 works in conjunction with all of the other Treaty provisions that refer to intermediate-range missiles or shorter- range missiles; it has the effect of a type rule, making such provisions applicable to all GLBMs and GLCMs if a single GLBM or GLCM of that type is an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile. "Intermediate-range missile" and "shorter-range missile" are defined in paragraphs 5 and 6, respectively, of Article II.
Paragraph 3 of Article VII provides that if a type of GLBM is developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not on the surface of the Earth, then it will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty. Paragraph 3 thus provides an explicit exception to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VII, and applies to such ground-launched ballistic missiles as anti-satellite missiles (ASATs), anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs), and air defense or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
Paragraph 4 of Article VII establishes criteria for defining the range capability of GLBMs and GLCMs not specified in Article III. For purposes of the Treaty, the range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III is defined as its maximum tested range.
The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III is defined as the maximum distance it can cover, while flying in its standard design mode, before it runs out of fuel. Distance is calculated by projecting the flight path of the GLCM onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.
Paragraph 4 also describes intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in terms of their range capability. A shorter-range GLBM or GLCM is a missile with a range capability equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 1000 kilometers. An intermediate-range GLBM or GLCM is defined as a missile with a range capability greater than 1000 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers.
Paragraph 5 of Article VII provides that the maximum number of warheads considered to be carried by an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is the number of warheads specified for missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU. The specification of the number of warheads associated with an existing type of intermediate-range missile is necessary in order to calculate compliance with the warhead limits pertaining to intermediate-range missiles provided for in Article IV.
Paragraph 6 of Article VII provides that each GLBM or GLCM will be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads for a missile of that type specified in Section VI of the MOU. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads on intermediate-range missiles to meet their obligations for the first phase of reductions, they will use the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of intermediate-range missile as specified in Section VI of the MOU.
Paragraph 7 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs, respectively. This paragraph works in conjunction with the Treaty provisions that refer to the testing of GLBM launchers or GLCM launchers; it has the effect of a type rule, making such provisions applicable to all launchers of a given type if a single launcher of that type has been tested to launch a GLBM or a GLCM, respectively. "GLBM launcher" and "GLCM launcher" are defined in paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, of Article II.
Paragraph 8 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has contained, or has launched, a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM, respectively. This paragraph has the effect of a type rule. Thus, if one launcher of a type has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered GLBM or GLCM launchers, respectively, and thus will be subject to the Treaty.
Paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that each launcher of an existing type of GLBM or GLCM will be considered capable of carrying or containing the number of missiles specified in Section VI of the MOU for that type of launcher. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads associated with intermediate- range missile launchers, they will use the number of GLBMs or GLCMs that the launcher of that type is considered capable of carrying, as specified in Section VI of the MOU, and, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VII which provides the warhead counting rule for GLBMs and GLCMs, multiply that number times the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of GLBM or GLCM, as specified in Section VI of the MOU.
Paragraph 10 of Article VII provides counting rules for GLBMs and GLCMs. These rules define how GLBMs and GLCMs are accounted for under the terms of the Treaty. The purpose of these provisions is to facilitate verification of compliance with the Treaty by identifying those features of the missile systems most easily observable by national technical means of verification.
Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLBMs stored or moved in separate stages (such as the Pershing II), the longest stage of an intermediate range or shorter-range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that each longest stage of such a GLBM will be counted as one complete missile. The Protocol on Elimination requires, however, that all stages of existing types of GLBMs be eliminated.
Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 of Article VII provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages (such as the SS- 20), a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate- range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that the canister does not contain such a missile. This means that such a GLBM canister will be counted as one complete GLBM. This canister counting rule serves an important verification purpose. Soviet missiles typically are kept in canisters. By virtue of this rule, if the United States detects a canister subject to the provisions of the Treaty, it will be entitled to consider that canister to contain a missile of the type associated with that canister, unless the Soviet Union can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the United States that the canister does not contain such a missile. Such a demonstration could involve on-site inspection, national technical means of verification, or cooperative measures. Absent such a Soviet demonstration, each Soviet canister counts as one missile for purposes of Treaty limitations. Also, pursuant to the Protocol on Elimination, canisters of prohibited types of intermediate-range and shorter range missiles must be eliminated along with their associated missiles. In addition, subparagraph (b) of Article 10 provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages, an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be considered a completed missile. Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that the airframe of a GLCM will be counted as if it were a complete missile.
Paragraph 11 of Article VII provides that a ballistic missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLBM launchers subject to the Treaty. Similarly, a cruise missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLCM launchers subject to the Treaty. These exceptions are necessary to permit the land-based testing of items not subject to the Treaty, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
Paragraph 12 of Article VII gives each Party the right to produce and use existing booster stages in order to create booster systems with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. This provision permits each Party to produce and use booster stages that otherwise might, because of the range to which the booster system is launched and the payload that is tested, be considered for the purposes of the Treaty to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. In this regard, if a ballistic missile or cruise missile is not a weapon-delivery vehicle, then pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2, respectively, of Article II it is not subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Paragraph 12 is essential to permit the United States to continue on-going research on advanced concepts for strategic reentry vehicles and defensive systems.
Paragraph 12 further provides that launches of such booster systems will not be considered to be flight testing of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as long as four conditions are met. First, the stages used in such booster systems must be different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III. Second, the booster systems must be used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than themselves. Third, the total number of launchers for such booster systems must not exceed 35 at any one time for either Party. Fourth, the launchers for such booster systems must be fixed and emplaced above ground. Such launchers must be located only at research and development launch sites that are specified in Section VII of the MOU. Such research and development launch sites are not subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. Paragraph 6 of Article IX, however, provides that each party must notify the other Party, at least ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in this paragraph. The purpose of such a notification is to enhance the verification by national technical means of such launches. ARTICLE VIII--LOCATION AND TRANSIT
Article VIII sets forth locational restrictions both for intermediate-range missiles and their launchers and for shorter- range missiles and their launchers. In addition, Article VIII limits the movement of missiles and launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The ability to verify compliance is enhanced if there are restrictions on the location and movement of Treaty-limited items during the period in which they are being eliminated.
Paragraph 1 of Article VIII provides that all intermediate- range missiles and their launchers must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "deployment areas," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 7, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missiles are specified in Section III of the MOU, and notification of missiles and launchers in transit is required pursuant to subparagraph 5(f) of Article IX.
Paragraph 2 of Article VIII requires that stages of intermediate-range missiles must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities, or between deployment areas and missile support facilities. Paragraph 2 complements paragraph 1 of Article VIII by placing restrictions similar to those for intermediate-range missiles on stages of such missiles. The terms "deployment area" and "missile support facility" are defined in paragraphs 7 and 9, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missile systems are specified in Section III of the MOU.
Paragraph 3 of Article VIII provides that all shorter-range missiles and their launchers, until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V, must be: (a) located at missile operating bases, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Paragraph 10 of Article II requires that such transit can only be to elimination facilities. Shorter- range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "missile operating base," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II, and the location of such bases is specified in Section IV of the MOU.
Paragraph 4 of Article VIII provides that the transit of a missile or launcher must be completed within 25 days. To facilitate verification of compliance with this provision, paragraph 5(f) of Article IX provides for notification of such transits within 48 hours after they have been completed. Such notification must include the location of the transiting missile or launcher once every four days during that transit.
Paragraph 5 of Article VIII states that all deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities are specified either in the MOU or in subsequent updates of data provided pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a), or 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty. Also, paragraph 5 of Article VIII provides that neither Party will increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities from those set forth in the MOU. Elimination facilities are excepted from this prohibition in order to give each Party the flexibility to determine the most appropriate elimination site(s) during the three-year elimination period. Finally, paragraph 5 provides that a missile support facility will not be considered to be part of a deployment area even if it is located within such an area. Missiles, stages, and launchers located at missile support facilities are considered to be non-deployed. If a missile support facility located within a deployment area were considered to be part of the deployment area, then any missiles, stages, or launchers located at that facility would be deployed, rather than non-deployed.
