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SAFETY AND SECURITY OVERSIGHT OF THE NEW NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ===================================================================== JOINT HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER and the SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 14, 2000 __________ Serial No. 106-105 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce ------------------------------ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 64-030CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York GREG GANSKE, Iowa TOM SAWYER, Ohio CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin BILL LUTHER, Minnesota LOIS CAPPS, California James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff James D. Barnette, General Counsel Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel ______ Subcommittee on Energy and Power JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia CLIFF STEARNS, Florida KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri Vice Chairman TOM SAWYER, Ohio STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RALPH M. HALL, Texas ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia SHERROD BROWN, Ohio TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma BART GORDON, Tennessee JAMES E. ROGAN, California BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico TED STRICKLAND, Ohio JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona PETER DEUTSCH, Florida CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, RON KLINK, Pennsylvania Mississippi JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, VITO FOSSELLA, New York (Ex Officio) ED BRYANT, Tennessee ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland TOM BLILEY, Virginia, (Ex Officio) ______ Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman JOE BARTON, Texas RON KLINK, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER COX, California HENRY A. WAXMAN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART STUPAK, Michigan Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky TED STRICKLAND, Ohio GREG GANSKE, Iowa DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado ROY BLUNT, Missouri JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, ED BRYANT, Tennessee (Ex Officio) TOM BLILEY, Virginia, (Ex Officio) (ii) C O N T E N T S __________ Page Testimony of: Burick, Richard J., Deputy Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory................................................. 42 Glauthier, Hon. T.J., Deputy Secretary of Energy; accompanied by David Michaels, Assistant Secretary, Office of Environment, Safety, and Health; Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance; Eric Figge, Deputy General Counsel; and David Klaus, Director, Management and Administration, U.S. Department of Energy....................................... 7 Jones, Gary L., Associate Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues, General Accounting Office.................. 89 Kuckuck, Robert W., Deputy Director for Operations, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California.... 26 Miller, Daniel S., First Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources and Environment Section, State of Colorado, on behalf of National Association of Attorneys General........ 94 Robinson, C. Paul, President and Laboratories Director, Sandia National Laboratories............................... 31 Van Hook, Robert I., President, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc............................................... 49 Material submitted for the record by: Department of Energy, response for the record................ 124 (iii) SAFETY SECURITY OVERSIGHT OF THE NEW NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ---------- TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 2000 House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Joint with Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton (chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) presiding. Members present Subcommittee on Energy and Power: Representatives Stearns, Burr, Whitfield, Shimkus, Wilson, Pickering, Bryant, Markey, and Strickland. Members present Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: Upton, Burr, Whitfield, Bryant, Stupak, and Strickland. Staff present: Tom DiLenge, majority counsel; Kevin Cook, majority counsel; Anthony Habib, legislative clerk; Sue Sheridan, minority counsel; and Edith Holleman, minority counsel. Mr. Upton. Good morning, everyone. The Congress this morning is not yet in session. Welcome to a joint hearing between the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee and the Energy and Power Subcommittee. The Congress is not going into session until 2 o'clock. I would note that my very good friend, Joe Barton, chairman of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, has an election in Texas today and he will remain in Texas to vote and we do not expect him. Unless this hearing goes terribly long we do not expect him to be here for this hearing. But we have members from both subcommittees that are here and I would make a unanimous consent request that all members will be allowed to enter their opening statement as part of the record. Without objection so ruled. Today's hearing will explore what impact the implementation of the new National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Education may have on the currently centralized and critical functions of security and safety oversight. This committee knows perhaps better than any committee in Congress the extent of the Department's problems in these areas after having a number of hearings this past year. We have worked together in a bipartisan fashion to explore and expose these failings and to urge necessary reforms. Safety and security oversight has been a consistent and central theme of our work and the focus of many of these hearings and other activities. I believe that we have prodded the Department toward progress in these areas and I expect that this committee will continue to do so in the future. The newest challenge for the Department comes in the wake of last year's spy scandal which revealed much more about the Department's poor security practices than its failure to prevent one alleged spy in Los Alamos from compromising our national security. That scandal and the resulting scrutiny of DOE's security practices led Congress to create a new semi-autonomous agency within the Department to manage its nuclear weapon and defense-related activities. The new NNSA was conceived of as a way to streamline the chain of command and improve accountability for security matters--two reforms that numerous independent reviews from the GAO to the President's own Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, headed by former Senator Rudman, had called for over the years. I think that we can all agree with these objectives and that the Department needed to be reformed. But one important question not addressed in the new law was how semi-autonomy would work with respect to the independent oversight of safety and security. No agency or administration, whatever it is called or however it is set up, should be immune from independent oversight of such critical functions. The history of poor security and safety practices at these sites, however long it may be, is still recent enough in fact to caution us against letting the NNSA become a self-regulating entity within the Department. Today's hearing will explore some of the questions raised by the act and the Department's implementation plan, particularly as they relate to this matter of security and safety oversight. Although the NNSA is only 2 weeks old, we may be able to begin exploring whether some of the ambiguities and inherent conflicts evident in the law and the administration's implementation plan are already manifesting themselves in on- the-ground problems in these two areas. I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing here today and will now recognize other members for an opening statement. Mr. Stearns from Florida. Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing today is one of profound importance to our national security. I don't think this morning you need to go over the allegations of Chinese espionage and security concerns which surfaced last year, but rather we should use this forum to highlight the problem areas that exist and examine all possible solutions. Last year Congress, as mentioned, passed legislation to establish the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi- autonomous agency within the Department of Energy. This legislation was designed to streamline and improve security measures and ensure accountability in our national security defense facilities. Even before the NNSA passed, a number of concerns were expressed by both Congress and the administration. For example, a number of Commerce Committee members voted against the National Defense Authorization Act specifically because of this legislation. So I would hazard to guess something has deeply troubled them about the language. Our goal here today, Mr. Chairman, is to assess the problems inherent within NNSA as it relates to oversight of safety and security. These are chronic problem areas which have existed since the Department's creation. We have heard both Senator Rudman and the GAO refer to a, ``culture,'' in DOE which seems to espouse a bureaucratic form of elitism and a resistance to substantive change. Despite our concerns, the NNSA language is now law and we have seen a number of reforms set forth by Secretary Richardson to implement the provisions of this new law. However, some of these actions such as a, ``dual hatting,'' of current DOE officials into corresponding NNSA port positions appear to be contrary to the letter of the law. It is possible though that DOE is finding itself in a Catch-22. DOE appears to be violating the, ``semi-autonomous,'' intent of the NNSA law in order to comply with its implementation. The laboratories themselves are exemplary scientific facilities with some serious security and environment, safety, and health problems. Mr. Robinson, Director of the Sandia National Labs, has referred to the Department, DOE's loaded bureaucracy and micro- management as a serious problem. But we must remember that responsibility must fall on the frontline contractor who manages these facilities on a daily basis. In fact, Mr. Robinson quoted Senator Rudman's report, which referred to DOE as a, ``big Byzantine and bewildering bureaucracy.'' I think this speaks volumes in terms of addressing the designs of a new NNSA. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the Commerce Committee has just released a GAO report detailing the shortcomings in security tracking, inconsistent rating criteria and development of corrective actions from security inspections. This hearing is but one more step in the process. We have an extensive public record resulting from a number of hearings on DOE restructuring and lab management practices over the last several years. My responsibility as a member of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power is to work to develop legislative solutions to problems that exist within the agency's and within the committee's jurisdiction. So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses today and I am confident that the information will prove valuable as we move through the process. Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Stearns. I would recognize the gentlelady from Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mrs. Wilson. Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding this hearing today. As you know, I have worked with the nuclear weapons complex in the past, and Sandia National Laboratory is in my district. I was actively involved in crafting the legislation last year to implement some common sense reforms to protect our Nation's nuclear programs from espionage. Last year the Congress passed both the reorganization of the Department of Energy and measures to strengthen the Department of Energy's counterintelligence program. The legislation creates a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy with responsibility for the Nation's nuclear weapons nonproliferation and nuclear reactors program. While the Cox report last year and the Rudman report brought a renewed awareness of the problems in the management in the Department of Energy, what those reports brought forth were not new. The Chiles report in 1999, the Drell report in 1990, the Institute for Defense Analysis 3 years ago, and the Galvin report are only some of the very distinguished and thoughtful groups that have recommended significant organizational change at the Department of Energy. Following the 1999 Cox Report on Chinese espionage, former Senator Warren Rudman and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board came to similar conclusions. I won't go through what those reports recommended, but I will include them in my statement in the record. Today a fellow New Mexican and a former member of this committee, recognizing that there are serious problems, has again tried to implement reforms. The fact is that every secretary and assistant secretary recognizing there were serious problems tries to implement reforms, and we have had an ever-increasing number of management overlays within the Department of Energy and more structures on top of more structures to oversee other structures. That resulted in literally having overseers oversee the overseers. As an example I will cite the review by the Institute for Defense Analysis which found that many DOE and contractor officials described Defense Program's oversight as creating an inverted management pyramid because the number of reviewers exceeds the number of hands-on workers; for example, contractors of cited examples where work done by two or three people becomes the subject of review meetings involving 40 or more defense program's officials. The fact is that this myriad of oversight and review did not improve performance. To the contrary in some cases I would argue that it diminished performance. It is my view that it is frequently easier to be the overseer than to be the responsible party. As the overseers multiplied, the line between oversight and responsibility was blurred and sometimes disappeared and the frequent result was that when mistakes were made everyone thinks they are an overseer and nobody takes responsibility. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that this duplication of oversight was also tremendously costly and it is the taxpayers of this country that pay that cost. That is why I and some others in the Congress came to the conclusion as a result of input and conversations with many constituents and others who understand these things a lot better than I do that it was time to make some serious management change in the way that the Department of Energy was structured. Last year the Congress passed legislation to reorganize DOE and create a semi-autonomous agency within the DOE. Where are we now? The DOE initially opposed the implementation of the law and the opposition was reflected in the President's statement on signing the law. The President and the Secretary dual hatted people in the Department of Energy and in the NNSA. Both actions are contrary to the spirit and the letter of the law. Following its initial resistance to implementing the law, the DOE has made some progress and I particularly commend the Secretary on the nomination of John Gordon to head the NNSA, and I will work hard to make sure that the legislation is there to allow him to have the full 3-year term. While both of these actions are positive, the implementation plan is inadequate in some respects that deserve highlighting. The plan continues to confuse lines of authority that the law was intended to eliminate. The plan anticipates dual hatting employees. That is clearly in violation of the Reorganization Act and the plan lacks specificity in many important respects. These deficiencies in the implementation plan and the dual hatting directive tell me--lead me to only one conclusion, and that is we are in a transitional period at the Department of Energy. Some activity will take place over the next 9 months, but the reorganization will be fully implemented by the next President, whoever he may be. And so now here we are, here we go again. The Department of Energy is here with their first round of what I assume will be many requests to add overseers and undermine the reorganization and the change that was intended by passing the act last year. I will resist that change because I think we did something good last year. We have a national nuclear security that is subject to all of the environment, safety, and health policies that are promulgated by the DOE. What we don't have is bureaucrats in Washington telling a new director of the NNSA and the lab directors how to do their jobs, out there playing on the field until it is time for accountability and then they disappear into the woodwork. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Upton. Thank you. The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am not going to make an opening statement. Mr. Upton. Thank you for keeping things on schedule here. [Additional statement submitted for the record follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan Mr. Chairman, I support your effort to take a close look at the early implementation of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a ``semi-autonomous'' agency within the Department of Energy that was established over your and my objections in Title 32 of last year's Defense Authorization. It is perhaps too early to determine whether fears that this law would recreate the discredited old Atomic Energy Commission will bear out. However, it is not too early to witness the fruits of hasty drafting on the part of the Armed Services Committees, who skirted the normal legislative process and as a result have saddled the Department with a poorly conceived reorganization plan. There is little doubt that safeguards and security at the Department of Energy need improvement, as this committee has observed in a number of hearings over the years, and as events within the weapons complex last year demonstrated. However, this legitimate concern about security was parlayed into a much more ambitious agenda. In its final form, the FY 2000 Defense Authorization bill undertook a complete reorganization of the Department's nuclear weapons complex--including the national laboratories--in a provision drafted on the last night of the conference, behind closed doors and never subjected to legislative hearings. Moreover, Title 32 was included in the defense bill over objections from Chairman Bliley, myself, the Subcommittee chairman, and a number of other members of this and other committees of jurisdiction. It also was adopted over the strong objections of Secretary Richardson and the Administration. This legislation gives more autonomy and less oversight to the entities within DOE that have caused the greatest environmental disaster in the country's history, major health and safety problems and the security breach that resulted in this legislation. Often they defied directives from headquarters that would have avoided some of these problems. As is often the case, this departure from normal legislative practice has been achieved at considerable cost. Perhaps the most glaring problem is ambiguity in the drafting and internal inconsistency within Title 32, which makes implementation of this provision rather difficult. Is the dual appointment of Department personnel to the NNSA permitted? If so, for how many employees and at what levels of seniority? Do the legal interpretations of the Department's General Counsel take precedence over those of the NNSA's own general counsel, or vice versa? I must note that the three laboratory directors who will appear before us today wholeheartedly endorse this new approach. And why shouldn't they? Once again, they are in charge, despite their mediocre--at best--history of dealing with safety, environmental and security crises. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee raised these same questions, and many others, when our colleagues on the Armed Services Committees rushed to adopt this provision in conference last year. The resulting uncertainty will doubtless continue to plague both DOE and the Congressional committees with responsibility for overseeing its operations for some time to come. Mr. Chairman, I want to particularly call Members' attention to the testimony of Mr. Miller of the Colorado Attorney General's Office, which highlights the serious adverse consequences that certain provisions of Title 32 may have on the States' ability to enforce environmental laws and oversee cleanup at DOE nuclear weapons facilities. Mr. Miller and 43 State Attorneys General are not alone in calling for legislative changes to protect and preserve existing state authorities. The National Governors Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures have also raised serious concerns about Sections 3261 and 3296 of the National Nuclear Security Agency legislation and these serious deficiencies should be corrected. I ask that correspondence from each of these organizations be inserted at the appropriate place in the record. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing and look forward to the witnesses' testimony. Mr. Upton. Our first panel includes the Honorable T.J. Glauthier, Deputy Secretary of Energy; and will be accompanied by Dr. David Michaels, the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health; and a frequent member to our subcommittee, Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Director of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance of the Department of Energy. I think as all three of you gentlemen know, it is generally the practice of the Oversight Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. Do you have any objection to that? Hearing none, we also under committee rules allow you to be advised by counsel. Do you need counsel? Mr. Glauthier. I think we might. Mr. Upton. You might? Mr. Glauthier. We would like to include our counsel being sworn. Mr. Upton. If you might, just indicate their names for the record and then when we swear you in have them stand as well. Mr. Glauthier. Mr. Eric Fygi, who is the Deputy General Counsel for the Department of Energy. I think we might include David Klaus, who is our Director of Management and Administration and co-chaired the implementation effort within the Department. Okay. If you all five would stand up and raise your right hand. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Upton. Thank you. You are now under oath. Mr. Glauthier, your remarks will be made in their entirety as part of the record. We would like, if we can, to limit your opening statement to about 5 minutes and the time is now yours. Thank you. TESTIMONY OF THE HON. T.J. GLAUTHIER, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MICHAELS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH; GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE; ERIC FYGI, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL; AND DAVID KLAUS, DIRECTOR, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Mr. Glauthier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will abbreviate my comments, understanding the full comments are in the record. I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department's implementation of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act and in particular how the Department will address safety and security within the NNSA. With me today are Dr. David Michaels, the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, and Glenn Podonsky, the Director of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. They have been involved in developing the Department's implementation plan for the NNSA and can help answer questions in those areas. And as I mentioned a moment ago, Mr. Eric Fygi, our Deputy General Counsel, and David Klaus, who is the Director of our Management Administration, are both with me as well. As a starting point I would like to report to the subcommittee that the NNSA is now in place and as of March 1 over 2,000 Federal employees and over 37,000 contractor employees have been reassigned to the NNSA. The Offices of Defense Programs, Naval Reactors and Fissile Materials and Disposition and Non-proliferation National Security have been incorporated into the administration. Organization charts, mission and function statements for the new administration are in place. Delegations of authority to the NNSA administration are in place and new positions have been established. The Department is making significant progress in the effort to fill the leadership positions of the new administration. As you know, President Clinton has announced that he intends to nominate Air Force General John Gordon for the position of Under Secretary and Administrator of the NNSA. We look forward to that and hope that that will proceed rapidly. President Clinton also last week nominated Madelyn Creedon for the position of deputy administrator of the NNSA for defense programs. We hope that she as well as General Gordon will be confirmed by the Senate in the near future. With these positions filled, the leadership of the NNSA will be in place and fully operational. While we are implementing the law the Secretary still has concerns about how the NNSA was designed in last year's legislation. Secretary Richardson is seeking new language which allows the Secretary of Energy to manage all personnel within the NNSA. This power was provided in the Senate passed version but was dropped in the conference version bill. The President and the Congress hold the Secretary of Energy accountable for his or her actions. At the very least, the law should allow the Secretary to manage personnel at the NNSA in the fashion he determines necessary. Your committee has expressed a particular interest in how safety and security concerns will be managed at the new administration. Our objective in this regard has been to implement the NNSA Act in a manner that continues the significant progress that the Department has made in these areas and allows the Department's expertise to be utilized throughout the full Department. As you know, the NNSA has been established at a time when DOE is in the midst of responding to significant challenges with regard to security. On May 11 last year, Secretary Richardson directed the most far-reaching security reorganization in the DOE's history to address heightened concerns with regard to the security of the nuclear weapons program. These reforms included the establishment of a new Office of Security and Emergency Operations that reports directly to the Secretary and the establishment of a new Counterintelligence Program for the Department that also reports directly to the Secretary. In addition, the Secretary created the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance assurance, led by Mr. Podonsky, to provide independent oversight of the effectiveness of safeguards and security, cyber security and emergency management policy and to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of these policies in the field. His office also reports directly to the Secretary. The security reforms have led to significant progress in addressing security issues throughout the Department. We also have an equally important focus on worker safety and health and environmental protection. The Office of Environment, Safety, and Health directly supports the Secretary in the development of internal environmental, safety, and health policy, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the management of corporate programs such as radiation accreditation, implementation of independent environment, safety, and health oversight and enforcement of nuclear safety rules under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. The office has led recent initiatives at the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant and other DOE facilities with regard to environment and worker safety. The Department's implementation plan for the NNSA seeks to buildupon these initiatives and to continue the progress that has been made in addressing safety and security concerns at all of our facilities. In this regard I refer also to the principles that guided the Department's implementation plan, two of which were to preserve the Secretary's overarching authority and to protect the environment and health and safety of workers and the public. The overall responsibility and authority on safety and security policy in the Department rests with the Secretary. I can assure you that the Secretary and the entire Department take this responsibility quite seriously. As for the role of support organizations, it is important to recognize that the establishment of the NNSA does not change the scope of responsibility for the departmental offices that perform independent oversight and have departmentwide responsibilities of overall policy in areas such as environmental compliance, security, and worker safety and health. Independent oversight offices will continue to review all DOE sites and activities and report directly to the Secretary on their findings and recommendations. To be specific, the Assistant Secretary of Environment, Safety, and Health and the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance will continue to perform their current functions with regard to all activities in the Department, including those within the NNSA. Responsibility for the implementation of these policies rests within the NNSA and its line management organizations. Similarly, the primary responsibility for security will be the responsibility of the program offices and the Office of Defense Nuclear Security, the Office of Nuclear Counterintelligence within NNSA. As you may be aware, these are two positions that are filled by dual hatted officials of the Department. The Department already