On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Washington. START mandates substantial reductions in the number of strategic ballisticmissiles and heavy bombers and their attributed nuclear warheads.The breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991 delayed START's entry into force until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, all of which had inherited strategic nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, ratified START and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states.
When START entered into force on December 5, 1994, signatories began to implement the Treaty's complex set of intrusive inspection and verification measures. The Treaty provides for 12 types of inspections and exhibitions, as well as continuous monitoring at mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) final assembly facilities, that may be used by each signatory in evaluating START compliance.
As part of START's verification provisions, each signatory was required to declare all facilities related to ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has declared over five dozen START-inspectable sites. The complete list (by country) of FSU START-inspectable sites appears below; formerly declared sites are grouped together and shown initalics.
START contains provisions that permit up to 30 inspectors to conduct continuous portal and perimeter monitoring activities at two former Soviet and one U.S site. Inspectors are permitted to visually observe and physically measure all exiting vehicles. The two designated portals in the former Soviet Union are:
START continuousmonitoring began in January 1995. The United States and Ukraine subsequently agreed to change the status of Pavlohrad from acontinuous monitoring site to a suspect inspection site. Therefore, the United States ceased its Pavlohrad monitoring operations in May 1995. Continuous portal monitoring continues at Votkinsk.
HeavyBomber/Former Heavy Bomber Facilities
The Treaty also gives signatories the right to conduct suspect site inspections to confirm that covert assembly of mobile ICBMs or mobile ICBM first stages is not occurring. Both the Soviet Union and the United States included sites that would be subject to suspect site inspections in START's Memorandum of Understanding. In the former Soviet Union, those suspect sites are:
(ForForeign Inspection Teams)
For foreign inspectors arriving to conduct START inspections at declared and undeclared sites, the Treaty designates points of entry on each signatory's territory. The points of entry in the former Soviet Union are Minsk, Belarus; Almaty, Kazakhstan; Moscow and Ulan-Ude, Russia;and Kiev, Ukraine.
* Locations with two or more inspectable facilities
1 Closed out ICBM base for silo launchers
2 Closed out ICBM conversion facility
3 Closed out mobile ICBM repair facility
4 Closed out portal, now a suspect site
5 Closed out submarine base
6 Not inspectable until facility is closed out
As of December 1997