05 June 1998
(Powers reject India, Pakistan as nuclear club members) (3820) Geneva -- Secretary of State Albright says the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) "will not amend the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) to accommodate India and Pakistan," because that would send a message "that every nation is free to test its way into the nuclear club." At a June 4 press conference following the P-5 meeting in Geneva on the crisis precipitated by nuclear tests conducted by the two South Asian nations, she also said the United States will "insist that no nation that disregards international norms become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council." Albright called on India and Pakistan to take immediate steps to reduce tensions, saying both countries should sign the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), stop production of fissile material, formalize their pledge not to export dangerous weapons and technologies, and resume dialogue over outstanding issues, including Kashmir. "The whole world is asking India and Pakistan to stop, listen and think," Albright said. "Don't rush to embrace what the rest of the planet is racing to leave behind." And she warned them not to assume that they are the only countries in the world "immune to miscalculation." Albright told reporters the best reason for India and Pakistan "not to test is that it's not in their national interest." With regard to Kashmir, the Secretary of State said the best way to deal with the long-standing conflict is for India and Pakistan to resolve the problem themselves. However, she also said the international community in some organized forum may have "some suggestions to make." Albright said the India-Pakistan crisis will be the focus of talks at the G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting in London June 12. Following is the State Department transcript: (begin transcript) DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman June 5, 1998 PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT Palais des Nations Geneva, Switzerland June 4, 1998 ALBRIGHT: Good evening, and thank you for coming out at this late hour. We have just completed an extraordinary meeting to forge a unified strategy toward the crisis in South Asia. We met in this group today because, as the permanent members of the Security Council, we have an obligation to respond to what is clearly a threat to international peace and security. And, as the NPT nuclear weapons states, we have a responsibility to protect the non-proliferation regime. But this is not a challenge the nuclear powers can or will meet alone. In the coming weeks, we will be engaging with a broader group of non-proliferation leaders, including Japan and Germany and nations that have wisely foresworn the nuclear option. We are defending our principles here, not our privileges. The whole world is asking India and Pakistan to stop, listen, and think. Don't rush to embrace what the rest of the planet is racing to leave behind. Don't assume you are the only countries on earth that are immune to miscalculation. There is no point worth making; no message worth sending; no interest worth securing; that can possibly justify the risk. Our first purpose today was to send a coordinated message to India and Pakistan about what we, as outside powers, believe they must do to diminish the immediate risk of escalation. We have also called on India and Pakistan to take additional steps to avert an arms race and ease the tensions between them. They should sign the CTBT; refrain from deploying missiles; stop production of fissile material; formalize their pledge not to export dangerous weapons and technologies; and resume dialogue, including over Kashmir. The second part of our message today is that we're prepared to help India and Pakistan maintain peace if they're prepared to do the right thing. We will each do our part to prevent destabilizing transfers of arms to South Asia. The United States is willing to share our expertise and our capability to help India and Pakistan monitor military activities and avoid miscalculations. We are all ready to assist them in settling differences and reducing tensions. At the same time, a number of nations, including the United States, will maintain sanctions against India and Pakistan until the situation is resolved. The United States will also insist that no nation that disregards international norms become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. We each have a distinctive relationship with India and Pakistan, and we will each try to influence them in our own ways. What is vital is that no nation should look upon sanctions as a commercial opportunity. If some of us are willing to take the heat, others should not be rushing to take the contracts. Finally, we affirmed our resolve today to shore up the global non-proliferation regime. We will not amend the NPT to accommodate India and Pakistan, for that would send a message that every nation is free to test its way into the nuclear club. Clearly, these nations have had a nuclear weapons capability, and they will have one for the foreseeable future. What we're insisting is that they freeze that capability, and that they not deploy nuclear weapons or missiles. There are many things we want India and Pakistan to do, but we don't want to isolate these