United States And India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act Of 2006 

[Congressional Record: July 26, 2006 (House)]
[Page H5902-H5930]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr26jy06-116]

UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROMOTION ACT OF 2006

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 947 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5682.

{time} 1731

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India,
with Mr. Duncan in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Lantos) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)

[[Page H5903]]

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S.-
India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, which the Committee on
International Relations ordered reported by a vote of 37-5 on June 28.
This, therefore, is truly a bipartisan effort.
This bill is based on the administration's original proposal, H.R.
4974, which Mr. Lantos and I introduced last fall at the request of
Secretary Rice. Current law does not permit civil nuclear trade with
India. That legislation would have authorized the President to waive a
number of provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to
allow him to negotiate an agreement establishing civil nuclear
cooperation with India.
This agreement will permit the U.S. to sell technology to India for
nuclear power development. In return, India will open up for inspection
its civilian nuclear program to international inspections and also
agree not to test nuclear weapons and abide by nuclear export controls.
H.R. 5682 takes the President's bill as a starting point and amends
it in several key ways. The most important of these is that the process
of congressional consideration has been reversed, meaning that the
agreement cannot go into effect unless Congress approves it. This
seemingly small change actually has great ramifications for the role of
Congress as it ensures that we will retain a substantive role in the
negotiation and implementation of this historic and far-reaching
agreement.
Other major improvements in this bill include strengthening the
conditions which the President must certify. The original, vague
generalities have been made more specific and require a number of
conditions to have already been met instead of being open-ended. The
most important of these include:
That India has provided the United States and the International
Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to separate its civilian and
military facilities;
India has concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA regarding
its civilian nuclear facilities;
India and the IAEA are making ``substantial progress'' toward
concluding an Additional Protocol, which is a set of enhanced
safeguards and inspection measures that the United States is urging all
countries to negotiate for themselves;
India and the United States are working toward a multilateral Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty;
India is working with the United States to prevent the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing technology;
India is taking steps to secure its nuclear and other sensitive
materials and technology through enhanced export control legislation
and harmonizing its export control laws, regulations and procedures
with international standards; and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also
known as the NSG, has voted to change its guidelines to allow civil
nuclear trade with India.
As many of you know, the NSG is a voluntary group of countries that
export nuclear materials and technology and that coordinate their
export policies regarding other countries. Currently, those guidelines
do not permit nuclear trade with India.
In addition, the legislation requires detailed annual reports on the
implementation of the U.S.-India agreement and on U.S. nonproliferation
policy with respect to South Asia. There are also sections on Sense of
Congress and Statements of Policy that, although containing many useful
provisions, I will not take the time to describe in detail now.
Taken together, the committee believes that this bill represents a
judicious balancing of competing priorities and will help lay the
foundation for an historic rapprochement between the United States and
India, while also protecting the global nonproliferation regime.
Having described the major components of the bill, let me take a
brief moment to address some of the arguments made by supporters and
opponents.
I have yet to hear any objection raised by any Member regarding the
desirability of improving U.S.-India relations in general. She is the
largest democracy in the world, with 1.1 billion people.
The announcement on July 18 of last year by President Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Singh of a new global partnership between our two
countries has been almost universally praised in this country and is
rightly regarded as an historic achievement and one that is long
overdue.
That partnership embraces many elements, from combating the AIDS
epidemic to collaboration on scientific research to closer cooperation
and ensuring stability in South Asia and other regions. Among other
benefits, the agreement on nuclear cooperation that this bill will make
possible will help India address its pressing energy needs by allowing
it to build several nuclear reactors to supply electricity and
lessening the need for petroleum.
A major argument in favor, however, is that a closer relationship
with India is needed to offset the rising power of China. There is much
to this view, and it is clear that the U.S. will need to draw upon new
resources to handle the challenges of this new century.
In the end, this is a good deal for both the U.S. and India. While
the world has known that India possesses nuclear weapons, India has not
had a seat at the table of nuclear stakeholders. The agreement calls
for the U.S. to sell technology to India for nuclear power development.
In return, India will open its 14 civilian nuclear reactors to
international inspections, agree not to test nuclear weapons and abide
by nuclear export controls. This brings India into the mainstream with
other accountable countries, giving rise to the same benefits and
responsibilities as such other countries.
It is important to note that this deal would improve international
nuclear security and at the same time expand relations between the U.S.
and one of the most important emerging nations in the world. It will
enable India to make energy cheaper, cleaner and more accountable. It
would create more customers for U.S. firms and, in the end, both
countries will benefit.
I urge support of this important legislation.
I want to acknowledge the indispensable collaboration of Mr. Lantos
and his marvelous staff, matched only in talent and zeal by my
marvelous staff. This is truly a product of very desirable
bipartisanship, and I thank them and salute them for their
contribution.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the legislation. This is no
ordinary vote. Historians will regard what we do today as a tidal shift
in relations between India and the United States. This will be known as
the day when Congress signaled definitively the end of the Cold War
paradigm governing interactions between New Delhi and Washington.
A few weeks ago, by a vote of 37-5, the International Relations
Committee resoundingly approved this legislation backing the civilian
nuclear accord with India. This was nothing short of a vote of
confidence in the long-term future of relations between India and the
United States.
President Clinton laid the foundation for this process with his
historic trip to India 6 years ago. He demonstrated that the United
States was launching a new era of mutual respect and cooperation.
A year ago, this vision was brought to full realization as the
President and Prime Minister Singh issued a joint statement on an array
of new initiatives spanning the fields of high technology, space
exploration, counterterrorism, defense cooperation and energy security.
Today, Mr. Chairman, the House of Representatives steps forth into
the spotlight to offer its judgment on one critical element of this new
relationship, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion
Act of 2006, the first key step to create the statutory authority to
expand nuclear research, civilian nuclear power and nonproliferation
cooperation New Delhi.
Our legislation represents a nonproliferation victory for the United
States. As part of the agreement, India has committed to continue its
moratorium on its own nuclear tests. It will also adhere to
international nuclear and missile control restrictions, and India has
agreed to place its civil nuclear facilities for the first time under
international safeguards.
Mr. Chairman, this, of course, is not a perfect agreement. No
agreement between two sovereign nations can ever

[[Page H5904]]

be perfect, because the agreements arise from hard negotiations.
Compromise was necessary on all sides. But we must not let the siren
song of perfection deafen us to this chance for dramatically
strengthening an important and valued ally.

