Chapter
5.
DECLASSIFICATION OF ATOMIC-ENERGY INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
Classification of “atomic-energy information” [Restricted Data
and Formerly Restricted Data (RD and FDR)] was described in the previous
chapter. Before classification and declassification principles are discussed,
it is useful to review the history of declassification of atomic-energy
information. This history is particularly important because within the
Manhattan Project all atomic-energy information was “born classified,” and it
was only when declassification of some of this information was considered, near
and shortly after the end of World War II (WWII), that much thought was given
to the principles of either classification or declassification of atomic-energy
information. However, when the first declassification principles were
established, they were developed by some of the top scientists working on the
Manhattan Project. The initial declassification policies even required the
approval of President Truman!
This chapter discusses, in three separate sections,
declassification of atomic-energy information. Those sections cover
declassification in the Manhattan Project, declassification under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, and declassification under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Historical aspects are broadly covered with respect to the Manhattan Project
and the early years of the atomic Energy Commission (AEC) because much of that
information is in documents not readily available to most persons. A final
section to this chapter describes some major document-declassification review
programs carried out since 1954 that concerned RD and FRD.
DECLASSIFICATION IN THE MANHATTAN PROJECT
The first “declassification” of atomic-energy information
occurred when a uranium atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
The second declassification occurred when the plutonium bomb was dropped on
Nagasaki (the event revealed that plutonium could be used as the fissile
material in a nuclear weapon). The third declassification occurred when the
Smyth Report[1]
was published. The Smyth Report was a general account of all the U.S. work
related to the development of atomic energy as directed toward the production
of atomic bombs during WWII. To guide the preparation of the Smyth Report,
General L. R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, directed that a set of
“classification rules” be prepared. Those rules were developed by R. C. Tolman,
one of General Groves’ scientific advisors, and H. D. Smyth, a
scientist on the project and the author of the Smyth Report. The classification
rules were approved by J. B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research
Committee and another of General Groves’ scientific advisors.[2]
Presumably, those classification rules also required the final approval of
General Groves.
To be included in the Smyth Report, information had to satisfy at least one
requirement in each of three categories established by Smyth and Tolman:[3]
I. (A) That it is important
to a reasonable understanding of what had been done on the project as a whole or
(B) That it is of true scientific interest and likely to be truly helpful to
scientific workers in this country and
II. (A) That it is already
known generally by competent scientists or (B) That it can be deduced or
guessed by competent scientists from what is already known, combined with the
knowledge that the project was in the overall successful or
III. (A) That it has no real
bearing on the production of atomic bombs or (B) That it could be discovered by
a small group (15, of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent
scientists working in a well-equipped college lab in a year’s time or less.
Information
concerning actual construction of an atomic bomb was excluded from the report.
The Smyth Report was released to the public on August 11, 1945,[4]
after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August
9). That report was thoroughly reviewed by the major Manhattan Project
participants before its release, with the final review by R. C. Tolman and H.
D. Smyth.[5],[6]
Final release approval for that report was by President Truman.4 The
release was also previously approved by the British, through J. Chadwick, Chief
of the British Scientific Group assigned to the Manhattan Project.,
Comprehensive guidelines for declassifying atomic-energy
information were established shortly after the end of WWII. In early November
1945, General Groves asked R. C. Tolman to draft a declassification policy for
the Manhattan Project. Dr. Tolman assembled a seven-member committee (all
scientists), which consisted of R. F. Bacher, A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J.
R. Oppenheimer, F. H. Spedding, H. C. Urey, and himself.[7],
All members except A. H. Compton attended the Committee on Declassification’s
first meeting, held at Pasadena, California, on November 13-14, 1945. The Committee’s
first report to General Groves was dated Nov. 17, 1945.[8]
The Committee on Declassification, also known as the Tolman
Committee, stated the following as its general philosophy:
In accordance with your
[Gen. Groves’s] directive the Committee has considered the effect of release of
information both on the national welfare and on the national security. In the
interest of national welfare it might seem that nearly all information should
be released at once. In the interest of national security a superficial
consideration of the problem might lead to the conclusion that very little
information should be released.
