Iraq had a comprehensive and well-advanced offensive biological weapons programme, ranging from research and development on a variety of bacteriological agents, viruses and toxins through the production, weaponization and military deployment of biological and toxin weapons. [S/1995/1038]The Security Council required Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities (para. 8 (a) of resolution 687 (1991)). To that end, Iraq is required to submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items mentioned in the biological area (para. 9 of resolution 687 (1991)). Iraq is further required to agree to urgent, on-site inspection by the Special Commission of its biological capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself (para. 9 (i) of resolution 687 (1991)). Other acts required of Iraq include the yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all biological items.
Monitoring in the biological area began in full on 4 April 1995, preceded by a four-month interim monitoring phase. The scope of activities and sites to be encompassed by the monitoring needs to be broad because of the inherent dual-use nature of biological technology and the ease with which civilian facilities can be converted for biological weapons purposes. The Commission has been compelled to cast a wider net in the biological field because of Iraq's incomplete disclosure of the full extent of its past biological warfare activities. [S/1995/864] The task facing UNSCOM requires it to monitor throughout Iraq sites and facilities with equipment capable of producing proscribed weapons as well as to watch for clandestine sites that may be created for proscribed activities. Thus, for the monitoring system to be effective, it must cast a broad net and cover major facilities where biological warfare agents could be produced. However, such agents can also be clandestinely produced by Iraq in such facilities as breweries, and even university microbiology laboratories containing permitted dual-use equipment. Therefore, those facilities must also be covered. The biological monitoring group consists of a total of 11 inspectors from 9 States. Iraq provides semi-annual declarations for 91 sites. There are 1,335 items of tagged equipment [up from 893 in 1997] under monitoring by the Commission's biological monitoring team. As with the chemical monitoring group, the biological monitoring group continues to find dual-use materials which should have been declared by Iraq.[S/1998/920]
As of 1995 79 sites throughout Iraq were included in the biological monitoring and verification regime. These sites are comprised of:
Initially Iraq denied having ever had any offensive biological weapons program or activities.
In autumn 1994, a thorough review was conducted by UNSCOM of all information and data obtained through inspections, technical talks with Iraq and interaction with supporting Governments. This included an attempt to create a material balance of equipment and complex growth media acquired by Iraq. The review reinforced the suspicion that the Al Hakam factory was a biological warfare agent production facility and that other sites were also involved in a biological weapons programme. Based on the results of that review, inspections, including interviews with more than 50 Iraqi personnel, were carried out. These enabled UNSCOM to arrive at a firm assessment that Iraq's declarations in the biological area at that time were fundamentally wrong and misleading as it was attempting to hide a full-scale biological warfare program, including weaponization. The Commission came to the unequivocal conclusion that Iraq had in fact produced biological weapons, that its biological programme was offensive in nature, that Al Hakam had been constructed as a dedicated biological warfare agent research and production facility and had been operational before January 1991, and that additional sites, including Muthanna, a known chemical weapons establishment, were involved in the programme. The Commission confronted Iraq in February 1995 with these assessments. In response, Iraq continued to deny flatly and categorically any biological weapons activities. [S/1996/848]
In March 1995, Iraq officially submitted a new full, final and complete disclosure in the biological area which, like its original FFCD in May 1992, and other declarations since the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), adhered to the position that Iraq had had only a very small defensive biological research program conducted by 10 people from 1985 until the autumn of 1990. [S/1995/864] It is stated to have produced only 10 basic research papers on various aspects of three bacteria (B. anthracis, C1. botulinum and C1. perfringens). It is further claimed that no decision had been taken as to the longer-term direction of the programme until the program's discontinuation in autumn 1990. [S/1995/284]Iraq acknowledged that it procured, through the Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID),very large quantities of complex growth media in 1988 but failed to provide an accounting for the purposes of this importation and for the use of a significant portion of it. Iraq claimed that, while the media was imported by TSMID, the import was on behalf of the Ministry of Health for the purposes of hospital diagnostic laboratories. This importation of media by types, quantities and packaging is grossly out of proportion to Iraq's stated requirements for hospital use. Iraq explained the excessive quantities imported and the inappropriate size of the packaging as being a one-of-a-kind mistake and attempted to justify the import as appropriate and required for medical diagnostic purposes. However, for hospital diagnostic purposes, only small quantities are needed. According to Iraq's declarations, which were imprecise and changing, over the period 1987-1994 Iraq's total hospital consumption of all such media was less than 200 kg per annum. But in 1988 alone, TSMID imported nearly 39,000 kg of such media, which has a manufacturer's guarantee of 4 to 5 years. A further incongruity was that, of all the types of media required for hospital use, only a select few were "mistakenly" imported by TSMID in large quantities. These did not include those most frequently used in hospitals. Furthermore, the packaging of TSMID imports was inconsistent with declared hospital usage: diagnostic assays use very small quantities of media and so, because the media deteriorates rapidly once a package has been opened, media for diagnostic purposes is normally distributed in 0.1-1 kg packages. However, the media imported by Iraq in 1988 was packaged in 25-100 kg drums. This style of packaging is consistent with the large-scale usage of media associated with the production of biological agents. The types of media imported are suitable for the production of anthrax and botulinum, known biological warfare agents researched by Iraq in its declared biological military program. [S/1995/284]