{time} 1745

Mr. Chairman, I understand the criticisms of this agreement on
nonproliferation grounds. But I would like to assure the House that the
International Relations Committee has thoroughly examined these issues
during our five extensive hearings since last September on this
initiative.
And, Mr. Chairman, our bill addresses those concerns thoroughly. It
requires the President to make several determinations to Congress.
Among these, the President must determine that India has concluded a
credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities;
that India has concluded a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency that will apply safeguards in perpetuity to
India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs; that India
is harmonizing its export control laws and regulations to match those
of the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group, and that India is actively
supporting U.S. efforts to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty.
It is worth repeating, Mr. Chairman, that the International Relations
Committee came to the determination that this agreement advances our
Nation's nonproliferation goals, and our committee approved the bill by
an overwhelming, bipartisan vote of 37-5.
Mr. Chairman, this legislation has been carefully crafted to protect
our nonproliferation interests, and to ensure direct congressional
oversight. Members will recall that the administration wanted Congress
to approve the India deal in advance, without seeing the details of a
still-to-be-negotiated nuclear cooperation agreement.
There would have been no effective subsequent review by the Congress.
We rejected that approach. Our agreement ensures that Congress will
have the final word on whether or not the agreement for cooperation
with India can become law. Under our approach, Congress must vote a
second time before there can be any civilian nuclear cooperation with
India.
Congress must approve the completed cooperation agreement. But
congressional oversight does not end there, Mr. Chairman. Our
legislation also requires that the President make detailed annual
reports on U.S. nonproliferation policy with respect to South Asia and
the implementation of the U.S.-India agreement. And it includes certain
guarantees that India will adhere to international standards for
maintaining a safe civilian nuclear program.
Mr. Chairman, it is my deep pleasure to see the United States and
India finally emerging from decades of distrust and aloofness. Today,
we are at the hinge of history, as we seek to build a fundamentally new
relationship based on our common values and our common interests.
Our legislation, which is before this House, is a concrete and
meaningful element of this new and dynamic relationship. I urge my
colleagues to give their full support to this legislation and to help
usher in a new day in U.S.-India relations.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos
for their hard work on this bill. I think they have covered the details
of the bill rather well.
The reason I wanted to take 1 minute was to say that I met with Prime
Minister Singh in Delhi, India, along with some of his cabinet members,
oh, a couple of months ago.
And although I have not always been in accord with some of things
India has done, I am sure that they want to work with us on this
nuclear agreement. They have assured me, and I am confident they will
keep their word, that there will be a clear demarcation between civil
use of nuclear energy, nuclear technology we might sell to them and
their nuclear weapons program.
And there is about 800 million people in India that are living on
less than $2 a day. And when you go through Delhi and you see how they
are living, under horrible, horrible conditions, little children
running around with no place to go, burning cow chips for the heat that
they need to stay warm at night, you realize the need for energy that
they have and they need it so badly.
So this nuclear technology we are going to sell them for civil use
will be very helpful, not only for job creation over there, but for
making the quality of life better for all the people in India.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Davis) for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request.
(Mr. DAVIS of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. DAVIS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682,
the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.
Mr. Chairman, ``India,'' Mark Twain wrote, ``is the cradle of the
human race, the birthplace of human speech, the mother of history, the
grandmother of legend, and the great grandmother of tradition.'' Now,
this remarkable country is asking for our assistance as it develops its
civilian nuclear program.
The possibilities for nuclear technological innovation in India are
limitless. Domestic infrastructure improvements in water supply, power
generation, and other industries will substantially improve the quality
of life for over one billion Indian people.
Cooperating with India as it develops stable nuclear technology will
strengthen the bond between India and the United States. Offering our
expertise will increase the environmental protections in production and
promote the responsible discard of nuclear waste. Bringing India's
nuclear program under international guidelines will ensure a safer
nuclear program.
The security and stability of India's nuclear program security is of
the utmost importance. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Indian Government have been working together to apply safeguards in
accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency practices as well as
formulating a plan to ensure the separation of civil and military
facilities, materials, and programs. Furthermore, India is supporting
international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and
reprocessing technology. India is ensuring that the necessary steps are
being taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through the
application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations
through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control
Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.
India is a flourishing democracy that seeks to develop its nuclear
program for purely peaceful reasons. It should be congratulated for
that. Cooperating with India as it develops a civilian nuclear program
will help India fulfill its civilian energy needs while creating a
strategic partner for the United States in a volatile region.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/4\ minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Berman) our distinguished colleague who has made
invaluable contributions to the development of this legislation.
(Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman and the
ranking member of the committee, both Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos, and
their staffs for their hard work on this legislation.
There is no question that this bill is a major improvement over the
administration's legislative proposal, as Mr. Lantos mentioned. Because
of the changes they have made, we will have an opportunity to decide
whether or not to approve the nuclear cooperation agreement by a
majority vote after the agreement is negotiated, after we see the IAEA
safeguards agreement with India, and after the Nuclear Suppliers Group
has reached a consensus.
Notwithstanding that, I do remain deeply concerned about this nuclear
deal, because I fear that it will complicate our efforts to prevent the
spread of weapons of mass destruction. Not because I think India is
going to be a major proliferator, but because once you change the long-
established nonproliferation rules for the benefit of one country, even
a friendly democracy like India, then it becomes much easier for the
other countries to justify carve-outs for their special friends.
I would not be so concerned about setting a bad precedent if there
was some compelling nonproliferation gain, but I just do not see it
here. Later today, Representative Tauscher and I will offer an
amendment to provide

[[Page H5905]]

that missing piece of the proposal. Our amendment, based on a proposal
by former Senator Sam Nunn, would allow exports of nuclear reactors and
other technology to India after a nuclear cooperation agreement has
been approved by the Congress.
But it would restrict exports of uranium and other nuclear reactor
fuel, until the President determines that India has halted the
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Otherwise,
we incentivize this.
Mr. Chairman, I come at this as someone who is unabashedly pro-India.
I strongly support efforts to strengthen the U.S.-India strategic
partnership. I also accept the fact that India has nuclear weapons,
will never give up those weapons, and will probably never sign the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome civilian nuclear cooperation with India, as
long as it is done in a responsible way that does not undermine our
credibility as a leader in the fight against proliferation. I believe
the Tauscher-Berman amendment will help to achieve that goal.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce).
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this
legislation, allowing for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India.
The last two administrations have forged closer ties with India. And
India is a nation now of over 1 billion people. The last two
administrations frankly have overcome the chilly relations of the Cold
War with India.
And last July's joint statement committed each country to a global
partnership which has accelerated our cooperation on many issues,
including on counterterrorism. As we saw 2 weeks ago, when a series of
commuter train bombings hit Mumbai, killing over 200 Indian people,
India is a frontline state in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.
Congress has played a leading role promoting U.S.-India relations.
There is an India Caucus which I cochaired in the 107th Congress. In
2001, I led a congressional delegation to India's earthquake-shattered
Gujarat region. Other Members have focused on India. But nothing we
have done is as significant as the civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement that we are debating today.
As our distinguished chairman has noted, the International Relations
Committee has given this agreement close and extensive review. We held
five hearings, which is certainly warranted given the high stakes.
Supporters and detractors alike recognize the great significance of
this policy shift that the Bush administration has engineered. I would
like to commend Chairman Hyde. He took a weak administration
legislative proposal, one dismissive of congressional prerogative and
turned it around. I want to commend Ranking Member Lantos, too, for his
detailed work on this challenging issue.
While nuclear energy is controversial in the United States, it is not
in India. Like in several other countries, nuclear energy is widely
viewed as a critical technology, one central to uplifting hundreds of
millions of impoverished Indians. So India will develop its nuclear
energy sector, not as easily or as quickly without this deal, but it
will nonetheless. And India will not relinquish its nuclear weapons at
this point in time, which is understandable, given its security
situation.
So right now, many Indians view the United States as blocking India's
technological and developmental aspirations by our opposition to their
acquiring nuclear material and technology. With its growing economy,
India is consuming more and more oil. It is competing on the world
market, competing with American consumers for limited hydrocarbon
resources.
This gives Americans an interest in helping India expand its nuclear
power industry, which this legislation does. It also encourages India
to move away from burning its abundance of highly polluting coal. By
passing this legislation, we also take a step toward internationalizing
India's nuclear industry, which I believe would make it safer.
Young Indian scientists and engineers in the nuclear field are
interested in collaborating with their American counterparts. Today
they are isolated. I would rather know more rather than less about
India's nuclear work. Some have raised legitimate concerns about the
impact of this agreement upon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
the Indian nuclear weapons arsenal. I am not prepared, at this point,
to call this agreement a nonproliferation plus, as some do, but neither
is it the clear setback some opponents describe.
For one, this agreement forces a separation between India's civilian
and military nuclear programs. This is a good step. The agreement also
is likely to increase India's cooperation with us in confronting
countries seeking to break their NPT commitment by developing nuclear
weapons.
In my view, this agreement is more likely a wash in the
nonproliferation category, while its broad benefits, primarily
cultivating a more influential relationship with India, are big pluses.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to distinguished
Democratic whip, my good friend from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

{time} 1800

Mr. HOYER. I thank Mr. Lantos for yielding the time, Mr. Chairman. I
support this important bipartisan legislation, and I urge my colleagues
to do the same.
It is critical to note that this bill creates a two-vote process for
Congress to approve this Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with
India. While the bill allows the necessary waivers to the Atomic Energy
Act for this pact, it also requires that the President submit a final
agreement to Congress for a second up or down vote. I want to
congratulate the gentleman from California for getting us a process
that gives us that opportunity.
In short, I believe a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India
will serve America's strategic interests and strengthen global
nonproliferation regimes by bringing the majority of India's nuclear
reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight for the
first time.
In addition, this bill will strengthen the relationship between our
two great democracies. A civilian nuclear agreement will help India's
burgeoning economy continue to grow, and it will provide India with a
clean source of energy.
Now, it is true that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, an international accord that I strongly
support. But it is also true that India has honored the spirit of that
treaty and has been a responsible nuclear nation for the past 32 years,
unlike Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, I might observe.
Under this bill, the President is allowed to waive provisions of the
Atomic Energy Act only after he sends Congress a determination that
India has a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear
facilities. The President must also send to Congress a determination of
an agreement between India and the IAEA requiring that agency to
safeguard in perpetuity India's civil nuclear facilities, materials,
and programs. In addition, the legislation requires detailed annual
reports on the implementation of this agreement.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the House bill represents a policy that
recognizes our Indian allies' responsible actions over more than three
decades and our two nations' strong and deepening relationship. I thank
the gentleman from California and Mr. Royce for their work on this bill
and rise, as I said at the outset, in support of it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation
which will further the cause of civilian nuclear cooperation with
India, and I would like to thank Mr. Lantos and Chairman Hyde for the
work that they put into this, again demonstrating the bipartisan
cooperation that is possible even in the arena of international affairs
which sometimes gets rather testy.
Let me note that the United States-India relations got off to a very
bad start shortly after India became independent of Great Britain.
India basically sided with Russia in the Cold War. Well, the Cold War
is over, and we should be making up for lost time, which is exactly
what this bill is all about.
This is dramatically in the interests of both of our countries.
Economically,