It is not the conviction of
the Committee that the concealment of scientific information can in any long
term contribute to the national security of the United States. It is recognized
that at the present time it may be inevitable that the policy of the Government
will be to conceal certain information in the interest of national security. Even
within this limitation there are many matters whose declassification would
greatly help the progress of science without violating that policy. If we are
looking to the national welfare or national security as they may be two decades
from now the Committee has no doubt that the greatest strength in both fields
would come from a completely free and open development of science.
Thus, the Committee is
inclined to the view that there are probably good reasons for keeping close
control of much scientific information if it is believed that there is a
likelihood of war within the next five or ten years. It is also their view,
however, that this would weaken us disastrously for the future—perhaps twenty
years hence.[9]
The Tolman Committee’s report listed the following positive and
negative criteria for declassification and transmission of information:
Positive Criteria
1. Advancement of general science
2. Advancement of nonmilitary aspects of
nuclear science
3. Advancement of military aspects of nuclear
science
4. Advancement of general technology
5. Advancement of nonmilitary aspects of
nuclear technology
6. Advancement of military aspects of nuclear
technology
7. Information already substantially known
outside project
8. Information readily obtainable by theory or
minor experimentation
Negative Criteria
1. Disclosure would jeopardize U. S. military
security
2. Disclosure would weaken U. S. position in
international discussions
3. Disclosure would jeopardize patent position[10]
The Tolman Committee considered as a possible positive criterion
“information that cannot be kept secret” but concluded that this was not a
proper criterion.[11]
A possible negative criterion was “disclosure would not give fair credit to
different workers.” However, the committee decided that this also was not
appropriate.[12]
The committee stated that the relative importance of the criteria would change
with time, as follows:[13]
1. As experience is gained in
declassification
2. As the state of general knowledge in
the field changes
3. As the state of the art changes
4. As
the international situation changes and as the formulation of policy by the
government progresses
Starting with a list of topics that encompassed the six major
research and production activities of the Manhattan Project,
the Tolman Committee assigned each topic to one of three categories: immediate
declassification, possibilities for declassification, and not recommended for
declassification.
They suggested that this list be used as a “Declassification Guide.” However, they
recommended that this guide not be generally distributed in its entirety since
it gave an overall picture of the project; declassifiers should get only the
part of the guide that they needed for their particular declassification work
(a continuation of the “compartmentalization” policy).[14]
The Tolman Committee also suggested some declassification
procedures. It recommended that a declassification organization include (1)
directors of organizations originating documents to be considered for
declassification, (2) “Responsible Reviewers” who would review documents in
their field of expertise, and (3) a “District [Manhattan District, United
States Engineer Office] Declassification and Transmission Office.”[15]
Prior to declassification, each document would be reviewed independently by the
originating organization’s director
and by a Responsible Reviewer to ensure that it was declassifiable and that
publication would not adversely affect the government’s patent position.[16]
The Tolman Committee’s intention was “that the principal responsibility for
declassification recommendations should rest with the Responsible Reviewer.”[17]
The major responsibilities of the “District Declassification and
Transmission Office”
were (1) to declassify documents based on the certifications from organization
directors and Responsible Reviewers, (2) to establish “suitable checks” to
ascertain whether declassification was proceeding according to the rules, (3)
to make sure that the declassification process was proceeding promptly and efficiently,
and (4) “on the basis of an overall view to make sure that appropriate material
in all fields is declassified as expeditiously and completely as possible in
order to secure the maximum benefits to be derived from its wider use.”[18]
In late December 1945 the Tolman Committee met in Wilmington,
Delaware, and New York City to obtain declassification suggestions from
representatives of 12 corporations that played major roles in the Manhattan
Project. The Committee also met with General Groves on December 29, 1945.
