The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
1. The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating states will seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities.
2. It will complement and reinforce, without duplication, the existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as other internationally recognised measures designed to promote transparency and greater responsibility, by focusing on the threats to international and regional peace and security which may arise from transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies where the risks are judged greatest.
3. This arrangement is also intended to enhance cooperation to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses, if the situation in a region or the behaviour of a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern to the participating states.
4. This arrangement will not be directed against any state or group of states and will not impede bona fide civil transactions. Nor will it interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means with which to defend themselves pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
1. Participating states will meet on a regular basis to ensure that transfers of conventional arms and transfers in dual-use goods and technologies are carried out responsibly and in furtherance of international and regional peace and security.
2. To this end, participating states will exchange, on a voluntary basis, information that will enhance transparency, will lead to discussions among all participating states on arms transfers, as well as on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, and will assist in developing common understandings of the risks associated with the transfer of these items. On the basis of this information they will assess the scope for coordinating national control policies to combat these risks. The information to be exchanged will include any matters which individual participating states wish to bring to the attention of others, including, for those wishing to do so, notifications which go beyond those agreed upon.
3. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item will be the sole responsibility of each participating state. All measures undertaken with respect to the arrangement will be in accordance with national legislation and policies and will be implemented on the basis of national discretion.
4. In accordance with the provisions of this arrangement, participating states agree to notify transfers and denials. Initially, these notifications will apply to all non-participating states. In the light of the general and specific information exchange, the scope of these notifications, as well as their relevance for the purposes of the arrangement, will be reviewed. Notification of a denial will not impose an obligation on other participating states to deny similar transfers. However, a participating state will notify, preferably within 30 days, but no later than within 60 days, all other participating states of an approval of a licence which has been denied by another participating state for an essentially identical transaction during the last three years.
5. Upon the commencement of this arrangement, participating states agree that work on further guidelines and procedures will continue expeditiously and taking into account experience acquired. This will include, in particular, a review of the scope of conventional arms to be covered with a view to extending information and notifications beyond the categories described in Appendix 3. Participating states agree to discuss further how to deal with any areas of overlap between the various lists.
6. Participating states agree to assess the overall functioning of this arrangement regularly, for the first time in 1999.
1. Participating states will control all items set forth in the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and in the Munitions List (see Appendix 5)*, with the objective of preventing unauthorised transfers or retransfers of those items.
2. The List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (tier 1) has two annexes of sensitive (tier 2) and a limited number of very sensitive items (subset tier 2).
3. The lists will be reviewed regularly to reflect technological developments and experience gained by participating states, including in the field of dual-use goods and technologies which are critical for indigenous military capabilities. In this respect, studies shall be completed to coincide with the first revision to the lists to establish an appropriate level of transparency for pertinent items.
* (France and the Russian Federation view this list as reference list drawn up to help in the selection of dual-use goods which could contribute to the indigenous development, production or enhancement of conventional munitions capabilities.)
1. Participating states agree to exchange general information on risks associated with transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies in order to consider, where necessary, the scope for coordinating national control policies to combat these risks.
2. A list of possible elements of the general information exchange on non-participating states is contained in Appendix 1.
1. Participating states will notify licences denied to non-participants with respect to items on the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, where the reasons for denial are relevant to the purposes of the arrangement.
2. For tier 1, participating states will notify all licences denied relevant to the purposes of the arrangement to nonparticipating states, on an aggregate basis, twice per year. The indicative content of these denial notifications is described in Appendix 2.
3. For items in the second tier and its subset of very sensitive items, participating states will notify, on an individual basis, all licences denied pursuant to the purposes of the arrangement to non-participating states. Participating states agree that notification shall be made on an early and timely basis, that is preferably within 30 days but no later than within 60 days, of the date of the denial. The indicative content of these denial notifications is described in Appendix 2.
4. For items in the second tier, participating states will notify licences issued or transfers made relevant to the purposes of the arrangement to non-participants, on an aggregate basis, twice per year. The indicative content of these license/transfer notifications is described in Appendix 2.
5. Participating states will exert extreme vigilance for items included in the sub-set of tier 2 by applying to those exports national conditions and criteria. They will discuss and compare national practices at a later stage.