[[Page H5906]]

a prosperous, democratic India with an expanding middle class is a
dream market for American entrepreneurs, manufacturers and, yes,
technologists. This agreement is designed to provide India the energy
it needs to achieve its economic goals but in a way that will not
damage America or other western democracies' economy by fencing off and
consuming limited energy resources or using high-pollution energy
resources of their own.
The high-temperature gas reactor, my subcommittee had a hearing on
this, noting that there are new nuclear alternatives like the high-
temperature gas reactor and other type of nuclear power systems that
offer a safe method of providing India the energy it needs to uplift
the standard of living of its people. This legislation is pro-
prosperity, pro-energy; and, if we are vigilant, it will not be
contrary to the interests of the nonproliferation movement. But it is
up to us to work with India to make sure that nonproliferation remains
a high priority for our countries, both of us together.
Finally, let me note, Mr. Chairman, that we need to have a strong
relationship for it with India, yes, with Japan and, yes, with the
former Soviet Union, if we are to have peace in this world. There is a
danger looming in the future. Hopefully, China will some day
democratize. Until then, we must have alliances with the world's
democracies like India in order to preserve the peace of the world.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to my
good friend from New York (Mr. Ackerman), a distinguished colleague and
valued member of the International Relations Committee.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, today the House has an opportunity to
make an historic choice of great proportions. For 30 years, Mr.
Chairman, U.S. policy toward India has been defined and constrained by
our insistence on punishing India for its sovereign decision not to
sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The truth be told, had India conducted its nuclear tests earlier, it
would have been treated the way we treat France and Britain and Russia
and China and ourselves. In short, it would have been grandfathered in
as a member of the nuclear weapons club. But they did not test earlier,
and they have been treated differently. And nothing that we have tried
over the last three decades has convinced them to give up their nuclear
status, and nothing that we would say over the next three decades would
convince them, either.
The time has come for the United States to deal with the reality of
South Asia as it is and not as a fanciful wish. India lives in a
difficult neighborhood, next to Pakistan, which continues to produce
nuclear weapons unchecked, and China, whose commitment to a fissile
material cutoff is suspect, at best. If India didn't exist in that
neighborhood, we would have to invent them.
India has been a responsible nuclear power and deserves to be treated
that way. The bill before us does just that.
Critics have expressed concerns regarding the bill's impact on our
nonproliferation policy; and, clearly Iran, Pakistan and North Korea
are looking for clues as to what it means for them and their nuclear
programs.
What do you tell Pakistan and Iran and North Korea? Well, you tell
them this: If you want to be treated like India, be like India. Be a
responsible international actor with regard to weapons of mass
destruction technologies. Don't sell your nuclear technologies to the
highest bidder. Don't provide it to terrorists. Be a democracy, a real
democracy like India, and work with us on important foreign policy
objectives and not against us.
Iran and North Korea signed the NPT and are now running away from
their freely entered into obligation and away from IAEA inspections.
India did not sign the NPT, and yet is embracing the IAEA and embracing
global nonproliferation. India's attitude should be recognized and
commended and congratulated.
There are two options before us today: One, don't pass the bill. We
do that, and we allow India to pursue its national interests unimpeded,
as it has been doing outside of the nonproliferation mainstream.
The other is to make a deal with India and give to the United States
and the international community a window in perpetuity into two-thirds
of India's nuclear facilities and all of its future nuclear facilities,
under safeguards, in compliance, transparent.
I think the choice is clear: If you want the IAEA to inspect India's
civilian nuclear facilities, then you are for the bill. If you want
India to be obligated to adhere to the missile technologies control
regime for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want them
to comply for the first time with the nuclear suppliers' groups
guidelines for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want
to send a clear message to nuclear rogue states about how to behave,
then you are for the bill. And, if you want a broad, deep, and enduring
strategic relationship with India, then you are for the bill.
Mr. Chairman, it is time for a 21st century policy towards India, one
that supports and encourages India's emergence as a global, responsible
power and solidifies U.S.-India bilateral relations for decades to
come. The bill before us today is that new policy. I urge our
colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 5682.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Wilson).
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise today as an
original cosponsor of the civilian nuclear agreement. As a member of
the International Relations Committee and past cochair of the
Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, this is an issue I
have enthusiastically supported. I want to thank Chairman Henry Hyde,
Ranking Member Tom Lantos, Chairman Ed Royce, Caucus Cochairs Gary
Ackerman and Joe Crowley, and all other members of the committee who
have crafted well-balanced, bipartisan legislation.
Some incorrectly believe this agreement will have a negative impact
on nonproliferation. In contrast, it will greatly strengthen our
current nonproliferation system. India has long been outside of the
international nonproliferation regimes. Under this agreement, India
will place 14 of 22 existing and planned nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards.
For 30 years, India has protected its nuclear programs. It has not
allowed proliferation of its nuclear technology. India is the world's
largest democracy, with the 11th largest economy. It is treated
uniquely because of its history of maintaining a successful nuclear
nonproliferation regime. I saw firsthand on a visit to India in
December the vibrant future of India as America's partner in the codel
led by Dan Burton.
Passage of this agreement promotes meaningful mutual economic
benefits for India and America. Secretary Rice has noted that as many
as 5,000 direct jobs and 15,000 indirect jobs could be created as a
result of this agreement. In addition, India will be better positioned
to compete in the global economy, and trade between our countries will
continue to grow at a record pace, such as in 2005 when we recorded a
30 percent increase in exports to India.
In conclusion, God bless our troops and we will never forget
September 11.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to my
good friend from Nevada (Ms. Berkley) so she may engage in a colloquy.
Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. Lantos and Mr.
Royce for engaging in this colloquy with me.
I fully appreciate the importance and significance of this historic
piece of legislation. However, I rise today to discuss two amendments
that were adopted by the committee.
I am sure that you are all aware that for over 20 years Nevada has
fought to keep nuclear waste out of Yucca Mountain. This is a most
compelling issue for the people of the State of Nevada. I am very
pleased that the committee agreed with my arguments that, before we
enter into any agreement to support a proliferation of nuclear power,
we should know where the nuclear waste is going to be stored.
Nevada certainly doesn't want to store the nuclear waste that is
generated in our own country, much less the nuclear waste that is
generated in other countries, and that includes India.
I am pleased that an amendment that I sponsored ensuring that spent
fuel

[[Page H5907]]

from India's civilian nuclear reactors cannot be transferred to the
United States without congressional oversight, that was passed by the
committee. Another amendment that requires the President to issue an
annual report describing the disposal of nuclear waste from India's
civilian nuclear program was also approved by the committee.
I believe these are critical provisions that the final bill simply
must contain. Both of these provisions passed without objection during
the committee markup of this legislation. I would ask the chairman
whether he can assure me that he will work to maintain these provisions
in the final bill as the legislative process goes forward.
I yield to the distinguished subcommittee chairman.
Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I supported the gentlewoman's amendment in committee. And while not
necessarily concurring with all the views that she expressed in
committee, I supported her amendment; and hers are helpful amendments
which I will work to maintain in the final bill.
Ms. BERKLEY. I thank the chairman.
I yield to the ranking member of the committee.
Mr. LANTOS. I want to thank the gentlewoman for her excellent work on
this legislation. I will do my utmost to work to keep this provision in
the legislation.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time for
closing.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
my good friend from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the distinguished
ranking member on our Budget Committee.