The Committee on Declassification issued its second report on
January 20, 1946, and its third and final report on June 21, 1946. The
Committee’s views on declassification were made public via a press release,
“Statement of Recommendations on Release of Atomic Project Information,” which
was issued on February 4, 1946.[19]
The second and third Committee reports did not significantly expand on the
proposed declassification philosophy or policy but mostly provided additional
specific recommendations concerning the scientific and technical matters under
consideration for declassification. One interesting feature of the Second Report of Committee on
Declassification was a recommendation concerning declassification of the
Manhattan Project’s routine business correspondence and other non-technical
documents.[20]
The Committee suggested that recommendations for declassification of those
materials should originate with the director of the organization involved and
then should be acted upon by a commissioned officer, who would be assisted by
technically trained enlisted men or technically trained civilians.
Declassification approval of those non-technical documents by a Responsible
Reviewer would not be required, as was the case for declassification of scientific
and technical information.
After receiving the approval of Secretary of War Patterson and
President Truman to proceed with declassification according to the policy
developed by the Tolman Committee,[21]
General Groves directed that a declassification guide be prepared. This
declassification guide (classified), dated March 30, 1946, described
information declassified according to the Tolman Committee’s recommendations
and information that the Committee did not declassify. Since the
declassification policy incorporated in this guide had been approved by the
highest level of government, this guide represented the national policy on
declassification of atomic-energy information.
In April 1946, the Manhattan Project declassification
organization began operations. The “Manhattan District Declassification and
Publications Office,” the equivalent of the Tolman Committee’s recommended
“District Declassification and Transmission Office,” was established at the
Manhattan Engineer District’s (MED) headquarters in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The
declassification function was organizationally located in the Manhattan
Engineer District Research Division in Oak Ridge.[22]
Lt. Col. W. S. Hutchinson was appointed MED District Declassification Officer
by the District Engineer. A Manual for
the Declassification of Scientific and Technical Matters,
dated May 1, 1946, was prepared and issued, with the procedures scheduled to go
into effect by May 30.[23]
Declassification was to be by document, via a three-step process,
rather than by “fields of activities.”,[24]
First, the document was examined by a Coordinating Organization Director.
If that director found that the document could be declassified and that its
release would not adversely affect the Government’s patent position, then it
would be sent to a Responsible Reviewer
selected by that director. If the Coordinating Organization Director and the
Responsible Reviewer disagreed about the declassification of a document, then
the document was sent to a Senior Responsible Reviewer
whose decision was final. If the Coordinating Organization Director and the
Responsible Reviewer agreed that a document could be declassified, the
Coordinating Organization Director recommended a disposition of the document to
the District Declassification Officer. The final decision on document
declassification was by the District Declassification Officer. A document was
declassified when the reviews described earlier “clearly indicated that the
information in the document fell in the category of safely releasable material
as defined in a Declassification Guide” prepared by the Committee on
Declassification.[25]
Six different declassification guides
were prepared and distributed to Coordinating Organization Directors and
Responsible Reviewers. Consistent with the recommendations of the Tolman
Committee, those directors or reviewers were issued only the declassification
guides appropriate to their needs. Other persons could also obtain copies of
the guides applicable to their fields of work so that they could more easily
prepare documents for declassification.
Shortly after the MED declassification organization started
operations, a Committee of Senior Responsible Reviewers was established to
assist in clarifying declassification policy decisions and in carrying out the
declassification process. This committee provided high-level classification
advice that could no longer be quickly provided by the Tolman Committee, whose
members had more urgent duties. One reason this advice was needed was that, in
the early phases of declassifying Manhattan Project documents, the Army
required the classification guide to be “rigidly” applied. That is, if the
guide did not specifically state that an item of information was unclassified,
the Army would not allow its publication. Several of the project’s scientists
believed that this restriction was contrary to the intent of the guide, which
was to provide broad guidance and to leave details to the judgment of the
Responsible Reviewers. This concern was expressed to Col. K. D. Nichols, Manhattan
Project District Engineer.
The matter was shortly resolved to ensure that the judgment of the Responsible
Reviewer was an essential part of the declassification process.
Four Senior Responsible Reviewers were appointed in July 1946: W.