Iraq acknowledged the purchase by TSMID in 1989 of four filling machines, ostensibly for a biopesticide project at the Salman Pak site. Until this acknowledgement, Iraq, while declaring Salman Pak to be the site of its biological military research programme, had not declared any biopesticide activity there. Filling machines, while having many uses, are required for filling bacterial warfare agent into munitions or containers. TSMID procured a spray dryer in 1989. Again, it was claimed that this was for the above-mentioned biopesticide project at Salman Pak. This spray dryer has technical specifications which provide a capability of drying the bacterial slurry resulting from the fermentation process to produce dry matter with particle sizes in the range of 1 to 10 m. This particle size is associated with efficient dispersion of biological warfare agents, not with the production of biopesticides. Furthermore, dry bacterial matter is easier to store for longer periods. Such spray dryers, therefore, would be a crucial component in acquiring an indigenous capability to produce viable and durable biological weapons. TSMID attempted to order various named and virulent anthrax strains, known to be particularly appropriate for biological warfare purposes. Iraq flatly denied this, despite confirmation to the Commission by the potential supplier. [S/1995/284]The March 1995 FFCD was so contrary to the information in the Commission's possession that UNSCOM saw no merit in initiating verification of the document. The stalemate continued through June, but with promises from Iraq of information about its biological weapons program to be provided only in late June or early July, if Iraq at that time concluded that there were indications that progress was being made towards the reintegration of Iraq into the international community. [S/1995/864]
After intensive inspection efforts and accumulation of further findings by UNSCOM, on 01 July 1995, Iraq finally admitted for the first time that it indeed had had an offensive biological weapons program from April 1986 to September 1990. While acknowledging an offensive program that included the production of large quantities of two warfare agents at the Al Hakam facility, Iraq nevertheless firmly denied weaponization of these or any other biological warfare agents. In the second half of July, Iraq prepared a draft FFCD which contained many areas in which Iraq's disclosures were inconsistent with UNSCOM's information or where information was missing or unclear. These deficiencies followed a pattern: they appeared to be designed to deny information that would either provide evidence of weaponization or reveal military connections with the biological weapons program. There was also a strong suspicion that Iraq's new accounts of agent production and complex growth media consumption were manipulated to provide what Iraq hoped would pass as a credible accounting for the missing media. On 04 August 1995 Iraq officially submitted its FFCD, which was consistent with Iraq's oral presentation of 01 July and the July draft FFCD. [S/1995/864]
The weaponization and the broader scope of the biological warfare programme was disclosed only in August 1995, after the departure from Iraq of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamel, former Minister of Defence and Minister Supervisor of the Military Industrialization Corporation. [S/1996/848] On 17 August 1995 Iraq informed UNSCOM that the full, final and complete disclosure of 04 August should not be considered valid. Iraq then presented a vastly different account of Iraq's past biological warfare program that included weaponization, additional agents and additional sites involved in the program. [S/1995/864]
Since 1995 UNSCOM said it has consistently found indications, both physically and on paper, that Iraq had acquired supplies, equipment, and material for its BW program. It also produced various types of agent as well as munitions for these agents. Evidence presented by UNSCOM in this area indicates that it is probable that portions of Iraq's biological weapons program remains intact.
On 22 June 1996, the Government of Iraq submitted a declaration which it stated to contain its official FFCD on the proscribed biological weapons program. This document of 622 pages was essentially a copy of the May 1996 draft. [S/1996/848] According to Iraq, all biological warfare munitions, agents and documents related to the proscribed biological warfare activities had been destroyed unilaterally, even though such action, if it occurred, would have been in violation of the directives of the Security Council.[S/1997/774]
Iraq requested that its biological weapons Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of September 1997 be assessed, again, by international experts during a special meeting for that purpose which was held in Baghdad in July 1998. International experts assembled by UNSCOM had examined Iraq's biological weapons declarations on three previous occasions and expressed the unanimous view that Iraq's disclosures were incomplete, inadequate and technically flawed. The UNSCOM Executive Chairman proposed that the July 1998 meeting focus primarily on the material balance of biological weapons produced and disposed of by Iraq. Iraq agreed to this proposal. [S/1998/920]This required the following key elements of the material balance to be considered and analysed :
Iraq declared that it had produced and filled with biological weapons agents special warheads for the Al Hussein missiles and R-400 aerial bombs. Iraq also disclosed the development of biological weapons spray tanks and some other weapon systems for the delivery of biological weapons agents.[S/1998/920] Iraq has not provided any evidence to support its account of what agents were filled into munitions, the quantity of agents consumed in the filling process, and the quantity and type of munitions filled with each agent. Within the overall production figures of CW and BW R-400 bombs, it is not possible to determine how many weapons were filled with particular biological weapons agents.[UNSCOM 03 June 98]
The international expert team at the July 1998 meeting concluded that Iraq's full, final and complete disclosure, in its totality, could not be verified. The team recommended that no further verification of Iraq's current biological weapons full, final and complete disclosure be conducted at the senior international expert level, until Iraq commits itself to provide substantive, new information. [S/1998/920]