Call from Chagai & Pokhran      New Nuclear Order!  by   Ishtiaq Ahmad    A publication of Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.

Contact E-mail:

ishtiaq@law.emu.edu.tr
 
Contents

Author's Note

Part I
Tale of Three Treaties: NPT, CTBT & FMCT

Part II
Reducing Nuclear Danger: Big Five's Track-record

Part III
Nuclear Debate in 1990s: Pakistani Perspective

Part I
Conclusion: Why New Nuclear Order?

Bibliography

Appendix

Author's Note

Monday, 11 May 1998. At around 4:30 in the evening, Umer Farooq, defense correspondent of The Nation and Islamabad correspondent of Jane's Defense Weekly, calls me on the mobile, breaking the news about India's three nuclear tests. "Really? I never thought they would be so quick in exploding." My instant reaction, after hearing the news about a development that has been expected since Delhi's takeover by Hindu nationalists of the Bharatiya Janata Party in March 1998. "What should we do now?" I ask Umer, who agrees with me that Pakistan is left with no option but to respond in kind to India's nuclear tests. And then start those seventeen long days, during which India carries out two more nuclear tests, bullies Pakistan on Kashmir, and on the night before May 28-the day Pakistan conducts five nuclear tests-prepares for air strike at Khan Research Laboratories, the country's key nuclear installation located in the suburbs of Islamabad. During this period, pros and cons of Pakistan's nuclear response to India are extensively debated in the national media. India's nuclear tests are perceived to endanger the very basis of Pakistan's creation: that of not accepting India's hegemony, come what may. Public opinion backs nuclear testing. So does Parliament. In the corridors of power, however, there emerges a gang of people, led by former Generals and serving bureaucrats, who oppose nuclear testing. They are not bothered about the dangerous consequences of not reacting to India. Fortunately, the civilian leadership of the country does not want to fail the people on an issue on which rests their destiny. The D-Day comes. Pakistan explodes at Chagai. Consequently, India-Pakistan military balance is restored. So is nuclear deterrence, which has established peace between the two South Asian states for over two decades.

Having written in support of Pakistan's overt nuclear option for a number of years, and experienced the day-to-day decision-making of the Nawaz Sharif government during the fateful seventeen days of May 1998, I thought it essential to publish my views on the nuclear issue in a book form. Why now?  Because I feel the time has come, and the right opportunity has arrived, for the international community to settle this issue, once and for all. It is an issue that has to be settled as soon as possible, because, like many others, I have no doubt in nuclear weapons' ability to eliminate entire mankind. But I am not a nuclear disarmer, as people like General Lee Butler, former head of the US Strategic Air Command, and Robert McNamara, former secretary of defense, are. Both are now championing the cause of nuclear disarmament. They never did, while they were occupying important positions in the US establishment. Likewise, there is no dearth of nuclear pacifists in India and Pakistan. The difference between the two countries, however, is that while anti- proliferation arguments of Indian academics and writers are motivated mostly by nationalistic considerations; their Pakistani counterparts argue for the same but often for purely personal reasons, the foremost being to secure some American fellowship. How cheap? Such breed of Pakistani fellows has another quality: their nuclear perceptions keep changing. So, some of them opposed Pakistan's nuclear testing. But when it tested, they were never short of reasons as to why Pakistan had to test. Well, this duplicity among Pakistani 'scholars' is not the subject matter of this book, nor is it an attempt to pinpoint who betrayed the nation during the crucial most days of May 1998's nuclear crisis. I am not an economist, but I do oppose those who try to portray as if everything nuclear is a great burden on national economy.

Nations make mistakes. India did, by re-making China its enemy, and miscalculating Pakistan's resolve to respond in kind. Today, it is encircled by not one but two nuclear adversaries. Thanks also to the Bharatiya Janata Party leadership for internationalizing the Kashmir issue. Pakistan has also made a mistake, but it does not concern post-tests economic decision-making of the government. As a government insider, this much I can share with the readers that the way foreign currency accounts were being emptied by some unpatriotic citizens of Pakistan, the Sharif government was left with no option but to freeze these accounts. But, then, there were ways the government could have avoided the financial panic that has gripped the country ever since testing. In diplomacy, the timing factor counts a lot. And the greatest mistake that Nawaz Sharif has made is on this very account. In my opinion, after conducting its sixth nuclear test, Pakistan should have announced its readiness to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is not discriminatory towards any particular state, be it Pakistan. From mid-May until the day Pakistan tested, aggressive intentions of India's Hindu nationalist leaders against Pakistan were becoming more and more obvious  with every passing day. So, after the 20th of May, it was clear that Pakistan would soon blast its own nuclear devices. On May 21, prime minister Sharif had given a go-ahead to nuclear scientists and engineers of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) to conduct nuclear tests, which required one week. And, it was during that one week prior to testing its nuclear devices that Pakistan should have undertaken concrete diplomatic initiatives, signaling to the international community that while it could not prevent nuclear testing, it would sign the CTBT soon after testing, and that it would do so without any pre-conditions.

By September 1998, Pakistan was preparing for signing the CTBT. This was apparent from the outcome of the fourth round of talks between US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott and foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad, which was held on August 24 in London. The Sharif regime had decided to place the treaty before Parliament. The Foreign Office's review of the country's strategic options after nuclear testing had also favoured signing of the CTBT. But, by this time, Pakistan's economic turmoil had also reached its zenith. Standing on a weaker footing, thus, the country was not in a better position to get international benefits in exchange for its signing of the treaty. If at all the government had to decide in favour of signing the CTBT three or four months after testing nuclear arms, why did it not do so soon after conducting these tests? Had Pakistan done so, it would have been hard for the US-led West and international financial institutions under its dictation to impose economic sanctions against it. But there is no need to cry over split milk. Singing of the CTBT, even if late, is a must-for reasons narrated in detail in Part I and Part IV of this book. In my opinion, those who are trying to politicize the CTBT issue are committing a national sin.

The PAEC scientists and engineers deserve all the praise for enabling Pakistan achieve a miracle, the real importance of which we have not yet realized. I also commend the present political leadership for not failing the people in perhaps the most crucial days of the history of Pakistan. Finally, I must thank those who helped me in the preparation of this book, including Muhammad Umer Shariq, Aamir Bashir, Azizullah, Mushtaq Hussain and Imdad Hussain.
 

Part I
Tale of Three Treaties
NPT, CTBT & FMCT

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty-the tale of these three treaties in Pakistan, as usually narrated by media writers and propagated by politically ambitious religious personalities, is based on grave misconceptions and lies. That all of these are essentially nuclear non-proliferation pacts sponsored by the US-led Western world, is an undisputed reality. But the three treaties cannot, and should not, be treated as equally discriminatory to the interests of Pakistan, which has just entered the Nuclear Club. That, like India, it is being denied the status of an acknowledged nuclear power by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is another matter. NPT is not CTBT. Nor is CTBT the same as FMCT. What follows is an attempt to establish essential distinction among these three accords.

The NPT is totally discriminatory, since its sole task was, and still is, to perpetuate nuclear monopoly of the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China-the five countries recognized as nuclear weapon states by the IAEA under Article IX of the treaty. Signed in 1968, the NPT entered into force in March 1970 and was extended for an indefinite period in May 1995. Under its provisions, any other state, even if it acquires nuclear weapons potential, is deemed to be a non-nuclear weapon state and hence cannot manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Also, each non-nuclear weapon state has to accept IAEA safeguards designed to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to develop nuclear weapons. This means if Pakistan signs the NPT, it will have to renounce its nuclear weapons, forswear its nuclear programme and submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection.
NPT is discriminatory, in letter & spirit

The main discriminatory provisions of the NPT are as following: Its Article I states: "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." The Article II states: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

As clear from the language of, and the intention behind, these two Articles, the NPT aims at confining nuclear prowess to just the so-called Big Five-even though China concluded the treaty over two decades after it entered into force.

Article III of the NPT states: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." This is again a discriminatory provision. Why should IAEA safeguards be applicable only to non-nuclear weapon states?

"The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty," Article III further states. Adds Article IV: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Article I of this Treaty. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

The question is: Have the five acknowledged nuclear states been true to their promise of helping the states of "the developing areas of the world" in the pursuit of their nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes? The fact is that the little help these nuclear powers provided to non-nuclear states was done on purely selective grounds: the United States, for instance, assisted Israel and India for the purpose, despite knowing that their nuclear weapons programmes were purely weapons-oriented. On the other hand, in assisting non-nuclear states in their peaceful nuclear pursuits, the track-record of non-nuclear powers like Canada is much more appreciable than that of the recognized nuclear states. China has been an exception only because its perceptions in this regard are altogether different.

Article V of the NPT is about the same subject. "Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis, and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements."

Had the recognized nuclear states helped the non-nuclear states in the acquisition of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the last 30 years, that is, since signing of the NPT, India, Pakistan and Israel would have concluded the Treaty years ago.
Article VI of the NPT states: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The question is again the same as it was with regard to the recognized nuclear states' commitment in Articles IV and V on helping non-nuclear states in the acquisition of nuclear technology and material for peaceful purposes: Have the Big Five been true to their commitment of undertaking "general and complete disarmament"? The fact is that these powers' track-record on this front as well is utterly deplorable: while Britain, France and China are yet to enter any talks reducing their nuclear arms, the strategic arms reductions that the United States and Russia have undertaken so far are negligible. A detailed discussion on the subject is provided in the next section of this book.

The most discriminatory provision of the NPT is its Article IX, which states: "A nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,1967." By exploding nuclear devices, India and Pakistan have, in fact, created a great dilemma for the sponsors of the NPT. If anyone had doubts about India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability before they tested nuclear weapons, such doubts have disappeared after the two countries went nuclear by not just testing various categories of nuclear devices but also officially announcing their status as nuclear powers. Thus, there is no other way for the international community but to acknowledge the nuclear weapons status of not only India and Pakistan but also of Israel, which is believed to be far advanced in its nuclear weapons development and possession than India and Pakistan.