C. Johnson (atomic “piles”); W. F. Libby (gaseous diffusion); R. L. Thornton
(electromagnetic separation); and J. H. Manley (weapons). This Committee of
Senior Responsible Reviewers held its first meeting in Berkeley, California, on
August 12-14, 1946. Included on the
agenda was an evaluation of proposed changes to the March 30, 1946,
declassification guide. The committee’s report to General Groves, transmitted
by letter dated August 23, contained the following noteworthy item:
7. We wish to emphasize that it is our opinion
that:
a) The facts of nature cannot long be kept as classified
information,
b) To attempt to do so even for the relatively short time of a year
or two is not conducive to the national welfare.
By October 23,
1946, General Groves had considerably revised and extended the duties and
responsibilities of the Senior Responsible Reviewers.
They were granted authority to recommend declassification actions and
appropriate changes to the Declassification Guides. Those recommendations could
either be made directly to the District Declassification Officer (minor
changes) or to the District Declassification Officer (important changes)
through (1) Dr. Tolman, (2) a member of the Declassification (Tolman)
Committee, or (3) a competent authority in the particular field (e.g., the
director of the laboratory concerned).[26]
About 500
documents were declassified by the end of 1946,[27]
at which time the Army’s responsibilities for operation of the Manhattan
Project’s facilities were transferred to the AEC.
DECLASSIFICATION
UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946
On January 1,
1947, the AEC became responsible for controlling atomic-energy information in
the United States as provided by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.[28]
The U.S. atomic-energy policy was in Sect. 1(a) of that Act.
Accordingly, it is hereby declared to be the policy
of the people of the United States that, subject
at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and
security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as
practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the
standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and
promoting world peace [emphasis added].
Thus the Act explicitly
stated that the “common defense and security” of the United States was the
paramount factor with respect to atomic-energy matters.
Section 10(a) of
the Act gave the nation’s policy for the control of atomic-energy information.
It shall be the policy of the [Atomic Energy]
Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as
to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the
Commission shall be guided by the following principles:
(1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and
enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for
destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of
information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for
industrial purposes; and
(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information
relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide
that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific
progress.21
Section
10(b)(1) defined Restricted Data (RD), gave the AEC the authority to declassify
RD, and set the standard for such declassification:
The term “restricted data” as used in this
section means all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic
weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable
material in the production of power, but shall not include any data which the
Commission from time to time determines may
be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security.21
(emphasis added)
Note that
declassification required approval by the five-member AEC and therefore was not
an action to be taken lightly.
The
standard for declassifying RD, that such an action would not “adversely affect
the common defense and security,” was exacting. At that time, it was difficult
to determine that publication of atomic-energy information, particularly
scientific or technical information, would not be of some help to an adversary.
The AEC’s second Director of Classification indicated that it was hard to reach
a conclusion that declassification of an item of information would not
adversely affect the common defense and security.[29]
The AEC
reaffirmed and continued to implement the MED’s declassification policy
established by the Tolman Committee.[30],[31]
The Public and Technical Information Service was established by the AEC in late
1947 to control and disseminate atomic-energy information.[32]
This organization was responsible for ensuring that information was properly
controlled (classification and declassification) and that documents (classified
and unclassified) were efficiently distributed (“standard” distribution lists
were prepared to help distribute classified documents).
The Declassification Branch of the Public and Technical Information Service was
responsible for declassification matters. During 1947, about 120 scientists and
engineers served as reviewers and recommended the declassification of more than
1000 documents from a group of about 1200 that were reviewed.[33]
At that time, the AEC’s declassification program was administered entirely by
scientific personnel.[34]
The AEC
Declassification Branch began to issue Declassification Information Bulletins
early in its existence. Bulletin No. 1 was issued on February 13, 1947.
Bulletin No. 2, March 20, 1947, stated that releases of information in any
foreign country after March 30, 1946 (the date of the initial Declassification
Guide), could not be used as authority for declassification of certain topics.