countries, or make them outcasts or pariahs. We must engage them. We must persuade and convince them that what the international community wants them to do, they should do, consistent with their legitimate security needs. Let me close by saying that this is not a one-shot event. This group will remain seized with this issue. We will work together on next steps. We have no illusions that we will succeed overnight, but a process has begun and we're determined to see it through. I am now ready to take your questions. Q: The communique and your statement raise a lot of questions. What if India and Pakistan ignore you, and not only test again, but deploy nuclear weapons? On the issue of Kashmir, is it enough to say, as the Chinese Foreign Minister just did, that the preference is for the two of them to solve this issue alone? They haven't been able to do it so far, and why aren't the Perm 5 offering their own mediation, or doing something more specific to help in this regard? ALBRIGHT: Let me say that I think that clearly we have all wanted, had wanted, to deter India and Pakistan from testing. And had done our very best -- I think all of us -- to try to have them desist. It would be my own sense that they might not have expected this kind of very widespread condemnation of what they have done. As I've said previously, what has happened in the last week is that whether we were at NATO, or the NATO-Russian foreign council, or the Euro-Atlantic partnership committee, or at the OAS, there has been general agreement of condemnation and telling, in very direct terms, what we believe India and Pakistan need to do. So there are over 80 countries that have made their views very clear. What I think is very important in the communique that has been issued today is that we have set forth a very unified and united message about what we are calling on India and Pakistan to do in order to have them stop testing and try to avert an arms race, and sign up to the CTBT and refrain from deploying missiles and stop production of fissile materials. Those are the major aspects of what we're asking them to do. I think we want to see how this message is received. It is, I think, a strong message from the permanent members of the Security Council, delivered loud and clear. And as I said, they better stop, look, and listen to what has happened. Should they take additional steps, I think there are other ways that the international community can deal with this. The second part, on Kashmir. Let me say on that issue, I think there is no question that Kashmir has really been a very serious, long-running problem. In fact, in stepping into this room this time, I remembered that the first time I was introduced to this building was actually when I was 10 years old and came here with my father, who was the Czechoslovak representative to the original India-Pakistan commission to deal with Kashmir. He's dead and I'm old, and it's still going on. I think that the flashpoint aspect of the Kashmir issue is very serious. We made clear today, it's very important for India and Pakistan to deal with the Kashmir problem together; the best way is between them. But either the international community in some organizational forum, or each of us as outside powers, might have some suggestions to make. But clearly, it's very important that in the communique it was clear that Kashmir was an issue that needed to be discussed. Q: You said that you would bring other countries into the process, and you named a few. Did you agree here today on a meeting of the G-8 in London or elsewhere next week, and at what level? ALBRIGHT: A plan had been announced earlier by Foreign Secretary Cook, and we expect that it will take place, on the 12th I guess is the date that's been agreed to, at the ministerial level. There were a number of ideas suggested about how to expand the group, and I sense that Foreign Secretary Cook is going to be looking into ways to do that as rapidly as possible. His meeting is the next one scheduled. I truly do think that you're going to see a series of different kinds of meetings taking place -- because there are a number of countries that want to be a part of this very strong statement about trying to reverse, or trying to have them stop, what has happened and not deploy and take the steps that I have mentioned. So there will be expansions of the group, and Robin Cook is going to be looking into different ways to do this. Q: India has said it's going to observe -- it is observing a moratorium on nuclear testing, but it wants to join the CTBT. It is willing to enter into "no first use" agreement and so on. None of these have been reflected in the communique. India has also said it wishes to begin talks to enter the CTBT, and none of this appears to be in the communique either. Is it because you think these are not positive things? Or do you have some other reason? ALBRIGHT: The main point of the communique was to send, as the P-5, a very strong message to India and Pakistan. While people have heard about these ideas, what is needed now is to really solidify and codify some of these ideas. There was a sense that we needed to know more about India's bona fides in terms of following through on these ideas. The moratorium is a partial solution -- especially when CTBT exists as a way to make sure that there are no additional tests. I think everybody