Prior to  nuclear tests by India, Pakistan had no objection to signing of the NPT, provided India signed it first. Its nuclear stand was so flexible that for the sake of global peace and security, as interpreted by the Big Five, it was ready to conclude a treaty that was discriminatory in letter and spirit. The reason was that achieving global power and prestige had never been a motive behind Pakistan's nuclear quest. It is still not, even after nuclear tests, and will never be. It is only after being forced by India to explode its own nuclear devices that Pakistan has started perceiving the nuclear issue in global perspective. In his last press conference, a few days before Pakistan tested, prime minister Nawaz Sharif stated that global nuclear non-proliferation pacts had become irrelevant for the country after India's decision to go nuclear; and, therefore, Pakistan had to re-evaluate its nuclear policy based on new realities. After Pakistan had also gone nuclear, the prime minister was quite vocal in criticizing "the established nuclear weapon states", who, he said in an interview to Emirates News (June 8), "had double standards on nuclear non-proliferation". The NPT, he said, was discriminatory, adding: "The established weapon states have sought to justify their retention of weapons on the basis of deterrence when none of them is threatened directly or indirectly in the post-Cold War era."

India's objection to the NPT primarily rests on the betrayal that the recognized nuclear states have made by not undertaking "general and complete disarmament" under Article VI of the NPT. Thus, India says that unless and until the five recognized nuclear states announce a specific deadline as to when they would eliminate their nuclear arms, India will not sign the NPT. After announcing its nuclear weapons status, India's leverage for pressing these powers towards achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament has increased significantly. Since India will never renounce its nuclear capability because of its obsession to become a world power, it is not possible for Pakistan to revert to non-nuclear status unilaterally by signing the NPT. For all practical purposes, therefore, returning to a non-nuclear South Asia is now an unrealistic proposition.

And, given that, Article IX of the NPT has to be amended. But, how can this amendment take place when the Treaty's procedures for amendment give undue powers to the "Depository States", which include the acknowledged nuclear states? More important, it is only after entering the NPT regime that India, Pakistan, or Israel will be able to propose any such amendment. Article VIII of the NPT states: "Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency."
Why Pakistan must sign CTBT

Article I of the CTBT states what this treaty is all about: "Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging or in anyway participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The CTBT is a follow up to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which prohibited "nuclear explosions for weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water", and the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which limited "underground nuclear testing to 120 kilotons." Until the end of the Cold War, the United States had always opposed the conclusion of the CTBT, since it required nuclear weapons modernization through nuclear testing in order to off-set Soviet advances in nuclear armament. The number of known nuclear tests carried out in the world between 1945 and 1996 is: the United States 1,054, Russia 715, France 210, China  45, Britain  45, and India 1. The total number of nuclear tests until 1996 was: 2,070. Thus, after India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests, numbering in total 11, the total number of known nuclear tests so far carried out in the world is 2,081.
Even though the aim of the CTBT is also to prevent the spread of nuclear arms to more states-a spread for which nuclear testing is a first step-the Treaty is not as discriminatory as the NPT is: nowhere does the CTBT mention that the right to acquire and possess nuclear weapons rests with only those states which had achieved nuclear weapons status until a specific date. Then, all the states which sign and ratify this Treaty are treated equally. The five acknowledged nuclear states do not have an edge over the non-nuclear states. In the CTBT Organization, Conference and Executive Council, all regions of the world are duly represented, with their respective interests served well. All decisions in the Conference will be taken by consensus.

According to Article II of the CTBT, which is about how decision-making in the CTBT Conference is to be done, "A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum. Each State Party shall have one vote. The Conference shall take decision on matters of procedures by a majority of members present and voting. Decision on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during its period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and all during its period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-third majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance."

"The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution, the Executive Council shall comprise: Ten States Parties from Africa; seven States Parties from Eastern Europe; nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean; seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia; ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East...The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows: At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled, taking into account political and security interests of States Parties in that region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of priority determined by each region; number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System; expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and contribution to the annual budget of the Organization; one of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter."

In the NPT, decision-making is manipulated by the recognized nuclear states. The withdrawal of any non-nuclear signatory state from the Treaty is rather impossible. In 1994, North Korea tried, but was eventually pressured by the United States from doing so. On the other hand, since the CTBT is universally-oriented, withdrawal of a signatory state from it will be easier. Article IX of the CTBT states: "Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other State Parties, the Executive Council, the
Depository and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests." Thus, if India does not sign the CTBT even after Pakistan's signing and some time in future resumes nuclear testing, Pakistan can always withdraw from the CTBT by giving a six-month notice and citing the following reason: that "extraordinary events to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized Pakistan's supreme interests".

The CTBT cannot enter into force unless the five recognized nuclear powers plus India, Pakistan and Israel sign and ratify it. The United States and other major powers have worked hard to obtain overwhelming endorsement of the treaty by the UN General Assembly. However, the future of CTBT is uncertain unless it is signed and ratified by India and Pakistan. The CTBT must be signed and ratified by all 44 countries, considered nuclear-capable and members of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD). Even a single country out of these can prevent the treaty from coming into force. If, by September 1999, all these 44 nuclear-capable countries, particularly India and Pakistan, did not sign the CTBT, its sponsors and signatories would have to decide whether to amend the Treaty and then seek its enforcement without India and Pakistan joining it. In such an eventuality, the Treaty would be less credible. Pakistan was one of the countries which voted in CTBT's favour, while India opposed it because, in New Delhi's perception, it did not meet its disarmament demand adequately. After its adoption by the UN General Assembly by 158 to 3 votes (India, Bhutan and Libya were the only three countries which opposed it), CTBT was opened for signature on September 24, 1996. As of November 1997, 148 signatures and 8 instruments of ratification had been obtained (the United States, Russia and China are among the countries which have yet to ratify it). Most of the signatories are expected to ratify the treaty before September 1999 when it will be reviewed.

Article XIV of the CTBT states: "This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. If this Treaty has not been entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depository shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification on the request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirements set out in paragraph 1 have been met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force.

Israel has signed but not ratified the CTBT. Before its nuclear tests, India had expressed its willingness to conclude CTBT provided the following three demands were met: that the recognized nuclear states announce a time-bound commitment to eliminate their nuclear weapons; that they acknowledge India's security concerns; and that, like them, India should also be allowed to simulate nuclear tests through computers or conduct sub-critical nuclear tests in the laboratory. Following its nuclear testing, India's demand until recently has been that it is willing to sign the CTBT if its status as nuclear weapons power is acknowledged, if it is given permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and if the recognized nuclear states guarantee to provide it the dual-purpose nuclear technology. From the outcome of the several rounds of talks which Jaswant Singh, a close aide to prime minister Atal Behari Vajpaee, has held with US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott, it is becoming increasingly clear that in the days ahead India may further dilute its obstructionist posture towards the CTBT.

That India is preparing for signing the CTBT, is apparent from the fact that even some of the top Indian strategists who played a key role in the BJP government's decision to go nuclear are now arguing in favour of India's conclusion of the CTBT. Birjesh Mishra, principal secretary to the Indian prime minister, has made it clear that "we would convert the moratorium into a formal obligation", a euphemism for signing CTBT. Sunil Narula in his article, "Testing the Heavy Water" (Outlook, July 20) quoted Jasjit Singh, director of the Delhi-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), as saying, "The most logical thing for India is to sign the treaty. India has two types of objections, technical and substantive. Among the substantive objections are India's security concerns, lack of linkage of the treaty to time-bound nuclear disarmament and a test ban that is not comprehensive in that it allows sub-critical tests and computer simulation. The problem with the intrusive verification regime is a technical objection. As for disarmament, India itself is moving towards arming itself with nuclear weapons. Having tested, India is now on the other side of the disarmament debate. Besides, with its new leverage it can push for time-bound nuclear disarmament. Earlier it wanted the treaty to be linked to this. Now that India too can conduct sub-critical tests and computer simulation, its earlier objections that the treaty was not comprehensive enough to ban all kinds of testing have been diluted. The verification regime, earlier rejected as too intrusive, is now dubbed non-discriminatory. Now that India has tested, its security concerns have also been addressed."

Like Birjesh, Jasjit was one of the persons who were involved in India's nuclear decision making while it went nuclear. He was a member of the Task Force constituted by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government to review national security affairs days before India went nuclear. For its part, the United States has also started showing some flexibility on the CTBT issue insofar as its on-going talks with India on the matter are concerned. According to Bhabani Sen Gupta (The Tribune, July 29), Strobe Talbott, in his talks with Jaswant Singh, has offered to revise the language of the CTBT at September 1999's CTBT review conference to describe India (and Pakistan) as countries that have tested nuclear weapons, but not as nuclear weapon powers. This falls short of the BJP coalition's major demand. The US, argues Bhabani, wants the Indian government to sign CTBT unconditionally but with an American commitment that certain linguistic changes will be made in the treaty next year.

By September 1998, Pakistan also appeared willing to conclude the CTBT. The Strategic Review undertaken by its Foreign Office to "assess the level of Indian weaponization and, in the light of this, see as to what its own national security requirements are" reportedly favoured signing of the CTBT. For the purpose, the Review gave the following reasons: that, after conducting six nuclear tests of various categories, Pakistan had achieved its minimum nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis India. Therefore, there was no need to compete with India in the sphere of nuclear testing, a competition that can drain national resources. Secondly, signing of the CTBT would not have a legally binding effect on the country until and unless it ratified the treaty. Even after ratification, Pakistan could always withdraw from the CTBT if any development undermining its vital national security interests required doing so. By September 1998, the Nawaz Sharif government had also decided to present the treaty before the parliament, where the Opposition led by Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party was also in favour of signing the CTBT. Still, however, the country's political non-entities such as the Jama'at-e-Islami were opposing signing of the CTBT on grounds which wrongly portrayed CTBT as discriminatory as the NPT was.