Paragraph 6 of Article VIII provides that, beginning 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may locate: (a) intermediate-range missiles, (b) stages of intermediate-range missiles, (c) launchers of intermediate-range missiles, (d) shorter-range missiles, (e) stages of shorter-range missiles, or (f) launchers of shorter-range missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, or test ranges specified in the MOU. This means that, after the 30-day period, locating a missile, a missile stage, or a launcher at a production facility or test range would be a violation. By providing that missiles, launchers, and stages may not be located in locations at which such items would be produced or tested, paragraph 6 makes compliance with the Treaty prohibitions on production and testing easier to verify.
Paragraph 7 of Article VIII provides that neither Party may locate any intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. The prohibition against locating missiles at training facilities is designed to guard against covert operation of those missiles at such facilities.
Paragraph 8 of Article VIII provides that a non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile may not be carried on, or be contained within, a launcher for such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities. This provision is designed to help ensure that non- deployed missiles are not covertly operational during the elimination period. Paragraph 9 of Article VIII provides that training missiles as well as training launchers for intermediate-range missiles and for shorter-range missiles are subject to the same locational restrictions as for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles that are provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article VIII. This means that training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range missiles must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit, while training missiles and training launchers for shorter-range missiles must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit to elimination facilities. Since some training systems are not readily externally distinguishable, particularly by national technical means of verification, from actual missiles and launchers, the requirement that they be located at the same facilities as operational systems helps to ensure that operational systems will not be covertly deployed under the guise of training systems.
ARTICLE IX--DATA EXCHANGES AND NOTIFICATIONS
Article IX sets forth the basic obligations for the data exchanges and notifications associated with the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. These data exchanges and notifications are of unprecedented scope and represent an important verification measure.
Paragraph 1 of Article IX states that the MOU contains categories of data relevant to the Treaty's obligations and that it lists all of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Paragraph 1 requires that updates of that data and notifications required by this Article be provided according to the categories contained in the MOU. While the data is updated in each category, the MOU itself, as well as its categories, does not change.
Paragraph 2 of Article IX requires that updates of data and notifications be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. As stated above, the Centers were established pursuant to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.
Paragraph 3 of Article IX provides that, not less than 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of the entry into force of the Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the MOU. Since paragraph 1 of Article IX requires that the data in the MOU be current as of November 1, 1987, paragraph 3 provides the mechanism by which the information initially provided by the MOU is updated for the period between November 1, 1987, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty. It is this updated data that lists the inventory of items to be eliminated under the Treaty.
Paragraph 4 of Article IX requires that, following the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must provide updated data for all categories in the MOU at six-month intervals. The updated data must be provided not later than 30 days after each six-month interval. The updates must inform the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, that have occurred during the six-month interval. The updates must also inform the other Party of the "net effect" of those changes.
Paragraph 5 of Article IX sets forth additional notification requirements imposed on each Party. These requirements will apply throughout the life of the Treaty.
Subparagraph 5(a) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility. Paragraph 8 of Article X calls for the elimination of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. Upon elimination, former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities (except missile production facilities) will continue to be subject to "short-notice" on-site inspections, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article XI, until 13 years have elapsed after the entry into force of the Treaty.
Subparagraph 5(b) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and date of a scheduled change. Elimination facilities, being a type of missile support facility, must themselves be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.
Subparagraph 5(c) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, stages and launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Such notifications must include the following five items:
Launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purposes of their elimination do not require notifications in accordance with subparagraph 5(c); rather, notice of such eliminations by launching must be provided in accordance with subparagraph 5(d) below.
