INDEX


                              CHAPTER V

            PROCEDURE FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY STUDIES
                 AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY SURVEYS


1.  GENERAL.  This Chapter establishes the responsibilities, processes,
    procedures, and requirements for Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies and
    Nuclear Explosive Safety Surveys.

2.  REQUIREMENTS.

    a.  Prior to beginning any operation involving a nuclear explosive,
        before the nuclear explosive components (i.e., main charge high
        explosive parts and pit) are in the same nuclear explosive area,
        or before transporting a nuclear explosive, the Manager of the
        operations office responsible for the proposed operation shall
        assure that a nuclear explosive safety study or nuclear explosive
        safety survey is conducted.  Appropriate action shall be taken by
        the Manager in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, on
        all recommendations to include nuclear explosive safety rules and
        immediate-action procedures developed by the nuclear explosive
        safety study and/or survey.

    b.  For a proposed operation involving a nuclear explosive that is
        believed to be comparable to a previously studied and approved
        operation, a nuclear explosive safety survey may determine that
        the approved study is valid for the operation being considered.
        This action is appropriate provided that the characteristics of
        the system, which affect nuclear explosive safety, are essentially
        the same, and the approved nuclear explosive safety rules provide
        adequate nuclear explosive safety.

3.  NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY STUDIES.

    a.  Organization.

        (1)  The Manager of the Operations Office responsible for a
             proposed operation or test to be studied shall appoint the
             Chairperson of the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group
             (NESSG), who will be a DOE employee.

        (2)  The chairperson shall schedule the Nuclear Explosive Safety
             Study and request appointment of the additional study group
             members and advisors.

        (3)  The NESSG shall normally include at least one member each
             from DP-20, Albuquerque, Nevada, and San Francisco Operations
             Offices (who shall be DOE staff) and from the laboratories
             (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National
             Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories), as well as
             other members or advisors as required by the cognizant
             Manager.  Additionally, when production plant nuclear
             explosive operations are being studied, the NESSG shall
             include one member each from the applicable DOE area office
             and the DOE production contractor organization.

        (4)  Upon request of the cognizant Operations Office Manager, other
             Managers of Operations Offices shall provide knowledgeable DOE
             and DOE contractor personnel to participate as members of, or
             advisors to, NESSGs.

        (5)  NESSG members shall be knowledgeable personnel other than those
             having direct design, development, or operational
             responsibility for the nuclear explosive and the operation or
             test under consideration.  These individuals shall:

             (a)  Have experience with or knowledge of the development,
                  testing, and/or production of nuclear explosives.

             (b)  Have knowledge and understanding of DOE directives,
                  policies, and procedures governing nuclear explosive
                  safety requirements and nuclear explosive production,
                  test, and transportation activities.

             (c)  Have currency in the technology and principles needed to
                  evaluate the nuclear explosive safety of nuclear explosive
                  production, test, and transportation activities.

    b.  Functions.

        (1)  To provide the Manager of the Operations Office responsible
             for a proposed operation or test and DP-20 with a report
             concerning the nuclear explosive safety of the proposed
             operation.

        (2)  To evaluate proposed operations associated with the nuclear
             explosive being studied, to identify any nuclear explosive
             safety concerns and make appropriate recommendations, and to
             develop immediate-action and emergency procedures and
             specific safety rules as necessary.

        (3)  To assure that all nuclear explosive operations are evaluated
             for compliance with the nuclear explosive safety standards
             and rules specified in Chapter IV and that there are no
             unresolved safety issues that could affect nuclear explosive
             safety.

    c.  Scope.  The NESSG shall consider and evaluate, as appropriate:

        (1)  A description of the operations or test to be performed and
             all applicable technical data.

        (2)  A description of the nuclear explosive.

        (3)  One-point safety of the nuclear explosive.

        (4)  Potential nuclear criticality risks associated with the
             operation or test to be performed.

        (5)  A description and analysis of the design safety features of
             the nuclear explosive.

