TL: Neptune Papers No. 5 SO: Handler & Arkin, Greenpeace International (GP) DT: 1990 Keywords: nuclear weapons greenpeace reports gp nfs navy warships deployment bombs missiles us ussr uk disarmament france china europe construction aircraft military spending / Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete Inventory Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin (GP) Greenpeace 1990 Table of Contents I.Recent Trends in Nuclearization of the Oceans -- Spontaneous Disarmament 1 1.Naval Nuclear Weapons in 1990 3 2.Strategic Forces 7 3.Cruise Missile and Attack Submarine Forces 9 4.Long-range Sea-launched Cruise Missiles 11 5.Aircraft Carrier and Surface Forces 14 6.Naval Aviation 17 7.U.K. and French Naval Nuclear Forces 18 8.Nuclear Propulsion 20 9.Conclusion 24 II.Naval Nuclear Weapons 26 1.Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles 26 2.Sea-launched Cruise Missiles 39 3.Anti-submarine Warfare Nuclear Weapons 48 4.Anti-air Warfare Nuclear Weapons 54 5.Air-Delivered Nuclear Weapons 55 II.U.S. Nuclear-capable Ships and Aircraft 60 A.Fleet Organization, Homeports, and Naval Nuclear Weapons' Shore Locations 61 B.Nuclear-capable Ships 68 1.Ballistic Missile Submarines 68 2.Attack Submarines 71 3.Aircraft Carriers 75 4.Battleships 79 5.Cruisers 80 6.Destroyers 81 7.Frigates 83 8.Amphibious Warfare Ships 83 9.Support and Logistic Ships 85 C.U.S. Nuclear-capable Naval and Marine Corps Aircraft 88 1.Carrier Air 89 2.Land-based Maritime Patrol 96 3.Marine Corps Aviation 98 4.Non-U.S NATO Nuclear-capable Naval Aircraft 99 III. Soviet Nuclear-capable Ships and Aircraft 105 A.Fleet Organization, Missions, and Homeports 106 B.Nuclear-capable Ships 108 1.Ballistic Missile Submarines 108 2.Cruise Missile Submarines 112 3.Attack Submarines 114 4.Aircraft Carriers 119 5.Cruisers 122 6.Destroyers 124 7.Frigates and Patrol Combatants 125 8.Support Ships 125 C.Soviet Nuclear-capable Aircraft 126 IV.United Kingdom Nuclear-capable Ships and Aircraft 131 A.Fleet Organization, Homeports, and Naval Nuclear Weapons' Shore Locations 132 B.Nuclear-capable Ships 135 1.Ballistic Missile Submarines 135 2.Aircraft Carriers 136 3.Destroyers 137 4.Frigates 138 5.Support Ships 139 C.United Kingdom Nuclear-capable Aircraft 139 V.French Nuclear-capable Ships and Aircraft 142 A.Fleet Organization and Missions, Homeports, and Naval Nuclear Weapons' Shore Locations 142 B.Nuclear-capable Ships 143 1.Ballistic Missile Submarines 143 2.Aircraft Carriers 145 C.French Nuclear-capable Aircraft 146 VI.Chinese Nuclear-capable Ships and Aircraft 148 A.Fleet Organization and Missions 148 B.Nuclear-capable Ships 149 C.Chinese Nuclear-Capable Naval Aviation 149 Abbreviations (for ship class abbreviations see Appendix H): ACNO U.S. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare CEA Commissariat a L' Energie Atomique CNO U.S. Chief of Naval Operations COMPHIBGRUEASTPAC Commander, Amphibious Group Eastern Pacific DCN Direction des Construction Navales DCNO Deputy Chief of Naval Operations DIA U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency DNA U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency DOD U.S. Department of Defense Encl. Enclosure EWDA U.S. Congress, Energy and Water Development Appropriations FBIS U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service FOIA U.S. Freedom of Information Act FY U.S. federal Fiscal Year (1 October to 30 September) GAO U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office HAC U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee HASC U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee HMSO Her Majesty's Stationary Office HOC U.K. House of Commons IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies IOC Initial Operational Capability JCS U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff JPRS U.S. Joint Publication Research Service Milcon U.S. Congress, Military Construction Appropriations NASBARPTINST Naval Air Station Barbers Point Instruction Neptune 2 Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, Neptune Papers No. 2, Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: A Complete Inventory, (Greenpeace/Institute for Policy Studies) May 1988) NWEF Commanding Officer, U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility NWP U.S. Navy, Naval Warfare Publication OPNAVINST U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction PDASD(ISP) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) RADM Rear Admiral RDT&E Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation Rev. Revision SAC U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee SASC U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee (S/FRD) Secret/Foreign Restricted Data SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIRPA Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques Armees SLCM Sea-Launched Cruise Missile SMP U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (U) unclassified UNOOB U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Naval Order of Battle - Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe (DDB-1200- 124-89) June 1989; released under the FOIA USMC U.S. Marine Corps USN U.S. Navy USNI U.S. Naval Institute VADM Vice Admiral I. Recent Trends in Nuclearization of the Oceans -- Spontaneous Disarmament Despite steadfast opposition by the U.S. government to any form of naval arms control, and the continuing failure of the Soviet Union to engage the west in a naval arms control process, naval forces are far from static. Superpower navies are declining in size, and plans for future expansion are being abandoned. Naval nuclear weapons are being reduced and controlled. Research and development of new nuclear capabilities is at an all time low. The future for naval nuclear power looks increasingly bleak. This condition, chiefly driven by the technological obsolescence of Cold War generation equipment, internal changes in military doctrines and strategy, and reductions in defense spending, could be characterized as having nothing to do with a "disarmament" process. Each side accuses the other of improving its combat capabilities. The Soviet Union eliminates hundreds of vessels and draws back its operations and is accused of trying to repair its economy, and of refocusing its military effort from quantity to quality. The United States unilaterally retires virtually all of its nuclear weapons earmarked for open ocean combat, and it is accused of building up its conventional capabilities and shifting its energies to attacking the Soviet Union directly. There is a bit of truth in both arguments. But what is being ignored in the posturing on both sides is a process of spontaneous disarmament which is occurring at a time of declining superpower tensions and threat, when the public mandate is for reductions in the resources devoted to the military, and when pressure is building in the arms control community to find a forum to deal with naval matters. Spontaneous disarmament has already begun to have an effect in the late 1980s: * Between 1988-1990, nuclear-capable ships and submarines in the U.S. Navy declined by 167 units, from 292 to 136. During the same time period, Soviet nuclear-capable ships and submarines declined by 68 units, from 633 to 565. * The number of U.S. and Soviet naval nuclear weapons declined from 15,429 to 13,934 between 1988-1990. U.S. non- strategic nuclear weapons declined from 3,645 to 2,500, with the elimination of the ASROC, SUBROC, and Terrier nuclear systems. Soviet non-strategic weapons declined from 2,705 to 2,608. Now the Soviets have declared that nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from the Baltic Fleet. * Construction of new naval platforms shows signs of slowing, and both navies have begun to experience cuts in naval research and development. * The START agreement will result in future constraints on strategic and non-strategic naval warheads. Submarine- launched ballistic missiles will be constrained to around 3,000 warheads for the United States and 2,000 for the Soviet Union. Nuclear armed long-range sea-launched cruise missiles will be limited to 880. These limits will result in reductions of 1,000 warheads in the U.S. force and 2,000 from the Soviet force, and will likely be followed by even greater numerical constraints in subsequent agreements. Perhaps most significant factor contributing to spontaneous disarmament is the changing pace of naval nuclear modernization during the 1980s. It may be true that the counterforce nuclear missiles -- the Trident II D5 and the SS-N-23 -- are being deployed, but they are being introduced in far smaller numbers than were projected in the early 1980s. Both sides are deploying long-range, accurate sea-launched cruise missiles. But a few hundred warheads will ultimately replace thousands of theater strike weapons (e.g., SS-20, SS-4, Yankee) which existed less than a decade ago. In the distorted arithmetic of nuclear warfare, this is significant progress. But most important, the trends portend major quantitative reductions in nuclear capabilities. Eight U.S. naval nuclear weapons under development since the mid-1970s -- vertical launch ASROC with a nuclear warhead, Standard Missile 2 (Nuclear), nuclear Harpoon, nuclear Phoenix, Sea Lance, the anti-submarine warfare standoff weapon, insertable nuclear components, a naval nuclear artillery projectile -- were cancelled for one reason or another. The U.S. Navy has only one nuclear weapon under development, the B90 nuclear depth/strike bomb, and its future has recently been put in jeopardy. With the deployment of the Trident II, the U.S. Navy does not have a new strategic missile under development for the first time since the early 1950s. Tomahawk missile follow-ons are widely reported as being examined only with conventional warheads. It is unknown whether future nuclear programs have been abandoned in the Soviet Navy, but the rate of nuclear testing continues to be extremely low (the Soviets had not conducted a nuclear test at least between October 1989 and July 1990), and spending on nuclear weapons has been reported as being massively cut. Development of the new SS-NX-24 supersonic sea-launched cruise missile appears to be essentially halted, and Backfire bomber deployment has slowed or stopped. The Soviets are also moving in the direction of greater reliance on conventional weaponry. 1. Naval Nuclear Weapons in 1990 The two superpowers have deployed nuclear weapons at sea for over 30 years, and the other three nuclear weapons states -- France, Britain, and China -- have joined them with their own naval nuclear systems. Approximately 14,600 nuclear weapons are earmarked for use by the five navies, about 30 percent of the world's total nuclear arsenal. In 1990, about 750 ships and submarines, and 2,800 aircraft and helicopters can fire naval nuclear weapons. All five nuclear navies deploy long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). These constitute 64 percent of all sea-based nuclear weapons, an all time high. Fourteen types of ballistic missile submarines carry 14 different types of missiles. There are currently 1,682 SLBMs armed with some 9,364 nuclear warheads, making up approximately 50 percent of the world total of land- and sea-based strategic nuclear warheads. An estimated 5,200 nuclear warheads are for the use of tactical naval forces. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) nuclear weapons are the largest category, numbering 2,150, or 15 percent of all nuclear warheads with naval roles. These weapons are deployed on surface ships, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters -- 1,677 platforms in total. The third largest category of naval nuclear weapons are air- delivered: bombs and air-to-surface missiles intended for attacks on surface ships and shore targets. In 1990, there are almost 1,700 aircraft (bombers, attack planes and fighters) with about 1,900 nuclear weapons. Twelve different types of aircraft with naval missions can deliver at least six types of nuclear bombs and five types of nuclear air-to-surface missiles. Sea-launched cruise and anti-ship missiles are the fourth largest, and fastest growing, category of naval nuclear weapons. The U.S. and Soviet navies currently have about 900 nuclear sea- launched cruise missiles, of eight different types. Nuclear- armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) are currently deployed on 107 surface ships and 118 submarines (225 total platforms). Table 1: Naval Nuclear Weapons (1990) United Soviet United States Union Kingdom France China Total Strategic Missile Warheads 5,024 3,802 96 416 26 9,364 Non-strategic Sea-Launched Cruise missiles 325 570 0 0 0 895 Anti-submarine weapons 825 1,300 25 0 0 2,150 Anti-air weapons 0 188 0 0 0 188 Aircraft delivered weapons (not ASW)1,350 450 25 36 - 1,861 Coastal missiles 0 100 0 0 0 100 Subtotal 2,500 2,608 50 36 0 5,194 Total 7,524 6,410 146 452 26 14,558 ------------------------------------------------------------ Table 2: Nuclear-Capable Naval Aircraft (1990) United Soviet United States Union Kingdom France China Total Attack 995 395 82 36 150 1,658 Anti-submarine 595 330 178 0 0 1,103 Total 1,590 725 260 36 150 2,761 Table 3: Nuclear-Capable Ships and Submarines (1990) United Soviet United States Union Kingdom France China Total Submarines Ballistic missile 32 61 4 6 2 105 Cruise missile 0 60 0 0 0 60 Attack 50 178 0 0 0 228 Subtotal 82 299 4 6 2 393 Surface Ships Aircraft carriers 18 4 3 2 0 27 Battleships 4 0 0 0 0 4 Cruisers 16 33 0 0 0 49 Destroyers 16 37 12 0 0 65 Frigates 0 118 15 0 0 133 Patrol combatants 0 74 0 0 0 74 Subtotal 54 266 30 2 0 352 Total Ships 136 565 34 8 2 745 Support ships 96 47 4 0 0 147 2. Strategic Forces The U.S. ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force has declined steadily since 1980. Forty-one boats were maintained from 1967, when the last Polaris submarine joined the fleet, to 1980, when the first Polaris boats were withdrawn from strategic patrols. During the 1980s, ten Polaris boats were retired or converted to attack submarines, and an additional eight Poseidon boats were decommissioned. This reduction was only partially offset by the deployment of ten new Ohio class submarines, and thus by 1990, the force had shrunk to 33 submarines. The number of submarines will continue to decrease as all 11 of the remaining Poseidon submarines are retired by the mid-1990s. The number of strategic ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads aboard submarines has also fallen. In 1990, U.S. ballistic missile submarines carry 584 ballistic missiles with 5,024 nuclear warheads, a decrease from a peak of 648 missiles and 5,760 warheads in 1985. While the size of the submarine force has been declining, the nuclear capacity and targeting capability of the force has increased. The current submarine force is made up of a larger number of more accurate and capable Trident I missiles, as well as the new Trident II D5. The Trident II became operational on 29 March 1990 when the ninth Ohio-class submarine, the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), went to sea for its first patrol. At the end of the century, a planned 21 boat Ohio class fleet will have the capacity of carrying 4,032 warheads, all atop accurate Trident II D5 missiles. Nonetheless, the START Treaty restricts U.S. SLBM warheads to about the 3,000 level, which will result in a constraint of some 1,000 warheads. The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force currently consists of 61 boats, a decline of 28 submarines since the peak in 1978. Since 1988 alone, the force has suffered a net loss of 16 submarines. Twenty-one boats were retired or denuclearized -- including 15 diesel-powered Golf II, Golf III, Golf V submarines and six nuclear-powered Yankee I boats -- but only five nuclear-powered submarines of the Typhoon and Delta IV classes joined the fleet during the same period. While the number of operational Soviet SLBMs has declined to 914 from a peak of 1,038 in 1981, the number of nuclear warheads has steadily increased to the current level of 3,802. This growth reflects continued deployment of MIRVed SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 missiles on Typhoon and Delta IV class submarines. These missiles are replacing older missiles with single or double warhead capabilities. The sixth and last unit of the Typhoon class was deployed in 1989. The sixth Delta IV submarine was also added to the strategic force in 1989, and while the Delta VI class continues in production, START constraints will force the Soviet to reduce the level of all their strategic warheads at sea from the current 3,800 to some 2,000 by the late-1990s. In 1987, U.S. intelligence reported that a new class of ballistic missile submarine, a follow-on to the Delta IV class, was under construction at Severodvinsk. The report, however, now appears to be premature. In February 1990, the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence reported that "a new class of SSBN could replace the older Deltas," but did not mention a new submarine actually in construction. In addition, the U.S. government reported in 1987 that two new Soviet SLBMs were under development, one a follow-on and improvement of the SS-N-20, and the other a new missile. It now appears that the new missile has been cancelled or slowed in development. 3. Cruise Missile and Attack Submarine Forces Budget constraints and a declining threat began to seriously affect the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) force during 1989-1990. The U.S. Navy's 100 SSN force goal was abandoned de facto along with the 600-ship Navy. Since 1988, the SSN force has had a total loss of six submarines, dropping from 98 to 92 boats. Further reductions are likely to follow; reportedly the total SSN force is likely to decline to some 70-80 SSNs by FY 2000, with the retirement of older classes of submarines outnumbering the introduction of new boats. The 1980s plan for a total of 68-69 Los Angeles class submarines was revised in the FY 1990 budget, as the Navy decided to end the program at 62 submarines in order to shift resources to the new Seawolf (SSN-21) class program. In addition, during the formulation of the FY 1991 budget, the Navy decided to retire the entire fleet of 37 Sturgeon class submarines rather than overhaul them. Previous programs called for the boats to have their useful life extended to the year 2000. The Navy plans to ultimately procure 29-30 Seawolf submarines by the early in the next century, but a continuing trend of tightening fiscal limits and improved superpower relations will likely constrain this $36- 40 billion program. The number of nuclear-capable SSNs has also decreased, albeit temporarily. Mainly because of the retirement of the SUBROC nuclear depth bomb, the number of SSNs carrying nuclear weapons declined from a mid-1980s peak of about 70 submarines carrying either SUBROCs or Tomahawk SLCMs, to 50 Tomahawk- certified submarines in 1990. The number of Tomahawk certified submarines will continue to increase in the short run. But the looming reductions in the total SSN force make current Navy plans for 86 SSNs to be Tomahawk-armed by FY 2000 problematic. Throughout the 1990s, five classes of Soviet cruise missile and attack submarines will likely continue in production -- Akula, Kilo, Oscar II, Sierra and Victor III. Their production will result in the deployment of four or five new submarines per year in the early 1990s, and could accelerate in the late 1990s (if the second production line for the Akula class significantly accelerates introduction of this class). Production of new submarines, however, will be more than offset numerically by the retirement of older submarines, 120 of which at least will be retired in the 1990s. A significant number of diesel submarines were already retired in the 1980s, and U.S. intelligence predicts that well over 100 will be scrapped by 1995. "Clearly," Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence, stated in February 1990, "the Soviets have made the decision to give up their traditional large diesel submarine force in favor of quality vs. quantity." In addition to the retirement of large numbers of diesel submarines, the reactor accident aboard an Echo II submarine on 26 June 1989 resulted in a Soviet decision to accelerate the retirement of the Echo boats, as well as that of older first generation nuclear-powered submarines, including Hotels, Novembers, and a single Papa class. Many may already have been taken out of operational service, including the submarine involved in the initial accident. By 1995, U.S. intelligence predicts that some of the newer Mod Echo IIs and Charlies may also be retired. In addition, one of six Alfa class submarines was withdrawn and scrapped in 1988, and two Juliett class submarines were transferred from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic Sea in November 1989, possibly on their way to being scrapped. The number of SLCMs and nuclear warheads on cruise missile submarines remained fairly constant in the 1980s. The retirement of older SS-N-3 and SS-N-7 SLCMs was balanced by the deployment of roughly the same number of new SS-N-9, SS-N-12, and SS-N-19 missiles. In the attack submarine force, the major new capability is the deployment of the SS-N-21 SLCM, 136 of which are estimated to be deployed in 1990. 4. Long-range Sea-launched Cruise Missiles Long-range sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) programs in the U.S. and Soviet Union have been slowed or scaled back. The number of U.S. ships able to fire the Tomahawk SLCM is increasing slower than planned. In the mid-1980s, the Navy wished to have 126 Tomahawk capable vessels in FY 1990, some 40 less than the 86 that are currently available. This is mostly due to delays in conversions in Sturgeon (SSN-637) class submarines to carry Tomahawks; slower backfits of Spruance (DD- 963) class destroyers with vertical launching systems; problems with achieving an operational capability with the vertical launch system fitted on Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarines, and postponements in deliveries of new Los Angeles class submarines. Also, instead of building-up to 37 Tomahawk-armed Sturgeon class submarines through the year 2000, Sturgeon conversions are now expected to peak in 1994 at 26 boats, and then start to decline. The projected total number of Tomahawk-armed combatant vessels has also declined, from 198 to 191. This number will undoubtedly decrease further in revised projections as it assumes the United States will maintain a 100 boat SSN force, and keep all four battleships. As noted the SSN force is likely to fall to 70-80 boats and, in addition, two battleships are up for retirement in the FY 1991 budget, with the other two expected to follow later in the 1990s. The final number of nuclear Tomahawk missiles (TLAM/N) that will be procured will almost certainly be less than the 880 SLCMs permitted by the May 1990 U.S-Soviet SLCM limit agreement made in conjunction with the START negotiations. It also will likely fall below the U.S. Navy original 758 missile inventory objective. The Navy's 1980s plan was to have achieved the 758 nuclear Tomahawk goal by FY 1991, of which 90 percent (678) were to be procured by FY 1990. But as of FY 1990, the Navy had only procured 367 nuclear missiles or 50 percent of its original goal. The FY 1991 budget request included 75 more nuclear Tomahawks, with the remaining 316 left to be requested in FY 1992, the currently scheduled final year of procurement. There is a push in the Navy to extend the production run of the Tomahawk beyond FY 1992. This would obviously help to avoid such an unusual final year purchase of nuclear missiles (the largest purchase of almost a 100 was in FY 1986). Nonetheless, the shift from the original plan has implied that the Navy will purchase less than 758 nuclear Tomahawks. A declining number of planned SLCM platforms, and the Navy's budgetary constraints may have served to limit the nuclear program. In addition, the problems in the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex may have affected the priority of Tomahawk in comparison with other warhead programs. It is not thought that the slowdown in the Tomahawk program was caused by any reassessment of nuclear strategy, however, the Navy may be anticipating some reductions in targets in Eastern Europe and/or the Soviet Union. Also, reportedly, the Navy may have slowed purchases to avoid having excess missiles dismantled due to an arms control agreement. At any rate, reports persist that the Navy may elect to produce less than the 758 nuclear SLCMs it originally desired. At the end of the 1980s, there was a significant slowdown in Soviet long-range cruise missile programs, with the SS-N-21 Sampson evidently running into technical problems, and the SS-NX- 24 development program being slowed considerably. The larger supersonic SS-NX-24 SLCM, which the Pentagon predicted "to be operational in the next few years" in 1987, may have been cancelled. Test activity has been at a slow pace, and the U.S. Navy's director of naval intelligence observed in early 1990 that the missile "possibly remains under development." In addition to the possible cancellation of the SS-NX-24, the SS-N-21 may also have run into technical problems. Nonetheless, some 136 SS-N-21 Sampson SLCMs, first operational in late 1987, are estimated to be deployed on 30 Akula, Sierra, Victor III, and Yankee Notch class attack submarines. 5. Aircraft Carrier and Surface Forces Fifteen aircraft carriers are active in the U.S. Navy in 1990, but the deployable force is 12 ships, rather than the usual 14 through the late 1980s. This is because three carriers, instead of the usual one, are in extended overhauls. A 15- carrier deployable force by 1990 was the centerpiece goal of the 600-ship Navy, but now it even looks doubtful that the Navy will sustain a 13 carrier force. The USS Coral Sea (CV-42) was decommissioned in April 1990, and the USS Midway (CV-41) is slated for retirement during 1991- 1992. Three other carriers -- the USS Ranger (CV-61), the USS America (CV-66), and the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) -- are slated for service life extensions in the 1990s, but fiscal constraints will likely result in the cancellation of one or more of these planned overhauls. The USS Ranger and the USS Saratoga (CV-60) are already being considered for retirement. The deployment of three new Nimitz class carriers in the 1990s will not prevent the decline in aircraft carrier numbers. The number of nuclear weapons on aircraft carriers also shrunk slightly in the late 1980s, and is planned to continue to shrink in the 1990s under current plans. Each individual aircraft carrier will carry fewer nuclear weapons if the B90 nuclear depth/strike bomb is deployed. According to the Department of Defense, anti-submarine warfare and land-attack "...commonality will allow smaller aircraft carrier bomb loadouts than would otherwise be possible with separate tactical strike and depth bombs, thereby reducing overall stockpile numbers of fleet strike and depth bombs." With the abandonment of 15 carrier battle groups, so goes the four battleship battle groups, created by recommissioning World War II era Missouri class ships in the 1980s. The four battleship force was a short lived and expensive achievement. The FY 1991 budget calls for retiring the USS Iowa (BB-61), and the USS New Jersey (BB-62). The remaining two battleships will also be likely retired later in the 1990s. The retirement of the nuclear ASROC rocket thrown depth charge and the Terrier nuclear surface-to-air missile during 1988-1989 has had a major impact on the nuclear capabilities of U.S. surface forces. Despite an increase in the size of the cruiser force from 36 to 43 ships between 1988-1990, the number of nuclear-armed cruisers declined by 20, from 36 to 16 ships. The number of nuclear weapons aboard cruisers decreased by over two-thirds from an assortment of over 300 ASROCs, Terriers, and Tomahawks in the late 1980s, to 76 Tomahawks. During 1988-1990, the destroyer force shrunk by nine ships from 68 to 59 ships, and the nuclear armed destroyer force shrank by 48 ships, from 64 to 16. The number of Tomahawk outfitted destroyers, however, increased from nine to 16. The number of nuclear weapons aboard destroyers overall decreased by about two- thirds from an assortment of about 300 ASROCs, Terriers, and Tomahawks in the late 1980s to about 110 Tomahawks. A new destroyer class -- the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) -- was scheduled to be delivered in October 1989, but production problems have delayed the delivery date to February 1991. The Navy plans to construct at least 33 Burke class ships at a total cost of $27 billion, although the program has run into Congressional criticism and could be scaled back. The retirement of ASROC has resulted in the denuclearization of the frigate force, which shrank form 65 nuclear ships to zero. Overall the frigate force has declined from 115 to 100 ships due to the fiscally accelerated retirement of older classes. The Soviets have four smaller aircraft carriers, but have three full deck aircraft carriers in construction. The deployment of these three ships in the 1990s will significantly improve the ability of the Soviet Navy to take aircraft to sea. While preparation of the first Soviet large deck aircraft carrier continues, all commentators have neglected to report that the Soviets claim the Tbilisi, the first of these new ships, will not carry nuclear weapons. In addition, while western naval publications have speculated about a 60-aircraft wing aboard the ship, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet claimed that the Tbilisi will only carry ten aircraft. Claims of reduced nuclear capability for the Tbilisi seems to follow a pattern set by the last aircraft carrier deployed by the Soviet Navy: the fourth and last ship of the Kiev class, the Baku. This ship's weapons configuration deleted the nuclear-only FRAS-1 anti-submarine rockets present on earlier Kiev class ships, deleted nuclear torpedoes, and deleted SA-N-3 nuclear capable surface-to-air missiles. Larger surface warship production in the Soviet Navy has been modest, slightly lower than U.S. and NATO production, and is declining. Between 1988-1990, the nuclear-capable cruiser force was reduced by eight ships, and the destroyer force was reduced by 31 ships. The last of the Sverdlov class cruisers, and Skoryy, Kotlin, SAM Kotlin, MOD Kildin, Kildin, and Kanin class destroyers were retired in the late 1980s. The number of nuclear weapons in the cruiser and destroyer force declined, particularly the number of nuclear SAMs and torpedoes. Three major surface combatant types continued in production in 1990: the fourth and last Kirov class cruiser (to be deployed in 1992), and destroyers of the Udaloy and Sovremennyy classes. Budget cutbacks have led to discontinuance of construction of the fifth unit of the Kirov class. Slava class construction ended with the fourth ship. A new cruiser, smaller than the Kirov class, but larger than the Slava, is believed to be under construction at the Baltic Yard, Leningrad. The initial two units of a Krivak class frigate follow-on, designated BAL-COM 8, are also under construction in the Baltic and could commence sea trials in 1990. Most reference books credit Soviet surface combatants with the ability to carry nuclear armed surface-to-air missiles and nuclear torpedoes. Soviet naval officers, however, have denied that the SA-N-6 missiles are nuclear capable, or that surface ships carry nuclear torpedoes on a regular basis. 