{time} 1815

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I would like to engage my colleagues and managers of this bill, Mr.
Royce and Mr. Lantos, in a colloquy on the issue of India's nuclear
testing moratorium.
Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act provides that, ``No nuclear
materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology shall be
exported to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President
to have detonated a nuclear device.'' It is my understanding that
section 4(a)(3)(A) of H.R. 5682 waives this restriction for any nuclear
test that occurred before July 18, 2005, effectively allowing nuclear
cooperation in spite of India's past nuclear tests, but not for any
detonation or tests after that day.
Therefore, if India were to do so, continued nuclear cooperation
would be in jeopardy. Is that an accurate assessment?
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina is indeed
correct. It is our intent that section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act
should apply prospectively to India. Should India conduct a nuclear
test in the future, one likely consequence would be the discontinuation
of nuclear fuel and technology sharing by the United States with India.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I agree with my friend, Congressman Royce.
Nuclear tests by India would put the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation
agreement in serious jeopardy.
Mr. SPRATT. I thank my colleagues for that clarification. As a
further point of clarification, India's prime minister has reported to
his parliament that, ``the United States will support an Indian effort
to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any
disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactor.'' A sizeable
fuel reserve could conceivably minimize the impact of a U.S. decision
to cut off fuel supplies should India conduct a nuclear test.
Mr. Royce and Mr. Lantos, is it your understanding that aiding in the
development of a fuel reserve is not intended to facilitate a decision
by the government of India to resume nuclear testing? I yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. ROYCE. That is our understanding.
Mr. LANTOS. And I agree with that interpretation.
Mr. SPRATT. Finally, would the gentlemen then agree with me that any
fuel reserve provided to the Indians for use in safeguarded, civilian
nuclear facilities should be sized in a way that maintains continued
fuel supply as a deterrent to Indian nuclear testing? I yield to the
gentlemen.
Mr. ROYCE. Any fuel reserve should be intended to give India
protections against short-term fluctuations in the supply of nuclear
fuel.
Mr. LANTOS. I agree with Mr. Royce on this point.
Mr. SPRATT. I thank Mr. Royce and Mr. Lantos for that clarification
and commend you for your excellent work on this important legislation.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/4\ minutes
to our distinguished colleague from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega),
my good friend.
(Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the
U.S. and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act, and I want to
certainly commend Chairman Henry Hyde and Ranking Member Tom Lantos for
their leadership in moving this legislation forward. This proposed
legislation is a classic example of what bipartisanship is all about,
and I, again, commend our chairman and ranking member and their staffs
for their statesmanship and initiative in bringing this bill to the
floor for consideration.
I also want to compliment my colleague from New York (Mr. Ackerman)
for giving our colleagues a little historical perspective about this
whole question of non-proliferation, and I want to share with my
colleagues a historical perspective of why India did not and could not
sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Mr. Chairman, while some of our critics may argue that India has not
signed the NPT, I submit that had it not been for our own country's
indifference, I call it benign neglect, if you will, India may have
been a member of the nuclear club and our discussion about the NPT
would have been a moot point.
In the early 1960s, despite having a civilian nuclear program, India
called for a global disarmament, but nations with nuclear weapons
turned a deaf ear. In 1962, China attacked India claiming it was
responding to border provocation. The United States responded by saying
it might protect India against a future attack, but when China exploded
its first nuclear bomb in 1964, the U.S. welcomed China as a member of
the nuclear club, and we also supported China becoming a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council.
It may be of interest to our colleagues, Mr. Chairman, that India had
a civilian nuclear program in place prior to the NPT being open for
signatures in 1968, and at the time, India was only months away from
possessing nuclear weapons. So while critics may argue that India has
not signed the NPT, I agree with India's position that the NPT is, and
has always been, flawed and discriminatory.
Therefore, it is little wonder that India exploded its first nuclear
device in 1974. Recent U.S. State Department declassified documents on
U.S. foreign policy show that India had little choice given the hostile
attitude assumed by our country towards India during the Nixon-
Kissinger years.
I commend President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for bringing this
initiative to the table. I also applaud the effort of Under Secretary
of State Nicholas Burns who was our chief negotiator in development of
this agreement. He did an outstanding job and showed true
statesmanship.
I also want to thank Mr. Sanjay Puri, a great leader in our Indian
American community for all that he has done to rally support for this
bill.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S. and India
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act and I commend Chairman Henry Hyde and
Ranking Member Tom Lantos for their leadership in moving this
legislation forward. This proposed legislation is a classic example of
what bipartisanship is all about and I again commend our chairman and
ranking member and their staffs for their statesmanship and initiative
in bringing this bill

[[Page H5908]]

to the floor for consideration. I want to share with my colleagues a
historical perspective why India did not and could not sign the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, while some of our critics may argue that India has not
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPS, I submit that had it
not been for our country's indifference or, benign neglect, if you
will, India may have been a member of the nuclear club and our
discussion about the NPT would be a moot point. In the early 1960s,
despite having a civilian nuclear program, India called for global
disarmament but nations with nuclear weapons turned a deaf ear.
In 1962, China attacked India claiming it was responding to border
provocation. The U.S. responded by saying it might protect India
against a future attack. But when China exploded its first nuclear bomb
in 1964, the U.S. welcomed China as a member of the nuclear club and we
also supported China to become a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council. It may be of interest to our colleagues that India
had a civilian nuclear program in place prior to the NPT being opened
for signature in 1968 and, at the time, India was only months away from
possessing nuclear weapons. So while critics may argue that India has
not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPS, I agree with
India's position that the NPT is, and has always been, flawed and
discriminatory. Therefore, it is little wonder that India exploded its
first nuclear device in 1974. Recent U.S. State Department declassified
documents on U.S. foreign policy show that India had little choice
given the hostile attitude assumed by the United States towards India
during the Nixon/Kissinger years.
In 1965, believing India was weakened from its war with China,
Pakistan attacked India. In response, the U.S. remained neutral while
China outspokenly supported Pakistan. Concerned for its own security
and having little reason to rely on the U.S., India announced in 1966
that it would produce nuclear weapons within 18 months. But, in 1967,
the U.S. joined with the Soviet Union in crafting a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty which to this day states that only the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France are permitted to
own nuclear weapons because only these five nations possessed nuclear
weapons at the time the treaty was open for signature in 1968.
As we all can agree, India then and India today lives in one of the
world's toughest regions and it is a bit Eurocentric for the U.S. to
treat India as if she is beholden to us for the safety, protection, and
well-being of her people. It is no grand gesture on our part that we
now offer India civil nuclear cooperation. Instead, U.S.-India civil
nuclear cooperation is long overdue and, quite frankly, the deal is as
good for us as it is for India.
Mr. Chairman, I commend President Bush and Prime Minister Singh for
bringing this initiative to the table. I also applaud the efforts of
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who was our chief negotiator in
the development of this agreement. As the lead negotiator, Secretary
Burns has represented our Nation's interest with distinction and true
statesmanship, and I am honored to have worked with him during these
critical months leading up to today's historic deliberation of this
important bill.
I also want to thank Mr. Sanjay Puri, a great leader in our Indian-
American community for all that he has done to rally support for this
bill.
I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of H.R. 5682.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
rise in support of this legislation and of the growing strategic
partnership between the United States, the world's oldest democracy,
and India, the world's largest. The hard work by Members and the staff
on the IR Committee under the leadership of the chairman and ranking
member have produced a bill that better attempts to address legitimate
nonproliferation concerns and respects congressional authority to
approve agreements.
During the markup, the committee adopted an amendment I offered to
minimize the risk that our nuclear exports would assist India's nuclear
weapons programs.
Under this amendment, the President would be required to submit to
Congress a report on the steps he is taking to ensure our exports do
not contribute to India's nuclear weapons program. In addition, my
amendment declared that it is U.S. policy to encourage India not to
increase its production of fissile material in military facilities.
Taken together with the other statements by the administration, this
amendment makes clear that it is U.S. policy to promote the prompt
negotiation of a fissile material production cutoff treaty; that
pending entry into force of such a treaty, to press for the earliest
possible achievement of a multilateral moratorium to accomplish this
purpose; and to urge India to refrain from increasing its rate of
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, the final bill must contain these provisions, and I
would ask my colleague and the manager of the bill, Mr. Royce, whether
he can assure me that he will work to maintain these provisions and
their stated intent in the final bill as the legislative process goes
forward.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCHIFF. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, yes. I supported the gentleman's amendment
in committee, and I will work with him to maintain it in the final
bill.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCHIFF. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for his
excellent work on this legislation, and I intend to work to keep this
provision in the legislation.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank both of you gentlemen. I intend to support the
legislation.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), my very dear friend and our
most distinguished colleague.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, this agreement pours nuclear fuel on the
fire of an India-Pakistan nuclear arms race. This agreement will free
up 40 to 50 bombs worth of nuclear fuel for Indian nuclear bombs, and
the consequence of that will be that Pakistan will respond, and
Pakistan will respond with A.Q. Khan under house arrest in Islamabad,
the Johnny Appleseed of nuclear weapons spread from Iran to Libya to
North Korea.
And how do we know that? We know that because in Monday's Washington
Post we learned from an outside source that Pakistan is building a
facility that can create 50 plutonium nuclear bombs a year. We should
be debating that out here on the House floor tonight.
This House has 2 days to reject a sale of 36 F-16 bombers that can
take the 50 nuclear bombs which Pakistan can make each year in a radius
of 1,500 kilometers, but we are not going to debate that. We are not
going to debate Pakistan's nuclear program, which Congress was not told
about, the American public was not told about.
Who is in Pakistan? A.Q. Khan is in Pakistan. Osama bin Laden is in
Pakistan. Al Qaeda is in Pakistan.
This agreement is going to fuel an arms race, a nuclear arms race in
southeast Asia, and it is going to spread across the world, and instead
of debating an F-16 bill, 36 of them to Pakistan, with this abomination
of a nuclear program which they have, we are instead fueling it with
this India program which Pakistan knows is cynical because it will free
up 50 bombs worth of civilian domestic Indian nuclear fuel for their
bomb program.
We must halt, we must stop this nuclear arms race in southeast Asia.
We must vote ``no'' on this proposal. It is absurd. We should be
debating Pakistan's nuclear program, Pakistan's F-16 program tonight,
or else we will look back on this as an historic failure.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I think we are all very concerned about the reports on Pakistan's
programs that appeared this week. I think it was Monday in the
Washington Post, but I think it is important to also note that that
report stated that the construction on this facility in Pakistan to
make these bombs began sometime in the year 2000. So this is not
something that I think can be characterized as a reaction to this new
initiative with India.
I do have concerns about a nuclear arms buildup in Asia. Again, this
is something that the administration should be doing more on, working
towards a fissile material cutoff treaty.
However, I would just respond by pointing out that this agreement
gives us a chance to be engaged with India on their program instead of
being on the outside as we have been for decades.