was deeply troubled by the fact that India took these steps, and expects now to be quickly recognized as doing the right thing. We need to have proof of the right thing, and can't just take a country that willfully tested at its word. Q: I find it difficult to believe that three weeks ago, when all of this first happened, and before it happened, that either the Indian government or the Pakistani government would have been surprised at international condemnation. With that in mind, why not take this opportunity to surprise India and Pakistan and give them a reason not to test again -- other than the fact that they're going to suffer the disapproval, the strong disapproval, of the Permanent 5 members? Why not give them a reason not to test? ALBRIGHT: The best reason for them not to test is that it's not in their national interest to test. I think they are, if they have not discovered it already, they will be. There are those who believe that India first tested because it wanted to show its power, and to earn a certain amount of respect, and to gain security for its people. I think what has happened is that India has lost the respect of the international community. A nation that has the tradition of Gandhi, of non-violence, and of Jawaharlal Nehru, who had great moral authority throughout major portions of the Cold War -- that good name of India has been lost. As far as making their people more secure, I think the people of India are less secure because of the test, because the Pakistanis immediately responded. And by the way, they are also less secure and have less authority than they had before. Nobody gains from an escalation of a nuclear arms race. Therefore the reason not to test is because they are less secure, and therefore it's not in their national interest. Furthermore -- I think there was very much of a general sense of agreement on this -- is that the worst thing would be to reward these two countries for having broken what is now a well-established nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NPT and the CTBT. That is the word of the international community, overwhelmingly so, and they are outside the bounds of it and do not deserve to be rewarded in any way, shape, or form. They need to understand that it is in their national interest, and their security, and they have jeopardized that. Q: You said earlier that we're prepared to help them maintain peace. You then went on to say that we're ready to share capability and expertise. Can you elaborate on that, and refer to the sharing of intelligence information, which might be used as a confidence-building measure by both sides. ALBRIGHT: There are a variety of confidence-building measures that we can advise on, such as an improved hot-line or risk-reduction-center concepts that could be used. There are ways that troop and equipment redeployments could be in less-threatening postures. That could be helpful. An "open skies" type of regime could allow the sides to monitor each other's military movements in key areas. There are also various relatively low-tech devices for monitoring the absence of activities in tense locations. Those are the kinds of expertise and capability that we would be willing to share. Q: Last time many of us were at this venue, it was for another hastily-scheduled late-night meeting on the subject of weapons of mass destruction. At that time the question was Iraq. Could you assess the relative degree of harmony on tactics and strategy within the P-5 this time versus last time? ALBRIGHT: First of all, it's really early in comparison to what we were doing that night. I opened my intervention by saying it was nice to see daylight outside, in contrast to our 2 a.m. meeting the last time. You've asked a very interesting question, because I was struck in this meeting by the unanimity of views about the necessity of delivering this tough message. I think -- as my now long-time expertise of watching communiques being drafted -- this was one that the experts worked on very hard, but there was a very cooperative spirit, and the communique shows it. There was general agreement on this subject. There are obviously some nuances, as you might well expect. But I think there was a marked difference in the two meetings. I hadn't thought about comparing the two of them in the way you have. But from a very positive standpoint, the P-5, what I found here is that it was -- I'm very glad we had this meeting. The United States, we thought it was very important to have this meeting, and we were very glad that China was the coordinator. You know the P-5 chairmanship rotates month by month, and the Chinese were in the chair. We had worked very carefully in the days between -- I've totally lost track of time -- Luxembourg and this, not only with the Chinese but with the others. And there is a general sense, as I said in my statement, that the P-5 have a responsibility and that we have not just privileges but responsibilities, and I think those were very clearly exercised here today. Q: The communique urges the two countries not to proliferate their weapons of mass destruction. How urgent or critical a problem do you feel this is? Who would be the likely recipients of proliferation material from these countries? ALBRIGHT: Generally, in terms of trying to keep our non-proliferation goals, we want to make sure that the ability, technology, etc., does