6. Naval Aviation As the number of U.S. aircraft carriers decline, so will the size of the naval aircraft force. A 14th carrier air wing was activated in 1987 to equip the anticipated 15-carrier force, but due to fiscal constraints it was deactivated in FY 1989. In order to standardize naval aviation operations, and due to attack aircraft shortfalls in the late 1980s, variously configured air wings on different aircraft carriers are being reorganized into standard air wings. This plan is necessitating the transfer of Marine Corps A-6s to the Navy. Transitioning to the new air wing configuration will obviously be facilitated much easier if aircraft carriers are retired, freeing up aircraft to be assigned to remaining wings. The stealth A-12 Avenger Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) remains under development, although the Defense Department decided in April 1990 to cut the planned program from 858 to 620 aircraft. This reduction follows the budget-saving decision taken in FY 1989 to terminate an improved A-6F variant of the A- 6, and to instead extend the A-6's service life. The Navy states that 448 A-12s are needed to replace the A-6E, the remainder being earmarked for electronic warfare and surveillance roles. Given the high expense of the aircraft (620 will reportedly cost $52 billion), the program is likely to be reduced further. Ironically, even as U.S. aircraft carriers start to be cut back, Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) is becoming an increasingly important part of the long-range strike capabilities of the Soviet Navy. Although the traditionally large maritime bomber force is declining in size as Backfire bombers replace Badger and Blinder bombers on a less than one-for-one basis (SNA bombers are at their lowest level in a decade), additional new aircraft are being assigned maritime missions from the Soviet Air Forces, or are being directly put under the command of SNA. In the last half of the 1980s, this includes assignment of maritime missions to Bear G bombers assigned to Strategic Aviation, and resubordination of Air Forces Su-24 Fencer (and possibly MiG-27 Flogger J) fighter-bombers to SNA. 7. U.K. and French Naval Nuclear Forces Spontaneous disarmament is beginning to affect U.K. and French naval forces as well. The recently released results of the British government's "Options for Change" study calls for a reduction of the frigate/destroyer force to some 40 ships. The diesel- and nuclear-powered attack submarine force will shrink by almost a half to around 16 submarines, including the retirement of some five older nuclear-powered boats. In addition, the Nimrod maritime patrol force will also be reduced, and the Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft will be replaced by Tornado aircraft reconfigured for the maritime role. While the trend overall is clearly downward for U.K. naval forces, it is more mixed for U.K. naval nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons seem to be on the decline. A decision about a replacement for the WE-177C nuclear depth bomb has been put off, with even some U.K. analysts saying it may be delayed indefinitely. The Trident strategic program, however, is still proceeding towards deploying four new SSBNs with new Trident II missiles by the late 1990s. Depending on warhead production and the number of SSBNs kept at sea, this could lead to at least a trebling of the number of strategic nuclear warheads in the U.K. arsenal. French military forces are also undergoing reexamination, and facing pressures to cut expenditures. It is unclear how the overall size of the fleet will be affected, but major new programs, such as construction of the new generation SSBNs and Charles de Gaulle aircraft carriers have been delayed, due to budgetary constraints. French land-based prestrategic weapons are coming under increasing criticism for only being able to strike targets in eastern Europe, portending criticisms of French carrier based nuclear weapons with a similar capability. But, currently new naval nuclear weapons programs do not seem to be in doubt, although the total number of naval Super Etendard carrier aircraft converted to carry the new ASMP nuclear missile has been reduced, and there has been some delay in the development of the new 12-warhead M5 missile, with its fleet introduction pushed back from 1999 to the beginning of the next century. These trends do not promise a change in the role of naval nuclear weapons comparable to the metamorphosis occurring to the superpowers' forces. British and French forces have always stressed long-range strategic attack, and the completion of both countries SSBN and SLBM modernization will underscore this emphasis. But as the process of spontaneous disarmament unfolds, planned British and French nuclear modernization will not escape criticism. There is a particular nationalistic/psychological origin of support which keeps the status British and French nuclear forces independent from the state of the superpowers' arsenals. Nonetheless, the roots of these "independent" forces are in the dated Cold War justification that the United States would not attack Moscow to save London or Paris. As the Cold War continues to wind down, the British and French naval nuclear forces will increasingly appear outmoded. 8. Nuclear Propulsion One of the most intriguing aspects of the current and projected cutbacks in naval forces is the coming decline in the number of nuclear reactors at sea. Approximately 579 nuclear power reactors are currently located at sea, but this number is not likely to go much higher before it declines quite noticeably during 1991-1992. First-generation nuclear-powered submarines or surface ships in all countries are facing block obsolescence or retirements, and will leaving the nuclear fleets faster than the introduction of new submarines. The Soviet Union uses 380 reactors to run its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, cruisers and ice-breakers. Most submarines have two reactors each (a few have just one), and the cruisers and ice-breakers have two each. The United States has 162 nuclear reactors in its nuclear-powered submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers and a single submersible research vessel. All the U.S. submarines have one reactor each, while the cruisers have two. Four aircraft carriers have two each and one aircraft carrier has eight reactors. The United Kingdom has one reactor on each of its 21 nuclear-powered submarines. Similarly France's 10 nuclear-powered submarines, and China's six nuclear-powered submarines each have one reactor. From a peak of 169 reactors aboard U.S. vessels in 1988, the number in the United States is now declining at a steady rate. Between 1990-1995, the U.S. will likely retire some 34 nuclear- powered vessels, while only commissioning about 17 new ones. The number of Soviet nuclear-powered vessels is just about at a maximum and will decline sharply after 1991-1992 as Soviet first generation nuclear-powered boats are retired. In the early 1990s, the Soviet Navy will likely retire some 45 nuclear-powered submarines, a rate that will far exceed new commissionings, and the number will then decline. In addition, some six older U.K. and French nuclear-powered submarines are up for retirement in the same period. The declining number of nuclear-powered vessels is already having effects which will likely work to reduce further the number of nuclear reactors at sea, mainly by constraining the production of new nuclear-powered vessels. Increasing public concern, even including citizen activism in the Soviet Union, is being expressed about the disposal of decommissioned nuclear reactors. Concerns about safe disposal of reactors in turn is prompting a reexamination of the total cost of nuclear power at sea. At the same time, the up-front costs of nuclear-powered submarines are leading military professionals and elected officials to question the value of nuclear power given its share of the cost of building new submarines. This has resulted in slower building rates or lower projected class totals for new ships. And, as the number of nuclear powered vessels under construction declines, the unit-cost of each submarine increases, further underscoring the prohibitive cost of building nuclear- powered warships. Nuclear Reactors on Naval Vessels (1990) Nuclear Powered United Soviet United Ship Types States Union Kingdom France China Total Ballistic Missile Submarines 33 122 4 6 2 167 Cruise Missile Submarines 0 78 0 0 0 78 Attack Submarines 92 149 17 4 4 266 Aircraft Carriers 18 0 0 0 0 18 Cruisers 18 6 0 0 0 24 Other 1 25 0 0 0 26 Total 162 380 21 10 6 579 9. Conclusion As naval arms control is talked about more, the assumption grows that some solutions or compromises must be found. It is unclear what role traditional "arms control" fora have in this, as the process of spontaneous disarmament has occurred without the intervention of the arms control community. The U.S. and Soviet Navies are experiencing similar transformations as the contract to post-Cold War transition forces. The U.S. surface fleet, with the retirement of ASROC and Terrier and deployment of the Tomahawk cruise missile, is being altered from a multidimensional nuclear force, with anti-air, anti-submarine, and land attack capabilities, to a largely one dimensional force, with solely long-range nuclear attack capabilities. Similarly, the Soviet Navy is increasing its long-range strike capabilities. Former Yankee class strategic submarines and new land attack SLCMs launched from converted Yankees and other naval platforms provide new theater targeting capabilities in Europe and Asia, and could threaten North America. In addition, land-based Backfire and Bear-G bombers, together with newly assigned Fencer and/or Flogger air force fighter-bombers, provide a farther ranging maritime force to protect the Soviet homeland and threaten U.S. aircraft carriers and surface platforms. Tactical nuclear war at sea seems to be a declining threat, as nuclear weapons assigned to naval forces take on strategic roles in threatening or defending the homeland. As non-strategic naval forces evolve into more offensively capable one-dimensional nuclear forces, they must be reckoned with as being part of strategic capabilities, even if they have traditionally been regarded as solely of naval interest. As nuclear weapons assigned for purely "naval" missions are eliminated, the remaining nuclear weapons -- long-range SLCMs, land-based attack aviation, and aircraft carrier aviation -- are shown to be integral to theater, and increasingly strategic, arsenals. This inherent and growing strategic role of seemingly non-strategic naval nuclear forces has provoked a move by many western naval arms control advocates to suggest the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons. In the late 1989, the Soviets also began to shift some of their attention specifically to naval nuclear weapons, in addition to their various calls for confidence building measures and operational controls. Spontaneous disarmament, however, is mainly affecting fleet sizes and future ship and aircraft building rates. It can probably only go so far in relation to nuclear weapons. Elimination of long-range non-strategic naval nuclear weapons -- sea- and land-based, particularly aboard aircraft carriers -- will require an act of will on the part of national leaders to transform the nature of their naval forces. The navies of the United States and the Soviet Union do not themselves seemed predisposed towards volunteering to give up their non-strategic nuclear capabilities, even in a changing world. The challenge is whether prolonged naval arms control discussions will ever provoke higher level decisions to do so. II. Naval Nuclear Weapons 1. Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) United States The United States has three different types of submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on 32 ballistic missile submarines. The 584 missiles are armed with 5,024 nuclear warheads, broken down as follows: Missiles Warheads 176 Poseidon C3 1,760 384 Trident I C4 3,072 24 Trident II D5 192 584 Total 5,024 The Poseidon C3 missile (UGM-73A) is a two-stage, solid propellent missile. It replaced Polaris A2/A3 SLBMs on converted Poseidon submarines and first became operational on the USS James Madison (SSBN-627) in March 1971. The last submarine with Polaris missiles was converted to the Poseidon C3 in 1977. Since 1988, the number of submarines carrying Poseidon missiles decreased from 16 to 11 as five Lafayette (SSBN-619) class boats were deactivated. Currently the missile is deployed on three Lafayette (SSBN-619) class, two James Madison (SSBN-627) class, and six Benjamin Franklin (SSBN-640) class submarines. The number of Poseidons will decrease further as these classes are retired. The last Poseidon will likely be retired in the mid- 1990s. Each Poseidon missile can be armed with six to fourteen W68/Mk3 warheads/multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Generally, however, each missile carries ten warheads. The W68 warhead was first produced in 1970, and in 1990, some 1,800 are in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The warheads have the explosive power of 40 kilotons each. Poseidon missiles are inertially guided and have an accuracy (circular error of probability) of 0.25-0.3 nautical miles (0.46- 0.72 kilometers). Their explosive power, targeting ability, and accuracy make it useful for attacking mostly "soft" targets such as military airfields, bases, and command and communications installations. They have a range of 2,400-2,800 nautical miles (4,500-5,200 kilometers) with ten reentry vehicles or 2,200 nautical miles (4,000 kilometers) with 14 reentry vehicles. The Trident I C4 missile (UGM-96A) is a three-stage, solid propellent missile. It is deployed on 12 converted Poseidon ballistic missile submarines and eight new Ohio class boats. The first Trident I C4 became operational in 1979, the last in 1983. Twelve James Madison (SSBN-627) class and Benjamin Franklin (SSBN-640) class ballistic missile submarines were converted. The missile is also deployed on eight Ohio (SSBN-726) submarines. Each Trident I C4 missile can be armed with eight W76/Mk4 warheads/MIRVs. First produced in 1978, 3,175 W76 warheads are in the U.S. nuclear stockpile in 1990, and each has an explosive power of 100 kilotons. Trident I missiles have stellar-aided inertial digital computer guidance, and their accuracy (circular error of probability) is 0.125-0.27 nautical miles (0.23-0.50 kilometers). They have little hard target capability, but can attack "moderately hard" targets such as bomber bases or heavy industry. The missiles' range is 4,200 nautical miles (7,800 kilometers) at full payload and is greater with fewer reentry vehicles. The longer range of Trident I missile over Polaris and Poseidon meant that submarines carrying the missile did not have to be based overseas to be within range of their targets for a reasonable amount of time during their patrols. The numbers of submarines carrying the Trident I will decline as the James Madison and Benjamin Franklin submarines retire, and the eight Ohio class submarines with Trident I are modified to carry the Trident II. Approximately half of the existing W76 warheads will be "transferred" for use on Trident II missiles starting in the mid-1990s. The Trident II D5 is a three-stage, solid propellent missile. The U.S. Navy's newest SLBM, the D5 became operational on 29 March 1990 when the ninth Ohio-class submarine, the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), went to sea for its first patrol. The Trident II D5 will be deployed on subsequent Ohio class submarines and backfitted on the first eight submarines (replacing their Trident I C4 missiles) during their overhauls, with conversions starting in FY 1993. By FY 2001 all of the 20- 21 Trident submarines scheduled to be in the U.S. fleet will carry the Trident II D5. The Trident II D5 missile can carry either the W88/Mk5 or the W76/Mk4 warhead/MIRVs. The W88 is a new high-yield warhead with an explosive power of 475 kilotons, while the W76 is the same 100 kiloton yield warhead currently used on the Trident I. The W88 commenced production in September 1988 and some 200 are in the U.S. nuclear stockpile as of mid-1990. Although the missile is designed to carry up to 14 of the lighter W76 warheads, under the START negotiations the U.S. and Soviet Union have agreed that the Trident II missile will be counted as carrying eight warheads. The Navy has primarily justified the D5 missile for its ability to "engage the full spectrum of targets," including "those ... which the Soviets value most," referring to command and control sites and underground missile silos. When armed with the W88 warhead, the Trident II "will have the capability to destroy hardened targets, earlier thought to be vulnerable only to high-yield bombs or to the most modern U.S. [land-based] intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)." Production of the W88 warhead may be affected by the closure of the U.S. Department of Energy's Rocky Flats, Colorado, plutonium processing plant where the cores of nuclear warheads are fabricated. Environmental and safety problems led to the suspension of operations at Rocky Flats in December 1989. According to the U.S. Navy, enough W88 cores were produced prior to the shutdown to arm the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734) and the USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735). But U.S. officials claim if the Rocky Flats plant is not reopened by Fall 1990, the third submarine to be armed with the W88, the USS West Virginia (SSBN-736), may have to be equipped with older W76 warheads removed from Trident I missiles. Trident II missiles are equipped with stellar-aided inertial digital computer guidance. Prior to underwater testing, the Trident II D5 was predicted to be more than twice as accurate as the Trident I C4, with a circular error of probability estimated to be 0.07-0.10 nautical miles (0.13-0.19 kilometers). Testing has reportedly confirmed the doubling of accuracy. During the January 1990 underwater test launches, RADM Kenneth Malley, Program Manager of the Trident II, noted that the missile exceeded the "highest expectations" he had held, and added that "at 4,000 nautical miles we have an accuracy that's better than the length of the submarine [560 feet]." Admiral Malley also provided new details about the range of the Trident II. He said that with the heavier W88 warheads, the Trident II missile will have a range "hundreds of miles" greater than the 4,000 nautical mile (7,400 kilometers) Trident I missiles. With the lighter W76 warheads, the missile will have range "thousands" of miles greater, estimated to be some 6,000 nautical miles (11,100 kilometers). The U.S. Department of Defense reports the Trident II missile program cost is $37 billion for development and procurement of 899 missiles, including test and spare missiles. In addition, the estimated warhead cost is $5 billion. Total life-cycle costs for the development, acquisition, and operational support for the Trident II D5 missiles and related strategic weapons systems equipment (excluding the submarines and warheads) through the year 2032 is approximately $99.3 billion in escalated dollars. The Soviet Union The Soviet Union has six different types of submarine- launched ballistic missiles on 61 ballistic missile submarines. The 914 missiles are thought to be armed with 3,802 nuclear warheads, broken down as follows: Missiles Warheads 176 SS-N-6 352 286 SS-N-8 286 12 SS-N-17 12 224 SS-N-18 1,568 120 SS-N-20 1,200 96 SS-N-23 384 914 Total 3,802 The SS-N-6 Serb is a single stage, liquid fuel missile. As of mid-1990, it is deployed on 11 Yankee I class SSBNs. The current modification of the missile (Mod 3) carries two warheads on multiple reentry vehicles (not independently targetable) and became operational in 1973. The missile has a range of 1,600 nautical miles (3,000 kilometers), and its two warheads have the explosive power of 375-1,000 kilotons each. The missile is inertially guided and has an accuracy (circular error of probability) of about one nautical mile. The SS-N-8 Sawfly is a single stage, liquid fuel single warhead missile. It is deployed on 23 submarines: one Hotel III class, 18 Delta I class, and four Delta II class. The SS-N-8 first became operational in 1973. Each missile carries a single warhead with the explosive power of 1,000-1,500 kilotons. The missile has a range of 4,900 nautical miles (9,100 kilometers), is inertially guided, and has an accuracy (circular error of probability) of about 0.8 nautical miles. The solid fuel SS-N-17 Snipe is deployed on a single Yankee II class SSBN which was converted from a Yankee I in 1977. The missile itself may not have reached operational status until 1980. Each missile carries a single 500-1,000 kiloton warhead and has a range of 2,100 nautical miles (3,900 kilometers). The missile is inertially guided and has an accuracy (circular error of probability) of 0.75-0.8 nautical miles. The SS-N-18 Stingray is a two stage, liquid propellent multi-warhead missile, and was the first Soviet submarine- launched missile with MIRVs. It is currently deployed on 14 Delta III class SSBNs. The SS-N-18 first became operational during 1977-1978, and is deployed in three modifications: Mod 1 with three warheads, Mod 2 with a single warhead, and Mod 3 with up to seven warheads. The average loading of SS-N-18 missiles is assumed to be seven warheads under agreed U.S. and Soviet counting rules for START negotiations. The SS-N-18 Mod 1 and 3 missiles carry warheads that each have an explosive power of 200-500 kilotons. The Mod 2 missiles carry a larger warhead with an explosive power of 450-1,000 kilotons. The SS-N-18 Mods 1 and 3 missiles with multiple reentry vehicles have a range of 3,500 nautical miles (6,500 kilometers). The single warhead Mod 2 has an extended range of 4,300 nautical miles (8,000 kilometers). The missile is inertially guided and has an accuracy (circular error of probability) of 0.5-0.76 nautical miles. The SS-N-20 Sturgeon is a three stage, solid fuel multiple warhead missile that is deployed on six operational Typhoon class SSBNs. First operational in 1983, the missile is still in limited production. Each missile is counted as carrying ten 100- 200 kiloton warheads under agreed U.S. and Soviet counting rules for START negotiations. The SS-N-20 missile is inertially guided and has an accuracy (circular error of probability) of about 0.3 nautical miles. It has a range of 4,500 nautical miles (8,300 kilometers). A modified version of the SS-N-20 is also thought to be in flight testing and the early stages of production. The SS-N-23 Skiff is the newest Soviet SLBM, a three stage, liquid fuel multiple warhead missile. It is deployed on six Delta IV SSBNs and is still in production. The SS-N-23 first became operational in early 1986. Each missile is counted as carrying four 100 kiloton warheads under agreed U.S. and Soviet counting rules for START negotiations. The inertially guided missile reportedly has a greater accuracy than the SS-N-18. However, it has suffered some reliability problems in the past. In March 1988, the Director of Naval Intelligence testified before Congress that: Four DELTA IVs [submarines which carry the SS-N-23] are assessed to be operational, although none has gone on patrol. The SS-N-23, a highly sophisticated missile that probably pushes Soviet state of the art, apparently has suffered reliability problems. The missile is assessed to be operational, however, and work to improve its reliability continues. In 1989, Soviet Military Power reported that the Soviets had deployed a modified version of the SS-N-23 missile in 1988. It is assumed that this modified version corrected the problems encountered in the earlier missile. The SS-N-23 may be backfitted into Delta III class submarines in place of older SS- N-18s. In 1988, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that new Soviet SLBMs were under development, and predicted that they "should be well into developmental flight testing before 1990." One these missiles is the modified version of the SS-N-20. The other, a completely new SLBM, continued to be reported in development in 1989, but in 1990 nothing was mentioned of it and it is assumed to have remained in the research stage or to have been cancelled. The United Kingdom The United Kingdom deploys the Polaris A3TK SLBM on four ballistic missile submarines, and plans to replace this missile with the U.S. manufactured Trident II D5. The Polaris A3TK is a two stage, guided missile containing two "Chevaline" multiple reentry vehicles. The Chevaline modernization program began in 1974, and became operational in 1982 on HMS Renown (S26), replacing older Polaris A3 reentry vehicles. All four submarines were equipped with the new front- ends by 1987. The missile has a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,700 kilometers) and each warhead has an estimated yield of 40 kilotons. Some 96 warheads for the missiles are estimated to be in the British stockpile. In 1987 new engines for the Polaris missiles were installed at a total cost of ś437 million, allowing them to function until the Royal Navy converts to the Trident II. A refurbishment of the Chevaline reentry vehicles started in January 1988. The work was to extend "over a number of years," and be the last major work done to the Polaris A3TK missile before they were replaced by Trident. In the early 1980s, Britain decided to replace the aging Polaris missiles with the U.S. Trident II D5 missile. Trident missiles will be purchased from the United States, but be armed with British designed and built warheads, and carried on British built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The first U.K.-produced warheads are due to be delivered at the end of 1992, and the first Royal Navy Trident submarine, the HMS Vanguard, is scheduled to become operational in the mid-1990s. The Trident program is officially estimated to cost some ś9.38 billion (approximately $15 billion), some 32 percent of which will be spent in the United States. It is thought that the U.K. Trident missiles nominally will carry at most eight MIRVs, although missiles could carry up to 14 warheads. Deployment of the Trident missile will increase the number of warheads per submarine from the present 32 to at least 128 per boat. France France has three different types of SLBMs on six ballistic missile submarines. The 96 missiles are thought to be armed with 416 nuclear warheads, broken down as follows: Missiles Warheads 32 M20 32 16 M4A 96 48 M4B 288 96 Total 416 The M20 is a two stage, solid propellent, inertially guided 1,600 nautical mile (3,000 kilometer) range missile armed with a single 1,000 kiloton TN-61 nuclear warhead. The M20 was first deployed in 1977 as a replacement for the M2 missile, which was retired. In 1990, the M20 is deployed on two submarines: Le Foudroyant (S610) and Le Redoutable (S611). Le Foudroyant will be upgraded to the M4B missile by 1993. Le Redoutable will be retired in 1991. Since 1988, two of the other four submarines originally converted to carry the M20 have been further converted to carry the M4B missile. The number of M20/TN-61 warheads is thought to have fallen proportionately from 64 to 32. The M4A is a three stage, solid propellant, inertially guided, 2,200-2,700 nautical mile (4,000-5,000 kilometer) range missile armed with six MIRVs, each with a 150 kiloton TN-70 warhead. Sixteen missiles carrying some 96 warheads are presently deployed on the L'Inflexible (S615). Development of the M4A as a replacement for the M20 began in 1975, and it was first deployed in 1985 when L'Inflexible went to sea. L'Inflexible, however, is the only submarine with the M4A, since all subsequent replacements of the M20 missiles will be with the M4B. The M4B is a three stage, solid propellant, inertially guided, 3,200 nautical mile (6,000 kilometer) range missile armed with one to six MIRVs with 150 kiloton TN-71 warheads. It can achieve a greater range than the M4A by using the lighter TN-71 warhead and by mounting fewer than six warheads on the missile. The M4B was first deployed in 1987 on Le Tonnant (S614), which had undergone an extensive refit. Since 1988, two more submarines have been converted from the M20 missile to the M4B: L'Indomptable (S613) and Le Terrible (S612). A fourth submarine, Le Foudroyant (S610), will be upgraded by 1993. Some 48 M4B missiles with 288 TN-71 warheads are deployed with the three converted submarines. In 1986, development began on another version of the M4, the M45. This missile is an intermediate between the M4 missile and the under development M5 missile, combining some features of both. The M45 will carry six warheads, but will have improved penetrations aids and a new TN-75 warhead. It will be deployed on the first three new generation ballistic missile submarines, beginning with the first submarine, Le Triomphant, when it enters service in 1994. The new 12-warhead M5 missile is also under development. The M5 program has faced delays, however, and its fleet introduction has been pushed back from 1999 to the beginning of the next century. Thus it will arm the fourth new generation submarine, rather than the third as previously had been planned. China China's only reported SLBM is the Juilong 1 (CSS-N-3), a two stage solid fuel missile with an estimated range of 1,800 nautical miles (3,300 kilometers). It can carry a single warhead with an estimated yield of 200-1,000 kilotons. It was designed to be deployed on the Xia class ballistic missile submarines. Under development for more than ten years, the missile's first underwater launch from a submarine took place in 1982, using the Golf class SSB. Its first underwater launch from an Xia class submarine in 1985 seemingly was a failure. But a second underwater firing from the Xia submarine took place in 1988, and was a success. Some 26-38 warheads are estimated to be in the Chinese naval arsenal, enough to arm the missiles for the one or two Xia class submarines thought to be operational, as well as one Golf test submarine. Reportedly a new type of SLBM is also under development. 