        (6)  An electrical tester description and safety analysis for each
             tester used on a nuclear explosive, and a safety analysis of
             the tester/nuclear explosive interface.

        (7)  Special tooling and written procedures used during the
             processing of the nuclear explosive.

        (8)  Facilities and associated equipment used during the processing
             of the nuclear explosive.

        (9)  Reader worker procedure and check-off.

        (10) A safety analysis of the nuclear explosive prearming, arming,
             timing, and firing systems and procedures to be employed.

        (11) A description of the countdown emergency stop and hold
             capability.

        (12) The potential threat to a nuclear explosive from security
             operations.

        (13) The onsite and offsite transportation of nuclear explosives.

        (14) An analysis of the nuclear detonation response (predictably
             safe or unpredictable) of a nuclear explosive to an abnormal
             environment.

        (15) The characteristics of associated systems in order to
             determine any potential threat to nuclear explosive safety.

        (16) The quantitative risk assessment for a potential dispersal of
             radioactive material from the pit of a nuclear explosive as
             documented in a risk assessment report.

        (17) Other information that applies to nuclear explosive safety,
             which the NESSG determines to be necessary.

    d.  Source of Input Documentation.  The DOE and DOE contractor
        organizations responsible for the design, production, transport,
        or security of nuclear explosives shall provide the information,
        data, and analyses required in paragraph 3c above to the NESSG.

    e.  Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Report.

        (1)  The Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Report shall be provided
             to the Manager of the Operations Office responsible for the
             proposed nuclear explosive operation or test for review.

        (2)  The report shall include, as a minimum:

             (a)  A description of the proposed nuclear explosive operation
                  or test, the nuclear explosive, and associated systems.

             (b)  Pertinent input documentation.

             (c)  A listing of all existing NESSG reports that are
                  applicable to the proposed nuclear explosive operation
                  or test.

             (d)  Conclusions and recommendations based on the NESSG
                  evaluations specified in paragraph 3c above, as
                  appropriate.

             (e)  Proposed nuclear explosive safety rules and
                  immediate-action and emergency procedures for the
                  nuclear explosive operation or test, as appropriate.

             (f)  A statement concerning compliance with the criteria and
                  standards in this Order, and whether any unresolved
                  safety issues exist.

        (3)  In the event a NESSG member or members do not agree with the
             report, a minority opinion shall be appended to the report.

4.  NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY SURVEYS.

    a.  Organization.

        (1)  The Manager of the Operations Office responsible for a proposed
             operation or test, for which an existing NESSG report may be
             applicable, shall appoint the Chairperson of the NESSG.

        (2)  The Chairperson shall schedule the Nuclear Explosive Safety
             Survey and request appointment of the additional NESSG members
             and advisors.

        (3)  The NESSG shall normally include at least one member each from
             Headquarters (DP-20), Albuquerque, Nevada, and San Francisco
             Operations Offices (who shall be DOE staff), and from each of
             the laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence
             Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National
             Laboratories), as well as other members or advisors as desired
             by the Manager.  Additionally, when production plant nuclear
             explosive operations are being surveyed, the NESSG shall
             include one member each from the applicable DOE area office and
             the DOE production contractor organization.

        (4)  Upon request of the Manager of the Operations Office
             responsible for a proposed operation or test, other Managers of
             Operations Offices shall provide knowledgeable DOE and
             contractor personnel to participate as members of, or advisors
             to, NESSGs.

        (5)  NESSG members shall be knowledgeable personnel other than those
             having direct design, development, or operational
             responsibility for the nuclear explosive and the operation or
             test under consideration.  This individual shall:

             (a)  Have experience with or knowledge of the development,
                  testing, and/or production of nuclear explosives.

             (b)  Have knowledge and understanding of DOE directives,
                  policies, and procedures governing nuclear explosive
                  safety requirements and nuclear explosive production,
                  test, and transportation activities.

             (c)  Have currency in the technology and principles needed to
                  evaluate the nuclear explosive safety of nuclear explosive
                  production, test, and transportation activities.

    b.  Functions.