As Fahd Husain, The Nation's Islamabad editor, argued in a recent article, "there were fears among Pakistanis, some real some imaginary, about the possibility of CTBT somehow clamping restrictions on the nuclear programme and stifling its further development and refinement in future." According to him, many of these fears are borne from a general confusion about NPT and CTBT, "since many people have been heard saying that signing the CTBT would amount to signing the death warrant of Pakistan's nuclear programme. This is rather inaccurate, but such an impression has been manufactured to create public doubts about an issue which is not as complicated as some quarters have tried to make it." To sign or not to sign the treaty, according to Fahd, "now depends on what incentive Pakistan is offered in return for pledging not to conduct a nuclear test again until there is a dire threat to its national security, in which case it can opt out of the treaty."

 One of the initiatives proposed by former foreign minister Sardar Aseff Ahmad Ali in his article, "A Nuclear Doctrine for Survival", The News, July 12, was that Pakistan must open negotiations for entry into the CTBT on two conditions that economic sanctions are suspended during the course of negotiations; that if India enters the CTBT in future, no special status or concessions should be given to it; and that Pakistan will be entitled to dual-use nuclear technology if the same is permitted to India. Pakistan can always withdraw under Article IX (2) and (3) of the CTBT after signing it if its sovereign interest demands. Ratification of the treaty should be subject to the above conditions."

The CTBT does not differentiate between the five members of the Nuclear Club and the non-nuclear weapons states. Under it, each state party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion.  CTBT's main objective, as explained in the preamble, is cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Even after signing CTBT, if necessary, Pakistan can go for sub-critical nuclear tests, including non-explosive nuclear testing, computer simulation, as they are not specified in CTBT. If the five members of the nuclear club can conduct sub-critical tests after signing CTBT, so can Pakistan. These tests are not forbidden under the treaty. Under Article IX of CTBT, each state party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from CTBT if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of CTBT have jeopardized its supreme interest. The main objective of CTBT is to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers. Since Pakistan, by its recent nuclear tests, has already emerged as a de facto nuclear weapons state, it can sign CTBT without causing any harm to its national interests. Pakistan can sign the CTBT but withhold its ratification until India reciprocates for one year, a time limit permissible under the CTBT.
FMCT & fissile material disparities

Essentially a nuclear non-proliferation accord, the FMCT is not less discriminatory than the NPT. Its discrimination is of a different form. The treaty, still at the negotiating stage, will put a universal ban on the production of fissile material-the material used for making nuclear weapons, including weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium, and plutonium. According to a report of the Rand Corporation, a US think-tank, "The purpose of the treaty is not only to stop production of fissile material but also to place sensitive facilities and the material produced from them under IAEA safeguards. The treaty is aimed particularly at India, Pakistan and Israel, which are resisting the NPT. The proposed treaty offers a new avenue towards placing their sensitive facilities and material under safeguards."

The FMCT would cap Pakistan's fissile material at a level far lower than that of India. Before carrying out nuclear tests, India sought to link its signing of the FMCT to a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament. Afterwards, it is willing to consider a global cutoff without any limits on existing fissile material stockpiles. The reason is that the existing fissile material stockpiles of India are sufficient enough to enable it to produce an array of nuclear weapons with which it can ensure credible deterrence against China. This should be a matter of grave concern for Pakistan, because India's achievement of credible deterrence vis-a-vis China means its nuclear superiority over Pakistan. But, then, the purpose of Pakistan's nuclear policy is not to match India's every nuclear weapons-oriented effort; rather, it is to have such nuclear weapons capability with which the country can effectively neutralize India's conventional arms edge over it. Since Pakistan is believed to have exhausted most of its fissile material stock in the nuclear tests, signing of the FMCT at an earlier date will amount to compromising its vital national security interest.

Former foreign minister Agha Shahi has always cautioned against signing of the FMCT by Pakistan due to the treaty's inherently discriminatory nature. He recently wrote: "On the FMCT, negotiations in the CD have yet to take off. Pakistan will of course be participating in them even though the "agreed mandate" for these negotiations is seriously flawed. Hence, it would be highly premature for Pakistan to commit itself before how the text of the Convention turns out to be, particularly its provisions for verification of fissile material production. Also, India may well become less enthusiastic about submitting its present inspection free reactors producing plutonium, its preprocessing plants and other plutonium related facilities to international inspection. The FMCT is likely to take several years from now to enter into force. De-linking from India at this stage is not called for."
On the United States and Russia, the FMCT will have little impact since they already have a surplus. France and Britain have less surplus fissile material than the US and Russia, but can manage. All of them have ceased production of fissile material. Even after the planned elimination of hundreds of tonnes of weapons grade plutonium and uranium, Russia and the US will retain enough fissile material to make 10,000 thermo-nuclear warheads. In September 1998, the CD was in the process of appointing an ad hoc committee, which would start preparing the draft of the FMCT once a president was elected to head this body. The working sessions of the CD on the FMCT were to conclude by the end of September and then resume in January 1999. So, it will take some months to prepare the draft of this treaty, which is intended to put total ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes. CD's negotiations on the FMCT had been lying dormant since 1996, primarily due to Pakistan's reservations. Now that they are making progress is only because Pakistan has agreed to participate in the process, no matter how uneven it is insofar as the country's national interests are concerned.

The global nuclear debate is all about discrepancies, inequalities and discriminations. India says it will sign the CTBT if the United States and other Western powers agree to provide it the necessary technology for computer simulation required to upgrade and modernize its nuclear weapons potential. India says so, because one of the main reasons why the five recognized nuclear powers signed the CTBT was that they did not need any more nuclear tests. And this was because the purpose that nuclear testing served in past could now be fulfilled through computer simulations and laboratory-based sub-critical nuclear tests. Before signing the CTBT in 1996, France had also resumed nuclear testing for some months, since the Jacques Chirac regime felt the country had not gathered enough data from past nuclear tests which could help it in computer simulation. The moment it felt that enough data for the purpose had been collected, France declared moratorium on nuclear testing and then signed the CTBT. Israel's case is similar. With significant nuclear assistance by France and other Western powers, Israel is said to have built some 200 nuclear warheads, and its nuclear potential is also said to be so advance that it has gathered enough nuclear tests data for computer simulation. Therefore, Israel's signing of the CTBT will not have any harmful impact on its nuclear weapons capability. After nuclear tests, Pakistan should be in a position to sign this accord, if it has the alternative of laboratory-based nuclear testing capability. India claims it has such capability.

Indian nuclear scientists have claimed they have gathered important data from nuclear tests which will enable them to upgrade the country's nuclear potential through laboratory tests. India's CTBT position that it is prepared to sign it if it is externally supported in the sphere of computer simulation technology means the level of India's technical know-how for laboratory nuclear testing is still far below that of the recognized nuclear powers. The same is the case with Delhi's fissile material stockpiles-which, to Pakistan, may appear gigantic, but if compared with, for instance, that of the United States, amount to nothing. For years, the United States has stopped the production of fissile material. That it has done because it has already stockpiled enough highly enriched plutonium and uranium, which can be consumed by the existing nuclear warheads as they become redundant or are improved in quality and design through sub-critical tests or computer simulation. It's not that the Indians are ahead of Pakistan only in fissile material stockpiles and are increasing this disparity with every passing day, they also possess a far superior indigenous computer software and hardware technology. Only some days prior to nuclear tests, Delhi had also claimed to have produced a super-computer. So, in the months ahead, India may be willing to sign not just the FMCT but also the CTBT, provided it feels that it has achieved the required technological level to test its nuclear weapons in the laboratory and also has produced the desired amount of fissile material for these weapons.

If India's nuclear grievances are seen purely in the context of the existing global nuclear order, they do make some sense: how can the Americans ask India, Pakistan and Israel to disband their nuclear weapons programmes when they still consider their own nuclear weapons potential as a vital and crucial element of military and defense potential? The United States can afford to sign the FMCT, since it has sufficient fissile material stockpiles. So can Russia, Britain, France, and China. All of these five powers signed the NPT, because the treaty gave only them the right to officially possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan, therefore, has to stick to such a nuclear stand which suits its national interest. Since the FMCT suits India, it may not object to the creation of an ad hoc committee of the CD to formulate the draft of the treaty. Since all of CD's decisions are taken by consensus, by the time the draft text of the FMCT takes the form of the actual pact ready for signatures within the next few months or early next year, India may also vote in its favour. For, by then, it would have achieved the desired level of fissile material stockpiles.

Unlike the FMCT, the CTBT forbids only nuclear explosions and testing; all other nuclear research and activities, including nuclear power, fissile material production, even making and designing of nuclear weapons are outside the purview of the Treaty and are by definition permissible activities. The monitoring and verification under the CTBT is for area monitoring detecting nuclear explosions. Testing or explosion sites may be physically inspected based on remote monitoring evidence. Remote sensing technologies, including sensors, linked to regional and global monitoring devices and computers, will be installed. Any earth movement or shock of more than one kiloton would be detectable. Then, this Treaty provides for effective safeguards against frivolous and intrusive verification activities. There is a provision of respect of confidentiality regarding activities and processes that fall beyond the purview of the Treaty. Thus, those in Pakistan opposing the CTBT on the ground that it will expose the country's nuclear installations to international monitoring, are basically lying to the nation.