2. Sea-launched Cruise Missiles The United States The U.S. has one nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) -- the Tomahawk (BGM-109A) -- a subsonic guided, submarine- or surface-ship launched, missile which comes in both conventional and nuclear versions. The nuclear version is commonly called TLAM/N, for Tomahawk Land-Attack/Nuclear. It carries one W80-0 warhead with a selectable yield of 5-150 kilotons. About 325 W80-0 warheads are estimated to be in the U.S. nuclear stockpile in mid-1990. TLAM/Ns have an inertial and terrain matching guidance system (TERCOM) and an accuracy (circular error of probability) of about 30 meters. The missile is propelled by a solid booster for launch and a small turbofan engine during its cruise flight. The TLAM/N range is 1,350 nautical miles (2,500 kilometers). A total of 3,630 Tomahawks of all variants are scheduled to be procured. Tomahawk missiles can be launched from submarine torpedo tubes, armored box launchers (ABL) on surface ships, and vertical launching systems (VLS), both on submarines and surface ships. TLAM/N introduction has been moving forward slower than originally planned by the U.S. Navy. In the mid-1980s the Navy intended to buy its total inventory objective of 758 nuclear missiles by FY 1991, of which 90 percent (678) were to be procured by FY 1990. As of FY 1990, the Navy had only procured 50 percent (367) of its original goal. The FY 1991 budget request includes 75 more nuclear Tomahawks, with the remaining 316 left to be requested in FY 1992, the currently scheduled final year of Tomahawk procurement. Since this would be an unusual final year purchase of nuclear missiles (the largest purchase of almost a 100 was in FY 1986), this has implied the Navy will ultimately build less than 758 nuclear Tomahawks. Nonetheless, the shift from the original plan remains unclear. Reportedly, the Navy may have slowed purchases to avoid having excess missiles dismantled due to an arms control agreement. But also the number of planned SLCM platforms has declined slightly, and the Navy is suffering budgetary constraints. In addition, the problems in the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex may have affected the priority of Tomahawk in comparison with other warhead programs. It is not thought that the slowdown in the nuclear Tomahawk program was caused by any reassessment of nuclear strategy, although the Navy may be anticipating reductions in targets in Eastern Europe and/or the Soviet Union. Still, reports persist that the Navy may elect to produce less than the 758 nuclear SLCMs it originally desired. The nuclear Tomahawk was first deployed on ships and submarines in June 1984. In June 1990, there are 86 ships and submarines certified to launch and carry some, but not necessarily all, variants (see Table 5). Table 5: Tomahawk Certified Vessels (end 1985-1989 and June 1990) Submarines Surface Ships Sub- Sub- Grand 688 637 Total BB CGN CG47 DD963 Total TOTAL 1985-- 15220 4 8 23 1986-- 21331 6 13 34 1987 25 6 31 3 4 3 7 17 48 1988 28 8 36 3 5 6 9 23 59 1989 30 13 43 4 5 8 12 29 72 1990 32 18 50 4 5 11 16 36 86 The number of vessels able to fire the Tomahawk missile is also increasing slower than earlier U.S. Navy plans. In the mid- 1980s the Navy planned to have 126 Tomahawk-capable vessels by FY 1990, 40 less than are currently available. The reduction is mostly due to delays in conversions in Sturgeon (SSN-637) class submarines to carry Tomahawks; slower backfits of Spruance (DD- 963) class destroyers with vertical launching systems; problems with achieving an operational capability with the VLS fitted on Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarines, and postponements in deliveries of new Los Angeles class submarines. The total number of combatant vessels that will carry nuclear Tomahawks also will be slightly less than the Navy had originally envisioned. In the mid-1980s, the Navy wanted to have 198 surface ships and submarines equipped with Tomahawk missiles by the mid- to late-1990s. Now the Navy estimates it will have 191 vessels by the late-1990s or early 2000s. Even this goal probably will not be achieved as it does not account for the retirement of all four battleships, nor a possible submarine force of only some 70-80 boats. The Navy is developing a follow-on to the Tomahawk, called the long-range conventional cruise missile (LRCCM), but current plans call for this missile only to be conventionally armed. The LRCCM program also has been referred to as "Excalibur," the Long Range Conventional Standoff Weapon (LRCSW), or the advanced sea- launched cruise missile (ASLCM). The Soviet Union The Soviet Navy deploys seven different types of nuclear- capable sea-launched cruise and anti-ship missiles: the SS-N-3 Shaddock/Sepal, the SS-N-7 Starbright, the SS-N-9 Siren, the SS- N-12 Sandbox, the SS-N-19 Shipwreck, the SS-N-21 Sampson, and the SS-N-22 Sunburn. With the exception of the SS-N-21, all of these SLCMs are thought to be dual-capable, i.e., they can carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead. As of 1990, Soviet ships and submarines have 1,010 SLCM launchers (not counting the capacity of 30 attack submarines which can fire approximately 136 SS-N-21s from torpedo tubes), and it is estimated that the Soviet Navy possesses 570 nuclear versions (see Table 6). Table 6: Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles and Platforms Type Platform Missiles Warheads SS-N-3c Shaddock Juliett, Echo II 96 76 SS-N-3b Sepal Kynda, Kresta I 48 14 SS-N-7 Starbright Charlie I 64 32 SS-N-9 Siren Charlie II, Papa, 248 92 Nanuchka, Sarancha SS-N-12 Sandbox Kiev, Slava, Echo II 248 106 SS-N-19 Shipwreck Kirov, Oscar I/II 180 72 SS-N-21 Sampson Akula, Sierra, Victor III, 136 136 Yankee Notch SS-N-22 Sunburn Sovremennyy, 126 42 Tarantul III Total 1,146570 Soviet deployment of shorter range cruise and anti-ship missiles continued at a steady but reduced rate during the late 1980s. According to U.S. naval intelligence, "several Soviet naval cruise missiles systems have recently undergone or are possibly undergoing upgrade.... Other naval anti-surface cruise missile systems are also being developed that may significantly enhance the ASUW capabilities of a number of units. A new small, subsonic missile system -- designated the SS-NX-25 and believed to be very similar to the U.S. Harpoon -- is under test and evaluation. It is not known whether this last missile would be nuclear capable. First deployed in 1960, the SS-N-3 is the oldest SLCM in the Soviet fleet. The SS-N-3 is deployed in two versions: the submarine-launched SS-N-3c Shaddock, and the surface-launched SS- N-3b Sepal. With a range of 250 nautical miles (460 kilometers), it was the longest range cruise missile until the introduction of the SS-N-12 in 1976. It is estimated that there are a total of 144 SS-N-3 missiles deployed with 90 nuclear warheads. The SS-N- 3c is deployed on Echo II and Juliett class cruise missile submarines, and the SS-N-3b is deployed on Kresta I and Kynda class cruisers. SS-N-3s on Echo II class submarines were being replaced by SS-N-12s in the 1980s, and only seven Echo IIs are thought to still be armed with the SS-N-3. The SS-N-3 was once the most numerous Soviet SLCM deployed. The decision to phase out the Echo IIs, and the age or conversion of the other SS-N-3 platforms (a single Juliett class submarine reportedly has been converted to be a trials ship for the SS-N- 12), however, means the remainder of the missiles probably will be retired by the mid-1990s. The SS-N-7 Starbright was deployed in 1968 on Charlie I (and possibly Charlie II and Papa) cruise missile submarines. It was the first Soviet SLCM capable of submerged launch from a submarine. Some 64 of the 30 nautical mile (56 kilometer) range missiles and 32 nuclear warheads remain deployed on the Charlie I class. Charlie II and Papa class submarines are thought to have been converted to the SS-N-9. A nuclear version of the SS-N-7 missile may no longer be active, as Charlie I class submarines are being retired, and two have been leased to India with conventional versions of the missile. In any case, the missile is likely to be retired in the 1990s. First deployed in 1969, the SS-N-9 Siren arms Charlie II and Papa class cruise missile submarines, Nanuchka I and III class patrol combatants, and Sarancha class patrol combatant hydrofoils. Some 248 missiles are operational with 92 nuclear warheads. The range of the SS-N-9 is 60 nautical miles (100 kilometers). The SS-N-9 is thought to be in production. The SS-N-12 Sandbox is currently the most numerous SLCM deployed. It is a long range SLCM (300 nautical mile (550 kilometer) range), arming Kiev and Baku class aircraft carriers, Slava cruisers, modified Echo II class cruise missile submarines, and a single Juliett class cruise missile submarine. Some 248 of the missiles are deployed with 106 nuclear warheads. About 20 of 25 Echo II class submarines are thought to be converted from the SS-N-3 to launch the SS-N-12. The SS-N-12 is thought to be in production. The SS-N-19 Shipwreck, which was deployed in 1980, has a range of 300 nautical miles (550 kilometers), and is thought to be the Soviets' second longest range SLCM. It is an improved SS- N-12 with a lower flight profile. It is fired from three of the Soviet Navy's most heavily armed ships -- the Kirov class cruisers and Oscar I and II class cruise missile submarines. It is estimated that some 180 missiles and 72 nuclear warheads are deployed. The missile is in production. The subsonic SS-N-21 Sampson, a 1,600 nautical mile (3,000 kilometer) range missile similar to the U.S. Tomahawk, was first deployed in late 1987. It is fired from Akula, Sierra, Victor III, and converted Yankee Notch class SSNs. It is estimated that some 30 submarines (four Akula, two Sierra, 23 Victor III, and one Yankee Notch) are capable of delivering the SS-N-21. These submarines carry an estimated 136 SS-N-21s. The SS-N-21 despite being declared operational in late 1987, may still not be widely deployed. In March 1990, the U.S. Navy described the "recent completion of a two year improvement program for the SS-N-21 land attack cruise missile, which probably focused on improving the SLCM's guidance/propulsion systems." The missile is thought to be in full scale production. The SS-N-22 Sunburn, deployed in 1981, arms the Sovremennyy class destroyers, Tarantul III class patrol combatants, and the Utka and Dergach class hydrofoils. The 60 nautical mile (100 kilometer) range missile is an improved derivative of the SS-N-9, and the first Soviet anti-ship missile having a sea skimming flight profile in the final phase of its attack trajectory. It uses the same radar and fire control systems as the SS-N-9. Some 126 missiles are deployed with a total of 42 nuclear warheads. The missile is in production. A large supersonic SS-NX-24 SLCM is believed to be undergoing testing from a single converted Yankee class submarine (designated a cruise missile submarine, SSGN, rather than an attack submarine). But development of the SS-NX-24 seemingly has been slowed, and perhaps even terminated. After years of declaring the missile imminently operational, Soviet Military Power 1989 stated that "Test activity for a sea-launched version [of the supersonic AS-X-19 air-launched cruise missile], the SS- NX-24, is continuing at a slow pace." Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, in his March 1990 testimony before the U.S. Congress only mentioned the SS-NX-24 once, and that was with this reticent passage: "The supersonic SS-NX-24 also possibly remains under development." 3. Anti-submarine Warfare Nuclear Weapons The United States The retirement of the nuclear SUBROC submarine-launched and ASROC surface-ship launched rockets during 1989-1990, leaves the U.S. with one nuclear anti-submarine weapon: the B57 nuclear depth bomb. In addition, the B90 nuclear depth/strike bomb is under development to replace the B57 in the mid-1990s. Experimental development of other anti-submarine nuclear weapons was halted in the 1980s. Warhead development for the Vertical Launch ASROC and Sea Lance anti-submarine warfare standoff weapon was cancelled in FY 1986 and FY 1988, respectively. Nuclear versions of neither are anticipated to be revived. Paper studies for an unspecified new type of nuclear anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapon continue, however. Despite retirement of virtually all ASW nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory, and cancellation of anticipated replacements, the U.S. Navy still justifies the need for a new air-launched depth bomb. "The principal advantage provided by a nuclear depth bomb," according to the Navy, "is a credible deterrence against escalation to nuclear warfare at sea. Should deterrence...fail, a nuclear depth bomb improves our warfighting capability since it is invulnerable to countermeasures or false targets. Also, a nuclear depth bomb provides increased lethality against the modern, high speed deep diving double hulled Soviet submarines." The B57 is a lightweight multi-purpose nuclear bomb that can be used as a nuclear depth bomb for ASW. Its yield is in the sub-kiloton to 20 kiloton range. Of the 1600 B57s in the U.S. arsenal in 1990, approximately 825 are anti-submarine versions for delivery by U.S. and NATO naval aircraft (Dutch NP-3 Orions, U.K. Nimrods, and Italian Atlantics). It can be delivered by carrier-based S-3A/B Viking jets and SH-3D/H Sea King helicopters, A-6E and A-7E attack aircraft, as well as land-based P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Development of the B90 nuclear depth/strike bomb (NDSB) continued in 1988-90. It was scheduled to enter the inventory in FY 1993, but its status is now in doubt as its FY 1991 budget request is facing opposition in the U.S. Congress. The B90 will be a multi-purpose bomb which will have "modern safety and security features" and will replace the almost 30-year-old B57 tactical strike bombs and B57 depth bombs. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, "This commonality will allow smaller aircraft carrier bomb loadouts than would otherwise be possible with separate tactical strike and depth bombs, thereby reducing overall stockpile numbers of fleet strike and depth bombs." The B90 will be deliverable by the P-3, the long-range replacement for the P-3, the S-3, and the SH-3, as well as allied maritime patrol planes. It is estimated that some 1,000 B90 bombs will be purchased between 1993-2000. Total program cost is estimated to run approximately $1 billion dollars, or $1 million dollars per warhead. The Soviet Union The Soviet Navy has a total of about 1,300 nuclear anti- submarine warfare warheads on five different types of weapons: nuclear torpedoes, a submarine rocket nuclear depth bomb, a submarine launched ASW missile, a ballistic rocket, and air delivered nuclear depth bombs. The Soviet Navy deploys two different types of nuclear torpedoes: the Type 65 and ET-80. The Type 65 was introduced in the early 1960s, and the ET-80 was introduced in the early 1980s. Today, 520 nuclear torpedoes are estimated to be deployed on submarines and surface ships. Three incidents involving Soviet attack submarines indicate that nuclear torpedoes are routinely deployed. The first reportedly occurred in December 1972, when a nuclear-powered submarine from the Northern Fleet had an accident while on patrol off the east coast of North America. The accident occurred in the forward section of the submarine and was caused, according to intelligence reports of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, by a radiation leak from a nuclear torpedo. The second occurred in October 1981 when a Whiskey class attack submarine ran aground near the Karlskrona naval base in Sweden. Swedish Defence Ministry authorities detected the presence of Uranium-238, leading them to conclude that the submarine probably had "one or more nuclear weapons aboard." The third occurred in April 1989, when the Mike class submarine sank in the Barents Sea and the Soviet government announced that the submarine was carrying two nuclear torpedoes. Most western reference books credit all 21-inch nuclear torpedo launchers as capable of delivering nuclear torpedoes. Soviet officials, however, have denied that surface ships regularly carry nuclear torpedoes. There are 149 surface ships of nine classes -- Riga, Grisha I/III/IV/V, Krivak I, and Krivak II class frigates as well as Turya class patrol combatants -- that are only armed with one possible nuclear-capable launcher, i.e. 21-inch torpedo tubes. Since these ships are small frigates and patrol boats, it is thought that they may not be nuclear capable. The Soviet Union also deploys three types of nuclear-armed missiles and rockets for anti-submarine missions: the FRAS-1 nuclear rocket, the SS-N-15 Starfish nuclear depth bomb, and the SS-N-16 Stallion dual-capable ASW missile. Twin SUW-N-1 launchers with FRAS-1 (Free Rocket Anti- Submarine) rockets are deployed on three Kiev and two Moskva class surface ships. The missile is a nuclear-only variant of the Soviet Army's FROG-7 short-range rocket. It is estimated that 25 missiles with nuclear warheads are deployed. The fourth ship of the Kiev class -- the Baku -- designated a separate class because of major weapons configuration changes, did not include the SUW-N-1 launcher. The submarine-launched SS-N-15 Starfish rocket propelled nuclear depth bomb was deployed in 1973 and is similar to the U.S. Navy's retired SUBROC. It is fired from either 21- or 25.6-inch torpedo tubes and is carried on Typhoon, Charlie I/II, Papa, Oscar I/II, Victor II, Alfa, Sierra, and Akula class submarines. Victor I and Tango class attack submarines also may be capable of firing the SS-N-15. The SS-N-16 Stallion ASW missile has a longer range than the SS-N-15 (64 versus 20 nautical mile [120 versus 37 kilometers]), and is able to carry a nuclear or conventional torpedo. The nuclear version is designated the SS-N-16B. Larger than the SS- N-15, the SS-N-16 can only be fired from 25.6-inch (650mm) torpedo tubes. First deployed in 1979, the SS-N-16 is thought to be deployed on the Typhoon, Oscar I/II, Victor III, Sierra, and Akula classes. Tango class attack submarines also may be capable of firing the SS-N-16. There are an estimated 400 nuclear warheads for SS-N-15s and SS-N-16s, with each submarine being allocated an average of four nuclear weapons. The Soviet Navy also deploys ASW nuclear depth bombs, which are deliverable by three types of land-based fixed wing aircraft and two ship-based helicopters. Two types of ASW nuclear depth bombs exist, one older and one introduced in the early 1980s. There are 330 nuclear capable ASW aircraft: 180 land-based aircraft, comprised of about 75 Be-12 Mail, 60 Tu-142 Bear F, and 45 Il-38 May patrol planes; and 150 Hormone A and Helix A helicopters. It is estimated there are 350 nuclear depth bombs, or about one per nuclear-capable airplane and helicopter. These aircraft also may be capable of delivering nuclear torpedoes and nuclear sea mines. The United Kingdom The United Kingdom possesses some 25 nuclear depth bombs versions of the WE-177 nuclear bomb, designated the WE-177C. According to the U.K. Ministry of Defence, "British nuclear depth-bombs can be delivered by Royal Navy anti-submarine helicopters" (i.e. Sea King and Lynx ASW helicopters). During 1988-1990, the United Kingdom has been considering replacing the WE-177. The main interest has been in a new air-launched strike weapon to succeed the RAF's WE-177A/Bs, but a follow-on for the WE-177C depth bomb has also received attention. The government was to make a decision by mid-1990 on whether to proceed, but the decision was subsequently put off until late 1990. 4. Anti-air Warfare Nuclear Weapons The United States The United States no longer deploys nuclear-armed surface- to-air missiles. The last nuclear Terrier (RIM-2F) was retired in September 1988. In the early to mid-1980s, a nuclear-armed Standard-2 missile (SM-2(N)) was under development to replace the Terrier. The U.S. Congress, however, refused to fund the missile and the program was terminated in mid-1986. The Soviet Union The Soviet Navy has two types of surface-to-air missiles which are thought to be nuclear capable: the SA-N-1 Goa and the SA-N-3 Goblet. It is estimated that a total of 188 nuclear versions exist, four per ship on three aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, and 17 destroyers. The 12 nautical mile (22 kilometer) range SA-N-1 Goa, is deployed on Kresta I, Kynda, and Kashin/Mod Kashin class cruisers and destroyers. The SA-N-1 also has limited surface-to-surface capability. As older ships are retired, the SA-N-1 is also thought to be undergoing retirement. This may also mean a diminished, and or, eliminated nuclear capability. The 20 nautical mile (37 kilometer) range SA-N-3 Goblet, is deployed on the Kiev class carriers, and the Moskva, Kresta II, and Kara class cruisers. 5. Air-Delivered Nuclear Weapons The United States U.S. Naval and Marine Corps aircraft can deliver some 1,350 nuclear weapons in three types for attacks on surface targets. The B43-1 (B43 mod 1) "is a tactical thermonuclear bomb designed for high-speed, low or high-altitude delivery against surface targets" by A-4M, A-6E and A-7E attack aircraft. The B43 has an estimated yield of 1,000 kilotons, and of the 350 B43s in the U.S. stockpile in 1990, 250 are estimated to be for Navy use. The B57 is a lightweight "multipurpose, air-launched, nuclear fission bomb designed for special tactical situations and anti-submarine warfare. Selectable delivery options are free- fall airburst, retarded-fall airburst, retarded-fall ground burst (laydown), and retarded-fall underwater burst [for the ASW depth bomb version]." Its yield is in the sub-kiloton to 20 kiloton range. For land-attack missions, it can be delivered by A-4M, A- 6E, A-7E, and F/A-18 attack/fighter aircraft. Of the 1600 B57s in the U.S. arsenal in 1990, 475 are thought to be for strike/land-attack use by the Navy. The B61 is a lightweight, multipurpose thermonuclear "modern tactical bomb" in seven current modifications (mods). Four mods are currently used by the Navy (mods 0, 1, 2, 5), the rest are used exclusively by Air Force and NATO aircraft. The selectable yield bomb can be exploded from as low as one kiloton, to 100-345 kilotons. B61s can be delivered by A-4M, A-6E, A-7E and F/A-18 attack/fighter aircraft. Another four B61 mods are scheduled to enter the stockpile in the 1990s, with improved safety and command features, of which the B61 mod 6 (B61-6) is scheduled to achieve an initial operational capability with the Navy in early 1991. The remaining mods are in preproduction phases. Of the 3,025 B61s in the U.S. stockpile in 1990, some 625 are estimated for Navy use. The Soviet Union The Soviet Union has four types of dual-capable air-to- surface nuclear missiles (ASMs), as well as nuclear gravity bombs for naval missions. The ASMs include: the AS-2 Kipper, the AS-4 Kitchen, the AS-5 Kelt, and the AS-6 Kingfish. It is estimated that some 450 nuclear versions are deployed, arming Tu-95 Bear G strategic bombers in Strategic Aviation, and naval Backfire and Badger bombers. Fitter C fighters and Su-24 Fencer C/D/E aircraft assigned to SNA can deliver nuclear bombs, and may also be converted to carry the newer anti-ship missiles. (The number of nuclear bombs deployed on naval aircraft is not precisely known.) The 100-115 nautical mile (185-210 kilometer) range AS-2 Kipper, deployed on Badger bombers in 1961, is the oldest missile and is being phased out of service. The AS-4 Kitchen, introduced in 1967, is carried on the Backfire B/C naval bombers. This 150- 300 nautical mile (280-560 kilometer) range missile is the primary anti-ship weapon of SNA Backfire bombers. The 100-120 nautical mile (180-220 kilometer) range AS-5 Kelt carried on the Badger C/G, first deployed in 1965, partially replaced the AS-2. The 150-250 nautical mile (280-460 kilometer) range AS-6 Kingfish, first deployed in 1970, is also carried on the Badger C/G. It also is reportedly carried by Backfire bombers, although this has not yet been confirmed visually. In addition to the SNA bombers, the AS-4 Kitchen is carried on converted Bear G bombers which are assigned maritime missions. The AS-15 Kent long-range air-launched cruise missile, introduced in 1984 and deployed on Bear-H bombers of Strategic Aviation, could also be assigned maritime missions. The United Kingdom The Royal Navy has approximately 25 WE-177A/B nuclear bombs for non-strategic naval missions. The bombs have a variable yield of 200-400 kilotons and can be delivered by RAF Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft. During 1988-1990, the United Kingdom began to consider replacing the WE-177A/B versions with a new nuclear-armed tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM). Three foreign systems already under development are being examined: Boeing Aerospace's Short Range Attack Missile Tactical (SRAM-T); a missile based on Martin Marietta's Supersonic Low-Altitude Target (SLAT) missile; and a longer-range successor to the French ASMP (Air-Sol Moyenne Portee) missile, known as the ASLP (Air-Sol Longue Portee). In early 1989, Britain signed a government-to-government pact with the United States, which sanctioned U.S. contractors to assist in the development of the U.K. missile. However, by late 1989, a decision on the missile was delayed a year to be able to reevaluate a new French design. In early 1990, Aerospatiale was awarded a $1 million contract by the U.K. Ministry of Defence for a pre-feasibility study for a 500 km stand-off missile. A decision on the missile airframe is expected in late 1990. The missile could be carried by Buccaneer and Sea Harrier aircraft by the end of the century. France French naval aviation has one type of air-to-surface missile, and two types of nuclear gravity bombs. The gravity bombs on Clemenceau class aircraft carriers are delivered by Super Etendard fighter aircraft, and include the AN-52, reported to have an explosive yield of some 25 kilotons, as well as a 6-8 kiloton lower-yield bomb variant of the AN-52. The new supersonic air-to-surface missile, the Air-Sol- Moyenne-Port‚e (ASMP), became operational with French naval aviation in 1989. It carries a TN-80 300 kiloton warhead and has a range of 30-130 nautical miles (60-250 kilometers). An inertial navigation system guides the missile, but the missile has no terminal homing capability. The ASMP is a dual-service program also used by French Air Force aircraft and serves both non-strategic (pr‚strat‚gic) or strategic purposes. The missile is intended to replace AN-52 gravity bombs carried by only some Super Etendard aircraft. About 50-55 Super Etendards were scheduled to be outfitted to carry the ASMP, but due to budgetary constraints only 20 will be so configured. II. U.S. Nuclear-capable Ships and Aircraft The U.S. Navy had 549 commissioned ships as of June 1990. Some 40 percent (233) of these ships are nuclear-capable. About 343 ships are principal combatant warships, attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines. About 40 percent (131) of these ships do, or could, carry or deliver nuclear weapons (see Table 7). The remaining 205 or so ships consist of amphibious warfare ships for Marine Corps support, small patrol combatants, and various logistic support and service ships. Nuclear weapons could be transported or serviced by approximately 50 percent (102) of these ships. The U.S. Navy also operates six types of nuclear-capable aircraft, five from ships and one from land, while the Marine Corps has one additional nuclear type. Together the Navy and Marine Corps possess almost 1,600 operational planes and helicopters which can deliver nuclear weapons, some 30 percent of their total operational aircraft inventory. Table 7: U.S. Nuclear-Capable Warships and Submarines (June 1990) Type Number Nuclear Weapons Ballistic Missile 33 Poseidon, Trident I, Submarines Trident II Attack Submarines 50 Tomahawk SLCMs Aircraft Carriers 12 Bombs and Depth Bombs Battleships 4 Tomahawk SLCMs Cruisers 16 Tomahawk SLCMs Destroyers 16 Tomahawk SLCMs TOTAL 131 