[[Page H5909]]

Mr. Chairman, I yield for the purposes of a unanimous consent request
to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach), the chairman of the Asia
Subcommittee.
(Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to recognize
Chairman Hyde and the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, for
their leadership in improving the Administration's draft proposal for
facilitating civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and
India.
In particular, I appreciate their efforts to lessen the
nonproliferation risks inherent in this initiative and to ensure that
Congress remains a full partner with the Executive Branch as we move
forward with this endeavor.
Nonetheless, while the issue at hand is a close call, in my judgment
this particular initiative does not strike the right balance between
two competing American national security interests: the important goal
of improving relations with a rising India and the critical priority of
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile material in an era
hallmarked by the global threat of terrorism. Let me explain why.
There is nothing more difficult than to attempt to put perspective on
events of day because so many issues can only be understood clearly, if
at all, with the passage of time. For example, if we ask what is new on
the Asian landscape over the last several years there is a tendency to
emphasize troubling developments: the scourge of terrorism, North
Korea, tensions over Taiwan, and America's growing trade deficit with
China. But on the positive side little is more consequential than
America's deepening ties with India.
The growing warmth between our two countries has its roots in the
common values and the increasingly congruent interests of democratic
societies committed to the ideal of liberty, social tolerance,
representative government and the fight against terrorism, as well as
other transnational threats--such as the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, illicit narcotics, and the scourge of HIV/AIDS. In this
regard all Americans condemn the recent horrific bomb attacks in
Kashmir and Mumbai, and we stand with the people and government of
India in their opposition to anarchistic acts of terror.
Our deepening government-to-government relationship is complemented
by a rich mosaic of expanding people-to-people ties. In many ways, the
more than 2 million Indian-Americans have become a living bridge
between our two great democracies, bringing together our two peoples,
as well as greatly enlarging our understanding of one another.
From a Congressional perspective, it should be underscored that
America's commitment to this robust and multi-faceted relationship is
fully bipartisan. As underscored by the debate on this measure, there
is virtually no dissent in Washington from the precept that India and
the United States should become increasingly close strategic partners
with compelling incentives over time to develop convergent perspectives
on a host of regional and global policy concerns.
By any objective measure, U.S.-India relations have never been on
more solid footing. From new agreements on defense cooperation to
expanded high technology trade and space cooperation, the relationship
has been moving forward in an impressive fashion. On the economic
front, America is India's largest trading partner and largest foreign
investor. In many ways, however, what is impressive is how marginal,
not how significant, is our trade. Economic and commercial ties between
the U.S. and India are at an incipient, not end stage, and arguably
deserve priority emphasis at this point in our relationship.
In this context, many in Washington and elsewhere around the world
were caught by surprise with the Administration's offer last July to
extend full civilian nuclear cooperation to India; a proposal which
presented Congress with a fait accompli, notwithstanding the fact that
implementation would require legislative action.
By background, when Prime Minister Singh was set to visit Washington
last summer, the Administration was weighing two policy options to help
ensure maximum success for this important summit with the President.
One option would have been to announce unequivocal U.S. support for
India's claim to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council; a stance clearly in the interest of India and also compatible
with the interests of the United States. Bizarrely, however, the
Administration position then and now has been that Washington is
unprepared to take a firm position in support of Indian membership
until the U.S. achieves certain goals related to UN administrative and
management reform, none of which are as critical as the case for
Security Council enlargement to reflect the new balance of power in
world affairs.
Frankly, I am flabbergasted by the Administration's ideological
rigidity, as well as its lack of preparation to support India on this
issue. I regard the U.S. position as awkward philosophically,
illogical, and incompatible with sound strategic judgment.
Instead of supporting India's aspirations for Security Council
membership, the Administration instead chose to peremptorily re-write
the rules of the global nonproliferation that have well-served U.S.
interests for over three decades.
To be sure, I acknowledge that there are a number of credible
rationales for this agreement: to earn trust and goodwill with
policymakers in Delhi, and the Indian public; to help accelerate the
development of a strategic partnership between our two countries; to
promote the use of nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly
alternative to the use of coal and other scarce fossil fuels; and to
emulate an Eisenhower-style atoms-for-peace initiative.
Nevertheless, as strong as the case for this initiative may be, I
remain deeply concerned that the agreement negotiated by the
Administration fundamentally undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the linchpin of U.S.led international efforts to stem the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Administration officials assert that the exceptional treatment being
accorded to India is unique and un-replicable. Once an exception to
treaty law is made, however, the door is opened for a whole spectrum of
governments, including close friends and alliance partners, to come
forward to make comparable claims for special treatment--whether they
be Brazil, Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Pakistan, and even
Taiwan.
If India were the only consideration, it would be a no-brainer to
support this agreement. Unfortunately, at issue is the rule of law as
it applies to us and others as well.
In particular a number of other countries, with whom we currently do
not have amicable relations, such as Iran and North Korea, can be
expected to similarly press the international community to recognize
their legitimacy as nuclear weapons states. And if we unilaterally
declare the right to ignore international law, other countries,
including nuclear weapon states, can not be expected to go along with
an exclusive American right to take exception to treaties.
This agreement thus creates opportunity for countries to use
commercial or geopolitical rationales to expand forms of nuclear
cooperation otherwise prohibited by existing international norms (such
as the NPT) or procedures (such as those developed by the multilateral
Nuclear Suppliers Group).
For example, in the immediate wake of the President's announcement of
a policy shift, before either the Congress or the multilateral NSG
could consider the proposal, Moscow moved to preempt Washington by
announcing it would provide New Delhi with uranium reactor fuel in
contravention of NSG guidelines.
In other words, the mere announcement of an Executive Branch-
initiated proposal has had the effect of undercutting the NPT and
precipitated another nation-state to implement key aspects of
Washington's initiative.
Similarly, the government of Pakistan announced it would be obligated
to match any expansion in India's nuclear weapons program.
The reason we have an NPT is to restrain nuclear weapons development.
Based on news reports this past week from Pakistan, it is clear that
one of the consequences of breaking international law is the
precipitation of an arms race on the Indian Subcontinent. But as
unfortunate as this arms race is, the consequence of the U.S.-led
unraveling of the NPT is the spiraling of nuclear weapons development
elsewhere.
Mr. Chairman, in a philosophical context this agreement is a
reflection of an Administration approach to foreign policy rooted in
the so-called doctrine of American Exceptionalism, which neo-cons do
not define as refining a shining city on a Hill but as the right of a
superpower to place itself above the legal and institutional restraints
applied to others.
In the neo-con world, values are synonymous with power. The implicit
assumption in that American security can be bought and managed alone,
in many cases without allies, and without consideration of contrasting
international views or the effect of our policies on others. Treaties
like a Comprehensive Test Ban, which every President since Eisenhower
has propounded, have been rejected, as have negotiations to strengthen
the verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.
Now the Administration proposes to weaken the NPT, perhaps fatally,
which despite its weaknesses has helped limit the number of nuclear
weapon states to a relative handful instead of 20 or 30 or even more.
As much as I support the Administration's desire to more rapidly
advance a warming of relations with India, I cannot in good conscience
support a weakening of the global nonproliferation regime or the
breaching of United States obligations under international law. I
therefore cannot support the legislation in its current form.

[[Page H5910]]

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished Democratic
leader, my friend and neighbor.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from
California for yielding, for his tremendous leadership in making our
country strong and respected throughout the world.
I am pleased to join him in paying tribute to the chairman of the
committee, Henry Hyde. What a wonderful honor that this bill is named
for him. He, too, has been a champion to promote a values-based
diplomacy for our country. We have all fought many years with him in
support of human rights throughout the world. This is probably one of
the last bills that will be completed on issues that relate to national
security and the respect with which we are held in the world. So
appropriately, it is named for Mr. Hyde.
Both Mr. Hyde and Mr. Lantos have presented the House with
legislation that is a vast improvement, frankly, over the bill that the
President requested earlier this year, and it is a tribute to their
leadership that we can all come together on this legislation this
evening.
The bill before us establishes a two-step process for the India
nuclear agreement. It is a process and legislation, which I support,
that allows Congress to reserve final judgment on the agreement until
the specifics are known. It requires that before Congress votes on the
agreement, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency will have
had to establish a process through which IAEA safeguards will be
applied forever to India's civilian nuclear facilities, programs and
materials.
Therefore, if an agreement is ultimately approved, Congress will
retain the ability to monitor it through the required annual reports on
U.S. nonproliferation policies in South Asia and on the implementation
of the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