Part II
Reducing Nuclear Danger
Big Five's Track-recorWhy should the international community exclusively focus on India's or Pakistan's nuclear pursuit alone? That nuclear weapons pose a principal threat to international peace and security, is a fact. But this threat originates more from the nuclear weapons possessed by the recognized nuclear states than those acquired by the de facto or threshold nuclear states. Reducing the nuclear danger, as it confronts the entire world, should, therefore, be treated as a collective responsibility of the international community. At the same time, the needs and aspirations of de facto or threshold nuclear states should not be ignored. Over 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapon stockpiles are in the hands of the United States and Russia.  The rest are possessed by China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan and Israel. Surely, those having the largest number of nuclear weapons have to surrender the most in order to reduce the nuclear danger. This is the first requirement. Only then, a real march towards nuclear abolition can start. How true the United States, Russia and three other recognized nuclear states have been to their NPT commitment of undertaking "general and complete disarmament", is quite visible from the discussion that follows in this part of the book-which covers the post-Cold War nuclear outlook of the so-called Big Five nations, the US-Russian strategic arms reduction process as it currently stands, and how it can be made credible enough to reduce nuclear danger from the world in cooperation with the de facto and threshold nuclear states.

If the nuclear arsenals continue to exist at the same scale and without effective international safeguards, there will always be a possibility-no matter how remote it is-that nuclear weapons may be used, especially in a crisis when the chances of misjudgment, miscalculation and misinformation are always very high. Although Western writers like Scott D Sagan-who authored The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons, an interesting book on the subject-give an exaggerated account of the risks associated with an unauthorized launch of nuclear first-strike, this does not rule out such a possibility. This is because, even years after the end of the Cold War, the number of nuclear arms possessed by the United States and Russia alone still runs into many thousands, not few hundreds. The post-Cold War world's foremost danger, however, is linked to the use of nuclear weapons, not to their possession.  The possession of nuclear weapons stabilized political relationship between great powers in past and prevented them from causing a conventional catastrophe of the scale of the two world wars.  That has happened due to the existence of nuclear deterrence between nuclear states.  None of them attacked the other fearing massive retaliation.  The utility of nuclear weapons arises from their possession, not from their use.  If nuclear weapons maintained peace and deterred aggression in past, they would perform the same role in future as well.
That nuclear weapons have played a stabilizing role in international politics, however, does not mean they should be retained at the existing level.  They have to be reduced at the deepest possible level.  This is required in the wake of the recent radical political transformation that has changed global power configuration drastically.  Consequently, the role of nuclear weapons has also declined in international politics.  Today economic power is more important than military potential.  But this is not to say that nuclear weapons have altogether become irrelevant to the international system.  Their role in deterring aggression and maintaining peace remains as valid today as before.  The purpose of nuclear arms control now is to further neutralize the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and to ensure that they are not used in critical times.  What is needed today is not nuclear deterrence with Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as its underlying principle; rather, a more cooperative foundation rationalizing the existence of nuclear weapons as they are gradually reduced to a level as minimum as possible.  That is, the Mutual Assured Survival (MAS)-as described by the American Nuclear Posture Review of 1994.

When the Cold War ended, some arms control analysts were quick to interpret it as the end of arms control as well.  Why pursue arms control, when arms race is no more there? They argued.  But this was a narrow interpretation of the concept of arms control, which, in fact, is a much broader concept, encompassing a whole gamut of safety and security related issues.  Arms control is not merely about limiting or reducing arms, it includes all measures to prevent the occurrence of war or to limit its scope should it occur.  Thus arises the need for rethinking arms control in accordance with the spirit of the time. This part of the book is about the impracticality of the idea of nuclear disarmament, and about the feasibility and desirability of reducing nuclear weapons in the hands of the recognized nuclear states to the minimum deterrence level. The option of minimum deterrence will be both stable and credible provided nuclear weapons that are finally retained are deployed in survivable ways so that none of the nuclear powers will ever think of resorting to a first-strike in the belief that, consequently, it will be destroyed due to a retaliatory strike from the power being attacked first.
The road to strategic arms reductions

The destructiveness of nuclear weapons and their spread across the world were two main factors which motivated the United States and the former Soviet Union to constrain their strategic or long-range arsenal soon after the nuclear age began.  But, till the early 1980s, nothing much could be accomplished as the political relationship between the two superpowers was characterized by over-blown suspicion of each other's intentions.  The two Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties ( START I and II) became possible only after cooperation came to characterize Washington-Moscow ties. The United States and the former Soviet Union developed and modernized their strategic weapons during the Cold War era. The maintenance of a credible and stable nuclear deterrence, however, was deemed essential for preventing Cold War from turning into an all-out war.  The war-fighting, not war-prevention, role of nuclear weapons was emphasized, and counter-force options were preferred over those of counter-value. Each side developed such weapons as gave it the capability to strike back effectively in the case of first-strike from the other. But every new weapon which one side developed was considered first-strike weapon by the other.  That was how the race for arms was fuelled.

Arms control also stalled exactly for the same reason: the United States wanted Russia to reduce drastically that component of its strategic nuclear triad which was perceived by American arms control negotiators as allowing the Russians a first-strike capability.  The Russians wanted the same.  Even during the seventies, when the spirit of d?tente came to characterize US-Soviet political relationship, the two sides did not abandon their quest for strategic weapons.  In fact, during this period, the strategic arms race took a turn for the worse: the race for the deadliest of all weapons, ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, started and picked up with no end in sight.  This development resulted from the failure of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) to constrain the US-Soviet strategic arms potential qualitatively.  The SALT II agreement did include some provisions for the purpose, but it was not ratified.  The two agreements, however, set important precedents for future strategic arms control efforts.

In the beginning of the 1980s, the Americans were concerned about the first-strike potential of Soviet ICBMs, especially heavy ballistic missiles.  Both sides also realized that it was needless to maintain an "overkill" strategic capability, when the strategic weapons strength of each side, especially of the former Soviet Union, had reached a level beyond which its economy could sustain.  Thus began a long and cumbersome negotiating process in the early eighties, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. With  Gorbachev's political will, and the corresponding political will of American leaders, their mutual concern about the dangers of retaining a huge nuclear arsenal and realization about what caused the failure of SALT-all these factors led to the signing of START I in July 1991 and START II in January 1993.  The primary reason for the conclusion of the two treaties, however, was the great international political change that started with democratic upsurge in eastern and central Europe in the late 1980s.

Taken together, the two START treaties set many precedents for another strategic arms reduction treaty, START III, the United States and Russia have agreed to sign.  They include stringent verification provisions that ensure transparency of strategic arsenals and predictability about their deployment modes.  They eliminate the most destabilizing strategic arsenal ever conceived: Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).  They reduce the over all attack potential of the United States and Russia.  They have helped reverse the arms race.  Whatever these agreements include must, therefore, be made irreversible. START I and II agreements have generated hopes about deeper cuts. If Russia and the United States are no longer enemies, why should they need 3,000-3,500 warheads each, the post-START II limit for the two countries, respectively? This concern for much deeper reductions, in fact, goes back to the pre-START II period.

In September 1991, about three months before the Soviet collapse, the US National Academy of Sciences released a study which concluded that if positive trends continued, and other nuclear powers accepted appropriate strategic arms limitations, the United States and Russia could reduce their strategic arsenals to 1,000-2,000 warheads each, respectively. Then there are proposals for reducing strategic arsenals to as low as 200.  The proposals for strategic arms reductions beyond the levels included in START II have also raised the question of including France, Britain and China in a legally binding nuclear arms reduction regime. More than anything else, it is the new international alignment that has prompted nuclear strategists in the United States to address the following question: how low can we go? The answer to this question will depend on the purposes one assigns to nuclear weapons.  If these weapons are to be used exclusively for deterrence, a few hundred may be sufficient-as France and Great Britain have concluded.

Deterrence, both in theory and practice, may continue to exist as long as nuclear weapons are there.  And nuclear weapons will be there as long as there are risks of armed conflict.  Even the end of Cold War has not reduced the risks of armed conflict.  The post-Cold War world has seen the depressing resurgence of old ethnic conflicts that remained repressed in some of the former communist regions and which the world had hoped to forget.  It is against this pessimistic reading of the trends that predictions about future nuclear deterrence must be made.  Therefore, even if START II is implemented, strategic relationship between the United States and Russia based on MAD will remain intact.

However, in recent times, the traditional theory of deterrence has undergone significant changes to cope with the drastic transformation of international system.  Previously the main argument about nuclear deterrence was between those favouring minimum deterrence and those backing war fighting.  Through START, the United States and Russia have worked for stable deterrence, for a security regime of cooperative behaviour.  In case the START process made credible head way, deterrence in the next century would take a more cooperative form-instead of the traditionally provocative offensive force structures and doctrines of the Cold War era.  Despite the easing of tension between the United States and Russia, a cooperative, reciprocal deterrence between them will continue to be as important as nuclear weapons and their utility.  The new concept is based on common security percepts, which emphasize the need for mutual reassurance and the acceptance by the United States and Russia of the legitimate security interests of each other.  The underlying notion behind this new form of deterrence, however, is still based on the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction: that both sides should maintain the capability to match the destructiveness, range and accuracy of each other's nuclear arsenal.
Nuclear-free world: pros and cons

That deterrence is to stay as a workable concept, means there is no chance in near future to move towards a nuclear-free world.  Still, ever since the Cold War's end, the desirability and feasibility of moving towards such a goal has been debated by the arms control community-more than ever before.  Although the arguments for a nuclear-free world have not changed in any fundamental sense, their salience has dramatically increased in the post-Cold War period, when the United States and its European allies no more face as dangerous a military threat as the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Past allies once posed.  This has resulted in a pronounced shift in the cost-benefit calculus of retaining nuclear weapons.  The retention of thousands of nuclear weapons is both costly and dangerous.  Nuclear proliferation poses another problem.  Therefore, the alternative of a nuclear-free world appears increasingly attractive.  The argument for zero nuclear weapons rests on the assumption that nuclear weapons have only limited utility, which is to prevent their use by others: if nuclear weapons are useful solely to deter others from using them, then nothing is lost by getting rid of them altogether.

Since the development of nuclear weapons and their use by the United States in Second World War against Japan, the debate on nuclear disarmament has been going on. What, however, was missing in it as long as the Cold War continued, was a credible and realistic initiative from states possessing nuclear weapons or aspiring to develop them. Consequently, the talk about nuclear disarmament remained idealistic, confined to resolutions of the United Nations or the Non-Aligned Movement. The initiative always came from non-nuclear weapon states, while nuclear states dithered on the matter. The difference this time is that the initiative for nuclear disarmament is coming from the nuclear nations themselves, even though not officially as much but from their former top officials and non-government think-tanks.