Subparagraph 5(d) requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X. Such notifications must include the following information:
Subparagraph 5(e) requires notification of changes, within 48 hours after they occur, in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their launchers, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, resulting from elimination. Such notifications must include the following information:
Subparagraph 5(f) requires notification of the transit, not more than 48 hours after it has been completed, of intermediate- range missiles or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Such notifications must include the following information:
Paragraph 6 of Article IX requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII. This provision facilitates monitoring, which helps to ensure that missile systems subject to the Treaty will not be covertly tested under the guise of research and development boosters.
ARTICLE X--ELIMINATION
Article X sets forth the basic obligations for the elimination of items or facilities whose destruction is required by the Treaty. Details concerning the elimination of specific items are provided in the Protocol on Elimination. This elimination regime helps to ensure that all elimination required by the Treaty will, in fact, be performed.
Paragraph 1 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its intermediate-range and short-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.
Paragraph 2 of Article X provides that on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination must take place in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspection, and the Protocol on Elimination.
Paragraph 3 of Article X requires that when intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment are removed from deployment areas to elimination facilities, they must be removed in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States, such organizational units are batteries of Pershing II ballistic missiles and flights of BGM-109G cruise missiles. For the Soviet Union, such organizational units are SS-20 ballistic missiles regiments composed of two or three battalions. Elimination by complete organizational units will aid in verification of the elimination process.
Paragraph 4 of Article X provides that the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment must be carried out either at the elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities identified in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. If such items are eliminated in accordance with Section IV (i.e., elimination in situ) or section V (i.e., elimination through loss, accidental destruction, or static display) of the Protocol on Elimination, then they need not be eliminated at the facilities specified in the MOU or at the facilities as to which notification was made in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. Support structures, associated with Treaty-limited missiles or launchers, that are subject to elimination must be eliminated in situ.
Paragraph 5 of Article X permits each Party to eliminate, within the first six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, up to 100 intermediate-range missiles by means of launching. Section III of the Protocol on Elimination requires that such missiles must be launched from designated launch sites to existing impact areas. The purpose of the six-month time limit is to reduce any potential conflict between this means of elimination and the flight-test ban provided for in paragraph 1 of Article VI.
Paragraph 6 of Article X requires that certain intermediate- range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, must be eliminated within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, if such missiles meet the following three criteria: (a) they were tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, (b) they were never deployed, and (c) they are not listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. Such missiles must be eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. These missiles are, for the United States, the Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missile, and, for the USSR, the RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missile.
Paragraph 7 of Article X provides that elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment will be considered to have occurred after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon receipt of the notification required in subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX.
Paragraph 8 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. It is important to understand that all deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities that are listed in the MOU or, in the case of elimination facilities, those identified by means of a subsequent data update, must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8. A Party must notify the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of article IX of the Treaty, of the date of the eliminations, but only after three conditions have been fulfilled. The conditions that must be met before notification can be given are as follows:
Paragraph 8 of Article X further provides that such deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities will be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI (i.e., there has been a "close-out" inspection) or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination (for which notification was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX). Thus, inspection of eliminated locations is a right available to both Parties, but such inspections are not required by the Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility that met the three conditions specified above prior to entry into force of the Treaty, and which was not included in the initial data exchange update made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty, and which was not included in the initial data exchange update made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty, will be considered to have been eliminated. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI, any such location will be subject to an on-site "baseline" inspection in order to determine whether, in fact, it was eliminated.
Paragraph 9 of Article X provides that if a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the MOU for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to the Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted. However, while such a missile base can be converted, such a base must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X above. Conversion is not a substitute for elimination under the Treaty.