has recognized world class managers like Ed Curran in counterintelligence and General Gene Habiger in security. They are already leading the effort to implement the departmentwide security reforms we all believe are so essential at this time. These security problems exist across the complex, not only within NNSA. It is essential to have consistent and effective policies in place within and outside the NNSA, the Department's implementation plan dual hats Ed Curran and General Habiger, because it makes no sense to search out other people to perform a function they are already doing so well. Assistant Secretary Michaels has one dual hat responsibility within the NNSA, so he can initiate shutdown in circumstance where a clear and present safety danger exists. The Assistant Secretary has had such authority throughout the Department since 1986 and it is appropriate that he continue to be able to exercise this authority at the NNSA facilities if needed. That's the only responsibility he has in that dual hatted position. Let me give you an example of how the restructured DOE will respond to safety and security concerns in the future. This is a real example of how Secretary Richardson and the Department are responding to the discovery of ground water contamination at the Pantex plant near Amarillo, Texas. The Department's initial response to this discovery was taken on March 6, less than a week after the day that the NNSA was established and of course only a week ago. It provides an excellent example of how the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health will be involved at an NNSA facility such as Pantex in a matter that is consistent with the NNSA Act. Let me tell you what we have done. First, the Department made the determination as to whether the discovery of trichloroethylene in the Ogollala Aquifer presented such a serious threat to health and safety that operations at Pantex should be shut down. This determination, which was made in consultation of officials at the facility, at the Office of Defense Programs, and Assistant Secretary Michaels, was that the facility did not need to be shut down. Second, Secretary Richardson directed that a team of experts from our Environmental, Safety, and Health Office go to investigate the situation and provide a report to the Secretary. I ``emphasize investigate and report'' because you should know that ES&H is not going to Pantex to take over the situation and direct and control what is going to happen. They are there to provide expertise and advice to the Defense Program Office and to the Secretary and to the NNSA. We the senior officials need to know the facts and recommendations. Third, Secretary Richardson directed experts from the Office of Environmental Management who are familiar with TCE contamination to provide Pantex officials the most recent information and help develop a response plan. Once again those officials were not there to direct and control the response. They were there to help develop a response. The responsibility for the actual corrective action still rests with the Office of Defense Programs within the NNSA. All of these actions are appropriate and entirely within the NNSA Act. They also are the best way to get experts from throughout the Department down to Pantex to help solve the problem. That's what we need to do when we are faced with a situation that threatens health and safety, to help solve the problem. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to testify and would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Hon. T.J. Glauthier follows:] Prepared Statement of T.J. Glauthier, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Department of Energy I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's implementation of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act, and in particular how the Department will address safety and security at the NNSA. With me today are Dr. David Michaels, Assistant Secretary or Environment, Safety and Health, and Glenn Podonsky, the Director of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. They have been involved in developing the Department's implementation plan for the NNSA, and can help answer any questions the Committee may have regarding safety and security throughout the Department, including the NNSA. establishment of the national nuclear security administration As a starting point I would like to report to the Subcommittees that the National Nuclear Security Administration is now in place and, as of March 1, over 2000 federal employees have been reassigned to the NNSA. The Offices of Defense Programs, Naval Reactors, Fissile Materials and Disposition, and Nonproliferation and National Security have been incorporated into the Administration. This means over 37,000 contractor employees are under the purview of the NNSA. Organization charts and mission and function statements for the new Administration are in place. Delegations of authority to the NNSA Administration are in place and new positions have been established. As required by the NNSA Act, the following contractor-operated national laboratories and nuclear weapons facilities also became part of the NNSA on March 1, 2000. All of these facilities will report to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs:Los Alamos National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, California; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California; the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri; the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas; the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the tritium operations facilities, Savannah River, South Carolina; and the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The Offices of Defense Nuclear Security and Defense Counterintelligence also have been established within the NNSA, as well as the positions of NNSA General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel. The Nevada and Albuquerque Field Operations Offices have been transferred into the NNSA, and procedures have been put in place so that the Field Office Managers at the Oakland, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River Operations Offices are reporting to the NNSA programs for NNSA functions. The Department is making significant progress in the effort to fill leadership positions at the new Administration. President Clinton has announced that he intends to nominate Air Force General John A. Gordon for the position of Undersecretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA. The NNSA Act specified that the Under Secretary have a national security and a technical background. A special search committee appointed by the Secretary to make recommendations for this position found no better-qualified candidate for this position than General Gordon--he was at the top of their list. We believe it is critical that NNSA Administrator not be limited in focus to the balance of the current Administration, and therefore are seeking a change in the law to specify the sense of the Congress that the first Administrator serve for a minimum term of three years, at the pleasure of the President. This legislative provision would be much like those providing for the appointments of the Joint Chiefs for a specified term, at the pleasure of the President. Key leaders of the Senate Armed Services Committee have indicated that they intend to move expeditiously on this legislation. A three year appointment is a serious commitment to making the NNSA Act work in a way that supports the mission of the Department of Energy. I would like to stress, however, that this provision would only apply to the first Administrator, and that all future Administrators would be appointed in the normal cycles of Presidential appointments as Administrations change. President Clinton also has announced his intention to nominate Madelyn Creedon for the position of Deputy Administrator of the NNSA for Defense Programs. We hope that she, as well as General Gordon, will be formally nominated and confirmed by the Senate in the near future. With these positions filled, the leadership of the NNSA will be in place and fully operational. While we are implementing the law, the Secretary still has concerns about how the NNSA was designed in last year's legislation. Secretary Richardson is seeking new language which allows the Secretary of Energy to manage all personnel within the NNSA. This power was provided in the Senate passed version of the bill, but was dropped in conference. The President and Congress hold the Secretary of Energy accountable for his or her actions. At the very least the law should allow the Secretary to manage personnel at the NNSA in the fashion he determines necessary. safety and security at the nnsa Your Committee has expressed a particular interest in how safety and security concerns will be managed at the new Administration. Our objective in this regard has been to implement the NNSA Act in a manner that continues the significant progress that the Department has made in the areas of safety and security, and allows the Department's expertise in these areas to be utilized throughout the Department. As you know, the National Nuclear Security Administration has been established at a time when the Department of Energy is in the midst of responding to significant challenges with regard to security at the Department's nuclear weapons laboratories and production/test facilities. On May 11, 1999, Secretary Richardson directed the most far-reaching security reorganization in the Department of Energy's history, to address heightened concerns with regard to the security of the Department's nuclear weapons program. These reforms included the establishment of a new Office of Security and Emergency Operations that reports directly to the Secretary, and the establishment of a new counterintelligence program for the Department that reports directly to the Secretary. In addition, the Secretary created the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, led by Glenn Podonsky, to provide independent oversight of the effectiveness of safeguards and security, cyber security, and emergency management policy, and to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of these policies by the field. This office also reports directly to the Secretary. The security reforms have led to significant progress in addressing security issues throughout the Department. The Office of Security and Emergency Operations has implemented a number of new security policies, and additional actions to improve security at the national weapons laboratories and production/test facilities are at various stages of development and implementation. Since the Office of Counterintelligence was established, numerous counterintelligence measures have been implemented and new counterintelligence personnel designated at critical field operations offices and laboratories across the Department. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance has conducted numerous independent reviews of field facilities, including all the nuclear weapons laboratories. As a result of these reviews, significant security issues have been identified and security programs have been enhanced. The Department has an equally important focus on worker safety and health and environmental protection. The Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) directly supports the Secretary in the development of internal environment, safety and health policy including the National Environmental Policy Act, the management of corporate programs such as radiation accreditation, implementation of independent environment, safety and health oversight, and enforcement of nuclear safety rules under the Price Anderson Amendments Act. The Office has led recent initiative at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plan and other DOE facilities with regard to environmental and worker safety. The Department's implementation plan for the NNSA seeks to build upon these initiatives, and to continue the progress that has been made in addressing safety and security concerns at all DOE facilities. In this regard, I refer you to two of key principles that guided the Department's Implementation Plan for establishing the NNSA: Preserve the Secretary of Energy's overarching authority to establish policy for the Department. The NNSA Act recognizes the Secretary's responsibility to set policy for the Department, including the NNSA, and provides that the staff of the Department may support the Secretary in the development of such policy. The Department has implemented the Act in a way that preserves the Secretary's ability to draw upon the expertise and experience that exists throughout the Department in the development of such policies. Protect the environment and the health and safety of workers and the public. Substantial DOE expertise on worker health and safety and environmental protection resides in the Office of Environment, Safety and Health, the Office of Environmental Management and in other program and support offices that are not within the NNSA. The Implementation Plan assures that this expertise, and the capability to provide independent safety oversight and reviews, will still be available with regard to NNSA programs. The overall responsibility--and authority--on safety and security policy at the Department of Energy rests with the Secretary of Energy. I can assure you that the Secretary, and the entire Department, take this responsibility quite seriously. As for the role of support organizations, it is important to recognize that the establishment of the NNSA does not change the scope of responsibility of the departmental offices that perform independent oversight and have the department-wide responsibilities for overall policy in areas such as environmental compliance, security, and worker safety and health. Independent oversight offices will continue to review all DOE sites and activities and report directly to the Secretary on their findings and recommendations. To be specific, the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, and the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance will continue to perform their current functions with regard to all activities of the Department, including those within the NNSA. Responsibility for the implementation of these policies rests within the NNSA and its line management organizations. Similarly, the primary responsibility for security will be the responsibility of the program offices and the Office of Defense Nuclear Security and Office of Nuclear Counterintelligence within the NNSA. As you may be aware, these are two positions that are filled by ``dual hatted'' officials of the Department. The Department already has recognized world class managers like Ed Curran in Counterintelligence and General Gene Habiger in Security. They are already leading the effort to implement the Department-wide security reforms that we all believe are so essential at this time. These security problems exist across the DOE complex--not only within the NNSA. It