One significant proposal towards this end has come from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. In its August 1996 report, the Commission proposed a phased elimination of nuclear arms. Some former top US government and military officials and Western media analysts have also argued strongly for the elimination of nuclear weapons. For instance, General Lee Butler has argued against the continued validity of the US nuclear capability in the country's global agenda. He says: "Nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible." In its report, the Canberra Commission, of which General Butler was also a member, gives the following arguments to justify the case of elimination of nuclear weapons: "One, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so great that they have no military utility against a comparably equipped opponent, other than the belief that they deter that opponent from using nuclear weapons. Use of weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state is politically and morally indefensible; two, the indefinite deployment of the weapons carries a high risk of their ultimate use through accident or inadvertence; and, three, the possession of the weapons by some states stimulates other nations to acquire them, reducing the security of all."

The goal of nuclear disarmament is as old as the development of nuclear weapons itself. The very first resolution of the first session of the United Nations in 1946 had talked of eliminating the nuclear danger. The United States was the first country to make a nuclear disarmament proposal in the 1950s, the so-called Atom for Peace proposal. But the Soviet Union, whose communist influence in the world the US had started containing soon after the end of the Second World War, took this proposal as an American attempt to retain its nuclear monopoly. Then, in the following years, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China became nuclear powers one after another. Until the early 1960s, all of them paid only lip-service to the idea of nuclear disarmament, despite the fact that, during this period, non-nuclear states were arguing strongly in its favour at the various sessions of the UN Conference on Disarmament.

In the mid 1960s, nuclear states put the idea of nuclear disarmament on the back-burner replacing it with that of nuclear arms control. Rooted in the notion that nuclear weapons are essential to preserve national security, the arms control thesis emphasized the importance of managing the competition and stabilizing the deterrence-based relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The new talk was about achieving strategic parity and ensuring MAD. The primary objective was to prevent nuclear war, rather than run after the utopian idea of nuclear disarmament. For the purpose, some treaties, such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, were also signed. Nuclear powers did talk about disarmament when the question of the spread of nuclear weapons to states other than them arose in the late sixties. Thus, the NPT, which they sponsored, was signed in 1968. In Article VI of the NPT, as discussed in detail in the first part of this book, nuclear powers pledged to eliminate their own nuclear weapons, although without giving a specific deadline for this elimination.

Following the entry into force of NPT in 1970, the United States and the former Soviet Union started the SALT process to freeze their strategic nuclear weapon capabilities. SALT collapsed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Then, in the beginning of 1980s, START started to actually reduce such weapons, a process which eventually resulted in the signing of two START treaties in the early 1990s. From the start of SALT until the signing of START treaties, nuclear disarmament was never the aim of US-Soviet arms control negotiators. It has never been since the conclusion of START II. Since then, however, the only difference has been the emergence of concern for nuclear abolition among a significant number of nuclear experts in the recognized nuclear states, particularly in the United States.

As clear from the Canberra Commission report, these nuclear abolitionists argue for the elimination of nuclear weapons on moral grounds. For instance, McNamara has argued that there are about 40,000 nuclear warheads in the world with a total destructive power more than a million times that of the Hiroshima bomb.  Even assuming that reductions required by the two strategic arms treaties are carried out, the stock of warheads of the five declared nuclear powers is not likely to be reduced below 10,000 by the early next century. Moreover, the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of international conflict, but it needs not mean a return to an earlier style of international relations based on the balance of power and shifting alliances.  The unlimited destructiveness of nuclear weapons call into question the utility of war as a policy instrument.  So does recognition that wars fail to settle conflicts that lead to them.

The arguments in favour of moving towards a nuclear-free world are powerful.  But not only is such movement practically impossible, it will not be feasible, both for political and strategic reasons.  The practical argument against moving down to zero nuclear weapons rests on a sober consideration of the magnitude of the task at hand.  To be effective, a nuclear-free world would have to construct a system of airtight verification and assured enforcement, neither of which seems practically feasible.  A particular verification problem is the existence of large quantities of plutonium from dismantled weapons.  The US National Academy of Sciences estimates that, by the end of the century, the world stockpiles of plutonium will be 1,600 to 1,700 metric tonnes, only about half of which is contained in spent fuel.  Because a few kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium are sufficient to build a nuclear weapon with a yield in the kiloton range, and because no one knows what the actual inventory of fissile material in the world really is, few countries are likely to be confident that all materials and weapons-making capability have been accounted for.  There can be no certainty that someone is not cheating.  There is no guarantee that the plutonium stockpiles collected from dismantled strategic systems, under START agreements, will not find their way back once again into the same systems.

For a non-nuclear world, what is needed is the perfect operation of a collective security system.  But there are both practical and historical reasons to doubt that collective security will in fact operate perfectly, especially when participation in collective action is likely to increase the threat to oneself.  Collective security requires collective interests and a collective will.  But history and logic suggest that it is a feeble foundation on which to base one's security.  Thus, unless an effective security system has first been created, which will require an unprecedented devolution of sovereignty, no state that currently depends on nuclear weapons for some of its security is likely to agree to their elimination.  The political case against zero nuclear weapons follows logically from this conclusion.
Disarmament: neither possible nor feasible

So long as nuclear weapons have value to their possessors, so long as they are perceived to have value, their agreed elimination is not possible.  And however much some may want to believe otherwise, nuclear weapons are still valued by their possessors, many of whom continue to believe that their relative power resides in possessing these weapons. For instance, Russian president Yeltsin recently argued, "It is no secret that Russia's status as a great power depends on its armed forces having nuclear weapons." Also, despite nuclear weapons reductions and fundamental international change, the US policy in retaining nuclear weapons in thousands remains unchanged.  The United States still believes that it should have sufficient nuclear strength to withstand a nuclear first-strike from an adversary and inflict an unacceptable damage on the adversary.
In September 1994, the US Department of Defense had announced its Nuclear Posture Review, which concluded that it was too soon to commit to cuts in strategic forces below START II levels.  Two days before the Review was announced, defense secretary William Perry summarized its results in a Washington speech, saying the United States could not make strategic force reductions below the 3,500-warhead level, as required under START II, until the treaty was "implemented fully".  To justify his argument that an American commitment to go below START levels would be premature, Perry said reforms in Russia might fail, and the United States should be prepared to respond if necessary.  He said under the Review's proposed force structure, the United States would retain a capability to "reconstitute" its strategic forces rapidly by "uploading" warheads on its Minuteman III ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles) and Trident II SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles).  In the Nuclear Posture Review, US force posture decisions, made essentially on Cold War assumptions, were presumed to be in line with a radically different strategic landscape in the post-Cold War period. Accordingly, strategic forces were to be reduced to 3,500 weapons deployed on a triad of land, sea and air-based modes. One significant departure was the much greater emphasis on the safety and security of nuclear forces that remained, and the stated intention to move from the world of MAD to MAS.

The Nuclear Posture Review codifies American unwillingness to go for nuclear disarmament.  The Russians are also unwilling to disarm. Strategic perceptions in both countries continue to be guided by the following notion: that the elimination of weapons does not eliminate the perceived need for their possession.  The existence and accumulation of weapons are a function of actual or potential conflict between states.  Eliminating weapons no more means peace than that their possession means war.  If disarmament is to make war unlikely, then it must reduce the incentives to war.  In short, the problem is not so much the existence of nuclear weapons as that international society is organized around a system of states which lacks central authority.  In such a system, conflict and war are always possible.  Because nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, and because neither airtight verification nor assured enforcement is possible in a world without a central authority, states will always lack confidence in the ability of an international treaty to prevent nuclear armament at some point in future.

The very concept of a world without nuclear weapons is an illusion.  Assume for a moment that all nuclear weapons have been destroyed.  Unless the means for building them are also destroyed, or placed under some airtight supervision, a number of nations would still be able to produce them quickly.  The knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons cannot be erased.  A world in which nations destroyed their nuclear weapons but knew how to produce them would not be a more secure world.   To imagine a world free of nuclear weapons is to imagine a world in which nations truly cooperate in enforcing inviolable restraints on their own knowledge, permit controls over all of their nuclear facilities and accept verification inspections in all parts of their territories, including their military and industrial plants.  A world free of nuclear weapons might also become dangerously safe for conventional war.  Never in history have two dominant powers competed so intensely-during the Cold War period, so fraught with provocations and indirect conflicts-and yet avoided open warfare.  Making the world safe for resumption of conventional warfare can hardly be considered a major advance for humanity.

For a world free of nuclear weapons to be safe, the end of US-Russian rivalry is just one requirement; all the regional and international conflicts will need to be resolved.  A serious commitment requires abandoning much more than nuclear weapons.  It will demand a radical shift in the basic assumptions about power that have guided the United States and other nations for the last 50  years.  Security can be strengthened by gradual and progressive mutual accommodation in arms control negotiations, and also by unilateral actions.  Therefore, step-by-step reductions, meant to reduce the threat of a first-strike, should be the objective of a nuclear arms reduction process involving all the recognized nuclear states.  It must also be noted that, as in the case of START I and II, reduction in warhead numbers is not the only means of nuclear restraint.  The same objective can also be achieved by reducing vulnerability, improving controls, avoiding destabilizing surprises, and controlling and limiting weapons-grade material.
Neutralizing the role of nuclear weapons

There is convincing evidence that recognized nuclear states are not willing to totally eliminate their nuclear weapons.  Every one of the five recognized nuclear powers would like to keep some weapons as long as any of the others do for the very end of maintaining a stable and credible deterrence. States that have nuclear weapons regard them as the ultimate guarantee of their security in an uncertain world where there is no dependable central authority.  Therefore, the abolition of nuclear weapons is not a practical objective at this time.   What, however, is possible today is the adoption of measures aimed at neutralizing the importance attached to the possession of nuclear weapons.  Once nuclear weapons are actually neutralized, they will cease to be a major factor in international politics.

