U.S. Department of Energy ORDER
Washington, D.C. DOE 5610.13
SUBJECT: JOINT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPON
SYSTEM SAFETY, SECURITY, AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES
1. PURPOSE. To establish Department of Energy (DOE) policy, procedures,
authorities, and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon
and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control activities in
conjunction with the Department of Defense (DOD).
2. SCOPE. The provisions of this Order apply to DOE Headquarters and
field elements and its contractors and subcontractors that conduct
nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
activities in support of the nuclear weapons program, as provided by
law and/or contract and as implemented by the appropriate contracting
3. APPLICABILITY. Requirements set forth in this Order apply to all joint
DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and
control activities from initial design through the retirement phase of
each nuclear weapon system.
a. DOE 5610.10, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SAFETY PROGRAM, of
10-10-90, which establishes the DOE policy, authorities, and
responsibilities for nuclear explosive and weapons safety.
b. "Memorandum of Understanding Between DOE and DOE on the Objectives
and Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities," of
1-17-83, which supplements previous agreements delineating DOE and
DOE objectives, responsibilities, and measures to improve
stockpile planning and acquisition; and ensuring high-level
attention to nuclear weapon safety, security, and control.
c. DOD Directive 3150.2, "Safety Studies and Reviews of Nuclear
Weapon Systems," of 2-8-84, which provides the policy,
responsibilities, and procedures for applying safety standards to
nuclear weapons and weapon systems, for developing and processing
nuclear weapon system safety rules, and conducting safety studies
and operational safety reviews of nuclear weapon systems.
d. National Security Decision Directive Number 2.
e. National Security Decision Directive Number 309.
a. DOE Field Review (Field Review). A DOE-initiated review of DOD
nuclear weapon and/or nuclear weapon system activities/operations
to satisfy the DOE's dual-agency responsibility to protect public
health, safety, and the environment.
b. Weapons Design Laboratories. Those laboratories; i.e., Sandia
National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
Los Alamos National Laboratory, which conduct nuclear weapon
research, design, and development activities under the auspices of
the Department of Energy.
6. POLICY. DOE shall establish and maintain inter- and intra-Departmental
procedures for addressing and conducting joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon
and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control activities to
assure that these areas are adequately addressed from the initial
conceptual design through the retirement phase of each weapon system.
7. OBJECTIVE. To establish and implement systematic procedures to assure
nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
are adequately addressed throughout all phases for each nuclear weapon
a. Phase I, Weapon Concept;
b. Phase II, Program Feasibility;
c. Phase IIa, Advanced Development;
d. Phase III, Development and Engineering;
e. Phase IV, Production Engineering;
f. Phase V, First Production;
g. Phase VI, Quantity Production; and
h. Phase VII, Retirement.
This effort shall include, but not be limited to, the DOE's
participation in the development, staffing, and implementation of
safety rules that shall govern all nuclear weapon system operations
throughout the stockpile-to-target sequence.
a. Secretary of Energy (S-1) is responsible for rendering final
Departmental decisions on nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system
safety, security, and control issues.
b. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1) is responsible
(1) Developing and promulgating Departmental policy regarding
joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system
safety, security, and control activities.
(2) Serving as the Department's representative to the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC).
(3) Providing DOE concurrence in new or revised DOD safety rules.
c. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application (DP-20) is
(1) Providing overall direction for policy implementation and the
compliance of requirements contained in this Order.
(2) Serving as the DOE member to the Nuclear Weapons Council
Standing Committee (NWCSC).
(3) Chairing, and designating DOE members, to the Nuclear Weapons
Council Weapons Safety Committee (NWCWSC).
(4) Monitoring and appraising the DOE Operations Offices conduct
of joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system
safety, security, and control activities, as provided for in
(5) Designating DOE Headquarters representatives to serve on
Project Officer Groups and respective safety subcommittees.
(6) Coordinating and approving the results of nuclear weapon and
nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
activities that are conducted by DOE Elements, its
contractors and subcontractors, prior to the release of such
results to the Department of Defense.
(7) Assuring timely response to Military Service approved Nuclear
Weapon Safety Study Group (NWSSG) recommendations that
require Department of Energy action or support.
(8) Coordinating requirements for obtaining DOE concurrence in
DOD safety rules.
(9) Preparing and forwarding to DP-1 the recommended DOE position
on any new or revised DOD safety rules for concurrence
(10) Providing direction and guidance for conducting DOE
d. Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) is responsible for:
(1) Managing, under DP-20 direction, the DOE's program for
participation in the DOD Safety Studies and Reviews of
Nuclear Weapon Systems.
(2) Serving as the point of contact to the military services and
their Nuclear Weapons System Safety Groups (NWSSGs)
concerning matters relating to the military services' safety
studies and operational safety reviews.
(3) Providing a representative to serve as a member of each of
the military services' NWSSGs.
(4) As required, tasking the weapons/design laboratories to:
(a) Provide a technical advisor to assist the DOE's NWSSG
(b) Provide the NWSSGs with technical support,
documentation, and briefings.
