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FAS Intro: The following letter from National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger to Rep. Lee Hamilton calls for changes to the Government Secrecy Reform Act that would drastically diminish the bill's value for secrecy reform. In particular, the White House insists that the bill's proposed public interest "balancing test" -- in which any public interest in disclosure would be weighed against the security interest in secrecy -- "must be eliminated." In a recent report, Senator Fred Thompson's Committee on Governmental Affairs termed the balancing test "the most significant feature" of the bill.


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 17, 1998

Dear Lee:

Thank you for your letter inquiring about the Administration's views on S.712, the Government Secrecy Reform Act of 1998, which was reported out of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in July. I wrote to Chairman Thompson on May 11, 1998, conveying Administration views on this legislation; a copy of that letter is enclosed.

The amended version of S.712 incorporates most of the Administration's recommendations regarding the Office of National Classification and Declassification Oversight (NCDO); the use of classification and declassification guidance; and the need to ensure that declassification decisions are made only by the originating agency. The Committee also clearly tried to address our concerns about new rights of judicial review, but further clarification on this vital point is necessary.

The additional improvements in S.712 that we believe are essential are discussed below. Based on recent discussions with staff of Chairman Thompson, Senator Moynihan, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I am hopeful that needed changes can be made that would enable the Administration to endorse this legislation. For each of the key issues, our suggestions are included in a line-in/line-out version of S. 712 enclosed with this letter.

1. The bill must be modified to make it unambiguously clear that this legislation confers no new rights of judicial review. While the text of Section 6 attempts to limit judicial review, the interplay of other sections would create new substantive and procedural rights. Section 2(c), which requires a national security/public interest balancing test before classifying or declassifying any information, also sets forth specific standards for defining harm to national security and the public interest. Section 2(f), which amends the FOIA, clearly would make the application of a balancing test subject to judicial review under FOIA. Indeed, the Government Affairs Committee Report states that "the legislation necessarily imports into its new secrecy regime the judicial review available under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). For example, proper application of the public interest/national security balancing test would be within the scope of judicial review for Freedom of Information Act requests for classified information. . . ." Since the bill was reported, we have considered several approaches to revising the balancing test language or adding additional language to limit judicial review. None of these approaches completely addresses the concern that legislating a mandatory balancing test could encourage judicial intrusion on the President's constitutional authority and transform the nature of judicial review of classification and declassification decisions in FOIA litigation. We have concluded that the balancing test must be eliminated in order to protect essential Presidential authority and to ensure that the legislation introduces no new rights of judicial review.

2. Section 2(d) would forbid the classification of any information for more than 10 years, without the concurrence of the head of the NCDO and a written certification to the President. Since over half of all original classification decisions made under E.O. 12958 are properly designated for more than 10 years (down from 95% under the previous Executive Order), implementation of this requirement would be unworkable without the employment of a huge new bureaucracy at the NCDO and hundreds of new certification writers at the agencies. The standards for duration of classification must be rewritten to make them compatible with the E.O. 12958 standards.

3. Section 4 establishes a Classification and Declassification Review Board, consisting exclusively of non-Government employees, to decide appeals from the public or agencies of decisions made by agencies or the NCDO. Agencies may appeal decisions of this Board only to the President. Given the new oversight authority assigned to the Director of the NCDO, and the existing rights of FOIA or Executive Order appeal, this new entity is redundant and unnecessary, and it is likely to be quite costly to operate. At a minimum, the legislation must be amended to permit the President to appoint Review Board members of his choosing, including current Government employees.

4. S.712 locates the NCDO within the EOP, which is highly problematic given the traditional constraints on the budget and staffing levels of the EOP. Therefore, we believe the best organizational placement for the NCDO is the National Archives and Records Administration, which has a strong institutional commitment to declassifying public records as expeditiously as possible consistent with protecting national security interests. That said, we also would recommend the addition of language that would codify an ongoing NSC role in providing policy guidance to the NCDO and would enhance the prospects of adequate funding for the NCDO. With a continued NSC imprimatur and adequate assured funding, organizational placement outside the EOP would be a much less difficult issue.

5. Section 2(c) (4) requiring detailed written justifications for all classification decisions is the kind of administrative detail that should be left to the discretion of the executive branch. As drafted, this provision would increase paperwork and costs, without any assurance of improving classification decisions or the management of the program. However, we agree that it would make sense to require detailed justifications whenever classification decisions are incorporated into an agency's classification guide.

6. Section 3(d)(7) should be modified to limit NCDO access to the most sensitive records associated with a special access program. Limiting access to such ecords is consistent with E.O. 12958 but will not undermine the NCDO's ability to oversee special access programs.

I appreciate your continuing leadership on this matter. By working together on the difficult remaining issues, I think we have a chance to establish a statutory framework for the classification and declassification program that enhances the President's authority to manage the program effectively.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Enclosures: As stated

The Honorable Lee Hamilton
Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc:
Senator Fred Thompson
Senator Richard Shelby
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan
Senator John Glenn
Senator Bob Kerrey




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