During
1948, the AEC approved a plan for distributing, to persons within the “National
Military Establishment” who had only military clearances, certain information
(Type B RD) dealing principally with the military’s use of atomic weapons, as
contrasted to information on the design, development, and production of those
weapons.[35]
This Type B RD was to be treated as defense information (the equivalent to the
classified national-security information currently defined in Executive Order
12958). A Classification Guide for the
Military Application of Atomic Energy was prepared that differentiated
between “regular” RD and Type B RD. To
assist in determining the RD that could be placed in the Type B category and in
other atomic weapons classification matters, a Weapons Effect Classification
Board was established,[36]
which met at Los Alamos on August 13, 1948, with Norris E. Bradbury, Director
of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, as Chairman.
Directors
of contractor laboratories were authorized to release unclassified reports in
certain fields of research under procedures adopted in 1948.[37],[38]
If those directors determined that the reports contained no RD, then those
reports did not have to be sent to AEC’s declassification organization prior to
release. The classification guide, Guide
to Unclassified Fields or Topics of Research, described those areas of
research where there was “low probability” of finding classified information.
This classification guide was to be used in conjunction with the March 15,
1948, declassification guide.[39]
A laboratory or plant had to request and receive specific permission from the
applicable AEC Operations Office before research in those fields could be
conducted as unclassified.[40]
It appears that a facility’s approved list of specific unclassified fields of
research was revised each year, as more atomic-energy information was
declassified. During 1949, more than half of the published technical papers
from AEC laboratories were released in this manner, without formal review by
the declassification system.[41]
In 1949,
the AEC discontinued using the term “Restricted” as a classification level for
documents containing technical information.
The following is from a 1949 Oak Ridge National Laboratory bulletin:[42]
We have been instructed by the Atomic Energy
Commission to discontinue using the term “Restricted” as a classification for
documents containing technical information. This term is to be used only for
administrative purposes.
Documents which contain scientific
information which does not fall within the purview of the “Unclassified Fields
of Research” should be classified “Confidential” or higher. Documents presented
for declassification should be limited to those classified “Confidential” or
higher.
Thus, there would no
longer be any documents marked “Restricted-Restricted Data.” Later in 1949, the
AEC directed that the classification “Official Use Only” was to be used instead
of “Restricted.”[43]
The use of the classification “Official Use Only” was to be limited to
documents that:
(1) Contain information that should not be
disclosed to anyone except for official purposes but which do not warrant a
higher classification.
(2) Do not contain restricted data . . . .
The classification
marking “Official Use Only” was in effect in the AEC from July 18, 1949, until
October 22, 1951.
In
mid-1949, the AEC created the Office of the Director of Classification, which
included the Declassification Branch of the Public and Technical Information
Services.[44]
The Director of Classification was responsible for interpreting AEC-approved
rules and guides for declassification and for the “original classification of
information.”[45]
Reasons for the organizational change included recognition of the specialized
nature of classification and declassification work and the possible conflict of
interest when the declassification function was organizationally under the
person who was also responsible for promoting the dissemination of
atomic-energy information.[46]
This change also reflected increased interest in the problem of secrecy and
recognized that “classification (assignment of an appropriate secrecy category)
is as important as declassification (release from the restricted data
category).”[47]
Organizationally, it appears that the Director of Classification was on the
same level as other Division Directors.[48]
Dr. Harold
A. Fidler was the first Director of Classification. He left that position in
late 1949 to become associate director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at
Berkeley, California.[49]
He was succeeded as Director of Classification
by Dr. James G. Beckerley, who was succeeded in 1954 by Charles D. Luke.
Subsequent heads of the classification organization have been Charles L.
Marshall (1954-1975), John A. Griffin (1975-1979), Robert T. Duff (1979-1984),
Esther L. Ellman-Lytle (1984-1986), F. Charles Gilbert (1986-1988), A. Bryan
Siebert (1988-1999), and Roger K. Heusser (1999-2000). Joan G. Hawthorne is the
current (2002) director of the Information Classification and Control Policy organization,
the most recent designation for the “classification office.”