The existence, quantity and quality, and distribution of nuclear weapons have played a critical role in defining the character of international environment after the Second World War.  Nuclear weapons had the effect of making the major powers much more cautious and far less inclined to consider war as a means of rationally settling the differences between them.  In the post-Cold War period, what has declined is the war-fighting role of nuclear weapons.  They have depreciated in their value as a currency in international relations.  However, even in the wake of their devaluation, nuclear weapons will retain their general importance in preserving peace among the major powers.  The major powers will no longer be concerned with deterring an adversary which is presumed to be considering aggression.  Rather, they will be interested in using nuclear weapons as a hedge in the event that international relations should deteriorate and as a means of keeping the major power competition at the political and economic, not the military level.

The depreciation of nuclear weapons as a political and strategic instrument in shaping major power relations is highly desirable, as it is a reflection of the end of the Cold War.  Nevertheless, it also reflects a major power vacuum that has emerged in world politics.  The international environment is now being more predominantly shaped by non-nuclear and non-military factors, some of which are not under the control of the major powers, and which may in fact be uncontrollable.  The international environment is, and will remain for some time, highly uncertain.  The Cold War has ended, but the character of international relations remains undetermined, so does the various stances the principal nations have to adopt to define their respective interests, in order to cope with the new global realities.  However, the fact that nuclear weapons will certainly not disappear cannot be ignored.   Thus, avoiding nuclear war will remain a significant consideration, and the war-prevention function of nuclear weapons will remain important.

No escape from post-START II cuts

The conclusion that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated in given circumstances, however, does not mean the United States and Russia should stop at START II.  The foremost factor that pushed the two countries towards START I and II reduction levels was the radically changed nature of their political relationship, characterized less by futile competition and more by fruitful cooperation.  And this is what makes useless the retention of an arsenal even as big as that will result after the implementation of START II. Some members of the American arms control community still argue that the United States should not go beyond START II.  For instance, asking the Clinton administration not to go beyond START II levels,  Paul  H Nitze, former US arms control negotiator, argues: "For the immediate future, our chief concern is likely to remain the arsenal of the former Soviet Union.  Even after all the prospective cuts in the arsenal are implemented, a process that will require many years, it will remain formidable.  Whoever controls it or substantial portions of it, will retain the ability to inflict catastrophic damage on us, our allies and friends worldwide.  Because we cannot be sure that such control will not some day revert to a leadership hostile to our interests, we must continue to rely on nuclear weapons as an insurance policy, to deter any future leader who may control all, or a major portion, of the former Soviet arsenal and contemplate using it.   At the same time, we should use our possession of nuclear weapons as a leverage to negotiate changes that will render that arsenal smaller, less threatening, safer, and more secure."

Arguments like this are seconded by officials of the Clinton administration.  The problem with the opponents of post-START II reductions, however, is that they have not de-linked START from Cold War concerns.  The arms control treaties that the United States and Russia have so far concluded, including START I and II, have not aimed at disarming the two sides to the point where the resort to war as an instrument of politics becomes impossible.   They were about controlling superpowers' rivalry.  The rationale for going beyond START II is, thus, obvious: in view of  the current  global realities, the number of START II warheads for each side is still mindlessly high, and no better connected to military rationality and strategic purpose.  How does the United States with even 3,500 strategic warheads in its pocket make the point that one warhead in India's or Pakistan's pocket is one too many? For their part, and benefit as well, the United States and Russia must, therefore, reduce their strategic weapons to such an extent that, for each of them, the resort to war as an instrument of politics becomes impossible. The rest of the three recognized nuclear states should follow suit. Such  levels of nuclear weapons will never be possible if alarmist considerations like the ones maintained by Nitze continue to characterize American arms control decision-making in the post-Cold War period.

The US Nuclear Posture Review avoided any commitment to negotiate cuts beyond START II.  Instead, it emphasized the continuing role of nuclear weapons in American strategy, pointing to the potential threat from Russia.  Any reductions below the START II level, says the Review, will depend on progress towards "a more democratic and more peaceful Russia." Yet in the same week the Review was announced, President Yeltsin offered to negotiate a START III agreement, accompanied by a "treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability" in which all five nuclear powers would agree to set targets for continuing arms cuts.  It was in 1997 that the United States offered to negotiate a third START treaty, to bring the level of strategic warheads possessed by the two countries down to 1,000 each. But nuclear nationalism in Moscow is intensified by the widespread perception that Washington exacted unfair terms in the START II agreement at a time when Russia was weak. Therefore, unless the United States agrees to discuss Russian concerns in START III negotiations, it is increasingly unlikely that the Russian parliament will ratify START II.

Russian hardliners are quite justified in pointing out anomalies in START II.  The treaty was negotiated and signed at a time when Russia's international position was weak and, internally as well, its situation was troublesome. When START I was concluded, both domestically and globally, Russia stood on a much weaker footing, as it was facing the negative fall-out of the Soviet collapse.  In such circumstances, president Mikhail Gorbachev could not bargain effectively in strategic arms reduction talks, whose outcome did not favour Russia. The Americans succeeded in retaining a considerable portion of their key strategic forces: the SLBMs and long-range bombers.  Traditionally, in both areas, the United States enjoyed a clear-cut advantage over the former Soviet Union, whose main strategic strength rested on the heavy, land-based ballistic missiles, the SS-18s and the land-based mobile ballistic missiles, the SS-24s and SS-25s. Traditionally, the land-based, heavy ICBMs have formed core of the Russian strategic capability.  It is in this area that START II discriminates.  It aims at eliminating the entire Russian arsenal of heavy and mobile ICBMs either by simply depriving Russia of this capability or by reducing the number of warheads these missiles can carry.

There is no escape from the fact that nuclear weapons have to be reduced.  The question that remains unanswered is, what can be the lowest possible post-START II level of nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia should retain to ensure a stable and credible deterrence between them?  Although the achievement of a credible and stable deterrence in the Cold War period was presumably linked to the deployment of thousands of nuclear weapons, this is no longer the case today.  A small, highly survivable force of a few hundred weapons is sufficient to meet the two sides' security requirements.  In addition, under current conditions, it is no longer plausible to maintain that deterrence works only if the United States can hold at risk the entire array of military, strategic, and leadership targets within the vast Russian landmass, as was deemed crucial during the Cold War period.  Rather, the purpose of nuclear weapons today is to remind any regime with potential hostile intent of its own inevitable vulnerability.  Considering the character of nuclear weapons, the prospect of just a few weapons-tens rather than hundreds, and certainly not thousands-exploding on one's territory would be a stark reminder of one's inescapable vulnerability.  Therefore, a force of just a few hundred survivable and deliverable nuclear weapons would be sufficient to deter an attack on the United States.  The same applies to Russia.  The decisive point is that lower and more stable forces are preferable not only for the two countries but also for their contribution to keeping the Cold War from revival.

With the end of the Cold War, the purpose and the role of nuclear weapons also need to be stated in new terms.  Leaving aside the hawkish concerns of some officials of the Clinton administration about post-START II reductions, and the opposition to START II by nationalist elements in the Russian parliament, the leaders of both the United States and Russia now seem to agree that a new stage can be considered after START II. Insofar as the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression and maintaining peace is concerned, both sides still agree that it remains as valid as in past. No rational government or leader can seriously contemplate a conflict fought with strategic nuclear weapons.  Yet the certainty that a nuclear first-strike should be met with nuclear retaliation and the element of doubt that persists in an aggressor's mind that his opponent might use nuclear weapons in the last resort, has kept peace between Russia and the United States, and in Europe, for 50 years.  It is this war prevention role of nuclear weapons that remains unchanged in the post-Cold War world.  Thus, the right recipe for future arms control negotiations is not to abandon nuclear weapons altogether.  It is to reduce them progressively to much more reasonable proportions than START I and II have done.

Extended deterrence still valid

In the Cold War period, besides ensuring deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons fulfilled another purpose for the latter: reassurance.  Because Germany, Japan and other allies of the United States could rely on the American nuclear guarantee, they faced no incentive to acquire nuclear weapons even though most were technically capable of doing so.  Unlike Russia, therefore, any American decision to go beyond START II ceilings also depends on the following question: how many nuclear weapons are sufficient today to convince these countries that the American nuclear guarantee is credible and thus to forestall new incentives for proliferation?

The countries which have so far abstained from nuclear weapons acquisition, thinking that American nuclear umbrella offered them protection, will continue to do so even if American nuclear force levels decline to lower levels. But there is a pre-condition: that nuclear weapons that threaten these states-especially Russia's-are also reduced the same way. Thus, further reductions in American strategic forces should occur in tandem with Russia's and should also be accompanied by cuts in the forces of the other acknowledged nuclear powers.  Regarding extended deterrence, however, what counts in current circumstances is whether the interest to be defended is vital to the United States, not the size of the nuclear forces defending it.  If the United States can be defended by that force, then nations vital to American interests can also be defended by that force. Extended deterrence is possible with minimum deterrence.

The end of the Cold War does not, therefore, mean the end of extended deterrence as an American objective.  The common perception today is that, with the disappearance of communist threat in Europe, the strategy of extended deterrence has also lost its value.  There have been calls for dismantling the NATO itself, since it has lost the logic for which it was created.  As a result, in the last few years, NATO's defense strategy has been restructured significantly to deter potential threats from ethnic turmoil in Europe and the threat of nuclear proliferation from across the Mediterranean. Russia's future remains uncertain.  That explains why the United States is interested in expanding NATO. START II, if ratified by Russia, will take over a decade to complete.  During this period, given the growing wave of nationalism in Russia, US-Russian relations may worsen.  Even after the implementation of START agreements, Russian nuclear forces will be formidable.  Moreover, China continues upgrading its strategic nuclear arsenal.  Therefore, even though no nuclear adversary presently threatens American allies in Europe, there is still a rationale for extending the American nuclear umbrella to them.  This will dampen national incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons.