{time} 1830

This legislation is important because it recognizes that the prospect
of greater nuclear cooperation with a nation that has not signed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty raises serious concerns. As one who
came to Congress intent on improving international nonproliferation
regimes, I appreciate those concerns. One of the most significant, the
issue of the production by India of fissile material, is addressed by
an amendment to be offered by the gentleman from California (Mr.
Berman).
The Berman amendment, which I support, conditions the provision of
nuclear fuel by the U.S. on a presidential determination that India has
halted fissile material production. But even if the Berman amendment is
not adopted, I hope that the agreement that will be presented to
Congress for approval when negotiations are concluded contains a
promise by India to halt the production of fissile material. Such a
promise would improve the agreement and go a long way to convincing
those who cannot support today's legislation that their concerns have
been heard and that the Bush administration and the government of India
has sought to respond to them.
The legislation before us clearly endorses the philosophy behind
India's nuclear initiative; a judgment that security would be promoted
by bringing India into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. On
balance, I believe that judgment to be correct, and I thank you, Mr.
Lantos and Mr. Hyde, for putting that balance here.
Although not bound by the NPT, India has a strong record of
supporting nonproliferation goals. They have never ever violated the
NPT. India has demonstrated by its actions a commitment to safeguarding
nuclear technology. That commitment will be strengthened by India's
adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and the Missile
Technology Control Regime guidelines as required by the nuclear
initiative.
A close relationship with the democratic India is critical for the
United States. There is a wide range of significant issues on which our
shared values and shared interests will enable productive collaboration
for the betterment of the world. This legislation reflects the strength
of our current relationship with India and our hopes for its future. It
is an expression of trust on matters relating to nuclear technology
based on 3 decades of experience.
I urge my colleagues to support it. Even though there may be some
questions and some amendments which may pass or not prevail today, on
balance, I believe this legislation as presented here is worthy of our
support.
I hope that the agreement that comes back to us is one that will be
without controversy and will again be a reflection of the close bond
between India and America. It was but a week ago when we were all
gathered here to extend our sympathy to the people and the government
of India because of the tragedy at Mumbai. Many of us expressed the
love that we have for India and appreciation for the gifts that India
has given to America, a vibrant dynamic Indo-American community which
has contributed enormously to the economic success of our country and
to our competitiveness in the world.
They have also contributed much to us in terms of our own social
justice. We owe much to India as the source of nonviolence as a
philosophy, espoused and practiced by Mahatma Gandhi. I said last week
that when Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and Coretta Scott King went
to India to study nonviolence, they received a gift from India that
would serve our country well and be important and fundamental to our
own civil rights movement; that nonviolence was a strength that again
improved America, and for which we all should be indebted to India and
we should never forget.
I also personally join Mr. Lantos, because I know of his history on
the subject in expressing appreciation to India for its hospitality to
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, a great leader in the world. And I am
enormously appreciative of the fact that his, I don't want to call it
government in exile, but whatever the term of art is, in Darussalam in
India.
The list goes on and on, we can name them over and over, again
whether it is again the contributions of the Indo-American community,
the philosophy that sprang from India that is so important to us, or
the support for human rights. But on target for today is India's
commitment, which it has never violated, to support the principles of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which although it is not a party
to that treaty, has been a supporter of its principles.
Again, for that reason, I hope that all of our colleagues will vote
in support of this legislation so that we can go to the next step and
that we can go into the future continuing a long and beneficial
relationship with India for us all.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, before yielding time, I want to express my
regret to all of my colleagues that the stringent requirements will
enable me to yield no more than 1 minute to each of our speakers.
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to a distinguished
member of the committee, my good friend from California (Mr. Sherman).
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, India is a democracy that understands the
role of this Congress. They have negotiated a deal that dramatically
loosens the controls on their nuclear weapons program, and they know
that it is the role of this Congress to make that deal one step
tighter.
Our job is to protect the nonproliferation interests of the United
States. The job of India is to say that any amendment we offer is a
``killer amendment.'' Do not be fooled. They know and they expect that
this Congress will do its job and make this deal one step better when
it comes to controlling nuclear weapons.
India did not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We should not
punish India for becoming a nuclear power, but this deal in its present
form facilitates building additional nuclear weapons by India. It will
allow them to build twice as many nuclear weapons per year as they are
doing now.
That is why I will be offering an amendment that will help India's
civilian nuclear program, without helping their military program.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Crowley).
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman.

[[Page H5911]]

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the India Nuclear
Cooperation Promotion Act, and I want to commend Chairman Hyde and
Ranking Member Lantos for the work they put into crafting this
bipartisan legislation that we have before us today. And I would like
to thank the current chairs of the caucus on India and Indian
Americans, Representative Gary Ackerman from Queens and my good friend
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida for the support they have given to the
passage of this agreement. I must also recognize the Indian-American
community for the incredible advocacy work they have done to educate
Members of Congress on the importance of this agreement.
I want it to be clear that this vote sets the stage for allowing the
cooperation, but the actual exchange of civilian nuclear cooperation
will not take place until Congress is provided with the details of the
relevant negotiations and takes a second up-or-down vote.
We will be taking an historic step in our relations today by passing
this agreement. This is about nuclear power access, not nuclear weapons
enhancement. By passing this agreement, we will be bringing an India
that has remained outside the nonproliferation regime for the past 32
years under the nonproliferation tent.
Some of my colleagues have argued we are destroying the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, also known as the NPT, by passing this
agreement. But while I have the deepest respect for the treaty and
those who support it, we must be realistic in understanding why this
deal needs to be done.
India cannot sign the NPT unless it were to give up its nuclear
weapons, which is unrealistic to ask a nation who finds themselves
surrounded by nuclear-armed nations they have fought wars against.
India has been punished for the past 32 years for testing a nuclear
weapon, and during these 32 years of NPT limbo they have not externally
proliferated, while remaining a true democracy with a strong rule of
law.
We need to use India as an example of what a nation should be doing
to gain the respect and inclusion by the international community. I
urge my colleagues to end India's nuclear isolation and allow them to
be brought into the nonproliferation tent with the rest of the
responsible states who seek safe and efficient civilian nuclear
technology.
I support this legislation because I support the relationship that
our two countries should and will be sharing. If we expect India to be
our ally in the 21st century, we must treat them as an equal, which is
what this cooperation will provide. I trust my colleagues will
recognize what our future with India holds and vote for final passage
of this legislation.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Meeks), our distinguished colleague.
Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Chairman, I too want to congratulate
Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos for the strong bipartisan bill.
This initiative really talks about and reflects confidence in India
as a global strategic partner. You know, the world is flat, and we have
to have these partners in the world. What this does is, it says to
India, because it is one of the world's largest democracies, that we
understand and we recognize that.
Also, we have to remember that this is about civil nuclear power.
India has over a billion people and we have to figure out how we also
make sure that we protect and preserve our environment. So what this
does is recognize that the production of clean energy can reduce
further pollution of the environment and decrease dependency on fossil
fuels.
In fact, if you look at the Indian CO<INF>2</INF> emission, a
threefold increase in India nuclear capacity by 2015 would result in a
reduction of over 170 million tons annually, or approximately the total
current CO<INF>2</INF> emissions of the Netherlands. So I strongly
support this bill.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield the balance of
my time to my good friend from California, Congresswoman Barbara Lee.
The Acting CHAIRMAN (Mr. Gutknecht). The gentlewoman from California
is recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman for yielding and
for his leadership and for really crafting a bill that I think is much
better than what it was prior to the hearing, but I must rise to oppose
this bill.
I had the privilege to visit India a few years ago with Mr. Crowley,
and I witnessed firsthand the brilliance, the spirit, and the
commitment to democracy of the Indian people. And like many of my
colleagues, I strongly believe that it is in our country's best
interest to strengthen our relationship with India. But to suggest that
we can only do so at the expense of the international nonproliferation
standards, as this legislation before us would, I think that is both
dishonest and it is dangerous.
Let us be clear. This is not about India. As far as I am concerned,
there is no country, and I mean no country, for which it would be
acceptable to sacrifice our international standards. The problem with
the deal, as it is currently written, is that it will do lasting harm
to more than 30 years of international efforts to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons.
This deal creates a double standard that undermines our efforts with
countries like Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. It
creates incentives for withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. Why have countries like Brazil and South Korea spent all these
years playing by the rules and not building nuclear weapons in exchange
for civilian technology when India gets both?
It sets a dangerous precedent. In explaining Beijing's rationale for
potentially pursuing a deal with Pakistan, Professor Shen Dingli of
China's Fudan University has already argued this. He said, ``If the
United States can violate the nuclear rules, then we can violate them
also.'' We should be fighting to save what is left of the international
nonproliferation framework, not just throwing it away.
We should insist that India formally commit to the goals and
restrictions on the international nonproliferation framework and sign
the Nonproliferation Treaty. Short of that, we should at least insist
on specific nonproliferation safeguards, as specified in an amendment
that I offered, which of course was not ruled in order. It would have
required, however, India to commit to the basic principles consistent
with the NPT. Again, unfortunately, this amendment was not made in
order.
We should not pass any type of a nuclear deal, a nuclear, quite
frankly business deal, without these safeguards. I don't think we
should throw them away. We need to go back to the drawing board and we
need to make sure that international nonproliferation goals are adhered
to.

{time} 1845

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, you know, while the United States is, in
fact, leading the way on this agreement, it is a multilateral agreement
in the sense that the NSG, 45 nations, must concur with this agreement;
and Congress must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement that the
administration is negotiating with India before technology is actually
transferred.
So I also want to make the point here that Congress is going to have
a second crack at this agreement when it comes back. But here is the
choice that we face: Either we continue to try to box in India and hope
for the best, or we make this move, we engage India, and we hope to use
our influence to move this increasingly important country in our
direction. And this will help make India a true partner, a true partner
as we enter what will be a decades-long struggle, I fear, against
Islamist terrorism.
This is not an ideal agreement, and the administration should be more
aggressively pursuing an international fissile material cutoff. But
this agreement is a good one which works through a difficult
nonproliferation situation to strengthen an important relationship for
us.
That is why I ask my colleagues to approve this legislation. Frankly,
it is a chance to strengthen an important relationship for us at a time
when we need more strong relationships, especially with regional powers
such as India; and, I will remind my colleagues, it strengthens a
relationship with a democracy, based on the rule of law, a democracy
that has a good record on nonproliferation.