A. Fleet Organization, Homeports, and Naval Nuclear Weapons' Shore Locations U.S. Navy ships belong to either the Atlantic or Pacific Fleet. Ships in the Atlantic Fleet are further operationally assigned to either the Second or Sixth Fleet, while ships in the Pacific Fleet are assigned to either the Third or Seventh Fleets. Ships are then subordinated to battlegroups and task forces which are part of the numbered fleets. The Second Fleet is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and its ships operate in the Atlantic Ocean and adjoining seas (except the Mediterranean area). The Sixth Fleet is headquartered in Gaeta, Italy, and its ships operate in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. The Third Fleet is headquartered in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and its ships operate in the northern and eastern Pacific. The Seventh Fleet is headquartered at Yokosuka, Japan, and its ships operate in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. With the exception of the ships deployed overseas, ships and submarines generally are rotated between their homeports and assignments to forward deployed fleets (the Sixth and Seventh Fleets). Ships in the Atlantic Fleet are homeported on the Atlantic coast of the United States, and in the U.K. and Italy. Pacific Fleet ships are homeported on the Pacific coast of the United States, Hawaii, Japan, and Guam. In the United States the two largest homeports are in San Diego, California, and Norfolk, Virginia, areas. Each has some 100 ships at a number of different installations. Charleston, South Carolina, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Long Beach, California, are the next largest homeports with approximately 60 in the Charleston area, and 40 ships each at the other two sites. Other are homeported in Bangor, Washington, near Seattle; in the San Francisco Bay area (at Alameda, Concord, and Vallejo); Mayport, Florida, near Jacksonville; King's Bay, Georgia; Earle, New Jersey, and in Groton and New London, Connecticut. Overseas, the largest bases are at Yokosuka, Japan, where the USS Midway (CV-41) and accompanying ships are homeported, and Sasebo, Japan, which hosts several amphibious ships. In addition, one nuclear-capable submarine tender is virtually permanently based at Holy Loch, Scotland, La Maddalena, Sardinia, and Guam, and a cruiser is homeported in Gaeta, Italy. U.S ships also make regular port calls to overseas naval facilities at Subic Bay, Philippines; Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan; Holy Loch, Scotland; Rota, Spain; Augusta Bay, Sicily; Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and Guantanomo Bay, Cuba. Throughout the 1980s the U.S. Navy pursued its "Strategic Homeporting Plan" which was scheduled to add Everett, Washington near Seattle; San Francisco, California; Staten Island in New York City; Corpus Christi, Texas; Mobile, Alabama; Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Pensacola, Florida to the list of nuclear- capable ship homeports. Battleships were programmed to be homeported in San Francisco, Staten Island, and Corpus Christi, while an aircraft carrier was to be homeported in Everett and Pensacola. Since 1988, however, the number of ports in the Strategic Homeporting Plan has been reduced due to budget constraints. The San Francisco homeport has been abandoned, and the rest of the plan has faced delays. Due to increased Congressional opposition and continued fiscal problems, most of the program may be forgone. The U.S. Navy has 18 principal nuclear weapons storage sites in the United States and overseas. Most are located near major naval stations for support of ships and aircraft. Nuclear weapons facilities in the Pacific include: - Naval Air Station (NAS) Adak, Alaska, which stores B57 nuclear depth bombs for use by P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft. - Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, near Bangor, Washington, which stores W76 Trident I warheads for the Trident submarines homeported at Bangor. - Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Concord, near San Francisco, California, which supports six homeported ammunition ships of the Pacific Fleet as well as NAS Moffett Field and NAS Alameda. Weapons stored include nuclear Tomahawks, nuclear bombs for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, artillery warheads for the Marines, and B57 nuclear depth bombs for NAS Moffett Field's P-3 Orions. - NAS Alameda which serves as a storage and transshipment point for the nuclear weapons aboard the aircraft carriers (bombs and depth bombs) and cruisers (Tomahawks) homeported at Alameda. - NAS North Island, Coronado near San Diego, California, stores bombs, nuclear depth bombs, and Tomahawks for the ships and submarines in the San Diego area. It is also the "logistics control center for all movements of Tomahawks needing air transportation," in the Pacific. - West Loch, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii, is the main nuclear weapons storage site of Naval Magazine Lualualei and provides support for the ships, submarines, and Marines at Pearl Harbor. Naval Magazine Lualualei has facilities for supporting Tomahawks. - NAS Barbers Point, Oahu, Hawaii, stores B57 nuclear depth bombs for use by P-3 Orions, and serves as a main transhipment point for nuclear Tomahawks and nuclear weapons stored a Lualualei. - Naval Magazine Santa Rita, Guam, is the main nuclear weapons storage site in the western Pacific, supporting U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units in Japan and the Philippines, and storing artillery projectiles, bombs, and B57 nuclear depth bombs. It also has been upgraded to support Tomahawks. Facilities in the Atlantic include: - NAS Brunswick, Maine, which stores B57 nuclear depth bombs for use by P-3 Orions. - NWS Earle (Colts Neck), New Jersey, supports five ammunition and fast combat support ships homeported there as well as Atlantic Fleet ships which call, and stores nuclear Tomahawks, nuclear bombs, and artillery warheads for the Marines. - NWS Yorktown near Norfolk, Virginia, stores nuclear weapons for naval units in the Norfolk area, including U.S. Navy and Marine Corps bombs, Tomahawks, nuclear depth bombs, and Marine Corps artillery warheads. - NAS Norfolk, Virginia, which is a major transhipment center for not only Navy nuclear weapons for ships and submarines at the Norfolk naval base, but for the nuclear weapons of other services as well. - NWS Charleston, South Carolina, located on the west bank of the Cooper River about 25 miles outside of Charleston, services Poseidon and Trident I warheads for submarines in overhaul and storage. It also supports Tomahawk missiles. - Naval Submarine Support Base, Kings Bay, Georgia, stores Trident I ballistic missiles and warheads. In addition, a Strategic Weapons Facility, for Trident II missiles and warheads has been constructed. - NAS Cecil Field, "Yellow Water," Florida (near NAS Jacksonville and Naval Station Mayport) stores Navy bombs and B57 nuclear depth bombs for use by Mayport ships and P-3 Orions. - NS Mayport, Florida, is a transhipment and storage point for nuclear weapons for the ships homeported at Mayport. Overseas land-based nuclear storage points include: - NAS Sigonella, Sicily, Italy, which stores B57 nuclear depth bombs for use by U.S. P-3 Orions and Italian Atlantics, and serves as the major transhipment point for ships of the Sixth Fleet. - Naval Aviation Weapons Facility, St. Mawgan, United Kingdom, which stores B57 nuclear depth bombs for use by U.S. and Dutch P-3 Orion, and U.K. Nimrod aircraft. The Tomahawk logistic infrastructure in the U.S. Navy has been steadily increasing as the missile is deployed. At the end of 1984, in the first year of deployment, four submarine tenders and two shore sites were fully capable of supporting Tomahawks. By 1987, seven submarine tenders and five shore stations were Tomahawk-capable. Currently nine of twelve submarine tenders can support Tomahawks: six of the nine Atlantic Fleet tenders (all but the three devoted to ballistic missile submarine support) and all three Pacific Fleet tenders. Sixteen shore-based ordnance facilities can support Tomahawk, ten in the Pacific and six in the Atlantic Fleet. As of 1990, nine of the Pacific and four of the Atlantic shore stations were fully capable of Tomahawk support, while the remainder had at least an initial capability to support horizontally launched Tomahawks. By FY 1992 all facilities should be able to support both horizontally- and vertically-launched Tomahawks. There are numerous other shore facilities that do not store nuclear weapons, but are part of the naval nuclear infrastructure. These facilities include test and training ranges for nuclear units, communications complexes used by nuclear units, and support headquarters. Some locations such as Holy Loch, Scotland, La Maddalena, Sardinia, Italy, and New London, Connecticut, routinely have submarine tenders and submarines with nuclear weapons docked in port and so become de facto storage locations, although no nuclear weapons are stored on land. Also Naval Supply Center (NSC) Oakland, California, and NSC Norfolk, Virginia, have important nuclear related roles. They stock nuclear weapon repair parts, maintain supplies of tritium for nuclear weapons, and keep track of nuclear logistics in their respective fleets. B. Nuclear-capable Ships 1.Ballistic Missile Submarines In 1990, the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force consists of 33 submarines: 11 submarines with Poseidon missiles; 20 with Trident I missiles; one with Trident II missiles; and one awaiting loading with Trident II missiles. Excluding the new submarine, which will probably become operational in late 1990, these vessels carry 584 ballistic missiles with 5,024 nuclear warheads. The numbers of SSBNs, missiles, and warheads will continue to decline as Poseidon submarines are retired faster than new Trident submarines are introduced. By FY 2001, Navy plans call for an all Trident II submarine force of 21 operational submarines loaded with 504 missiles and 4,032 warheads, with an additional two or three submarines in overhaul. Poseidon submarines each have 16 SLBM launch tubes. The submarines were commissioned during 1963-1967, and displace 8,250 tons submerged. They originally were armed with Polaris missiles, but then were modified during 1969-1977 to carry the Poseidon C3. Twelve submarines were further converted during 1979-1983 to carry 16 Trident I C4 SLBMs. The 11 remaining Poseidon C4 submarines are all planned to be retired by 1996, and the 12 Trident I C4 submarines will be gone by 1999 (although they may be retired earlier for arms control, fiscal, or operational reasons). The Poseidon submarines operate out of Charleston, South Carolina, and Holy Loch, Scotland. The converted Trident I C4 submarines operate out of King's Bay, Georgia. The new and larger Ohio class submarines each have 24 launch tubes. The first eight carry the Trident I C4 missile, while the ninth and subsequent submarines will carry the Trident II D5 missile. Ohio class submarines are twice the size of previous Poseidon boats, displacing 18,700 tons submerged. They are designed to be quieter and more reliable, spending about 66 percent of their life cycle at sea as opposed to 55 percent for the Poseidon submarines. Ohio class submarines with Trident I missiles are stationed in Bangor, Washington. Ohio class submarines with the Trident II D5 missile are based at King's Bay, Georgia. Construction of the Ohio class began in the mid-1970s and the first ship, the USS Ohio (SSBN-726) was commissioned in 1981. The ninth submarine of the class, and the first to be armed with Trident II D5, the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734), made its first operational deployment in March 1990. The tenth submarine, the USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735), is scheduled to go to sea in late 1990, and the eleventh, the USS West Virginia (SSBN-736), will make its first patrol in 1991. Six more are under construction, and the FY 1991 budget requests funding for procurement of the 18th, as well as advanced procurement for the 19th and 20th. The total number of Trident submarines to be procured has been a matter of debate. Throughout the 1980s, the Navy avoided setting an upper limit on how many Trident submarines it planned to procure. But in 1990, the Navy finally stated that it has a goal of 21 operational submarines, with and additional 2-3 in overhaul. Without "detubing" submarines and carrying fewer missiles than 24 per boat, or reducing the number of warheads on the missiles, START limits on ballistic missile warheads will limit the Navy to about 18 submarines, depending on the mix of land- and sea-based missiles. Congressional critics of a larger submarine force have noted that since each submarine costs approximately $1.3 billion, significant savings would accrue if the Trident program was limited to 18 submarines. The first eight Ohio class submarines will be converted to carry the Trident II D5 missile during regular overhauls at a rate of one per year from FY 1993-2001. The USS Ohio (SSBN- 726), the first submarine to be backfitted, is scheduled to enter the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Washington, in December 1992, and finish its overhaul by about January 1995. U.S. ballistic missile submarines operate regularly in the Arctic, north Atlantic, and north Pacific Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. About 30 percent of the force is "on station" in day-to-day alert while another 25-30 percent is in transit or on training missions. To maximize their time at sea, submarines are assigned two crews (a "blue" and "gold" crew) that alternate in manning the submarine. An average submarine patrol lasts about two months. The submarine then returns to port for about 30 days to exchange crews, reprovision, and carry out repairs before returning to sea. By 1990 the entire ballistic missile submarine force had conducted more than 2,700 deterrent patrols since the USS George Washington (SSBN-598) first deployed in November 1960. 2.Attack Submarines As of mid-1990, the United States had 92 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), six less than in 1988. The Navy's 100- submarine force goal has been abandoned de facto along with the 600-ship Navy. Depending on building rates, the numbers of SSNs are projected to decline to some 70-80 SSNs by the end of the 1990s. The retirement of the SUBROC anti-submarine rocket leaves the nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles as the only nuclear weapon carried by U.S. SSNs. Tomahawks are being deployed on newly commissioned Los Angeles class submarines as well as on older Los Angeles, Sturgeon and Narwhal class boats. They will also be deployed on the new Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarines. As of June 1990, 50 SSNs are capable of firing Tomahawks. Current plans call for 86 submarines to be Tomahawk certified by FY 2000 (see Table 8). Table 8: Projected Tomahawk Certified Attack Submarines September 1990-1999a SSN Class 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 SSN-637 21 24 24 25 26 25 22 21 21 21 SSN-688 26 30 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 SSN-688 (VLS) 8 14 18 22 25 30 31 31 31 31 SSN-21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 Total 55 68 73 78 82 86 84 84 84 86 a U.S. Navy, Cruise Missile Project Office, "Tomahawk Certified SSNs, end of FY 1989-FY 1999," 25 April 1990. Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarines hull numbers 688-718, and Sturgeon (SSN-637) and Narwhal (SSN-671) class submarines can carry eight SLCMs internally, to be fired from 21-inch torpedo tubes. Los Angeles class submarines SSN-719 and after have a vertical launch system (VLS) installed in the bow that can carry 12 SLCMs. The first submarine equipped with VLS Tomahawks deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in August 1988. The Sturgeon (SSN-637) class boats are the oldest nuclear- capable submarines. They were commissioned during 1967-1975, and displace some 4,600 tons submerged. As of June 1990, 18 of 37 Sturgeon class submarines are certified for some but not necessarily all variants of the Tomahawk. The Navy had planned to convert all 37 submarines plus the single Narwhal (SSN-671) class to carry Tomahawk. However, due to budget constraints the submarines are being retired early instead of undergoing overhauls and conversions. The numbers of Tomahawk-armed Sturgeon submarines will increase to 26 vessels in FY 1994 and then decline to 21 boats by FY 2000. The latest class of attack submarines, the Los Angeles (SSN- 688) class, was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The first ship was commissioned in 1976 and they displace some 6,900 tons submerged. By June 1990, 44 Los Angeles class were commissioned, with 18 additional authorized or under construction. As of June 1990, 32 Los Angeles class boats are certified for some but not necessarily all variants of the Tomahawk. Ultimately all 62 will carry nuclear Tomahawks. In the mid-1980s, the Navy had wanted a total of 68-69 Los Angeles submarines. In the FY 1990 budget, however, the Navy decided to end the program with 62 submarines, and shifted resources to the Seawolf class submarine program. An improved version of the SSN-688 has been entering the fleet since June 1988. These improved submarines are quieter, have an improved combat control system (the AN/BSY-1), can operate more freely in Arctic waters, and have a vertical launching system for missiles. The first five of these submarines are not yet fully operational due to problems with the BSY-1 system, but when finally ready, according to the U.S. Navy, they will be able to destroy twice as many Soviet submarines as earlier versions of the Los Angeles class: 5-6 Soviet submarines eliminated for every improved Los Angeles class submarine lost. The Seawolf class (SSN-21) is being developed as a follow-on to the Los Angeles class. According to the U.S. Navy, this new submarine design is needed to counter Soviet submarine improvements and will be a "revolutionary improvement in submarine warfighting capability." The first submarine was authorized in the FY 1989 budget, and the contract for the lead ship was awarded to Electric Boat, Groton, Connecticut, in January 1989. The Seawolf is scheduled to join the fleet in 1995. The second and third of the class are being requested in the FY 1991 budget. The Navy plans to buy some 29-30 submarines, 28 by the year 2000. The Seawolf submarines will be larger and even more capable than the improved Los Angeles class, displacing some 9,150 tons submerged. They will be quieter, have a higher tactical speed, an advanced AN/BSY-2 combat system, and carry more weapons (including nuclear Tomahawk SLCMs). The Seawolf's maximum speed will be a little over 35 knots, and importantly, the acoustic speed will be in excess of 20 knots. Eight 30-inch (760 mm) torpedo tubes amidships, will permit quieter launches of weapons. Seawolf class submarines will "spend half the time in transit" compared to the Los Angeles class submarines, and will be able to achieve "twice the time on station" in forward areas. Overall, the U.S. Navy maintains, it will have "three times the mission effectiveness of the improved [Los Angeles class] SSN-688." A new nuclear reactor is under development for the Seawolf submarine. The reactor is to provide significantly more power without commensurate weight and size penalties, and will do so more quietly than any previous reactor plant developed. According to the Navy's director of nuclear propulsion, "the Seawolf at its tactical speed will be as quiet as the [Los Angeles class] SSN-688 alongside the pier." A prototype core is scheduled to be installed and operated in an existing land- based nuclear propulsion plant at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, in West Milton, New York, (near Albany) prior to fleet introduction. Attack submarines are homeported at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and San Diego, California, and Vallejo, California, in the Pacific; and at Charleston, South Carolina, Norfolk, Virginia, and Groton, Connecticut, in the Atlantic. As of June 1990, 38 nuclear-powered submarines are assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 54 are assigned to the Atlantic. A typical submarine patrol lasts 75-80 days; however, they have been known to operate submerged for more than 100 days. On average, 50 percent of their time is spent away from port. 3.Aircraft Carriers Although the Navy owns 15 front-line aircraft carriers (CV/CVN), only 12 are considered deployable in mid-1990. Since 1988, the deployable force shrunk from 14 to 12 ships, with the commissioning of one new Nimitz class being offset by the decommissioning of one Midway class ship, and three rather one carrier being in extended overhaul. The 12 active carriers include one Midway (CV-41) class; four Forrestal (CV-59) class; one Kitty Hawk (CV-63) class; one John F. Kennedy (CV-67) class; and five Nimitz (CVN-68) class. The U.S. Navy's mid-1980s goal was to have 15 deployable aircraft carriers as the centerpiece of the 600-ship fleet by 1990. Now a deployable 15-carrier force has been abandoned, since carriers are being retired early due to budget constraints. The USS Coral Sea (CV-42) was decommissioned in April 1990. The USS Midway (CV-41) will be retired during 1991-1992. In addition, the USS Saratoga (CV-60) and the USS Ranger (CV-61) are being considered for early retirement. U.S. Department of Defense planning for the FY 1992 budget reportedly envisions a 12 carrier force by FY 1997, although it is unclear whether this number accounts for ships in overhaul. The latest Nimitz class carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), was commissioned in November 1989. Three more Nimitz class ships are under construction: the USS George Washington (CVN-73), USS John Stennis (CVN-74), and the USS United States (CVN-75). The George Washington was authorized in the FY 1983 budget (along with the newly-commissioned Abraham Lincoln) and is scheduled for delivery in 1992. CVN-74 and CVN-75 were authorized in the FY 1988 budget and will be delivered during 1995-1998. Depending on the size of carrier and its air wing, aircraft carriers deploy with 66-86 aircraft on board. These aircraft include F/A-18 Hornets for surface attack and air-to-air combat; F-14 Tomcats for air-to-air combat; A-6E Intruders and A-7E Corsairs for attack missions; S-3A/B Viking jets, SH-3D/H Sea King helicopters, and SH-60F Seahawk helicopters for anti- submarine warfare; EA-6B Prowlers for electronic warfare; KA-6D aerial refueling tankers; and E-2C Hawkeyes for airborne early warning and command and control. In addition, several logistic aircraft may be on board. The F/A-18s, A-6s, A-7Es, S-3A/Bs, and SH-3D/Hs are all nuclear-capable. The aircraft carrier "stores" B43, B57 and B61 nuclear bombs for surface attacks by the attack aircraft, and B57 nuclear depth bombs for the ASW aircraft. The "W Division" of the Weapons Department of each aircraft carrier is responsible for maintaining and preparing the nuclear weapons aboard. Security for the nuclear weapons is provided by a Marine Corps security detachment assigned to each aircraft carrier. Aircraft carriers are thought routinely to carry about 100 nuclear weapons when forward deployed. As of mid-1990, seven aircraft carriers are located in the Atlantic and five are in the Pacific. Pacific based aircraft carriers are homeported in Yokosuka, Japan (the USS Midway (CV- 41)); Alameda (San Francisco) and North Island (San Diego), California; and Bremerton, Washington, (the Bremerton carrier will be shifted to Everett, Washington, as part of the U.S. Navy's strategic homeporting plan). In the Atlantic carriers are stationed at Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. (A non- nuclear capable training carrier, the USS Lexington (AVT-16) is located at Pensacola, Florida.) Aircraft carriers operate world-wide and typically spend six months in forward deployment before being relieved. Four aircraft carriers generally are forward deployed at any given time, divided among the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean (although the Indian Ocean patrols are decreasing) and Western Pacific. The other carriers are either in overhaul or participating in exercises and training off the East and West coasts of the United States. When underway, carriers are accompanied by several escort ships, forming carrier battlegroups (CVBGs). The escort ships provide additional protection to the carrier from air, surface and submarine attacks, and in turn, the carrier's air wing gives similar protection to the escort ships. In peacetime, a carrier battlegroup usually consists of one carrier, 1-2 cruisers, 2-3 destroyers, 1-3 attack submarines plus support ships. In wartime 2-4 carriers would operate together along with proportionately more escort ships. 4.Battleships The U.S. Navy has four nuclear capable battleships (BB). Renovated and recommissioned during the Reagan Administration, three battleships -- the USS Iowa (BB-61), USS New Jersey (BB- 62), and USS Missouri (BB-63) -- were recommissioned during 1982- 1986, and the fourth, the USS Wisconsin (BB-64), was recommissioned in October 1988. Despite the expense of recommissioning these ships, the second largest vessels in the U.S. Navy, the four battleship force will be short lived. The FY 1991 budget calls for retiring the USS Iowa and USS New Jersey in early 1991. The remaining two ships may also be retired later in the 1990s. Battleships can fire Tomahawk land-attack SLCMs. Each can be armed with 32 Tomahawks in eight armored box launchers of four missiles each. Reportedly, the mix of versions "is generally believed to be one-half anti-ship, one-quarter conventional land- attack, and one-quarter nuclear tipped." Currently the USS New Jersey and USS Missouri are homeported at Long Beach, California, while the USS Iowa and USS Wisconsin are based at Norfolk, Virginia. 5.Cruisers As of June 1990, the U.S. Navy has 43 cruisers (CG/CGN), of which 16 are nuclear-capable and nine are nuclear-powered. The number of nuclear-capable cruisers has dropped from 36 to 16 since 1988, due to the retirement of the nuclear ASROC and Terrier weapons. Now only capable of delivering nuclear Tomahawk SLCMs, the number of nuclear-armed cruisers will increase to 27 by the mid-1990s, as the last Tomahawk-armed Ticonderoga class cruisers enter the fleet. Five nuclear-powered cruisers can launch Tomahawks from two four-celled armored box launchers. These include the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) and the four Virginia (CGN-38) class cruisers. Eleven Ticonderoga class cruisers are certified to carry Tomahawks. These are CG-52 and later ships outfitted with vertical launching systems (VLSs) that nominally carry 26 Tomahawks. The eleven Ticonderoga ships that remain to be delivered will also carry Tomahawks, thus 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers will eventually be nuclear-armed. Nuclear-capable cruisers range in size from 9,500-17,100 tons at full load. The oldest classes were commissioned in 1961 (the USS Long Beach), and during 1976-1980 (the four Virginia class ships), while the latest Ticonderoga class ships are still entering the fleet. The FY 1991 budget begins the planning process for the retirement of two nuclear-powered cruisers: the USS Truxtun (CGN-35), to be decommissioned in FY 1992, and the USS Bainbridge (CGN-25), to be decommissioned in FY 1994. This is the first time the U.S. Navy will retire nuclear-powered surface warships. 6.Destroyers As of June 1990, the U.S. Navy had 59 destroyers (DD/DDGs), 16 of which are nuclear-capable. The nuclear-capable destroyers are all Spruance (DD-963) class ships, and were commissioned during 1975-1980 and displace 7,800 tons at full load. Tomahawk SLCMs are the only nuclear weapon deployed on destroyers. The number of nuclear-capable destroyers has dropped from 64 to 16 since 1988, due to the retirement of the nuclear ASROC and Terrier weapons. The number of nuclear-armed destroyers will, nevertheless, double by the mid-1990s as more Spruance class ships are converted to carry Tomahawks and the new Tomahawk-armed Arleigh Burke class destroyers enter the fleet. Sixteen Spruance class ships are currently certified to carry Tomahawks. Seven of these ships carry two four-celled Tomahawk SLCM armored box launchers on the forward deck, positioned on either side of the conventional ASROC anti- submarine rocket eight-cell box launcher. Nine other Spruance class ships have had the forward ASROC launcher removed and replaced by a 61 cell vertical launching system (VLS), allowing each to carry a nominal load of 45 Tomahawks. Fifteen more Spruance class ships are scheduled to have the VLS installed, thus all 31 Spruance class destroyers will eventually be nuclear- armed. A new Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyer class is under construction. In July 1986 the keel of the first ship was laid down at Bath Iron Works, Maine, and it is scheduled to be delivered in February 1991. The Navy plans to construct at least 33 Burke class ships at a total cost of $27 billion. These ships will displace 8,300 tons at full load, and will be outfitted with an Aegis phased-array radar similar to the radar on the Ticonderoga class cruisers. Burke destroyers will be all steel to help limit the effects of electromagnetic pulse. The ships are also designed to withstand a nuclear blast overpressure of 7 pounds per square inch (psi) compared to 3 psi in most other Navy surface combatants. Burke class ships will be equipped with one 61 cell and one 29 cell VLSs, and will carry a nominal load of 28 Tomahawks. Non-nuclear Vertical Launch ASROC anti-submarine rockets, and Standard anti-air warfare and Harpoon anti-ship missiles will also be fired from the VLS. Destroyers, like cr