is essential to have consistent and effective policies in place within and outside the NNSA. The Department's implementation plan ``dual hats'' Ed Curran and General Habiger because it makes no sense to search out other people to perform a function they are already doing so well. Assistant Secretary Michaels has one ``dual-hat'' responsibility within the NNSA so that he can initiate shut-down in circumstances where a clear and present safety danger exists. The Assistant Secretary has had such authority throughout the Department since 1986, and it is appropriate that he continue to be able to exercise this authority at NNSA facilities if needed. Let me give you an example of how the restructured DOE will respond to safety and security concerns in the future. Unfortunately, it is a real example--how Secretary Richardson and the Department are responding to the discovery of groundwater contamination at the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. The Department's initial response to this discovery was taken on March 6, 2000--less than a week after the date upon which the NNSA was established. It provides an excellent example of how the Office of Environment, Safety and Health will be involved at an NNSA facility such as Pantex in a manner that is consistent with the NNSA Act. Let me tell you exactly what the Department did at Pantex. First, the Department made a determination as to whether the discovery of trichloroethylene in the Ogalalia Aquifer presented such a serious threat to health and safety that operations at Pantex should be shut down. This determination, which was made in consultation with officials at the facility, the Office of Defense Programs and Assistant Secretary Michaels, was that the facility did not need to be shut down. Second, Secretary Richardson directed that a team of experts from ES&H go investigate the situation and provide a report to the Secretary. I emphasize ``investigate'' and ``report'' because you should know that ES&H is not going to Pantex to take over the situation and direct and control what is going to happen. They are there to provide expertise and advice to the Defense Programs Office and the NNSA, and to report their observations to the Secretary. We, the senior officials of the Department, need to know the facts and the recommendations of our experts on how to proceed. Third, Secretary Richardson directed experts from the Office of Environmental Management who are familiar with TCE contamination to provide Pantex Plan officials the most recent information and help develop a response plan. Once again, the officials at Office of Environmental Management are not there to ``direct and control'' the response--they are there to help develop a response. Responsibility for corrective action rests with the Office of Defense Programs within the NNSA. All of these actions are appropriate--and entirely within the NNSA Act. They also are the best way to get experts from throughout the Department down to Pantex to help solve the problem. That is what we need to do when we are faced with a situation that threatens health and safety--solve the problem. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the important issues of safety and security at the NNSA. I will conclude my statement and welcome any questions which the Panel may have. Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. As you know our usual procedure is that members will be able to limit ourselves to 5 minutes and we will switch back and forth between members as they appear. Your written testimony asserts that under NNSA the independent oversight offices will continue to review all DOE sites and activities and report directly to the Secretary on their findings and recommendations. But I have a couple of questions that were not necessarily cited in your testimony. Will the oversight offices have the authority to unilaterally decide to initiate an inspection of a site within the NNSA or will they have to get NNSA approval? Mr. Glauthier. No. They will have the authority to decide when and where to make investigation. Mr. Upton. And Mr. Podonsky's office again I am sure will be conducting a no-notice cyber security penetration test on a regular basis. Will that office be able to do that under NNSA as well? Mr. Glauthier. Yes, it will. Mr. Upton. Because that's very important and certainly one of the things that we viewed as a number of us went and visited a number of the labs in January. Mr. Podonsky, one criticism of the oversight function in the past has been its reluctance to make specific findings and get involved in developing or reviewing corrective action plans and validating closure of those findings. Over the past year your security oversight office has been doing more of this hands-on work but a number of us are concerned that under the new NNSA these activities may again be limited by claims of undue interference. Indeed, throughout the written testimony of a number of the witnesses today there seems to be a notion that your office's role will be more circumscribed, essentially providing advice to the Secretary only. The GAO's testimony later on raises that exact issue and notes that DOE's implementation plan for NNSA is silent on the point. Do you expect a more limited role for oversight under the new structure or will you continue to take a more active role in corrective action planning and follow-up inspections to ensure the adequacy of the reforms? Mr. Podonsky. It is our intention, Mr. Chairman, to continue our role as an extension of the Secretary's office in which he established us to go out there and not to control or require, but to report on the activities. To date we have experienced within the existing NNSA mostly cooperation in this new approach that the Secretary has allowed us to take in terms of actually getting involved with corrective action plans and following those through to closure. Mr. Upton. So you don't see any problems at all, you think that you will have unfettered---- Mr. Podonsky. As of right now under this Secretary we feel very comfortable. Mr. Upton. Okay. That sort of leads to another question. As you may know, a number of us are planning to introduce legislation today that codifies what the Secretary has embarked upon. Do you know if the administration--I don't know if the exact language has been shared, but does the Department yet have a recommendation as to whether they would support this codification? Mr. Glauthier. Of course, Mr. Chairman, we don't have the legislation yet so we can't give you our assurance but we would be very interested to see it. Our concern is to be sure that we will be able to carry on the operations in the way that we have put them down. So we will be watching to look and see if your legislation is consistent with that. Mr. Upton. One of our strengths is yes, we do agree that we have a Secretary that is embarking on this effort. We are concerned, as I think my colleague from New Mexico has shared in her opening statement, that in fact under the next President and the next Secretary that in fact these reforms are kept in place and not allowed to slip back and therefore the intent of the legislation is to in fact codify what is being done now so that we have assurance in the next administration and the one following that if things don't work out well that we will have the proper oversight. Mr. Glauthier. We share your objectives. As you may have noted in our implementation plan we put forward several principles at the beginning, many of which had to do with the continuity of the management reforms and establishing more accountability within the whole Department for the same sorts of things. Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. My time is about ready to expire. I will let Mr. Stearns--I will yield to Mr. Stearns. Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you told us this morning that independent oversight of security and ESH functions will continue as before, including oversight of the elements within the new NNSA. That's good news, I think, to many of us. We agree with you on the need for continued independent oversight. However, I am not so convinced that the Defense Authorization Act lets you do that. Can you explain, please, how this works in light of the language in the law that specifies employees and contractors in the NNSA, ``shall not be responsible to or subject to the authority, direction, or control of any other officer, employee, or agent of the Department of Energy''? Mr. Glauthier. Yes, I would be happy to. I will also give you an initial response and then ask our counsel to add his thoughts as well. Mr. Stearns. You are not breaking the law are you? Mr. Glauthier. We are not. We believe this is well within the statute. Mr. Stearns. So you are finessing it. Mr. Glauthier. The statute gives very explicit authority to the Secretary to review and examine any of the operations in the full Department, to have any of his staff do that. The specific language you cited is a limitation on directing people within the NNSA from positions outside the NNSA. Both Mr. Podonsky and Mr. Michaels are operating from positions outside the NNSA but they have the authority under this legislation to review any of the operations, to examine what is going on, to make recommendations to the Secretary about changes and possible corrective action plans that would be appropriate. We believe there is no limitation that will affect the operations of these offices which are staff offices. Mr. Stearns. Let me ask counsel, do you think you are finessing it or do you think you have a legal basis to stand on? Mr. Fygi. I think my first observation, and I will answer the way I feel necessary, is that the Deputy Secretary's response is correct. We are not finessing anything. We are carrying out a statutory scheme that clearly codifies the Secretary's authority to monitor the entirety of the Department's activities through means of his choosing through policies that he adopts. Those also are statutory elements in the NNSA Act that are equal in dignity to the one that you referred to a moment ago. Mr. Stearns. Mr. Podonsky and Dr. Michaels, do you think this has made your job harder? Or maybe to ask you another way, do you think that this law, the language in the law to have independence and safety of security, do you think it should be changed? Mr. Podonsky. To answer your question, the first question is yes, I think it does make our job more difficult. Mr. Stearns. Because of the language. Mr. Podonsky. Because of the lack of specificity of the language. For example, we have already seen some aberration with career civil servants who say ``we are now a part of NNSA,'' we don't know whether we follow advice and counsel in terms of some of the oversight activities. That's an aberration I must say, but we are definitely concerned that that doesn't begin to grow into a wildfire. We do think from an oversight perspective, and I have not talked to the Deputy Secretary in detail about this, that there could be some more clarification to the language. But clearly it is our understanding from the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, for the safeguards and security oversight, that we will continue to provide and report to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary on issues and concerns. Mr. Stearns. Dr. Michaels? Mr. Michaels. I would concur entirely with Mr. Podonsky. Under the current Secretary and Deputy Secretary, flowing down to General Gioconda, the commitment to environment, safety, and health is unsurpassed. I feel very comfortable that although we have heard the same things that Mr. Podonsky has heard in terms of rumblings that the NNSA is insulated from our oversight, the law is clear on that regard and we have the full support of the leadership. I think what is also clear is this statute can be interpreted different ways and there are obviously people who interpret differently. My concern is that in the future administrations it may not be interpreted the same way. Mr. Stearns. Dr. Michaels, are you saying that you have also incurred resistance like Mr. Podonsky said? Mr. Michaels. We heard rumbling that before March 1 we were told by various career civil servants who said we won't see you after March 1, but we have made it very clear with the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and the head of DP that that is not the case, that the oversight will continue as planned. Mr. Stearns. Do you agree with his word, aberrations is what you said? Mr. Podonsky. I called it an aberration, yes. Mr. Michaels. I agree. And I think it will be cleared up shortly. Mr. Stearns. Let's get to the heart of it. Is your job easier or harder since this legislation passed? Mr. Michaels. Harder. Mr. Podonsky. I echo that. Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Upton. Mrs. Wilson. Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it from your answers to the previous questions that you continue to have the authority under the act as written to review compliance, to inspect, make reports, to make recommendations to the Secretary without any limitation. Is that correct? Is there any---- Mr. Michaels. Yes, ma'am. Mrs. Wilson. Is there any element of oversight that your-- or your definition of oversight that you are in any way precluded from by the act? Mr. Michaels. In terms of compliance, yes. The Price- Anderson program which specifically has orders to contractors of the NNSA to pay fines, for example: I can no longer sign documents calling for that. That would be under the implementation plan. Price-Anderson enforcement actions will be signed by the Administrator of the NNSA. Mrs. Wilson. But the NNSA still has to comply with Price- Anderson and they have that authority; is that correct? Mr. Michaels. Correct. Mrs. Wilson. So the mission is achieved with respect to Price-Anderson, it is just no longer your job, right? Mr. Michaels. I hope that continues that way, yes. But it is frankly of concern to me that in the long run we could have two Price-Anderson programs where we have different objectives and different policies. I think the implementation plan is specifically written to ensure that that doesn't happen. Mrs. Wilson. With respect to the career civil servant that you referred to and the aberration that you referred to, that they are lDOC> [106th Congress House Hearings] [From the U.S. that civil servant or in those particular cases, did they work for you directly? Mr. Podonsky. No, they did not. Mrs. Wilson. So they worked for somebody else? Mr. Podonsky. For the Program Office. Mrs. Wilson. They were not in your line of command, you don't have any supervisory responsibility for them at all? Mr. Podonsky. No. Mrs. Wilson. They do have a boss, right, presumably within the NNSA? Mr. Podonsky. Yes. Mrs. Wilson. Why should they listen to you if you are not their boss and they are responsible for implementing the same law that you are? Doesn't this get back to the same issue of matrix management that we are trying to get away from? Mr. Podonsky. Well, the way the Secretary has allowed us to conduct oversight, ma'am, was to be in a proactive fashion, not just a whistle blower organization of the past where you just raised issues and people had to respond with unfunded mandates. The way the Secretary has allowed us to do oversight is in a way that was helpful, value added, and the individual that I am referring to, when did I take it to General Gioconda, and not in specifics but in generalities, General Gioconda, as the Acting Defense Programs Assistant Secretary, felt that that was totally inappropriate for his staff to act that way because they have found our oversight to be most helpful. Mrs. Wilson. So we are talking about staff in Washington? Mr. Podonsky. Staff in Washington. Mrs. Wilson. Let me make sure I understand you. You referred to a number of acts and things, NEPA was one of them, the radiation compliance, the environmental safety and health rules. Just so that we clarify for the record, the NNSA still must comply with all of those acts; is that correct? Mr. Glauthier. Yes, absolutely. Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Upton. Mr. Bryant. Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might just follow up with my colleague, Mrs. Wilson's questions, Dr. Michaels, can you issue a subpoena or notice of violation under the Price-Anderson Act to any NNSA facility or can you only make a recommendation to the NNSA Administrator regarding enforcement action? Mr. Michaels. I can make a recommendation to the Administrator. I can issue subpoenas or enforcement orders to non-NNSA facilities within DOE, but for the NNSA facilities I would have to ask the Administrator to do such a thing. Mr. Bryant. Just to follow up on that one, too, do you have the authority to initiate type A accident investigations at NNSA facilities or do you have to operate in a recommendation only mode? Mr. Michaels. Correct, I no longer have that authority to initiate. For example, the Y-12 accident that occurred in December, I was onsite shortly after the accident and I immediately initiated a type A investigation. I could no longer do that under current NNSA implementation plans. Mr. Bryant. Thank you. Mr. Podonsky, some in Congress and others have suggested that your office as a function is best performed within the NNSA itself rather than external to it as the Secretary proposes to continue. Those with a long memory remember when your office reported to the responsible line or program management, the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs in the 1980's, which I think everyone now agrees was a bad idea and resulted in conflicts of interest. What is your view on whether your office could effectively operate within and reportable to the NNSA and is that something that you would urge us to consider? Mr. Podonsky. Having also served in that ``long memory'' that you just described where I reported to the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, which I equate to the previous NNSA organization, we were competing consistently with production. Safety was competing with production. It was very ineffective. That is not a reflection on the nominee, General Gordon. That is a reflection of priorities of the CEO having to balance between oversight and mission. And so if in fact we are inside the NNSA as opposed to external to the NNSA, we feel we would be very ineffective and history has shown that to be the case. Mr. Bryant. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I have just a few questions for you. If you could describe the relationships of the operations offices, your headquarters, into the laboratories and weapons plants and field sites. The law was supposed to streamline this chain of command and improve accountability but it seems as if all guidance must still be passed through the contracting officials at the operations offices in order to implementing changes in the contractor run lab plants. Mr. Glauthier. We have tried to streamline the management and make the lines of authority much clearer going back to last spring, the April announcement that we made, in trying to clarify the difference between line and staff organizations within the Department. The offices like Independent Oversight and Environmental Safety and Health are staff offices who develop policy for the various programs. The policy then is to be implemented by the line organizations. So we have tried to make it clear that the line authority and accountability goes from the Secretary and Deputy Secretary down through the organization to Defense Programs, to the field office to the contractor, and that that chain is a necessary chain for accountability, responsibility. The specific example you mentioned of having guidance go to a laboratory does have to go through the field office because the laboratory is run by a contractor, and the contracting officer, who is the field office manager has the legal power to direct the contractor. We have made sure that those people all have the appropriate authorities and these responsibilities can continue. Mr. Bryant. Let me ask you again. Several of our hearings last year and even in the Rudman report itself there was substantial emphasis on the necessity to hold DOE contractors to more accountability. How has the accountability of the contractors been improved under the new NNSA arrangement? Mr. Glauthier. We certainly agree with the need to hold them accountable and felt that had not been done in the past. Some of the reports cited earlier have characterized the previous experience. The NNSA really does not change this. It sets the accountability clearly. It makes it clear that those sites, for example, within the NNSA are to report specifically there. Los Alamos or Sandia, for example, report into the Albuquerque office and then to the Defense Programs program and the NNSA Under Secretary up to the Secretary. So that accountability chain will continue to function and we will continue to expect results to be reported along those lines. Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the balance of my time I would yield back, what time I have left. Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time expired prior to that. I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey. Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. You may know that I opposed the creation of NNSA because it would not address the environmental health and safety problems experienced at the national laboratory. Obviously the history of this whole area is very, very murky. We once had an agency that was not subject to expert review. It was called the Atomic Energy Commission, and its legacy is still seen in the headlines of today in Paducah, Kentucky, and the Ohio facilities and Hanford, Washington, at the Nevada test site, Rocky Flats, Savannah River in South Carolina, Los Alamos in New Mexico. All of these places still reflect the lack of oversight that the Atomic Energy Commission was subject to, secret experiments on Americans without their knowledge using radioactive materials. The NNSA is a step back to the days of the old Atomic Energy Commission. Where is the accountability to workers at the labs? Where is the accountability to the environment that the national labs will have responsibility of? In your testimony you indicate that the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health has the responsibility to investigate and report on problems but not correct problems at the laboratories under the auspices of the NNSA. How would this increase the ability of the Department of Energy to improve environment and safety conditions at the national laboratories under NNSA control if the responsibility for corrective action remains with NNSA, semi-autonomous organization within the Department of Energy? Mr. Glauthier. Congressman, I don't believe it increases the ability to do it. What we are trying to do is avoid any reduction in our authority to do it and it is very important that we keep the Environment Safety and Health Program at a level where it is a staff office that we can look at, examine any of the operations throughout the Department and issue policies that will come down through the Secretary and the directions that will be carried out uniformly across all of the sites. The sites that you mentioned, some of them are within the NNSA, others are not. It is very important that environment, safety, and health issues be managed strongly and consistently at all of those sites. Mr. Markey. I know you did it somewhere in your opening statement, but could you summarize the issues that the Department would like to see corrected? Mr. Glauthier. Well, the principal recommendation that the Secretary has made and is working on is to have the authority added to the legislation for the Secretary to be able to direct anyone within the NNSA. At this point the statute limits even the Secretary to only directing the Administrator and then, through the Administrator, others within the NNSA. That is a limitation in his authority that does not exist in the other organizations that were cited earlier in one Rudman Report as examples of semi-autonomous agencies, and he has asked for and would like to get that changed. There are other changes that would make it easier. The primary one is a broader delegation authority which would address some of the things that you are talking about. But at this point we are not asking for any other changes. Mr. Markey. I agree with you. I think that regardless of who the Secretary of Energy may be, that they should have the ultimate responsibility so there is accountability at the highest level that the public can rely upon to discharge these very important responsibilities. I thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Burr from North Carolina. Mr. Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you and Chairman Barton for this dual hearing. Welcome, and I apologize for the tardiness. Today has already started off as one of those days that we hate up here. I think everybody in the world is here. Glenn, it is good to see you back. Let me just ask right from the start. Dr. Michaels, you have sort of a dual hat in both, but Mr. Podonsky doesn't. Now, who is best to answer the question why or why not? Mr. Glauthier. I may be in the best position to give you that answer. The dual hat that you refer to for Dr. Michaels is a very narrow and specific one. It is only for the purposes of exercising shutdown authority over sites. If there is a safety issue that is so serious we feel it is necessary to have the operation shut down, he has the authority to make that kind of direction inside or outside the NNSA. The dual hat gives him that authority within the NNSA. Everything else he does, the oversight, the policy development, the recommendations for corrective actions or changes do not require actually being within the NNSA. So they continue to operate from the staff office position, as is the case with Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Burr. So tell me, if you will, where our safety net is on the security aspect. If Mr. Podonsky has a concern as it relates to the safety side, but not having a dual hat doesn't provide him the type of access that he needs on one side of this two-part process, then where are we? Mr. Glauthier. Mr. Podonsky, before the NNSA, did not have that authority either to direct people within the organization. That authority really came from the line organizations. So Mr. Podonsky would investigate and identify problems, identify corrective actions that were needed and make those recommendations to the line organization. If the immediate office is not responsive, then we expect him to raise that concern up the chain, bring it to me, bring it to the Secretary. We do have the authority to direct---- Mr. Burr. Prior to this when Mr. Podonsky went into one of the facilities on a security question he had the authority to have what he requested produced for him, correct? Mr. Glauthier. When he requested in terms of information or---- Mr. Burr. Yes, sir. Mr. Glauthier. Yes, information requests, and we expect that still to exist. Mr. Burr. To expect that still to exist, then why wouldn't he have the dual hat function where the question was taken off the table that I have, which we have now insulated these facilities to where he can make a request but they don't have to respond to it? He could work through the back channels that would lead him through the Secretary. I know how demanding the Secretary's schedule is because I have seen him in the Arab nations and I have also seen him in back of Vice President Gore at his victory party last week so he has traveled a lot of ground in a very short period of time. But we have to go back through the Secretary to address just a request for information for Mr. Podonsky to make an evaluation on a security concern he might have. Tell me the logic behind that road map we have designed. Mr. Glauthier. That should not be necessary. We are only 2 weeks into the implementation of this. I think it is understandable there is some confusion in the field about what they do and don't have to respond to. Information requests ought to be something that everyone has to respond to. If they come from Mr. Podonsky, an information request is part of the authority that the Secretary has to have his staff offices investigate any operation within the Department. So we expect that the new Administrator will ensure that all of the operations within the NNSA honor those requests and that we are not going to have to come back on a case-by-case basis and have appeals to the Secretary. The question about direction really comes more in the latter area or, should we hope eventually, than is the corrective action, what are you doing about---- Mr. Burr. At some point in the design you or Secretary Richardson or some individual looked at this process and you have these two bodies and you saw Dr. Michaels, who was a very talented individual who had a responsible job, and you came to a conclusion that he needs two hats because he needs the ability to shut down if he comes to this conclusion. Tell me why you looked at Mr. Podonsky and looked at security and didn't feel that the same type of accommodation is needed? Is security not as big of a concern as safety is? Mr. Glauthier. If we decide that we need to have that we can put that in place later on. The reason we did it for Dr. Michaels is the safety and health risks, if they do exist in such a severe level that they endanger the workers or the public and we need immediate action, we want to make sure that he has that authority. Mr. Podonsky doesn't really operate in the same mode at this point to my knowledge---- Mr. Burr. Safety does not have the--security does not have the same sense of urgency that safety does? Mr. Glauthier. We have a safety position that is separate. General Habiger is dual hatted in fact in the Office of Security for the NNSA. He has the responsibility for security policy development and security review of the whole operation in really the same fashion that Dr. Michaels does for