[[Page H5912]]

This deal is controversial in India. The coalition government of
Prime Minister Singh has come under intense attack from the political
extremes and from political opponents. He has been charged with selling
out India, opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection,
agreeing to check India's nuclear weapons production.
So far the center has held. Let's not deliver India's Marxist and
xenophobic forces a victory. They would like us to kill this deal.
Let's pass this legislation. As Chairman Hyde argued and as the ranking
member explained, let's pass this legislation. Let the administration
negotiate a nuclear sharing agreement with India, and then look again
and decide whether or not to proceed.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act (H.R. 5682). The bill has substantially improved since it
was first introduced in this body, but it still has a long way to go. I
am particularly concerned about the failure of the bill to slow down a
potentially catastrophic arms race in South Asia.
This bill would allow the President to enter into a nuclear
cooperation agreement with India, the world's largest democracy and an
important strategic ally of the United States. Under the proposed
agreement, the United States would transfer fissile material and
nuclear technology to India in exchange for India's promise to separate
its civilian and military nuclear programs, subject its civilian
programs to a host of international inspections and controls, and
continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
As is an all too common habit of this administration, the key
parameters of this agreement were negotiated with little or no
congressional input. Congress was forced to add in protections against
proliferation of nuclear technology and to ensure nuclear safety
largely after the fact.
To this end, the House International Relations Committee has done an
outstanding job in reasserting Congress' constitutional prerogatives.
Thanks to the hard work of the Committee, the bill now requires that
the President report to Congress on the progress that India has taken
toward separating its civilian and military programs, toward placing
its civilian programs under international supervision, otherwise living
up to its end of the bargain. Congress then must vote to grant the
President the authority to enter into this agreement. I welcome these
improvements.
I also commend Congressman Howard Berman for his tireless efforts to
give arms control protections in the agreement some teeth. Mr. Berman
was instrumental in adding provisions that would automatically cease
U.S. transfers of fissile material if India transferred missile or
nuclear technology to third parties in violation of the Missile
Technology Control Regime or the Nuclear Suppliers Group regulations.
These provisions are vital to ensuring that U.S. nuclear technology and
materials do not end up in the hands of terrorists or rogue nations.
But as far as this bill has come, it has not come far enough. The
bill still allows the President to transfer fissile material to India
without ensuring that India first cease its domestic production. It
would therefore allow India to use U.S.-provided uranium for its
civilian programs, while diverting all of its domestic production of
uranium to the development of nuclear weapons. If India chose to divert
its domestic material to its military programs, some commentators have
estimated that it could build an additional 50 nuclear weapons every
year.
This bill could thus fuel an already accelerating arms race in South
Asia. India and Pakistan have engaged in intermittent hostilities for
years, and both already have nuclear weapons. Adding hundreds of new
nuclear weapons to this equation will unacceptably increase the risk of
a nuclear exchange. Pakistan has already hinted that it would increase
its production of nuclear weapons if this agreement is approved. We
must do all in our power to stop this train while it is still in the
station.
I am sympathetic to India's needs for clean, affordable power. I also
recognize that India is a crucial ally of the United States. But we
cannot allow an arms race to spiral out of control.
Both India and the administration have time to allay these concerns
before Congress will hold its final vote on this agreement. I look
forward to reviewing the President's report, and will withhold final
judgment on this agreement until then.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5682, the
United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act.
Were India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the
primary international tool for limiting the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, I would gladly support the agreement. My district is home to a
large Indian-American population, whose opinions I value and whose
support I have long enjoyed. I regret having to disagree with many of
them today.
But I am--and have always been--an ardent proponent of nuclear
nonproliferation. I believe that the fewer nuclear weapons that exist
in the world, the better. Unfortunately, America's unilateral agreement
will encourage an arms race on the Indian subcontinent, promote weak
export controls around the world, and undermine the NPT.
This week, it was revealed that Pakistan is constructing a new
plutonium-production reactor that will massively increase its bomb-
making capacity. Rather than adding fuel to the fire by offering India
a deal that will allow and encourage it to also increase weapons
production, the United States should work to end the production of all
fissile material in South Asia.
A unilateral agreement with India could also undermine the
cohesiveness of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. If the United States
exempts India from nuclear nonproliferation controls, China would
likely feel it appropriate to make a similar agreement and export
civilian nuclear technology to Iran or North Korea.
I am aware that as part of the agreement, India has opted to allow
some of its reactors to be inspected. This concession, however, is
largely symbolic. The reactors that will continue to be off limits
could make more plutonium for weapons than India will ever need.
Furthermore, the precedent of working outside the NPT is dangerous. If
India can secure the benefits of NPT membership without adhering to the
treaty's limitations, other countries will have little incentive to
remain in the NPT.
I urge my colleagues to stand up for non-proliferation and join me in
voting ``no.''
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, having visited India following the
Southeast Asia tsunami, I am more convinced than ever of the benefits
of a stronger U.S.-India partnership. There is no relationship more
important than that between the world's largest democracy, India, and
the world's oldest democracy, the United States. I believe that, as the
world's largest democracy and a responsible regional power, India
deserves a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Support for such
an arrangement would have been a sensible centerpiece to a new
strategic partnership.
However, I am skeptical about elements of the proposed nuclear
cooperation agreement between the U.S. and India. I am particularly
concerned that this attempt to create an exception to international
nonproliferation norms for India may make our efforts in Iran more
difficult, or even encourage other countries to make their own
exceptions to the rules for assistance to the supposedly civilian
nuclear programs of less responsible countries.
I am pleased that the legislation crafted by the leadership of our
House International Relations Committee minimizes the risks associated
with this agreement and provides for close congressional oversight,
though I support additional amendments to strengthen it. I do not wish
to stand in the way of this legislation's progress and intend to follow
developments closely for the up-or-down vote that this bill authorizes.
I believe that the more pressing issue is developing an effective
strategy for cooperation to address India's growing energy needs.
Increased reliance on nuclear energy will only have a marginal impact
on India's consumption of fossil fuels and levels of global warming
pollution emitted. To make an immediate impact, we should be helping
India with conservation, renewable energy technologies, and strategies
to reduce pollution such as coal gasification.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5682, the U.S.
and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act.
India is the largest democracy in the world today, and is rightly
viewed as an emerging global power in the 21st century. I was pleased
to listen to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh address a Joint
Session of Congress in July 2005 and describe his vision of future
cooperation between India and the United States. I will continue to
encourage our government to strengthen our ties to India, in areas such
as high-technology, immigration, trade, space, and the military.
Today the United States and India can take an important step to lay
the foundation for our countries to greatly expand nuclear research,
nuclear power, and nonproliferation cooperation with each other. India
is facing enormous challenges in providing sufficient energy to its
growing population. India has more people living in abject poverty than
do Latin America and Africa combined.
This legislation establishes a two-step process under which the
United States may enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with
India. I am pleased that the Committee on International Relations has
significantly amended this legislation, as compared to the version
initially proposed by the Administration. The legislation today
preserves the important oversight role of Congress. Under this

[[Page H5913]]

legislation, the President must make a number of determinations before
India can be exempted from restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (AEA). Most notably, the President must determine that
India has provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a
credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear programs, and
that India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement requiring the
permanent application of IAEA safeguards to India's civil nuclear
facilities.
Once the President has made the determinations required by this
legislation, Congress must approve a joint resolution to ratify the
final negotiated text of a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. I
also support the provision in the bill that requires additional
consultation between the Administration and Congress, including regular
detailed reports on nonproliferation matters and the implementation of
this agreement.
I look forward to working with the Administration to implement this
nuclear cooperation program between the United States and India,
consistent with this legislation and the intent of Congress.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose H.R. 5682. I do this
reluctantly, because I am a strong supporter of India. But I cannot
turn my back on my life's work on nuclear non-proliferation.
Prior to coming to Congress, I worked at the U.S. Department of State
as an arms control expert. I spent each day there trying to reduce the
threat our nation faced from proliferation of nuclear weapons. I also
learned first hand how effectively the international non-proliferation
regime monitors existing nuclear states and prevents sensitive nuclear
technology from falling into the wrong hands. I also worked for 10
years at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory to research and
develop fusion energy, because it would be an abundant source of energy
that would not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I am also a lifelong supporter of India. In fact, I first traveled to
India more than 30 years ago. When I came to Congress, the first caucus
I joined was the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans.
Since then, my interest in India and my respect for its citizens have
only grown. That is why I believe it is essential that our nation
increase its cooperation with India.
India is our friend and a strong ally. The ties that bind our nations
go to the core of our democratic values. India is the world's largest
democracy, she possesses a vibrant economy, and she has an unwavering
commitment to ending terrorism. America is fortunate to have an ally
that shares our common vision and we need to grow our relationship by
increasing cooperation on other economic, educational, and security
concerns. But I have strong reservations about making individual
exceptions in our nation's laws for nuclear export to India or any
other state.
The non-proliferation regime we have is far from perfect, but it has
proven to be remarkably successful in deterring the spread of nuclear
material. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 is the
centerpiece of international nuclear nonproliferation structure. The
NPT ensured that today we are dealing with only a handful of
problematic states, such as Iran, rather than the dozens of nuclear
states that might have existed otherwise. These historical successes
highlight the essential role that the international non-proliferation
regime has played and why it must not be undermined.
The United States was instrumental in creating the NPT, and now is
not the time to stop our leadership on this important issue. The United
States should not send the wrong message to the global community. We
must continue to be a leader on nuclear non-proliferation if we hope to
prevent Iran, North Korea, or others from acquiring nuclear weapons.

