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After each trouble, Rus', the Muscovite state, [and] Russia settled down for a long time, restoring the broken economic ties, creating new state institutions corresponding to the times and tasks, re-establishing the ruptured foreign policy connections, joining together the regions that had become politically unraveled. At the basis of these processes is the ordinary logic of the nation's self-revival, its self-protection.10
Defining Military Reform
The question of determining the optimal place of the Armed Forces and defense industry in the new Russia with a civic society and democratic political system born in suffering has become critical. It must correspond to the real demands of Russia's defense capability and to the maintenance of a balance of forces favorable to Russia in various regions of the world. To find such an optimum in the most difficult economic conditions is difficult and extremely necessary.15
The military department [voyennoe vedomstvo] is a sensitive sphere of life. It is directly tied to politics. A limited circle of political leaders are involved in its control. An enduring immunity from control in military structures developed. But in conditions of a democratic variant of development this is an anomaly.16
The Current Status of Military Reform
Prospects for Military Reform
The first is to create conditions under which the army and the other power structures shall not be used for other than stipulated purposes. The second is to control the implementation of the military budget so as to assure its rational disposal and preclude embezzlement. An the third is to ensure compliance with the norms of law on the status of servicemen and their families. The latter is extremely important for the social and legal protection of servicemen.41
1. Jacob W. Kipp, "Consequences of Defeat: Modernizing the Russian Navy, 1856-1963," Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, XX, (June 1972), 210-225; and "M. Kh. Reutern on the Russian State and Economy: A Liberal Bureaucrat during the Crimean Era," Journal of Modern History, XLVII, No. 3, (September 1975), 437-459.
2. Jacob W. Kipp, "Peter the Great, Soldier-Statesman of the Age of Enlightenment: A Naval Perspective," Abigail T. Siddall, ed., Acta No. 7 (Washington, DC, 25-30 July 1982), International Commission for Military History, Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1984, 113-139.
3. Jacob W. Kipp, "Mass and Maneuver and the Origins of Soviet Operational Art" in Karl Reddel, ed., Transformation in Russian and Soviet Military History: Proceedings of the Twelfth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1986 (Washington, DC: United States Air Force Office of Air Force History, 1990), 87-116; "Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism," and "Soviet Military Doctrine and the Origins of Operational Art, 1917-1936," in Philip S. Gillette and Willard C. Frank, Jr., eds., Soviet Military Doctrine (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 63-84 and 85-133; "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern War: Military History and Military Theory," Introductory essay for: Kent Lee, editor, A. A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis: East view Publications, 1992), 21-60; V. K. Triandafillov's "The Nature of the Operations of Contemporary Armies," [editor and author of foreword] (London: Frank Cass, 1994), and "Two Views of Warsaw: The Russian civil War and Soviet Operational Art, 1920-1930," in B. J. C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessey, eds., The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 51-86.
4. Jacob W. Kipp, Foresight and Forecasting: The Russian and Soviet Military Experience (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology Stratech Studies, 1988); "The Soviet General Staff Looks at 'Desert Storm': Through the Prism of Contemporary Politics" in The Soviet Military and the Future, edited by Steven Blank and Jacob W. Kipp (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 115-144; "Soviet Military Foresight and Forecasting in an Era of Restructuring" in Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson, eds., Soviet Strategy and New Military Thinking (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 248-275; "The Soviet Military and the Future: Politico-Military Alternatives" in John Hemsley, The Lost Empire (London: Brassey's/Pergamon, 1992), 67-90; "The Nature of Future War: Russian Military Forecasting and the Revolution in Military Affairs, A Case of the Oracle of Delphi or Cassandra?," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, 9, No. 1 (March 1996), 1-45; "Soldiers and Civilians Confronting Future War: Lev Tolstoy, Jan Bloch and Their Russian Military Critics" in Stephen D. Chiabotti, ed., Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), 189-230; and "Introduction" in M. A. Gareev's If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict [edited by Jacob No. 6, (November-December 1996), pp. 5-11.W. Kipp] (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1998).
5. A. A. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika: Sovetskaya voyenno-politicheskaya i voyenno-strategicheskaya mysl', 1918-1991 gody (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya," 1955), pp. 3-15.
6. Andrei Kokoshin, "Voyenn-politicheskie i ekonomicheskie aspekty reformy Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossii," Voyennaya mysl',
7. S. F. Platonov, The Time of Troubles: A Historical Study of the Internal Crisis and Social Struggle in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Muscovy, translated by John T. Alexander (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1971), pp. 164-176.
8. In a discussin with Dr. Andrei Piontkovsky at a round table held at King's College, Cambridge, in January 1991, the author raised the question of whether the Soviet Union had not entered a new "time of troubles" with all its complexity and duration. Dr. Piontkovsky answered that it was a "trouble" [smuta] but thought that it would be of short duration.
9. For an excellent treatment of this critique and its political implications, see: Aleksandr Yanov, Posle El'tsina: "Veymarskaya" Rossiya (Moscow: Izdatel'skaya firma "Kruk," 1995), pp. 244-257.
10. Andrei Sakharov, "Smuty i avtoritarizm v Rossii, polemicheskie zametki" [Troubles and Authoritarianism in Russia, Polemical Comments], Svobodnaya mysl', No. 9 (September 1996), p. 92.
11. Jacob W. Kipp, "The Soviet Ground Forces between Repression and Reform: The Dialectics of Change in Soviet Military Doctrine," Defense Analysis, 7, Nos. 2/3 (June-September 1991), pp. 209-234.
12. Sergei Rogov, "Military Reform: Now or Never," European Security, I, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 5-12.