(c) Provide other safety, security, and control-related
functions, as required.
(5) Reviewing all DOD safety rules packages forwarded from
Headquarters (DP-20) for action and submitting appropriate
recommendations on the rules packages to DP-20.
(6) Monitoring the actions of the military services in responding
to the findings and recommendations of the NWSSGs and making
appropriate recommendations for DOE action to DP-20.
(7) As tasked by DP-20, appointing DOE/AL members to the NWC
Weapon Safety committee.
(8) Designating DOE/AL representatives to the Project Officer
Groups and respective safety subcommittees for each weapon
e. Managers, Nevada and San Francisco Operations Offices are
responsible for providing support to joint DOE/DOD Nuclear Weapon
System Safety, Security, and Control Activities.
9. PROCEDURES FOR DOE OVERSIGHT THROUGHOUT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM
a. General. A DOE representative shall be designated by DP-20 to
oversee and concur in all activities throughout each of the
Nuclear Weapon Program phases to assure adequate attention is
given to safety, security, and control considerations.
b. Oversight Activities.
(1) A DOE employee shall participate in all nuclear weapon
program activities that have or could have an effect on
nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system safety, security, or
control. This individual will normally be designated by the
Manager, AL; however, in some cases, and after coordination
with the Manager, AL, DP-20 will designate this individual or
additional individuals to assure all relative activities are
(2) Manager, AL, shall designate an individual to participate in
all Project Officer Groups and respective safety
subcommittees with their primary responsibility being to
assure that all safety, security, and control issues are
fully considered and adequately resolved.
(3) Issues resulting from joint DOE/DOD nuclear weapon and
nuclear weapon system safety, security, and control
activities shall be resolved by the following procedures as
(a) Coordination between appropriate level DOE and DOD staff
(b) Referral to the NWCWSC and/or to the NWC for recommended
(c) Submission, with appropriate recommendations, to the
Secretary for final disposition.
10. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OF AND CONCURRENCE IN DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM
a. General. The procedures for DOD development, processing, approval
(both interim and final) and promulgation of DOD nuclear weapon
system safety rules, including coordination with DOE, are detailed
in DOD Directive 3150.2. When operational requirements dictate
early approval of safety rules by the Secretary of Defense in a
period that does not permit sufficient time for DOE to complete
its formal coordination process, the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Atomic Energy)[ATSD(AE)] will request that DOE provide
interim concurrence in the rules subject to later completion of
formal processing within DOE and final DOE concurrence. The
procedures for DOE review and evaluation of proposed safety rules
in support of interim and final approval by the Secretary of
Defense are specified below.
b. Procedures for Interim/Final Approval.
(1) DP-1 shall:
(a) In the event there are no unresolved safety issues
relating to the safety rules package, provide DOE
concurrence in granting interim/final approval to DOD,
(b) In the event there are unresolved safety issues in the
rules package, take appropriate action in accordance
with paragraph 9b(3) above.
(2) DP-20 shall:
(a) Forward the safety rules package to the Manager, AL, for
review and recommendations.
(b) Conduct a review of the safety rules package based on:
1 the concept of operations; 2 the design safety
features of the nuclear weapon system; 3 the proposed
safety rules; 4 the NWSSG safety study/review
recommendations; and 5 AL recommendations.
(c) In the event there are no unresolved safety issues
relating to the safety rules package, forward the
package to DP-1 with a recommendation for concurrence
within 30 days, when possible, of receipt of the rules
(d) If pending final approval, and it is deemed necessary,
coordinate and conduct a field review of the proposed
(e) In the event that the safety rules package review (or
the field review, if conducted) reveals the need for
revising the proposed safety rules, coordinate the
revision with ATSD(AE).
(f) In the event that, following formal efforts in
conjunction with the ATSD(AE), unresolved safety issues
remain, submit the rules package with appropriate
recommendations to DP-1 for resolution.
(g) Provide a copy of all pertinent correspondence regarding
the safety rules package to the Manager, AL.
(3) The Manager, AL, shall:
(a) Upon receipt of the proposed safety rules package from
DP-20, conduct an analysis and review of: 1 the
proposed safety rules; 2 NWSSG findings and
recommendations; and 3 the military services' subsequent
actions on any NWSSGs findings and/or recommendations.
(b) Based on the results of paragraph 10b(3)(a) above,
provide comments and recommendations to DP-20 in a
timely manner to meet the suspense date.
(c) When a field review is directed by DP-20, provide
assistance in conducting the review.
(d) Task the appropriate weapon/design laboratories to
assist in the conduct of the reviews and analyses and in
the development of DOE comments and recommendations.
c. Procedures for Administrative Change. DP-20 shall:
(1) Determine, in each instance, whether the proposed change is
nonsubstantive in nature and should be processed
administratively or whether formal processing action is
required. In making this determination, an administrative
change shall be measured against the following:
(a) A nonsubstantive change may be one of the following:
1 Changes in nomenclature.
2 Editorial changes to bring particular rules into
agreement with approved rules of a later date.
3 Deletion of weapons and delivery vehicles no longer
in the inventory.