During the 2004 presidential campaign, both President Bush and
Senator Kerry agreed on one thing: nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism are the gravest threat that our country faces. The threat of
nuclear terrorism is underscored today because of the recent actions of
Iran and the continued work by North Korea to develop nuclear
technology.
That is why we need to be doing more to strengthen and support the
international nuclear non-proliferation structure, not weaken it. Some
non-proliferation experts have raised concerns that this bill would
violate Article I of the NPT. Additionally this bill would create an
exception to the rule, and thereby create a new rule.
I have been impressed by India and I do believe that she has been one
of the most responsible nuclear states in the world. And unlike her
neighbor, India has not engaged in wholesale proliferation of nuclear
technology.
The bill before us today would make changes to the Atomic Energy Act
which would allow for the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology and
material to India. This would be the first time the conditions for
nuclear cooperation in the Act were changed for an individual state. We
should not make these changes lightly. We need to understand the
implications of what we are doing for the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime.
As well, we must also be clear. This is not the final vote the House
will take on this important issue. Under the provisions contained in
this bill, Congress will again have to review and vote to support
nuclear cooperation once the final text of the cooperation agreement is
finalized. For that reason, I remain unsure why Congress is considering
or approving these significant changes to our nuclear non-proliferation
structure. The Nuclear Suppliers Group still needs to give its approval
to this proposed nuclear cooperation agreement. As well, India needs to
complete its negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency
on a new safeguards agreement. These are not just minor points, not
just iotas in the agreement. They are central to the issue. What would
be wrong with waiting for the final text to be negotiated and these
important steps to be taken before we change our nation's laws to allow
for nuclear material transfer?
That said, I remain troubled that providing nuclear technology to
India would create a double standard. Historically, the United States
has only provided nuclear technology to states that are parties to the
NPT. This bill would allow for cooperation with India, despite the fact
the India has not signed or ratified the NPT, and had previously
developed a secret nuclear weapons program.
Additionally, I am worried that this legislation does not require
India to cap or even limit its fissile material production. The United
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France have all publicly
announced that they are no longer producing fissile material for
military use. Even China is believed to have stopped producing fissile
material. Without a requirement to limit fissile material production,
the United States is tacitly endorsing further production. We should
not help any state in the world increase its stockpile of nuclear
weapons, especially at a time when we are reducing our own stockpile.
I am also concerned that this legislation does not require that all
of India's nuclear reactors be placed under international safeguards.
That means that some of India's reactors will be used for military
purposes and kept outside safeguards and the nonproliferation regime.
The whole purpose of safeguards is to ensure that fissile material is
not diverted to build nuclear weapons secretly. We need full scope
safeguards on all of India's reactors to ensure that U.S. technology or
nuclear material is not being diverted for military purposes. In
effect, we would be giving approval to the existence of undeclared,
uninspected production of fissile material.
Further, India is not required to classify her new reactors as
civilian rather than military. Some have argued that nuclear
cooperation is needed to help meet India's growing energy needs. If
that is the case then every single new reactor should be civilian
energy producing facilities. We should be doing more to discourage
India from expanding her military nuclear program, rather than making
it easier.
This bill makes some improvements on the legislation that the
Administration submitted, and I am glad that some of my colleagues who
share my concerns tried to improve it. Yet, even with these changes I
do not think it wise to shred one of the few nonproliferation
instruments we have. I am sorry that before they came to us the
Administration did not negotiate a better agreement which would not
jeopardize decades of nonproliferation work. I am also sorry we have
not approached this matter to obtain the active partnership of such a
respected and important country as India in the effort to prevent
nuclear proliferation around the world. India teamed with us and other
countries could be a most influential leader in reducing the threat of
nuclear weapons around the world. I remain convinced that nuclear
cooperation could be achieved with India, however this is not the
proper way to do so.
For these reasons, I cannot support this bill which would undermine
the NPT and our nation's long history of nuclear nonproliferation. I
would oppose this deal if it was with any country outside of the NPT
because I would have the same concerns. But I also know that despite my
vote on this bill it will be approved by wide margins. I hope I am
proven wrong, that this bill will not undermine our nation's
nonproliferation efforts, but I regret that I cannot see how that can
be.
Mr. JINDAL. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in support of H.R. 5682,
the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.
The bill would facilitate the sharing of civilian nuclear technology in
an attempt to decrease competition for scarce energy resources and
strengthen relations between the two nations.
With the receding of the global divisions established during the Cold
War era, there has been increasing recognition that significant
benefits can be obtained from closer cooperation between the U.S. and
India. H.R. 5682 reflects broad agreement that peaceful nuclear
cooperation with India can serve U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives and also minimize potential risks to the
nonproliferation regime. This ranges from shared

[[Page H5914]]

strategic interests, such as enhanced stability and security in South
Asia and the international system as a whole, to more specific
priorities, such as combating global terrorism.
Today, the chief threat to our security and the security of our
allies worldwide is posed by violent acts of terrorism by extremists
and rogue nations engaged in nuclear experimentation to the detriment
of the principles of freedom worldwide. As we witnessed recently by the
bombing of Mumbai's subway system earlier this month, global terrorism
is a threat that India shares with the United States. We need India's
ongoing partnership in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, by
engaging in this agreement with India, we are able to strengthen the
international nonproliferation regime by placing a majority of India's
nuclear plants under international inspection. This is a more practical
and realistic shift in U.S. nuclear policy that should be viewed as a
victory for nonproliferation advocates compared to our previous policy
of forced abandonment which yielded little towards achieving greater
international security.
For our own sake, if for no other reason, it is imperative that we
help countries like India and China curb their increasing consumption
of oil and natural gas for domestic and commercial use. This, in turn,
will help us curtail the cost of oil and natural gas, while helping
India develop its own nuclear power sources sufficient to meet their
growing demand. The result is that prices worldwide will decrease as
overall supply of oil and natural gas increase, thus helping our own
economy by preserving many of the industries that have been forced to
close their doors because of high production costs.
Our relationship with India is unique--the United States and India
are the oldest and largest democracies in the world. While we cannot
foresee that China will share common political principles in the near
future, because India's history is rooted in Democracy they are an
ideal partner for achieving our goals of creating international and
economic security. Passing H.R. 5682 is an important step toward
cementing the great strides we have made in the past year in
establishing this strategic partnership.
Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of
H.R. 5682, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion
Act.
India is a strategic friend and ally of the United States. Indian
Americans have made an indelible mark upon the culture and diversity of
our nation and I was proud to sponsor H. Res. 227 that recognized the
contributions of Indian Americans to our nation, which the House passed
earlier this year.
India and the United States have a strong history of cooperation.
Directly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, India was one
of the first countries to offer immediate aid to the United States. As
the two largest pluralistic, free-market democracies in the world, it
is only natural for the United States and India to seek to strengthen
our bilateral relationship.
Last July, President Bush and Prime Minister Sing issued a Joint
Statement declaring a new era of respect, reciprocity and cooperation,
spanning the fields of high technology, space exploration, counter-
terrorism, defense cooperation and energy security.
This legislation lays the statutory foundation to expand nuclear
research, nuclear power and nonproliferation cooperation with India
that would allow full trade in civil nuclear energy. In exchange for
such trade, India has agreed to separate its military and civilian
nuclear programs over the next eight years, placing 14 of its 22
reactors under permanent international safeguards, as well as all
future civilian thermal and breeder reactors. It has also agreed to
maintain its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and to work with
the United States toward a fissile material cutoff treaty.
Mr. Chairman, the United States should seize this opportunity to
forge a strategic alliance with India to expand civil nuclear energy
production in that country. In closing, I thank the leadership for
allowing this legislation to come to the floor today and urge an aye
vote.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006. With
the receding of the Cold War's global divisions and the new realities
of globalization and trans-national terrorism, for more than a decade
there has been increasing recognition in both countries of the
significant benefits to be obtained from closer cooperation across a
broad spectrum. To that end, on July 15, 2005 President Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement announcing a ``global
partnership'' between the two countries that embraces cooperation
across a wide range of subjects.
I am in support of this bill because this legislation reflects broad
agreement consensus among Members of Congress that peaceful nuclear
cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S. foreign policy
objectives, but must be approached in a manner that minimizes potent