ARTICLE XI--ON-SITE INSPECTION
Article XI sets forth the plan for on-site inspections the Parties will conduct to assist in the verification of compliance with the Treaty. This Article provides for several different types of inspections, including "baseline" inspections (paragraph 3), "close-out" inspections (paragraph 4), "short-notice" inspections (paragraph 5), continuous "portal monitoring" inspections (paragraph 6), and "elimination" inspections (paragraphs 7 and 8). "Elimination" inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 are the only on-site inspections that an Inspecting Party is obliged to carry out. All of the other types of inspections specified in this article are at the option of the Inspecting Party. Except for continuous portal monitoring, missile production facilities are not subject to any type of on-site inspection. This decision was made at the insistence of the United States for reasons of national security. Details concerning the procedures for each type of inspection are provided in the Protocol on Inspection.
Paragraph 1 of Article XI provides that, for the purpose of facilitating verification of compliance with the Treaty, each Party has the right to conduct on-site inspections in accordance with this Article and the Protocols on Inspection and Elimination.
Paragraph 2 of Article XI provides that such inspections may take place within the territory of each Party and within the territory of the Basing Countries, i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia. The Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the five Allied Basing Countries (i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom) provides the consent of the Allied Basing Countries to have inspections conducted within their respective territories pursuant to Article XI and the Protocol on Inspection.
Paragraph 3 of Article XI sets forth the parameters of "baseline" inspections. These inspections are for the purpose of helping to verify the updated data exchanged pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX. Beginning 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, these inspections will afford each Party an opportunity to inspect all missile operating bases and missile support facilities (other than missile production facilities) specified in the MOU, as well as an opportunity to inspect all elimination facilities listed in the updated data. These inspections must be completed within 90 days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties will exchange updated data and, within 90 days after entry into force, conduct inspections to help verify the updated data. The procedures for a "baseline" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.
Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for the "close-out" inspection of bases and facilities once they are declared to have been eliminated. It establishes the right to confirm by on-site inspection the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities, except missile production facilities, for which notification of elimination was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX. "Close-out" inspections must be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled elimination date in order to confirm that such elimination did in fact take place. Once such bases and facilities are eliminated, they are, as former facilities, subject to the "short-notice" inspections provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Article rather than those provided for under subparagraph 5(a) of this Article. If a Party conducts an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article (i.e., a "baseline" inspection) after the scheduled date of elimination of a particular facility, then no "close-out" inspection will be permitted. The procedures for a "close-out" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.
Paragraph 5 of Article XI provides each Party with the right to conduct two types of "short-notice" inspections for a period of 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. Such inspections are referred to as "short-notice" because, like "baseline" and "close-out" inspections, they require that an inspection team be transported to the inspection site no later than nine hours after the inspection team specifies which particular site it wishes to inspect. The "short-notice" inspection differs from "baseline" and "close-out" inspections because it is based on a quota system and is available to the Parties for 13 years after the Treaty enters into force. The two types of "short-notice" inspections are: (a) beginning 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to inspect missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities. The purpose of these inspections is to ascertain the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment located at the missile operating base or missile support facility that is being inspected; and
(b) each Party has the right to inspect former missile operating bases and missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty, other than former missile production facilities. This inspection right includes former missile operating bases that, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article X, have been converted for a use not limited by the Treaty after November 1, 1987. This inspection right is extended to such converted bases because they must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.
The Parties have the right to conduct a total of 20 of the inspections described in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of the Treaty, 15 such inspections per year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per year during the last five years. Thus, each Party will have an opportunity to conduct up to 185 such inspections over the course of 13 years. Neither Party may use more than half of its total number of inspections per year within the territory of any one Basing Country. The procedures for a "short-notice" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.
Paragraph 6 of Article XI provides the Parties with certain continuous monitoring inspection rights for a period of up to 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. These types of inspection are referred to as "portal monitoring." Each Party has the right to inspect by such portal monitoring: (a) the portal of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of GLBMs that use missile stages, any one of which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of solid- propellant GLBM subject to the Treaty, is accomplished. Subparagraph (a) is necessary because of the close physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the solid-propellant SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM; or
(b) if a party has no facility of the type described in subparagraph (a) above, the portal of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced. The existing types of GLBMs are specified in Article III.
The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to paragraph