4 Other changes not involving nuclear safety.
(b) A proposed administrative change shall satisfy the
1 There is no change in established safety policy.
2 There is no change to the operational concept upon
which the safety rules are based.
3 There is no change to any of the nuclear safety
features (either by modification, addition, or
removal) in either the weapon(s) or delivery
4 There are no changes to specific restrictions as
set forth in the rules.
5 There are no outstanding unresolved recommendations
that would degrade nuclear explosive safety.
(2) Obtain AL position (in coordination with the appropriate
laboratories) regarding the proposed administrative change.
(3) If determined to be an administrative change, provide DOE
concurrence in the change to the ATSD(AE).
(4) In the event that it is DOE's position that there are
unresolved safety issues and, therefore, does not constitute
an administrative change, an action memorandum detailing the
issues shall be submitted to DP-1 for resolution.
(5) Provide a copy of all pertinent correspondence to the
11. PROCEDURES FOR PARTICIPATION IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPON
SYSTEM SAFETY GROUP ACTIVITIES.
a. General. In accordance with paragraph 4c above, the Secretary of
each military department ensures the safety of all nuclear weapon
systems for which that service has operational, custodial, or
developmental responsibility. In discharging this responsibility,
each department Secretary establishes and convenes a NWSSG to
conduct safety studies and operational safety reviews of each
nuclear weapon system. The NWSSG membership includes an appointed
Chairperson from the military service, representatives of the
military service(s) concerned, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and
b. Guidelines for DOE Participation in NWSSGs.
(1) DOE, through the DOE designated weapon/design laboratory,
shall provide safety, security, and control-related data on
the specific nuclear weapon to be addressed by the NWSSG.
(2) The Manager, AL, shall appoint a DOE member whose primary
responsibility shall be participation in the activities of
(3) The DOE members of NWSSGs shall not have current or have had
prior responsibility for the design, development, or
production of the specific weapon or weapon system being
(4) The DOE NWSSG member shall be qualified by education and
experience to identify, analyze, and understand the
information necessary to conduct a proper evaluation of
nuclear weapon systems employed by DOD. The task of the DOE
NWSSG member is to make unbiased and independent judgments
regarding the nuclear safety of the nuclear weapon system
under consideration. The DOE NWSSG member shall not have
responsibility for advocacy of special interests of DOE or
any other agency.
12. SAFETY STANDARDS. In evaluating the nuclear safety, security, and
control of nuclear weapon systems through participation in studies and
reviews conducted by the DOD NWSSGs, the DOE member shall employ the
DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards contained in DOD Directive
13. DOE FIELD REVIEW.
a. General. The requirement for a DOE field review of a new or
stockpiled nuclear weapon system shall be conveyed to DOD when the
Department of Energy believes such action is necessary to fulfill
its obligation for dual-agency judgment to protect public health,
safety, and the environment. Field reviews shall be employed to
address the adequacy of proposed safety rules and to identify
required changes, if any, in the rules prior to DOE final
concurrence and final approval by the Secretary of Defense. The
field review process may also be used to develop the DOE position
on unresolved safety issues between DOE and DOD or to identify
safety concerns when significant changes are made to system
hardware or procedures.
b. Procedures for Conducting a DOE Field Review.
(1) The need for conducting a DOE field review shall be clearly
identified by appropriate DOE staff and forwarded through
management channels to DP-20 for action.
(2) Based on a review of the issue(s), DP-20 shall take action to
coordinate the conduct of a field review, or to resolve the
issue by other methods, with DOD, ATSD(AE).
(3) Should DOD nonconcur with DOE in the need for a field review,
DP-20 shall take appropriate action as outlined in paragraph
c. Field Review Scope. The DOE field review shall:
(1) Be conducted in an as realistic operational environment as
(2) Include briefings at the appropriate level of the military
service having primary responsibility for the system/activity
(3) Include discussions and demonstrations by elements
participating in the stockpile-to-target sequence to
(a) The adequacy of the nuclear weapon system safety rules.
(b) Conformance with the approved concept of operations.
(c) An understanding of the implementation of the safety
rules at the operational level.
(d) Solutions to unresolved safety issues.
d. Field Review Responsibilities.
(1) DP-20 shall:
(a) Coordinate the need for and conduct of field review with
(b) Notify Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, of the
field review requirements.
(c) Appoint a field review chairman.
(d) Provide direction and guidance for the conduct of the
(2) Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, shall:
(a) As directed by DP-20, provide membership to the field
(b) Task appropriate weapon/design laboratories to provide
support to the field review.
(3) Managers, Nevada Operations and San Francisco Operations
Offices, shall provide membership to the field review team,
as directed by DP-20.
(4) Reports. At the conclusion of the field review, a report
containing appropriate findings and recommendations shall be
prepared and signed by all field review members. Minority
opinions, if any, shall be included in the report. The final
report shall be submitted through DP-20 to DP-1, and/or S-1
(if applicable), with copies to all members.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY:
JIM E. TARRO
Director of Administration and
Human Resource Management