| LETTER OF SUBMITTAL|
Department of State
Washington, November 20, 1991
The White House.
I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Treaty) signed at Moscow on July 3, 1991.
In addition to the main body of the text, the Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts of the Treaty:
The Treaty's central limits require the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic offensive arms so that specified limits are reached at designated intervals over a seven-year period from entry into force of the Treaty. The Treaty's central limits also restrict the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. In addition, the Treaty places restrictions on, among other items, non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into space, ballistic missile submarines, and on certain types of facilities. The Treaty contains other prohibitions and restrictions, including those covering "heavy" ICBMs and SLBMs and their launchers, the locations of various strategic offensive arms, reentry vehicles, certain types of flight-testing, and the basing of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty outside of each Party's national territory. The Treaty requires the Parties to broadcast telemetric information during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs and generally to refrain from any activity that could deny the other Party full access to such information.
The Treaty establishes a far-reaching inspection regime, including on-site inspections, special access visits, continuous on-site monitoring of certain facilities, and technical exhibitions. This regime is designed to complement national technical means, the primary source for monitoring compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. Cooperative measures, such as the display of road-mobile and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, are also required and are designed to further enhance the effectiveness of our national technical means.
The goal of meaningful reductions in strategic offensive arms has long been sought by the United States and has its roots in the very beginning of the atomic age. For many years, this goal was elusive, as the number and potency of such weapons continued to increase. Earlier attempts at limiting such arms managed only temporarily to slow their increase.
On June 29, 1982, the United States and the Soviet Union began the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva. The announced U.S. goal was to achieve deep reductions in the most destabilizing systems of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. sought a verifiable agreement that would enhance stability and reduce the risk of war. With various interruptions, the talks continued for the next nine years, supplemented by several ministerials at Geneva, Washington, Houston, and Moscow, and Summit meetings in Geneva in 1985, Reykjavik in 1986, Washington in 1990. On July 31, 1991, the Treaty was signed at the Moscow Summit.
In addition to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Justice all played important roles in its development.
Throughout the negotiating process, the United States consulted and worked extensively with its NATO allies in preparation of its positions in the negotiations. The Senate has also been regularly advised on U.S. goals and objectives in strategic arms reduction and the progress of the negotiations.
At the core of the Treaty is the obligation undertaken to reduce and limit ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, such that, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, the aggregate numbers of each of the Parties do not exceed:
1600 for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers (including 154 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers), deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers; and
6000 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; including 4900 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, of which no more than 1100 can be attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs, and no more than 1540 attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.
The Treaty provides for the reductions to take place in three phases -- 36, 60 and 84 months after entry into force of the Treaty -- with separate aggregate limits for the first two phases, culminating in achievement of the full limits by the end of the third phase. (As you stated on September 27, 1991, however, the United States will accelerate its elimination of ICBMs scheduled for deactivation once START is ratified). The central limits also include a restriction on the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, which is to become effective seven years after entry into force of the Treaty.
LIMITS AND RESTRICTION ON NON-DEPLOYED AND OTHER ITEMS
In addition to the central limits on deployed items, the Treaty contains numerous limits and restrictions on non-deployed items. For ICBMs and SLBMs, the limits include numerical limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers (including a sub-limit for non-deployed rail-mobile ICBM launchers), non-deployed ICBMs at mobile ICBM base maintenance facilities, non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, and ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges.
The Treaty includes numerical limits on non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers, with a sub-limit on non-deployed rail-mobile launchers. The Treaty also limits the number of non-deployed mobile launchers allowed at certain maintenance and training facilities, and the number of test launchers, silo training launchers, and mobile training launchers. There are also numerical limits on: heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers (a classification of heavy bomber that meets specific requirements and that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments), and training heavy bombers; dedicated space launch facilities for ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space (and the ICBMs/SLBMs and their launchers located at such facilities); transporter-loaders for road-mobile ICBMs (transporter-loaders for rail-mobile ICBMs are banned); ballistic missile submarines in dry dock locations within a certain distance of submarine bases; ICBMs/SLBMs and their launchers on static display; heavy bombers and former heavy bombers used as ground trainers; storage and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; and on the duration of transits of certain items from one location to another.
The Treaty also restricts where the Parties can locate non-deployed missiles and launchers, and the proximity of certain facilities. These locational restrictions build stability in two ways. First, by segregating non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs from ICBM and SLBM launchers, the locational restrictions further reduce the possibility of rapid or covert augmentation of existing forces with non-deployed assets. Second, locational restrictions facilitate verification by national technical means, particularly for mobile ICBMs, by dividing the Parties' territory into permitted and prohibited areas.