Towards minimum deterrence

There are two reasons why strategic force levels lower that the START II ceilings are preferable.  First, the need for increased attention to the safety and security of the nuclear weapons that remain.  After the Soviet fall, strategic forces remained deployed on the territory of four newly independent states, with adequate control in some doubt. However, given the political instability in Russia, ensuring effective control over nuclear weapons and materials has become a priority for American policy. The second reason for preferring lower force levels relates to discouraging proliferation.  A deliberate strategy designed to cut nuclear force levels can help to reduce the perception that nuclear weapons endow their possessors with power, prestige, and international stature-a perception that in itself contributes to proliferation.

Is it really in the American interest to advertise the centrality of nuclear weapons to power in international affairs at a time when countries like Germany and Japan aspire to a greater role in, and responsibility for, preserving international security? Surely the United States has much to gain and very little to lose in arguing for the opposite-that power and responsibility reside in the political and economic well-being of nations rather than in their nuclear status. One of the foremost reasons for India to test the nuclear devices and declare itself a nuclear state is that India wants a big power status, a permanent seat in the Security Council. Power and prestige are two key determinants of India's nuclear weapons quest.

The United States and Russia must, therefore, strive to reduce their nuclear weapons to a few hundred weapons.  This may be a hard task.  The difficulties in securing Russian ratification of the START II treaty underscore that even a modest reduction process is far from easy to achieve.  More radical reductions would face even greater obstacles, particularly because these would have to be accompanied not just by cuts in American and Russian forces, but also by limitations on French, British, and Chinese nuclear weapons and a cap on the ability of other countries to expand their nuclear capabilities.  The task is indeed hard; it is not impossible now that, with the completion of START I reductions, many of the difficulties associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union have been overcome.

What kind of additional nuclear reductions and force posture changes should take place beyond START II levels? Aside from nationalist opposition, the main Russian concern regarding START II is that although the force limitations enshrined in the treaty conform closely to the structure of American strategic forces, provisions like the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs, the most modern and capable element in Russian forces, would compel a fundamental restructuring of Russian strategic forces, or abandonment of Russia's commitment to nuclear parity; none of which Russia finds acceptable.  A commitment to seek further reductions-especially if the specific force configurations conform more closely to Russian concerns-may, therefore, be important to alleviating Russian opposition to the START II agreement.

Addressing  Russian concerns and securing START II's entry into force is a necessary element in any new arms control strategy.  But it is not sufficient.  Two additional factors must also be taken into account.  One is to secure the participation of Britain, France and China in the nuclear arms reduction process. None of these three recognized powers has formally engaged in arms control negotiations affecting the size and disposition of its nuclear forces.  If a continuing improvement in US-Russian nuclear relations permits the two countries two to agree on reductions beyond START II levels, there may emerge a parallel preference in other nuclear powers as well.  To date, British, French and Chinese leaders have indicated they are not yet ready to participate in the arms reduction process.  They argue that, although deep cuts are to be made in American and Russian nuclear weapons, the nuclear superpowers still plan to field five to ten times as many nuclear weapons as Britain, France and China have.  This arithmetic has led officials in these countries to argue that they should not and will not join the arms reduction process until the United States and Russia reduce their forces much more.  Chinese officials have insisted that the United States and Russia must reduce their forces to China's level before Beijing contemplates cuts of its own.

Only one basic requirement remains for the strategic forces of the United States and Russia: they should be considered fully adequate, in each country, to ensure against attack from the other.  This deterrent requirement has been central for both sides throughout the nuclear age, and today it is the only one left that matters.  Neither side now asks that its strategic forces be able it to win some general nuclear war, because both sides now recognize openly that in such a war there will be only losers. An American force that is sufficient to balance the Russian force will be capable enough for every lesser job.  The same thing is now true on the Russian side.  During the Cold War, it was possible to think that Soviet planners must consider the nightmare of having to face three or four strategic nuclear enemies at the same time.  They certainly had deep political differences with all four of the other recognized nuclear weapon states.  But there is no justification for such Russian nightmares today. Force requirements for minimum deterrence depend on how vulnerable those forces are to pre-emptive attack.  Neither side needs to win, because winning is understood to be impossible.  Therefore, both sides have no immediate need for strategic nuclear forces beyond that required for deterrence of nuclear attack by other nuclear powers. Top-level control over any use of nuclear weapons will remain as long as nuclear weapons exist.  Command and control structures should be improved as technology permits.  Nuclear deterrence has always depended on the ability of the major powers to maintain responsible and adequate command and control of their forces, so that nuclear attack could not be launched without proper authorization.  The START treaties have laid down a firm basis for shared strategic moderation, for a stable and peaceful balance, at a great long-run reduction in cost, tension and danger.

The case for a minimum deterrence rests on the proposition that stability depends not on the size of a nation's strategic nuclear forces, rather on their degree of survivability in a surprise attack.  The more warheads that can survive an attack, the smaller the initial force needs to be.  Both the United States and Russia can build such a deterrent constrained within their current strategic force structures.  It is one that will be less expensive to maintain.  If such a force is militarily safe, technologically feasible and more fiscally prudent, why not pursue it? The true interest of both sides is that each step towards lower and less threatening deployments should be seen as a step forward by them, so that nuclear moderation remains for both a broadly popular policy.  In particular, the United States should avoid the temptation to use a time of great Russian economic stress to secure one-sided advantages.

The role of defense policy is to be prepared not only for immediate, but for unexpected future threats to national and international security. In future, both the United States and Russia can keep sustained assurance that there will be no nuclear break-out on either side without warnings that give more than enough time for any necessary response. Minimum deterrence is now possible because stability has come to depend not only on the threat of nuclear attack, but also on a shared preference for peace over war.

Ban on ballistic missiles

Eliminating all long-range ballistic missiles can be one of the targets of any post-START II reductions agreement. Ballistic missiles pose the greatest threat to stability.  These missiles combine high vulnerability to attack with great accuracy and speed; which makes them prime target in an initial strike, inevitably reducing the response time available to the defender.  Although the ban on MIRVed ICBMs has gone some way to alleviate this danger, the elimination of all ballistic missiles would remove the worry altogether.  In START I and II, neither side was willing to give up long-range missiles entirely for the reason that both of them considered such missiles as the most survivable single system of delivery.  Survivability is properly prized as an essential element in strategic stability.  The fact, however, speaks for the opposite: so long as ballistic missiles are there, neither side can escape the possibility of a sudden surprise attack.  In spite of careful technology, and the sanity and sobriety of those in control of such forces, this possibility will exist as long as these weapons exist.

With the nuclear forces of both sides limited to bombers and cruise missiles, neither would have to worry that it might have to launch its nuclear forces through a pre-emptive strike because the other side had launched, or was about to launch, a first-strike.  The objective of arms control agreements should not be confined to reducing the number of nuclear weapons only, it should also be to avoid either side's ever resorting to their use.  Nothing will do that more than dispensing with ballistic missiles.  The most important lesson of the last nearly four decades of living with a delicate balance of nuclear weapons is that no one has used them.  The irrationality of any calculated nuclear attack has been apparent to leaders of the two sides.
The danger that the world faces today is that rationality will be set aside some day in a moment of confused fear, probably based on misinformation.  Without ballistic missiles, such pressures and risks are bound to be less.  In addition, long-range ballistic missiles are, of course, not deployed only by the United States and Russia.  There are missiles in other countries, including China, India, Israel and Pakistan, that have nuclear warheads to put on them.  The renunciation of long-range ballistic missiles would have to be world-wide.  However, there will not be much international progress away from long-range missiles while Washington and Moscow continue to rely on them.  A US-Russian agreement to ban all land-based missiles would provide stronger nations with political leverage in their campaign to convince other countries to forego developing their own capabilities and, ultimately, to eliminate missile capabilities that have already been deployed.

As it is the case with the nuclear arms race, the blame for introducing the ballistic missile race in South Asia goes to India. So far, the short-range Prithvi and medium-range Agni are the two most lethal ballistic missile systems that India has test-fired. Both can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Prithvi has been deployed or 'stored' in Julundhar, close to Pakistan's Punjab frontier with India; while BJP-led Hindu nationalist government has given a go-ahead to the Defense Research and Development Organization, India's chief missile research and development setup, to produce Agni. The BJP regime has threatened to equip Prithvi with nuclear warheads. India also intends to develop an ICBM, Suriya. It was basically India's mad quest for ballistic missiles which forced Pakistan to develop its own medium-range ballistic missile, Ghauri. Since the two nuclear powers of South Asia share borders, and the missile flight time is also extremely short, the ballistic missile possession by the two countries increases the chances of an unintended, accidental nuclear war between them. Thus, it is in the interest of the United States and other big powers to conclude a global treaty banning the production and possession of ballistic missiles.
START's essential linkage to nuclear proliferation

START cannot be seen in isolation from the issue of nuclear proliferation. The threat to international security posed by the post-Soviet nuclear risks has been more or less tackled. Now, besides pursuing strategic arms reductions, a process that must include three other recognized nuclear states, the United States and Russia have to take an initiative to end the discrepancies inherent in the NPT on the lines as proposed in Part I of this book. The NPT was extended indefinitely on 11 May 1995; but such an extension will have little credibility as long as the two unrecognized nuclear states, India and Pakistan and the last remaining threshold state, Israel, are not part of the NPT regime. Therefore, START must be designed to deal simultaneously with the problems of vertical proliferation and compliance of the recognized nuclear states with the provisions of the NPT.
If the United States, Russia and other nuclear powers wish to diminish significantly the perceived political utility of nuclear forces in international politics so that other states will not find them of value, then they should reduce their forces far beyond START II levels.  The nuclear powers cannot call upon the unrecognized or threshold nuclear states to forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons when they show by their own example how much political utility they have.  There is an apparent contradiction between the logic of the NPT and the doctrine of nuclear powers that nuclear weapons are essential to deter aggression and maintain peace.  Why, the unrecognized, threshold or non-nuclear states can safely ask, do some states require their own national deterrent for these purposes, while others are expected either to seek a nuclear guarantee from their allies or-if that is not available, or comes at an unacceptable political price-simply to rely on some vague notion of collective security  and "new world order."