6. Participating states agree that any information on specific transfers, in addition to that specified above, may be requested, inter alia through normal diplomatic channels
1. Participating states agree that the information to be exchanged on arms will include any matters which individual participating states wish to bring to the attention of others, such as emerging trends in weapons programmes and the accumulation of particular weapons systems, where they are of concern, for achieving the objectives of the arrangement.
2. As an initial stage in the evolution of the new arrangement, participating states will exchange information every six months on deliveries to nonparticipating states of conventional arms set forth in Appendix 3, initially derived from the categories of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The information should include the quantity and the name of the recipient state and, except in the category of missiles and missile launchers, details of model and type.
3. Participating states agree that any information on specific transfers, in addition to that specified above, may be requested, inter alia through normal diplomatic channels.
1. Participating states will meet periodically to take decisions regarding this arrangement, its purposes and its further elaboration, to review the lists of controlled items, to consider ways of coordinating efforts to promote the development of effective export control systems, and to discuss other relevant matters of mutual interest, including information to be made public.
2. Plenary meetings will be held at least once a year and chaired by a participating state on the basis of annual rotation. Financial needs of the arrangement will be covered under annual budgets, to be adopted by plenary meetings.
3. Working groups may be established, if the plenary meeting so decides.
4. There will be a secretariat with a staff necessary to undertake the tasks entrusted to it.
5. All decisions in the framework of this arrangement will be reached by consensus of the Participating States.
The new arrangement will be open, on a global and nondiscriminatory basis, to prospective adherents that comply with the agreed criteria in Appendix 4. Admission of new participants will be based on consensus.
Information exchanged will remain confidential and be treated as privileged diplomatic communications. This confidentiality will extend to any use made of the information and any discussion among participating states.
General Information Exchange
The following is an list of possible principal elements of the general information exchange on non-participating states, pursuant to the purposes of the agreement (not all elements necessarily applying to both arms and dual-use goods and technology):
1. Acquisition Activities
2. Export Policy
· Export control policy;
3. Projects of Concern
· Description of the project;
4. Other Matters
Specific Information Exchange on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
Indicative Content of Notifications
The content of denial notifications for tier I will be based on, but not be limited to, the following indicative or illustrative list:
· From (country)
Denial notifications for items in the second tier and its subset of very sensitive items will be on the basis of, but not be limited to, the following indicative or illustrative list:
· From (country)
The content of notifications for licenses/transfers in the second tier will be based on, but not be limited to, the following indicative or illustrative list:
· From (country)
Specific Information Exchange on Arms
Content by Categories
1. Battle Tanks
Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armoured fighting vehicles with high cross-country mobility and a high level of self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 mm calibre.
II. Armoured combat vehicles
Tracked, semi-tracked or wheeled self-propelled vehicles, with armoured protection and cross-country capability, either: 1. Designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantrymen; or 2. Armed with an integral or organic weapon of at least 12.5 mm calibre or a missile launcher.
III. Large calibre artillery systems
Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a calibre of 100 mm and above.
IV. Combat aircraft
Fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialised electronic warfare, suppression of air defence or reconnaissance missions. The term "combat aircraft" does not include primary trainer aircraft, unless designed, equipped or modified as described above.
V. Attack helicopters
Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets by employing guided or unguided anti-armour, air-to-surface, air-to-subsurface or air-to-air weapons, and equipped with an integrated fire-control and aiming system for these weapons, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialised reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.
Vessel or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 750 metric tonnes or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 750 metric tonnes equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 km or torpedoes with a similar range.
VII. Missiles or missile systems
Guided or unguided rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 km and means designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets, if not covered by categories I to VI. This category:
1. also includes remotely piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined above;
2. does not include ground-to-air missiles.
When deciding on the eligibility of a state for participation, the following factors, inter alia, will be taken into consideration, as an index of its ability to contribute to the purposes of the new arrangement:
Whether it is a producer/exporter of arms or industrial equipment respectively;
Its nonproliferation policies and its appropriate national policies, including:
Adherence to non-proliferation policies, control lists and, where applicable, guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group; and through adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxicological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and (where applicable) START I, including the Lisbon Protocol;
Its adherence to fully effective export controls.
Appendix 5 consists of a List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and a Munitions List.