13. Jacob W. Kipp, "The Uncertain Future of the Soviet Military, from Coup to Commonwealth: The Antecedents of National Armies," European Security, I, No. 2 (Summer 1992), 207-238.
14. Kokoshin, Armiya i politika, p. 10.
16. Evgeniy Zelenov, "Problemy grazhdanskogo kontrolya nad voyennym byudzhetom v demokraticheskom obshchestve," in V. V. Naumkin, ed., Formirovanie voyennogo byudzheta: Materialy seminara (Moskva, 14-15 sentyabrya 1997) (Moscow: Rossiyskiy Tsentr Strategicheskikh i Mezhdunarodnykh Issledovaniy, 1997), p. 9.
17. Naumkin, ed., Formirovanie voyennogo byudzheta: Materialy seminara (Moskva, 14-15 sentyabrya 1997), p. 42.
18. Congressional Record, 139, No. 140 (18 October 1993), p. S13580.
19. Vitaly V. Shlykov, "The Real Defense Burden in Russia," a paper delivered at Swedish Defense Research Establishment's Conference: Russian Military Prospects, March 12, 1998, Stockholm, Sweden, p. 22.
21. Ibid., p. 20.
22. Sergey Oznobistchev, "The Situation in Russia Today," Center for Naval Analysis (Alexandria, VA: May 1998), p. 8.
23. Vitaly V. Shlykov, "Paradoksy Rossiyskoy demilitarizatsii," Voyennyy vestnik, No. 1 (April 1998), pp. 4-5.
24. Martin Nesirsky, "Russian Armed Force in Critical Shape," Johnson's Russia List #2168 (8 May 1998), firstname.lastname@example.org.
25. Vladislav Putilin, "Optimize the Strength of the Armed Forces," Military New Bulletin, VII, No. 6 (78) (June 1998), p. 2.
26. Ibid., and "Defense Chief Says Army was Unable to Fight," Agence France Press (8 April 1998).
27. Aleksandr Gol'ts, "Vo vlast'--shagom marsh!", Itogi (13 July 1998), pp. 33-34.
28. Greg Myre, "Russian Soldiers Support Job Cuts," Johnson's Russia List #2024 (21 January 1998), email@example.com.
29. Shylkov, "The Real Defense Burden in Russia," p. 21, and Krasnaya zvezda, February 6, 1998.
30. Krasnaya zvezda (February 6, 1996).
31. RIA Novosti, Nezavisimaya gazeta (10 February 1998).
32. Interfax, Moscow, 1145 GMT, 3 March 1998, in English.
33. Shylkov, "Paradoksy Rossiyskoy demilitarizatsii," Voyennyy vestnik, No. 1 (April 1998), pp. 4-5.
34. Nezavisimaya gazeta (4 April 1998).
35. Owen Matthews and Bill Powell, "What Really Ails Russia," Newsweek (June 8, 1998), p. 38; and Sergey Markov, "Is a Russian Storm on the Horizon?" Intellectual Capital.com (June 4, 1998). Markov concludes that current political and economic crises are symptomatic of "the long-term illness of modern Russia that periodically becomes more acute or gets slightly better." Russia faces "not an explosive development, but a continuation of slow-burning crises."
36. "Acting Prime Minister Pushes for Military Reform," Jamestown Foundation Monitor (7 April 1998).
38. "Yeltsin Decrees New Defense Commission," Jamestown Foundation Monitor (29 May 1998).
39. "Security Council Secretary Strengthened?" Jamestown Foundation Monitor (3 June 1998).
40. Aleksei Arbatov, The Russian Military in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), p. 2.
41. Eduard Vorob'ev, "Specific Features of Russian Military Reform," Military News Bulletin, VII, No. 6, (78) (22 June 1998), p. 5.
42. Jacob W. Kipp, "The Political Ballet of General Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed: Implications for Russia's Presidential Elections," Problems of Post-Communism (July-August 1996), 43-53, and Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).
43. Arbatov, The Russian Military in the 21st Century, p. 10.
45. Aleksei Arbatov, "Natsional'naya ideya i natsional'naya bezopasnost'," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, No. 6 (June 1998), pp. 5-19.
46. Grigory Yavlinsky, "Russia's Phony Capitalism," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1998), pp. 67-79.
47. G. Zyuganov, ed., Voyennaya reforma: Vooruzhennye sily Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moscow: "Dukhovnoe nasledie," 1998).
48. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
49. Ibid., p. 15.
50. Ibid., p. 38.
51. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
52. V. N. Lobov, "Karl Klauzevits. Zhizn'. Idei. Sovremennoe znachenie," in K. Klauzevits, O voyne (Moscow: LKOS/NAUKA ), pp. 21-22.
53. Mark Galeotti, "Crisis Continues for Russia's Army," Jane's Intelligence Review (June 1998).
54. "Kremlin Approves Major Defense Policy Document," Jamestown Foundation Monitor, IV, No. 149 (4 August 1998) on Daniela@Jamestown.org.
55. Nezavisimaya gazeta (4 August 1998).
56. "Kremlin Approves Major Defense Policy Document," Jamestown Foundation Monitor, IV, No. 149 (4 August 1998) on Daniela@Jamestown.org.
57. Kommersant-Daily(30 July 1998).
58. Itar-Tass, RTR (27 July 1998).
59. Yakov Urinson, "Defence Industry on the Most Efficient Enterprises," Military News Bulletin, VII, No. 6 (78) (22 June 1998), p. 6.
60. Simon Saradzhian, "Russian Budget Cuts Inflame Industry Workers," Defense News (July 20-26, 1998), p. 50.