DEFINITIONS AND COUNTING RULES
The Definitions Annex of the Treaty is the Treaty glossary. It is designed to facilitate Treaty implementation by giving precise meaning to Treaty terms. Counting rules are closely related to definitions. They enable the Parties to know with precision whether and when an item is subject to the Treaty and how it is to be counted under the central or other limits of the Treaty. In addition to covering deployed and non-deployed items of the types discussed above, the counting rules also deal with, among other things, newly-constructed strategic offensive arms and ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that are converted to launch different types of ICBMs or SLBMs. To further the objectives of these rules, the Treaty includes lists of existing types of systems, as of the date of Treaty signature, including ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, as well as similar information for new types. In addition, Treaty rules provide for attributing numbers of warheads to new types of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. As in the INF Treaty, ballistic missiles that are developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth are not subject to the Treaty.
The Treaty sets forth numerous prohibitions pertaining to strategic offensive arms. For example, the Parties agree not to: produce, flight test, or deploy new types of heavy (defined to mean having a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms) ICBMs, heavy SLBMs, mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs, additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs; increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type; convert launchers into launchers of heavy ICBMs; or reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type. Other prohibitions include deploying ICBMs other than in silos, on road-mobile launchers, or on rail-mobile launchers. There are also prohibitions on converting SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers, on locations for deployed silo launchers of ICBMs and soft-site launchers, and on converting silos used as launch control facilities into silo launchers of ICBMs.
The Parties agree not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles. The Parties also agree not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to that type of missile. The Parties also agreed not to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles from space launch facilities. The Parties undertake not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload practices. Also, they agree not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines.
The Parties are prohibited from producing, testing, or deploying: ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers (or launchers of such missiles) for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines; launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement or tethering in various underwater locations; systems for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit; air-to-surface ballistic missiles; and long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons. There are also restrictions on flight tests on certain types of aircraft.
The Parties agree to limit the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs with which existing or future heavy bombers will be equipped. The Treaty contains agreed locational restrictions on various types of heavy bombers, based upon the category of armaments for which each type of bomber is equipped. The Parties also agree not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines and not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty outside their respective territories.
MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
The Treaty contains special provisions for mobile ICBM launchers. Mobile ICBMs are a special problem because of the relative difficulty in counting them once they are deployed. Generally, road-mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles may only be based in certain restricted areas (each of which may have a limited number of fixed structures) that are located within specific deployment areas. Rail-mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles can only be based in rail garrisons, which themselves have restrictions on the number of entrances and exits, parking sites, fixed structures and maintenance facilities. Deployed mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, each of which (except for operational dispersals) is regulated as to frequency and duration.
DATA EXCHANGE AND NOTIFICATIONS
The Memorandum of Understanding establishes a data base of information exchanged in accordance with the Treaty. The Parties agree that changes in the initial data must be reported, and the data base will be updated every six months. In addition, the Treaty establishes a regime of over 80 different notifications to keep each Party informed of the activities of the other Party's forces. Such notifications include such diverse types of activities as: notice of movements of selected Treaty-limited items; transits; certain visits and operations by heavy bombers; departures and returns of deployed rail-mobile ICBM launchers for routine movements; departures and returns for rail-mobile test launchers and deployed mobile launchers; exercise and operational dispersals; variation from a standard configuration of trains with deployed rail-mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles; data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight as required by the Throw-weight Protocol; information on conversion and elimination of Treaty-limited items; and information on new types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS
In order to provide assurance that each Party has met the various limits set forth in the Treaty, the Parties are required to eliminate specified Treaty-limited items or to convert them to items not governed by the Treaty's central limits in accordance with procedures established in the Treaty. Most elimination activity is to take place at conversion or elimination facilities. Fixed launchers of ICBMs and fixed structures housing mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination are eliminated in situ. The Treaty expressly provides for verification of conversion and elimination by inspection as well as by national technical means.
The Conversion or Elimination Protocol sets forth specific means for conducting conversion or elimination of mobile ICBMs and their launchers, silo launchers and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers and certain associated equipment and structures. Techniques include cutting, flattening, destroying by explosion and modifying weapons bays.
The Parties are required to make on-board technical measurements and to broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements during each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM. With limited exceptions, no activity, including encryption, encapsulation, or jamming, that denies full access to telemetric information during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs is permitted. In addition, the Parties will exchange tapes of the telemetry recorded on each flight test and information that will assist in understanding that telemetry. These provisions are a major breakthrough in openness and transparency. The Parties have voluntarily committed to cease using encryption and jamming techniques for one year, beginning 120 days after signature (November 28, 1991).
VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
The Treaty provides for verification by national technical means of verification and prohibits use of measures of concealment or other measures that would interfere with such means. Upon request, the Parties are also required to conduct various cooperative measures to facilitate national technical means of verification, including display in the open of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs in restricted areas, of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at parking sites, and of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within a specified air base. Each Party may request such cooperative measures seven times per year.
VERIFICATION BY INSPECTION
The Treaty contains the most extensive and intrusive inspection regime ever included in an arms control agreement. The Parties will have the right to conduct 12 types of on-site inspections and exhibitions. In addition, the Treaty gives the Parties the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at mobile missile final assembly facilities.
There are the following basic types of inspections and exhibitions: baseline data inspections at facilities to help confirm the accuracy of the data on numbers and types of items specified in the initial data exchanges; data update inspections to help confirm subsequent changes in data; new facility inspections to help confirm the accuracy of data provided on such facilities; suspect-site inspections to help ensure that covert production of mobile missiles is not occurring at specific facilities that have such a capability; reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to "spot check" the data related to the number of warheads deployed on a specific type of missile; post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles; conversion or elimination inspections to observe those processes and witness removal from accountability; close-out inspections to help confirm that facilities have been eliminated; technical characteristics exhibitions to confirm the data on technical characteristics of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers; distinguishability exhibitions of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs; and baseline exhibitions of various bombers.
In addition, the Treaty provides for continuous monitoring activities at specified mobile ICBM final assembly facilities throughout the life of the Treaty. These provisions call for a continuous presence at the exits of these facilities so that monitors can count all the mobile ICBMs that exit such facilities.
The general obligation of the Parties to facilitate inspections and continuous monitoring is set forth in the Protocol on Inspection. It establishes: how inspectors, monitors and aircrew members are to be chosen and reviewed and sets forth the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled; a general framework for transportation to the place to be inspected or monitored; the detailed provisions on the notice that is to be given prior to inspections; and the requirements for identifying what is to be inspected.
IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties have established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Through the JCIC, the Parties can resolve questions of compliance, agree upon additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, and resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of the Treaty to new kinds of strategic offensive arms. The JCIC Protocol includes provisions that are designed to facilitate resolution by the Parties of compliance concerns, including by means of special access visits. The provisions of the Treaty governing the JCIC are being provisionally applied for a 12-month period pending entry into force of the Treaty.
AMENDMENTS; ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; WITHDRAWAL
The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.
The Treaty is to remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic arms. The Parties may agree to extend the Treaty for successive five-year periods.
The Treaty also provides that each Party may, in exercising its national sovereignty, withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Accompanying this Report is an Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty, including its Protocols, Annexes, and Memorandum of Understanding, as well as other agreements, letters and statements associated with the Treaty sent for the information of the Senate.
I believe that this Treaty, by significantly limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms, will reduce the risk of war and therefore enhance the national security of the United States. I therefore recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.
James A. Baker III.
TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START)
The White House, November 25, 1991
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991. The START Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof:
-- the Annex on Agreed Statements ("Agreed Statements Annex");
-- the Annex on Terms and Their Definitions ("Definitions Annex");
-- the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Conversion or Elimination Protocol");
-- the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Related to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 12 annexes ("Inspection Protocol");
-- the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Notification Protocol");
-- the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Throw-weight Protocol");
-- the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Telemetry Protocol");
-- the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Protocol"); and
-- the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 10 annexes ("Memorandum of Understanding").
In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, the Report of the Department of State and documents associated with, but not integral parts of, the START Treaty. These documents are of four types: separate executive agreements related to the Treaty; letters embodying executive agreements on various aspects of the Treaty; declarations regarding specific systems that do not fall within the scope of the Treaty; and a variety of statements and correspondence concerning aspects of the negotiation of the Treaty. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are relevant to the consideration of the Treaty by the Senate.
The START Treaty represents a nearly decade-long effort by the United States and the Soviet Union to address the nature and magnitude of the threat that strategic nuclear weapons pose to both countries and to the world in general. The fundamental premise of START is that, despite significant political differences, the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in reducing the risk of nuclear war and enhancing strategic stability.