        (1)  To provide the Manager of the Operations Office responsible
             for a proposed operation or test with a report concerning the
             nuclear explosive safety of the proposed operation.

        (2)  To conduct a comparative analysis of the proposed operation
             or test with the nuclear explosive, operation, and/or test
             evaluated in an existing NESSG Report.

    c.  Scope.  The NESSG shall consider and evaluate, as appropriate:

        (1)  A description of the operation or test to be performed and
             all applicable technical data.

        (2)  A description of the nuclear explosive.

        (3)  One-point safety of the nuclear explosive.

        (4)  Potential nuclear criticality risks associated with the
             operation or test to be performed.

        (5)  The characteristics of associated systems in order to
             determine any potential threat to nuclear explosive safety.

        (6)  Applicability of existing NESSG reports to the proposed
             operation or test being surveyed.

    d.  Adequacy and Applicability.  If it is determined that existing NESSG
        reports are not adequate and applicable to the proposed operation or
        test, a Nuclear Explosive Safety Study shall be conducted.

    e.  Nuclear Explosive Safety Survey Report.

        (1)  The Nuclear Explosive Safety Survey Report shall be submitted
             to the Manager of the Operations Office responsible for the
             proposed nuclear explosive operation for approval.  A copy of
             the report will be provided to DP-20.

        (2)  The report shall include, as a minimum:

             (a)  A description of the proposed nuclear explosive operation
                  or test, the nuclear explosive, and associated systems.

             (b)  Pertinent input documentation.

             (c)  A listing of all existing NESSG reports that are
                  applicable to the proposed nuclear explosive operation
                  or test.

             (d)  Specific conclusions and recommendation, as appropriate.

             (e)  A statement concerning compliance with the criteria and
                  standards in this Order and whether any unresolved
                  safety issues could affect nuclear explosive safety.

        (3)  In the event a NESSG member or members do not agree with the
             report, a minority opinion shall be appended to the report.

5.  APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY STUDY GROUP
    REPORTS.

    a.  Studies

        (1)  The Manager of the Operations Office responsible for a
             proposed nuclear explosive operation or test evaluated shall
             review the NESSG report and make a recommendation to DP-20
             regarding approval of the report.

        (2)  Documentation of the Manager's review shall be maintained as
             an integral part of the NESSG report.  The documentation
             shall include reasons for disapproving any of the NESSG's
             recommendations and/or for rejecting any minority opinion in
             the NESSG report.

        (3)  Documentation of the DP-20 action on the NESSG report shall
             be maintained as an integral part of the report, including
             the disposition of any minority opinions in the report.

        (4)  DP-20 will advise the cognizant field Office Manager of
             approval or any needed changes to the operation or test
             needed for approval of the report.

    b.  Surveys

        (1)  The Manager of the Operations Office responsible for the
             proposed nuclear explosive operation or test evaluated shall
             review and take appropriate action concerning its approval or
             disapproval.

        (2)  Documentation of the Manager's action on the NESSG Survey
             Report shall be maintained as an integral part of the report,
             including the disposition of any minority opinions in the
             report.

        (3)  Operations Office Managers shall provide a copy of all
             surveys to DP-20.

6.  VARIATIONS AND VALIDATION PERIOD FOR REPORTS.

    a.  The Manager shall assure that prior to any variation to an approved
        nuclear explosive operation, as documented in an approved NESSG
        report, that a determination be made regarding any possible adverse
        impact on nuclear explosive safety.  At a minimum, the action shall
        include an immediate nuclear explosive safety review of the proposed
        variation by qualified individuals, predesignated by the Manager.
        Based on their evaluation as to possible adverse impact on nuclear
        explosive safety, a determination will be made by the Manager's
        designated representative onsite.  If it is determined that adverse
        impact is deemed possible, the Manager shall be notified and shall
        convene a NESSG to conduct a survey or study as required.

    b.  Approved NESSG study or survey reports are valid only for the
        nuclear explosive and the nuclear explosive operation evaluated
        and are valid for 5 years unless there are significant changes to
        the operation for which the report was written.