The recognized nuclear states can discourage proliferation by opting for such levels of nuclear arms reductions as will neutralize the role of these arms in international politics. They  can agree to a reconciliation of export controls with a non-nuclear state's "inalienable right" under Article IV of the NPT to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. From the extensive debate that took place during the time the Conference on NPT Review and Extension was being held in New York in April-May 1995, it was apparent that, if the treaty was extended indefinitely, its non-signatory states would lose the little leverage they had to ensure that recognized nuclear states comply with their obligations under Articles IV and VI.

Given that, a US-Russian decision to go far beyond START II levels will be an additional evidence that they are complying with Article VI of the NPT, which requires the existing nuclear weapon states to engage in negotiations "towards general and complete disarmament." The treaty was not designed solely to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.  The non-nuclear states agreed to remain that way in return for a pledge, in Article VI, that the nuclear powers would pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." The full promise of the NPT has not yet been realized. However, it is unlikely that recognized nuclear states will agree to give up their nuclear weapons completely before there is a functioning system of world security with a proven record of achievement and a non-proliferation regime of recognized comprehensive effectiveness.  Since these conditions are not possible in foreseeable future, what is required is an approach that defines a new goal for nuclear arms control and which is realistic enough to have some long-term prospects of practical implementation.

That the United States and Russia have agreed to conclude a third START agreement to reduce the two countries' nuclear arms to 1,000 each, is indeed a good news. But, realistically speaking, unless START II accord is implemented, such news will have little practical viability. START II will not be implemented unless the Russian parliament ratifies it. As long as the Russian parliament is dominated by the hardliners, a domination that is likely to increase as Russian economic woes grow rapidly, START II's ratification will remain in limbo.  Even if it is ratified, it will be only by the year 2007 that START II reductions of up to 3,000 strategic warheads for Russia and 3,500 warheads for the United States will be complete. START III can take as many years, or less, to be implemented. Even with these reductions, the two countries will not compromise their military security and political position with respect to three other recognized nuclear states. And it is only after START III's implementation that the United States and Russia will be in a position to approach China, Britain and France to devise a framework for an agreement among the five recognized nuclear states to reduce their total arsenals to no more than 200 warheads each, to separate these warheads from their delivery systems, and to place both the warheads and the delivery systems under multilateral control on the territory of the owner states. This is a long way to go.

By exploding nuclear devices, India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapon states, whether the IAEA accepts them as nuclear powers or not. Therefore, there is no way left for the US-led West but to revise the NPT, amend its Article IX, and let Pakistan, India and even Israel be internationally categorized as recognized nuclear states. In the aftermath of India-Pakistan nuclear weapons testing, the NPT regime lies in a shambles. The two countries, besides Israel, cannot remain for long a victim of discrimination inherent in the NPT, whose sole aim is to perpetuate nuclear monopoly of the five big powers that went nuclear before January 1, 1967. As apparent from the preceding discussion, it may take years or even decades for the five recognized powers to come down to the level of 200 strategic warheads each. Of course, for such a long time, India, Pakistan and Israel cannot be excluded from the nuclear club. India and Pakistan have already tested various categories of nuclear arms. Israel is believed to be in possession of a huge nuclear arsenal. Given that, the more the United States-led West attempts to deny the status of a recognized nuclear power to these three countries, the more obvious the discrepancies inherent in the NPT will become.

Moving down to 200 strategic warheads

An equal level of 200 strategic warheads for the United States and Russia was recently proposed by Ivo H Daaldar for reasons of negotiability: it was slightly lower than the French or Chinese level.  It is a level that will be acceptable to all the recognized nuclear states, which may then commit themselves to dismantle all the warheads that are reduced to reach the 200-warhead level and to place all weapons-grade fissile material under international monitoring as reductions are carried out.  Afterwards, India, Pakistan and Israel can be given the choice between placing their nuclear warheads or explosive devices and fissile material in monitored storage or agreeing to their elimination.  If the three countries decide in favour of the former arrangement, that will place their nuclear weapons under international supervision and make it highly improbable that the weapons will ever be used.   And if they decide for the latter, they can be offered similar international security guarantees by the nuclear states as, for instance, have been given to Ukraine. After the Soviet fall, Ukraine had refused to transfer to Russia the nuclear weapons stationed in its territory, taking a plea that it perceived security threat from Russia. Then, the recognized nuclear states provided effective negative and positive security guarantees to Ukraine, and the problem was solved. The latter option, however, might not work in South Asia, since India's nuclear quest is primarily motivated by its insatiable lust for global power and prestige.
Under START I and II, the United States and Russia will eliminate only that number of nuclear weapons which they have developed since NPT's entry into force, in total violation of the treaty's Article VI.  Even this elimination will be doubtful as long as START II remains unratified.  Moreover, China, France and Britain have so far not participated in any nuclear arms reduction process.  Accepted that nuclear proliferation is a dangerous phenomenon. But the nuclear spread must not be treated solely as an issue of  'nuclear haves versus nuclear have-nots'.  The nuclear danger confronts the entire world, not just the United States or Russia.  Reducing this danger is, therefore, a collective responsibility of all the states.

The post-Cold War period provides an opportunity to the recognized, unrecognized and threshold nuclear states to reduce-and, in the long run, eliminate-the risks associated with the nuclear danger.  But, as mentioned earlier, even after the signing of START I and II, the ground reality today is that over 90 per cent of the world nuclear stockpiles are still in the hands of the United States and Russia.  Much of this nuclear capability seems irrelevant if seen in the context of existing political and military realities. It is also clear that none of the other recognized, unrecognized or threshold nuclear nations will be serious in reducing its nuclear arms or abandoning the nuclear quest unless the United States and Russia commit to surrender as much of their respective nuclear arsenals as removes their current status as nuclear superpowers.  It was the great international change occurring in recent times that made the signing of the two START treaties possible.  The same factor can make possible much more else, provided the US and Russia are sincerely willing to move ahead on the road to nuclear reduction.

The nuclear arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union was fuelled by overblown suspicion and exaggerated threats.  In the Cold War period, each side developed and deployed sufficient strategic weapons for counter-force and war-fighting purposes.  Neither side was able to introduce an arms control process that would keep the process of negotiations ahead of the process of building and deploying new weapon systems.  Arms control agreements during the Cold War-and these include SALT I and II; and, to some extent, the START I treaty-were concluded when neither side had an appreciable advantage over the other.  In the post-Cold War period, the clash of global ends between the United States and Russia appears to have largely ended; and, with that, the utility of counter-force doctrines and targeting.  Suspicion and mistrust are Cold War legacies.  And they should be treated as such by the Americans and the Russians. The same rationale, however, does not apply to South Asia, where the Cold War between India and Pakistan still continues. The issue of Kashmir, the main souring point in their relationship, remains unsettled. As regards the CTBT and FMCT, they are essentially nuclear non-proliferation treaties and, in no way, prove that the five recognized nuclear states are willing to fulfil their basic obligation of undertaking "general and complete" nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.

The Cold War confrontation provided the rationale for large nuclear arsenals.  In the post-Cold War period, there is no justification for retaining massive nuclear forces when the reasons for their build-up have disappeared.  Arms control is not an end itself; it is a means to an end: it removes uncertainties besetting states as they seek security in an international system whose dominant features are insecurity and anarchy.  The purpose of nuclear weapons today should, therefore, be to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war in a crisis.  The goal can be to extend fifty years of nuclear non-use to future.  By reducing their nuclear capabilities to minimum levels, the five recognized nuclear states can help achieve this goal.  Arms control can play a much important role today than before.  Given present global realities, the end of arms control must be to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

The recognized nuclear states have important obligations.  And one of them is a strict guarantee not to threaten or use nuclear arms against those states that do not have them.  Nuclear weapons should not serve their previous role as symbols of power and status.  They have to be neutralized.  The final START regime, including all the recognized nuclear states, should be one of minimum deterrence based on small, well-protected strategic forces designed to constitute weapons of last resort, an insurance against the recurrence of old threats or the emergence of new ones.  The limit of 200 weapons each, as recommended before, will serve all these purposes.  Minimum deterrence will reduce the probability of a nuclear war, while continuing to discourage conventional wars between great powers.  Fewer weapons will reduce the incentive to resort to nuclear weapons' use in times of crisis or war.  In addition, small forces are easy to command and control.  Minimum deterrence will also reduce the costs of defense preparation and production.

Under START I and II, warheads will only be removed, not dismantled.  The steps which both the United States and Russia have so far taken to dismantle strategic warheads voluntarily are insignificant.  All these warheads should be dismantled.  The fissile material thus obtained should be put in safe storage, with effective monitoring and accounting.  This will make the process of strategic arms reductions irreversible.  As argued earlier, an additional stabilizing step can be to separate warheads from delivery systems and place both under IAEA monitoring mechanism in the owner states.  The fissile material collected after dismantling warheads can be put in use for peaceful purposes.  And, it can be shared with the non-nuclear states under Article IV of the NPT.

The United States and Russia can learn important lessons from their past strategic arms negotiating process.  And one of these lessons is that it is very easy to negotiate arms reduction treaties in times when states happen to coexist peacefully.  What is needed today is that the two countries should try to benefit the most from all the cooperative trends in their political relationship, putting aside all differences which are not as acute as they were in the Cold War period.  The Russians are worried about NATO expansion. There is no end in sight of the political instability in Russia, caused by its worsening economic crisis.  These and many other factors do have the potential of undermining the spirit of coop