environmental, safety, and health. The office that Mr. Podonsky runs is an oversight office that functions in a way more like an audit group that goes out in great detail on a periodic basis and looks at operations at individual facilities but is really--I think the parallel is more the security office that General Habiger has. Mr. Burr. I realize the separation of the two and clearly under that structure General Habiger has access to both sides of this. I question whether Mr. Podonsky will have the same type of availability to the resources he needs to do his audit and, heaven forbid, that he find a serious flaw, has a lengthy process to go through to acquire the information to make some final determination. Mr. Glauthier. Let me give you an initial response and then ask Mr. Podonsky to also add his thoughts. One of the things we wanted to do was to be sure that we didn't end up with two oversight offices, one inside and one outside the NNSA. We wanted to make sure this system worked. The legislation is not ideal from our perspective. There was never a hearing on it, as you know. It was not drafted in a way that we worked collaboratively on it as we hoped to with most legislation. So we are trying to make the best of what we have to be sure that this office can continue in a strong and independent oversight role and to make sure then it will be able to carry that function along. Mr. Podonsky. Congressman, as long as the legislation gets further crystallized in clarity as to our ability to inspect, review NNSA without controlling or directing we report back to the Secretary, we feel that will continue to be effective as we have become in the last 11 months because of the committee's interest as well as the Secretary's commitment. Having served under six previous secretaries, unless the CEO of this corporation was interested as Secretary Richardson is today and Secretary Glauthier, it doesn't matter what we found. So we feel very strongly that the way it is set up now there needs to be further clarity in the legislation so that the existing NNSA staff folks won't use that as an excuse as to why not to work with us. Mr. Burr. Just two general comments. I realize my time has run out. One would be I have some degree of confidence that I believe you will be working under a seventh administration before too long and we can't feel as confident that the next Secretary will take security with the same vigor that our current one has. And it is very legitimate to make some comments that question the process that went through or did not go through with this legislation. By the same token it is justified for us to question the implementation process and that's in fact part of this hearing. I thank each of you and I yield back. Mr. Upton. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to follow up with Congressman Burr and also I came in on the last part of Congressman Markey's colloquy with you all, and the last couple of comments that were made deal with the implementation of legislation that you may not have all been fired up about. The conversation with Congressman Markey dealt with, I think, a desire to move some legislation also to correct or move in a more positive direction that you would feel. Am I correct in drawing this analysis and can you tell me if the Secretary wants to change the language of the law to clarify explicitly as such oversight applied to NNSA as well as the rest of the complex? Mr. Glauthier. Secretary Richardson would like a change in the legislation but he has not asked for that particular change. What he has asked for is clarity that he--and his successors--have the authority that they can direct any employees within the NNSA rather than to only direct them through the Administrator. Mr. Shimkus. When a Secretary makes this request, who is he making this request to? Mr. Glauthier. He has done it in discussions and in testimony, testimony 2 weeks ago before the House Armed Services Committee and in discussions with various leaders of the Congress. Mr. Shimkus. I think it would better serve the process if the Secretary, who is still I think considered somewhat of a favorite son of the committee, that he would draft some legislation and get it up here. I think what we are looking for and--we want to see instead of talk, we want to see some action. We want to talk over and discuss the language of the law and if we can get a legislative proposal then we have a basis. If we are just talking theory, we are not getting down to the work that needs to be done. If you would pass that on to the Secretary, I think I am echoing a lot of the sentiments of probably both committees. Mr. Glauthier. We appreciate that. We do have specific language and we would be happy to share that with you and appreciate any support that could you provide. Mr. Shimkus. With that I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Upton. Thank you. Just a couple of housekeeping matters and I think we will move to the next panel. First of all, I note that our colleague, John Dingell, wanted to be here very much this morning. We still expect an appearance so I would ask unanimous consent that all members will be able to keep the record open and perhaps provide some questions that you might respond to. Second, I am told that the Energy and Power Subcommittee is going to have a hearing on this legislation that is going to be introduced today next Wednesday. It is my understanding that the language has been or will be shared with you certainly by close of business today. If you could just--if we could just get a comment on a quick turnaround and get some comments and strenghths and weaknesses, preferably the former, by Wednesday of next week. I know my colleague Chairman Barton would be most appreciative of that effort. Mr. Burr. Mr. Chairman, could I have unanimous consent for a couple of additional questions? Mr. Upton. Hearing none, the gentleman is recognized. Mr. Burr. It is a safe request. I have been told that this was asked but they didn't write the answer down. Mr. Podonsky, let me ask you, has anything changed with the passage of this legislation relative to your oversight capabilities? Mr. Podonsky. Yes. I mentioned to one of your colleagues in a question--I echoed what Dr. Michaels said--is that it has become more difficult. I think it would be better to characterize it as increasingly challenging to do effective oversight. Mr. Burr. Can you be a little more specific about the term ``challenging''? What challenges has it created? Mr. Podonsky. Any time we do oversight in the Department it is difficult to be effective if the people receiving the inspection don't feel that it is going to be value added. But now with the legislation there were some aberrations, is the word I used, or where some career folks were debating whether or not they needed to be inspected or receive any advice and counsel from our activity. I mentioned one of the things that this administration has done; Secretary Richardson and Deputy Secretary Glauthier has allowed us to do oversight with a little more value added. We can discuss with the sites some of the proactive changes that might be taken not with unfunded mandates but to be--we inspect the entire complex. We have found that some of the issues that we have found throughout other sites we can share with the sites that we are inspecting and actually help them find solutions to their problems. Mr. Burr. If under this new setup in your oversight role you ran into a roadblock, somebody refused to supply what you had requested, what process would you now go through versus what you went through before to find a solution to it? Mr. Podonsky. Actually, there are three points in time I would like to answer that question with. Prior to Secretary Richardson when we ran into a roadblock I went to my assistant secretary and hopefully my assistant secretary would take it to the Secretary. The second point in time was when the Secretary Richardson moved us as a direct report to he and Deputy Assistant Secretary Glauthier, if we had any issues whatsoever--which we have had none so far--we would take it directly to either one of them. The third point in time is now within NNSA. It has only been in effect 2 weeks. We only had this one aberration. I immediately had discussions with Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, General Gioconda. General Gioconda sees us as a very necessary evil, that we provide his organization some value. So we have good support there. Mr. Burr. I have had more people than that describe you that way. Dr. Michaels, let me just ask you one question. Could you have shut down a facility without the authority given to you in the legislative plan? Mr. Michaels. Previous to March 1, I could. Now, with the implementation plan, I have my double hat within the NNSA in order to do the same thing. Mr. Burr. But without the dual hat you would not have had the power? Mr. Michaels. Correct. Mr. Fygi. The distinction, which goes back to your initial question of trying to define how the initial cut was made on dual hats, is that the emergency shutdown authority by its terms involved direct command authority in a very narrow class of circumstances, whereas the Glenn Podonsky oversight function by its terms was never, unlike the emergency shutdown authority, never codified as including direct command authority. I think that is the distinction that was one of the factors that weighed in the Department's judgment how to initially approach the number of double hats employed. Mr. Burr. Clearly this legislation was the result of, originally, security concerns that arose. I hope nobody takes offense at the questions that try to find the answers as to why security seems to be in the back seat, yet safety was recognized in this process as a front seat issue. I am hopeful that the process will work as smoothly as you see it, and I hope that if we have an opportunity to clarify it through legislation that in fact we will exercise that option. I thank you very much. I thank the chairman. Mrs. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask unanimous consent to ask a few more questions? Mr. Upton. Sure, go ahead. Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Deputy Secretary, I want to know whether there was anyone from the national weapons labs included in the implementation task force that was established in October? Mr. Glauthier. No. There were not any contractors who were in the actual task force. The task force was made up of Federal employees. We actually ran or processed--tried to consult with people in all parts of the operation and had discussions as we got more of the plan together. We have tried to work with the offices in this last 2 months where we have gotten the principals together and our general outlines of the plan that we published the first of January and as we tried to implement that tried to work with the different offices. Mrs. Wilson. I am not sure--I think that answer was no. Could you clarify it a little bit? Did you consult with or involve the national nuclear weapons labs in the implementation task force? Mr. Glauthier. You asked first about membership about the task force. They were not members of the task force. In terms of consulting we consulted with them relatively late in the process because we started consulting with the management of the programs, the people who are Federal employees, and then as time went on we worked out more broadly. So they were consulted but later in the process than some others were. Mrs. Wilson. Has the Director of the FBI or Director of the CIA reviewed your implementation plan? Mr. Glauthier. We did not send the formal plan, the full text. I don't know that--I don't believe so. Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Upton. Well, thank you again, panel, for being here this morning. Again you may see some questions arise from this subcommittee from members that are not here. Mr. Glauthier. Mr. Chairman, could I clarify one last thing in response to a moment ago about the CIA and the FBI review? Our representative, Ed Curran, who is our Director of Counterintelligence, did review this and he is an FBI employee as you well know; and then the CIA, Larry Sanchez, who is the head of our Intelligence Program and is the connection to the CIA, also reviewed that. Larry is an employee of the CIA. So they were both involved in the review process. Mr. Upton. Thank you. You are now formally excused. Thank you. Panel 2 will consist of Dr. Robert Kuckuck, Deputy Director of Operations for Lawrence Livermore; Dr. Paul Robinson, President and Laboratory Director of Sandia; Dr. Richard Burick, Deputy Director of Los Alamos; and Mr. Robert Van Hook, President of Lockheed Martin Energy Systems. Gentlemen, as you know, as some of you have been here before, it has been a longstanding practice for us to take testimony under oath. Do any of you have objections to that? Hearing none, the second part of that question is you are also entitled under committee rules to be represented by counsel. Do you have a need to have counsel? Seeing none, if you would stand and raise your right hand. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Upton. You are now under oath. As you saw in the previous panel, your testimony is being made part of the record in its entirety. If you could limit your remarks to 5 minutes that would be terrific. Dr. Kuckuck, we will start with you. TESTIMONY OF ROBERT W. KUCKUCK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; C. PAUL ROBINSON, PRESIDENT AND LABORATORIES DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; RICHARD J. BURICK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; AND ROBERT I. VAN HOOK, PRESIDENT, LOCKHEED MARTIN ENERGY SYSTEMS, INC. Mr. Kuckuck. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am the Deputy Director of Operations at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee today concerning the National Nuclear Security Administration and safety and security oversight at the laboratories. Our laboratory was founded in 1952 as a nuclear weapons laboratory. National security continues to be our central mission. Livermore is a principal participant in the Department of Energy stockpile stewardship program, heavily involved in programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and engage in energy, environmental and bioscience research and development as well as industrial applications of our core technologies. Our scientific and technological achievements in support of our national security mission depend on the conduct of safe and secure and efficient operations of the laboratory. The laboratory is committed to doing its part to providing every employee and the neighboring community with a safe and healthy environment. Likewise, because of the nature of our work and the intellectual and physical assets at our site, attention to safeguards and security is also of paramount importance. To this end I will very briefly report to you steps we have taken this past year to ensure that our operations are safe and secure. I will also provide the basis for my belief that safety and security for the laboratories will continue to receive this high priority commitment with the establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration. With this reorganization there is the potential for more streamlined and integrated management and oversight of safety and security, clear program direction, and strengthened accountability. During 1999, LLNL Director Bruce Tarter testified before this committee on two separate occasions on the issue of laboratory security. He stated Livermore's commitment and described our efforts to provide increased confidence in the security of the laboratory. We have made substantial progress in many areas: Security program management, materials control and accountability, physical security systems, classified material protection and control, cyber security, and personnel security. In particular, we have worked expeditiously to address all of the issues that arose in self-evaluations resulting from the May 1999 inspection by the DOE Office of Security Evaluations, OSE. As an outgrowth of these efforts we received an overall satisfactory or green rating from DOE/OSE in their follow-up inspection December 1999. We are on target to reach the challenging goals we set in 1999. We have implemented a significantly improved strategy to protect Livermore Superblock and the special nuclear materials in it. Our Materials Control and Accountability Program has successfully closed all previous OSE findings and all safeguard measurements are now current. In addition, major improvements have been made in controlling and protecting classified parts. Furthermore, the laboratory is in full compliance on all physical security systems and training issues associated with Livermore's personnel security assurance program have been addressed. We are rapidly implementing our cyber security strategy, including steps to address and identify potential weaknesses in the security of some of our unclassified computer systems. In the area of safety we are well into the process of implementing DOE's safety management system at Livermore and we are already beginning to experience a reduction in safety incidents. At the laboratory we have in the past tended to focus our attention on special hazards associated with high technology research projects. However, we can and must do better at preventing the more routine accidents connected with day-to-day activities. Our ISMS implementation is based on a set of work standards that were developed in partnership with DOE's Oakland Operations Office and the University of California. These work smart standards were accepted and ISMS implementation began in August 1999. We have set a goal, safety performance comparable to the best of our peers through top management leadership; clear roles, responsibilities, and performance expectations; and accountability. Training and integrating safety management was competed by all employees in September. Livermore's implementation of ISMS is currently under review by a DOE/OAK-appointed verification team. In December the team completed ISMS verification phase 1A and 2A, a review of documentation and implementation down to the directorate level. The verification team was impressed by laboratory management's enthusiastic support of ISMS and commitment to safety. They also identified a number of noteworthy practices that have been implemented. The laboratory recently completed a short list of items identified in OAK's acceptance review and submitted its ISMS description to OAK for final approval. Final verification of the implementation of ISMS at Livermore will begin this spring. I briefly reviewed for you the steps we have taken this past year for a particular reason, to illustrate our commitment to safe and secure operations at Livermore. These activities have greatly heightened safety and security awareness among all laboratory employees. More than ever attention to safety and security is ingrained in the way that we operate. With the establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration we will continue our strong attention to safety and security. We will still be governed by the same set of laws, orders, rules, regulations, and subject to oversight just as before. These requirements are currently explicitly stated in our contract and will remain so under the NNSA. However, with the reorganization there is a potential for continued improvement through more effective management and oversight of safety and security at reduced overall costs. A particularly significant change we face in many laboratory functions, including safety and security, is a continually growing amount of external management and oversight. Effective management and oversight are very important but it is also important to avoid blurring lines of responsibility and accountability. Through different lines of authority we have been at times provided with differing and sometimes conflicting guidance and directions with varying interpretations by our overseers. Add to that the multiplicity of layers of management for each line of authority and a myriad of oversight functions. We are in a situation where we are need to improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the efforts spent on management and oversight of safety and security. The establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration can potentially improve the situation in three related ways. First of all, with this reorganization there is a potential for more streamlined and integrated management and oversight of safety and security. Second, there is a potential for straightforward direction of safety and security management programs. It is possible to reduce conflicting guidance and establish clear expectations about performance. Finally, with clear performance expectations and a single DOE management team in charge, there is the opportunity for improved accountability. Effective management depends on accountability. The Secretary's creation of a Field Management Council that approves directives to the field, together with a central point of issuance, the lead program secretarial officer, has already been a major positive step in this direction. The FMC helps ensure the coordination and integrated evaluation of directives and it helps to eliminate overlapping or conflicting requirements. I am greatly encouraged by the FMC's activities and would be pleased to see even greater opportunity for contractors to provide feedback on directors prior to their issue. These potentially positive results I have just described will of course depend on details on how the new National Nuclear Security Administration will operate as it matures. I can't predict these details, including those related to the working relationships between NNSA and the overseers of safety and security and environmental management. However, streamlined management, clear program direction, and accountability are all attributes hoped for from the new NNSA when it was established by congressional legislation last year. An NNSA with these attributes combined with an oversight approach and appropriate checks and balances on implementation of findings would surely help to strengthen safety and security management at all DOE national laboratories. Let me close by saying once again safe and secure operations are vitally important to Livermore. They underpin all of our research and development activities and they protect our employees, our neighbors, and some of our Nation's most closely held secrets. Our laboratory's operations came under great scrutiny in 1999. We made upgrades to physical security, cyber security, and our counterintelligence program to strengthen these areas, address identified issues and deal with perceived weaknesses. Also during 1999 we made great strides in the implementation of DOE's integrated safety management system at the laboratory. These activities have greatly heightened safety and security awareness among all laboratory employees. More than ever, attention to safety and security is ingrained in the way that we operate. Our attention to safety and security is not diminished with the establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration. In practical terms we are governed by the same laws, orders, regulations and subject to oversight as before. However, with this reorganization there is a potential for streamlined management and oversight of safety and security, clear program direction, and strengthened accountability. While details about implementation are important and need to be resolved, in principle such changes could have a positive effect on safety and security management and implementation at the laboratory. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Robert W. Kuckuck follows:] Prepared Statement of Robert W. Kuckuck, Deputy Director for Operations, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory opening remarks Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am the Deputy Director for Operations at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Our Laboratory was founded in 1952 as a nuclear weapons laboratory. National security continues to be our central mission. Livermore is a principal participant in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, heavily involved in programs to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and engaged in energy, environmental, and bioscience research and development, as well as industrial applications of our core technologies. Our scientific and technological achievements in support of our national security mission depend on the conduct of safe, secure, and efficient operations at Livermore The Laboratory is committed to doing its part to provide every employee and the neighboring community with a safe and healthy environment. Likewise, because of the nature of our work and the intellectual and physical assets at our site, attention to safeguards and security is also of paramount importance. To this end, I will very briefly report to you steps we have taken this past year to ensure that our operations are safe and secure. I will also provide the basis for my belief that safety and security at the Laboratory will continue to receive this high priority commitment with the establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration. With the reorganization, there is the potential for more streamlined and integrated management and oversight of safety and security, clear program direction, and strengthened accountability. safety and security at the laboratory Laboratory Security. During 1999, LLNL Director C. Bruce Tarter testified before this committee on two separate occasions on the issue of Laboratory security. He stated Livermore's commitment and described our efforts to provide increased confidence in the security of the Laboratory. We have made substantial progress in many areas: security program management, materials control and accountability, physical security systems, classified material protection and control, cyber security, and personnel security. In particular, we have worked expeditiously to address all issues that arose in self-evaluations or resulted from the May 1999 inspection by the DOE Office of Security Evaluations (OSE). As an outgrowth of these efforts, we received an overall Satisfactory (Green) rating from DOE/OSE in their Follow-up Inspection in December 1999. We are on target to reach the challenging goals we set in 1999. We have implemented a significantly improved strategy to protect Livermore's Superblock and the special nuclear materials in it. Our Materials Control and Accountability Program has successfully closed all previous OSE findings, and all safeguards measurements are now current. In addition, major improvements have been made in controlling and protecting classified parts. Furthermore, the Laboratory is in full compliance on all physical security systems, and training issues associated with Livermore's Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) have been addressed. And we are rapidly implementing our cyber security strategy, including steps to address identified potential weaknesses in the security of some of our unclassified computer systems. Laboratory Safety. We are in the process of implementing DOE's Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) at Livermore, and we are already beginning to experience a reduction in safety incidents. At the Laboratory, we have in the past tended to focus our attention on special hazards associated with high-technology research projects; however, we can and must do better at preventing the more routine accidents connected with day-to-day activities. Our ISMS implementation is based on a set of work standards that were developed in partnership with DOE's Oakland Operations Office and the University of California. The Work Smart Standards were accepted and ISMS implementation began in August 1999. We have set a goal--safety performance comparable to the best of our peers--through top management leadership; clear roles, responsibilities, and performance expectations; and accountability. Training in Integrated Safety Management was completed by all employees in September. Livermore's implementation of ISMS is currently under review by a DOE/OAK-appointed Verification Team. In December, the team completed ISMS Verification Phase IA/IIA (a review of documentation and implementation down to the Directorate Level). The Verification Team was impressed by Laboratory management's enthusiastic support of ISMS and commitment to safety. They also identified a number of Noteworthy Practices that have been implemented. The Laboratory recently completed a short list of items identified in OAK's Acceptance Review and submitted its ISMS Description to OAK for final approval. Final verification (Phase IB/IIB) of the implementation of ISMS at Livermore will begin this Spring. oversight by the national nuclear security adminstration A Commitment to Safety and Security. I have briefly reviewed for you the steps we have taken this past year for a particular reason: to illustrate our commitment to safe and secure operations at Livermore. The activities have greatly heightened safety and security awareness among all Laboratory employees. More than ever, attention to safety and security is ingrained in the way we operate. With the establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration, we will continue our attention to safety and security. We are governed by the same set of laws, orders, rules and regulations and subject to oversight as before. These requirements are currently explicitly stated in our contract and remain so under the NNSA. However, with the reorganization, there is the potential for continued improvement through more effective management and oversight of safety and security at reduced overall cost. Opportunities for Improved Management and Oversight. A particularly significant change we face in many Laboratory functions, including safety and security, is a continually growing amount (as measured over decades) of external