The United States had several objectives in the START negotiations. First, we consistently held the view that the START Treaty must enhance stability in times of crisis. The strategic nuclear forces remaining after implementation of START -- as well as during the period when weapons are reduced -- should be such as to reduce Soviet incentives to provoke a crisis or to strike first during a crisis. Stability in times of crisis will remain important even in the post-Cold War era; no one can predict the future, and the purpose of this Treaty is to regulate the strategic threat for many years to come. Among the many measures we sought to fulfill this objective, the most important were the preferential treatment given to stabilizing systems, such as bombers and cruise missiles, the stringent limits on deployed ballistic missiles and their reentry vehicles, and the special, restrictive limits on heavy ICBMs, the most destabilizing weapons in existence.
Second, we sought an agreement that did not simply limit strategic arms, but that reduced them significantly below current levels. A successful combination of this objective with that of a stabilizing force structure can serve for many years as a linch-pin in shaping our strategic posture, and, if appropriate, can serve as a basis for future agreements that will lead to further reductions. Moreover, in order for the Treaty to work smoothly over many years, its terms must be as precise and unambiguous as possible. Neither Party should have any doubt as to the limitations and obligations that are imposed by the terms of the Treaty.
Third, we sought a Treaty that would allow equality of U.S. forces relative to those of the Soviet Union. Again, the emphasis is to reach equality in order that the resulting levels will be stabilizing. Equality does not require identical force structures; rather, it demands limits that allow the Parties to have equivalent capabilities.
Fourth, we sought an agreement that is effectively verifiable. Effective verification is necessary to ensure that the United States national security is not jeopardized under the Treaty. Effective verification also acts as an inducement to the Soviets to comply because they are aware that their behavior will be closely monitored.
Finally, the United States placed great emphasis during the negotiations in seeking an agreement that would be supported by the American and allied publics. This objective means that United States' policies regarding strategic forces must not only sustain deterrence, but will also serve to assure the American people and allied publics that the risk of war and crisis instability is low and is being further reduced.
I am fully convinced that the START Treaty achieves these objectives.
START will be the first Treaty that actually reduces strategic offensive arms. START will lead to stabilizing changes to the composition of, and reductions in, the deployed strategic offensive nuclear forces of both countries. The overall strategic nuclear forces of both countries will be reduced by 30-40 percent, with a reduction of as much as 50 percent in the most threatening systems. The Treaty will have a 15-year duration, and can be extended for successive five-year periods through the agreement of the Parties.
Force reductions under START will be asymmetrical due to currently higher Soviet levels, and will result in equal limits on deployed strategic offensive arms at the end of each of three phases over the first 7 years that the Treaty is in force. Moreover, I believe that the reduction of ICBMs should be accomplished even more rapidly than the Treaty would require. On September 27, as a part of my statement on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons, I said that those ICBMs that the United States would reduce pursuant to START would be eliminated more rapidly than required by the Treaty. Today, I reiterate that pledge.
More specifically, the central limits of START require reductions down to ceilings of 1600 on deployed strategic nuclear delivery systems (i.e., deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers), 6000 accountable nuclear warheads that those missiles and bombers would carry, and 3600 metric tons of aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight. Aggregate throw-weight -- a measure of the total weight of weapons and related objects that a ballistic missile can deliver -- is limited to approximately 54 percent of the current aggregate Soviet throw-weight level.
Within these aggregate limits, the United States and Soviet Union have agreed to observe certain subceilings in specific weapon categories. Reduction and limitations on those weapon systems that could most threaten crisis stability are emphasized in these subceilings. Under START, neither Party may have more than 4900 deployed ballistic missile warheads of which no more than 1100 warheads can be on deployed mobile ICBMs. Moreover, the Soviet Union is required to reduce by 50 percent their heavy ICBM force. The Soviet Union will eliminate no fewer than 22 SS-18 launchers every year during the 7-year reduction period to a ceiling of 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs.
To assist in verifying compliance with these limits, START incorporates the most extensive verification regime in history, which includes the exchange of ballistic missile telemetry tapes, the permanent monitoring of mobile ICBM assembly facilities, 12 kinds of on-site inspections, special access visits, cooperative measures, and data exchanges to complement our national technical means of verification. Moreover, many of the Treaty provisions, such as its definitions, counting rules, conversion or elimination procedures, notifications, and numerous data exchanges, will help to verify whether the Soviet Union is in compliance with the central limitations. Thus, I am convinced START is effectively verifiable.
START represents a critical watershed in our long-term effort to stabilize the strategic balance through arms control. Stabilization of the strategic balance will help cement one of the most fundamental tenets of our preferred world order -- that conflict must not and shall not be resolved through the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, recent events underscore the need to ensure stability and to broaden the dialogue between our countries. Implementation of START would reinforce these efforts.
In sum, the START Treaty is in the interest of the United States and represents an important step in the stabilization of the strategic nuclear balance. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, and to give advice and consent to its ratification.