not spread. To take a hypothetical situation as to who might be recipients, I think Pakistan has already indicated that it does not have any plan to "pass on" what it has done. We just hope that the message from here is very strong about the fact that we don't want to see this kind of capability be transferred to any other country. And, by the way, the reason we are not into inducements here is because we don't want any other country to feel there is a benefit to having a nuclear weapons capability, that this is not the way to become part of a respected group, and that the transfer of technology will not bring them respect or security for their people. Q: When India and Pakistan in 1995 decided not to join the extended NPT, and two years ago decided not to sign the CTBT here -- because they felt those treaties were discriminatory, or whatever -- your diplomats, such as Ambassador Ledogar, and the diplomats of the other nuclear powers, and of NATO, told us here that there should be no concern that India and Pakistan would ever test because of the fact that there were so many signatory states to both treaties -- CTBT and NPT. This now has proven to be a big miscalculation. Isn't it high time now for the P-5 to actually engage in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations here at the UN Conference -- not only to de-escalate the situation in South Asia but also to prevent others like Iran and Arab countries from taking the same route? ALBRIGHT: First of all, I do not believe that having the NPT and CTBT, with as many signatories as both have, could in any shape or form be a mistake. It's very clear that establishing those regimes is very important, and it is always very hard to guard against countries that, for willful reasons, defy the international community. Obviously part of what has to happen -- and we talked about this at the time of the renewal of the NPT was being negotiated -- and obviously the whole role of the CTBT is to try to do whatever we can to have as many possibilities of arms control within our groupings. We are all working on that. The United States and Russia have been involved in Start II negotiations and the ratification process. We believe that we do have a responsibility to systematically lower the levels of weapons. And we will continue to do that. That has been the goal, and we will continue to do so. There are a variety of fora in which to do that. The CD here is one of them, and one that we use, and that we believe has a very important role. The other aspect that we talked about was the importance of moving forward on the fissile-material cut-off. That is not only a part of the discussion that we had, and is part of the communique, but is very much something, some negotiations that we believe need to have more impetus to them. Q: You said that this agreement represents a united front with your counterparts in regards to the India-Pakistan crisis. However, there seems to be a lack of tough language on India and Pakistan -- demanding that they do something a little stronger than discuss and make considerations. In light of this fact, how is this agreement a political trigger to bring them back from the brink of nuclear mayhem? ALBRIGHT: I think everyone can read this language from your own perspective. I happen to think that this is very strong language that makes quite clear that the five nuclear powers -- the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council -- have made very clear what our goals are. They are a unified voice. There clearly is more work to be done. I pointed out that this is not just -- I suppose this is not a great word to use, a "one-shot process" -- this is not just something that we have paid attention to here in Geneva today. We are at the beginning of a process that is going to work to try to bring them back from the brink. The question over here was a legitimate question. We had thought that having so many countries sign these agreements would be enough warning. Obviously we have to look at other methods. This is what this meeting was about, and other meetings are going to be about: the ability to try to show them the error of their ways. Also, as I have said, we are not going to try to turn these two countries into pariahs -- we are going to engage with them and try to figure out ways to solidify our message and point out to them that they have earned nothing, zero, zilch, by what they have done. They have only earned themselves the opprobrium of the international community across the board, and have made their people less secure -- not to speak of poorer -- and not to speak also of having lost the respect that the international community for their role, and for their ability, frankly, to live even with difficulty, side by side in the subcontinent. So they have gained nothing. The international community, to use the normal UN words, is "seized of the issue." But more so, it is actively involved in looking for ways to bring them back from the brink. And as I said, nobody's promising that this particular communique is going to resolve the problem. But I hope you don't underestimate the importance of having had the P-5 meet in this kind of setting, be able to rapidly put together a clear statement of objectives, and then be prepared to follow through on further ways of dealing with the problem. Thank you. (end transcript)