management and oversight. Effective management and oversight are very important, but it is also important to avoid blurring lines of responsibility and accountability. Through different lines of authority we have been at times provided with differing--and sometimes conflicting--guidance, rules, regulations, and/or orders together with varying interpretations by our overseers. Add to that a multiplicity of layers of management for each line of authority and a myriad of associated oversight functions. We are in a situation where we need to improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the effort spent on management and oversight of safety and security. The establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) can potentially improve the situation in three related ways. First of all, with the reorganization, there is the potential for more streamlined and integrated management and oversight of safety and security. Secondly, there is the potential for straightforward direction for safety and security management programs. It is possible to reduce conflicting guidance, rules, regulations, and/or orders and establish clear expectations about performance. Finally, with clear performance expectations and a single DOE management team in charge, there is the opportunity for improved accountability. Effective management depends on accountability. The Secretary's creation of a Field Management Council (FMC) that approves directives to the field--together with a central point of issuance, the Principal Secretarial Officer--has already been a major positive step in this direction. The FMC helps insure the coordination and integrated evaluation of such directives, and it helps eliminate overlapping or conflicting requirements. I am greatly encouraged by the FMC's activities and would be pleased to see even greater opportunity for contractors to provide feedback on directives prior to their issue. Issues in Implementation Details. The potential results I have just described depend on details about how the new National Nuclear Security Administration will operate as it matures. I cannot predict the details, including those related to the working relationships between NNSA and the overseers of safety and security (and environmental management). However, streamlined management, clear program direction, and accountability are all attributes hoped for from the new NNSA when it was established by Congressional legislation last year. An NNSA with these attributes--combined with an oversight approach with appropriate checks and balances on implementation of findings--would surely help to strengthen safety and security management at all DOE national security facilities. closing remarks I appreciate the opportunity to address the Committee on safety and security oversight of the Laboratory and the new National Nuclear Security Administration. As I have said, safe and secure operations are vitally important to Livermore--they underpin all our research and development activities and they protect our employees, our neighbors, and some of our nation's most closely held secrets. Our Laboratory's operations came under great scrutiny in 1999. We made upgrades to physical security, cyber security, and our counterintelligence program to strengthen these areas, address identified issues, and deal with perceived weaknesses. Also during 1999, we made great strides in the implementation of DOE's Integrated Safety Management System at the Laboratory. These activities have greatly heightened safety and security awareness among all Laboratory employees. More than ever, attention to safety and security is ingrained in the way we operate. Our attention to safety and security is not diminished with the establishment of the National Nuclear Security Administration. In practical terms, we are governed by the same set of laws, orders, rules and regulations and subject to oversight as before. However, with the reorganization, there is the potential for streamlined management and oversight of safety and security, clear program direction, and strengthened accountability. While details about implementation are important and need to be resolved, in principle such changes could have a positive effect on safety and security management and implementation at the Laboratory. Mr. Upton. Thank you. Dr. Robinson, Paul, welcome. TESTIMONY OF C. PAUL ROBINSON Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did submit a longer statement. Let me just summarize a few of the key points and perhaps try and summarize some reactions to the previous panel. I think the central question before us all today is what are the right management principles to invoke for implementing oversight in the new semi-autonomous agency that has been created, the National Nuclear Security Administration. I cited in my testimony a number of major reports that have been carried out by senior people in the country to examine the situation at the laboratories and plants. First, the Galvin Commission in 1995; the 120-day study carried out by members of the Institute for Defense Analysis in response to the national defense authorization request; the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that completed its work last year; and the Foster panel, which was created to assess reliability and safety of the security of the U.S. nuclear stockpile established by the National Defense Authorization Act in 1999. All of these people, though tasked with specific agendas, all found occasion to remark about the level of bureaucracy that has grown up over time. Mr. Chairman, I left graduate school and joined one of the national laboratories in 1967, at that time under the Atomic Energy Commission. So I have watched the transition over more than 30 years as we move from the AEC, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and on to the Department of Energy. I must say it is easy for me to reflect back on that entire period of time and see the growth of bureaucracy with almost nothing to halt the steady and continuous growth. That is cited in the words I quoted from those expert panels. I think that the debate we are having here is not as to whether we should have oversight and management of these activities. Of course they should be there and it is a Federal function. But we must come to some agreement on what is excessive oversight and when does management move from good management to micro management. I think that is a central theme and setting the pendulum is a key part of the task you have taken on. When you spend more and more of your work going through bureaucratic procedures there is less time devoted to the mission work. I have seen that expand over time and I think it has gone too far. It is time--and I looked with great hope at the legislation for the NNSA as a chance to do just what was said, of streamlining some of the processes. Now, I certainly do not want to be put in the position of blaming any of the individuals in the Department today. I see no gain in that, no future in that. In fact, I have seen improvements in recent time as these folks who have come in now have in fact acknowledged the level of bureaucracy. As Mr. Glauthier said this morning, in April of last year they indeed invoked some new procedures to try to cut down on the many lines of accountability and authority which were a labyrinth overlapping the Department. That has been seen as a significant gain. I certainly take no issue with the good gentlemen, Dr. David Michaels or Glenn Podonsky. I think they are very well meaning individuals, they want to help and I believe they want to do more than just write traffic tickets, by analogy, which often turns out with oversight responsibilities. They would like to be part of the solution as well. Unfortunately, over time a lot of well meaning people have said we want to help and we want to be part of the solution. As the Galvin Commission said, we have all been getting far more help that we can usefully use. That is a central part of the problem. When everybody is in charge no one is in charge. It is crucial to try to define what are those lines of responsibility and accountability and we must hold people accountable for the work. One other key point I would mention is the history has not been a good one. We have watched the number of audits and oversight visits increase monotonically over time. They only after the Galvin Commission report put the spotlight on it and began to decrease somewhat. At that time we had two major audits or investigations of our lab every single month. The way these were carried out with the management change from headquarters, various offices, to the program offices to the field offices, each one would be worried, gee, what if they should find something derogatory in that inspection or evaluation. I know, we will conduct an inspection early. So we back up 2 or 3 weeks on the calendar before a major inspection by an oversight group, there would be a preinspection and then another group working on the chain would say, well, I wouldn't want my boss to find out that there is a problem, we better conduct an investigation 2 weeks before that. Over time a great number of the staff, a lot of the expenditures that were carried out were to keep up with these audits and oversight investigations. A key principle I believe has made an appearance upon the U.S. industrial scene in recent years. One of the most important parts of the quality I think it has brought to American business is that you can't really improve quality simply by inspecting out defects in a product or activity. You have got to take proactive efforts to build in quality from the ground up by the very people who must carry out the work. That's a theme that I think is vitally important for us in the laboratories to take to heart, to emphasize, and that I think comes with streamlining the oversight at the same time. That will pay much better dividends to the American taxpayers for the expenditures they invest with us. The environmental safety and health responsibilities must be embedded particularly in laboratories with the people who are there to do the work. An early administration actually tried to operate the laboratories as if they were a nuclear power station. Now, there is almost nothing we do that would resemble a nuclear power station. In fact, if we are carrying out leading edge research on behalf of the Nation, we almost never repeat the same activity twice. Research and development requires you to press the frontier and to try new things. It doesn't look like a production activity, and so that overlay never quite worked. But lots and lots of growth and organizations occurred but what we never called to accountability for was, was this working out or was it not working out. That's a key part of what I believe the NNSA was to accomplish, to put accountability in the people who are in charge of the mission and of the program's programs, and that I embraced very thoroughly. Let me close by mentioning that I attached to this statement a number of the activities that we have taken, not because anyone suggested that they should be taken, but because we knew they were important to carry out our mission in the best way. I have included an appendix of a wide number of activities, both in cyber security, which has been the newest and the major worry within the laboratories, but also security, environment, safety, and health. I think as you peruse those you will see the list is something that could not have occurred by an external organization at a long distance away making a suggestion of what should be done to better do the work. These are the kinds of things that had to arise by the people responsible for carrying out the work with their own caring about security and safety to take actions which are effective in raising the level of both security and safety to protect the lives of our employees and to protect our communities. Thank you very much, sir. [The prepared statement of C. Paul Robinson follows:] Prepared Statement of C. Paul Robinson, Director, Sandia National Laboratories introduction Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Paul Robinson, director of Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is managed and operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Sandia National Laboratories is a multiprogram laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and is one of the three National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) laboratories with research and development responsibility for nuclear weapons. Sandia's job is the design, development, and certification of nearly all of the non-nuclear subsystems of nuclear weapons. Our responsibilities include arming, fuzing, and firing systems; safety, security, and use-control systems; engineering support for production and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; and surveillance and support of weapons in stockpile. We perform substantial work in programs closely related to nuclear weapons, such as nuclear intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory, Sandia also performs research and development for DOE's energy offices, as well as work for other agencies when our unique capabilities can make significant contributions. I am pleased to comment on the important issue of safety and security oversight of the new National Nuclear Security Administration. Oversight is an essential function for good management, and when it is properly implemented it enhances the ability of an organization or program to perform its mission. The question before us is, What are sound management principles for implementing oversight in the new National Nuclear Security Administration? The implementation of the NNSA presents an opportunity for DOE to correct some of the structural problems with the oversight function as administered in the past. I will begin my statement with a brief review of a consensus view on DOE management and oversight that highlights a need for change. I will describe some positive trends in how oversight is evolving at DOE, largely as a result of several high-level studies. I will discuss how lessons learned from past oversight experiences should influence how we implement the newest effort--in oversight of cyber-security. I will also comment on the changes in the DOE management structure proposed by the Secretary's Implementation Plan for the National Nuclear Security Administration, including some concerns over ``dual-hatting'' of various staff functions. Finally, I have attached an appendix to my statement that lists some of the many improvements and innovations in security and safety implemented by Sandia National Laboratories on its own initiative without directive from DOE oversight offices. It is important for the Congress to appreciate that the NNSA laboratories are vigorously proactive in achieving high levels of security and safety, and not only as a result of DOE oversight. consensus on the need for change Several high-level studies have been critical of oversight and management at the Department of Energy. In 199