The Coordinating Organization Director (COD) did not have
a major role in classification matters after the Office of Director of
Classification was established. A 1956 AEC announcement stated that CODs were
to contact the Division of Classification only
with respect to “processing of documents for declassification.”[50]
The AEC
provided the following summary of its 1949 philosophy on the control of
information in its Seventh Semiannual
Report:[51]
CONTROL OF INFORMATION
The Commission has continued to give careful
consideration to the basic policies underlying the control of information. The
Commission, guided by the pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, has
determined that information should be controlled so as to promote the common
defense and security by—
a) Withholding from those whose objectives
may be inimical to the interests of the United States, information which could
be used by them to the detriment of this Nation’s security.
b) Providing adequate information for a
vigorous and efficient pursuit of the goals of this Nation’s atomic energy and
related programs, in a manner consistent with democratic traditions.
The secrecy classification to be applied to
any item of information thus depends upon a balance between the value of that
information to inimical interests and the value expected to accrue to the
United States through its dissemination.
In its consideration of policies in such
matters, the Commission has recognized that the essential assets of the United
States in atomic energy, as in other fields, are the ability and experience of
industry, the knowledge and enthusiasm of scientists, and the maintenance of
momentum in all technical fields. Many of these assets lie outside the
Commission’s organization and depend to an essential degree upon scientists,
technicians, and industrialists having free access to adequate information.
The importance of accountability to the
public must be considered, likewise, in determining information-control policy.
In a democracy, the people must be able to judge the action of their
representatives and officials, and to pass intelligently on policy. The
Commission believes that information about a public enterprise of such magnitude
as the atomic-energy program should be withheld only for reasons soundly based
upon the common defense and security.
The essential factors in appraising whether
particular items of information must be kept secret depend in part on a
technical judgment as to the pertinence of the information to the objectives of
this Nation’s over-all program. In forming this judgment, the Commission looks
to key technical personnel associated with its activities. It also depends on
many factors of nontechnical nature such as, for example, matters related to
military operations, civil defense, plant protection, or international
relations. In this judgment the Commission must obtain the views of competent
authorities in its own organization and in other agencies. The Commission
recognizes that control of information requires constant exercise of judgment,
in the last analysis, by every individual concerned with classified
information.
In
describing its information-control policy in 1950, the AEC indicated that this
policy was guided by three basic principles:
a) Weapons information, including design, production and stockpiles,
should be kept secret.
b) Basic science should be free except where it is directly related
to weapons.
c) Until international control is attained, there shall be no
information exchanged with other nations on the use of atomic energy for
industrial purposes.[52]
For
information not falling into those three categories, the AEC used a simple
criterion to judge the classification of that information: “Will the release of
this information help the United States atomic energy program more than it will
help the atomic energy program of a potential enemy?”[53]
A revision
of the declassification guide was issued on November 15, 1950, and the Guide to Unclassified Fields or Topics of
Research was revised on January 8, 1952. Classification Procedures for AEC Research Contractors[54]
was also issued on January 8, 1952. It established criteria for classification
and security procedures in off-site research contracts and unclassified on-site
research. Those procedures described four categories of research as guides for
off-site projects. Category I was clearly unclassified research and there was
essentially no chance for development of Restricted Data in this category. Category
II included areas that potentially could produce Restricted Data, but since
there was no initial intent to do so they could be started as unclassified
projects. Category III areas were not listed as unclassified fields of research
but information developed in those areas was declassifiable. Category IV areas
were classified fields of research, with presumably little chance of generating
unclassified information.
At an
early date, the AEC cooperated with the United Kingdom and Canada to ensure
uniform application of declassification policies with respect to atomic-energy
information shared as a result of their combined WWII efforts. The U.S.
declassification guide was sent to Canada and the United Kingdom and was
subsequently adopted by them.[55]
The first joint meeting on classification by the three nations was in November
1947. As a result of that conference, the Declassification
Guide for Responsible Reviewers was revised and reissued as the Declassification Guide for General
Application on March 15, 1948.[56]
Meetings among the three countries were thereafter held on an approximate
annual basis, with the sixth meeting held in April 1953[57]
and the tenth meeting held in Ottawa, Canada, in July 1974.
In
December 1947, after the November meeting between the U.S., U.K., and Canada on
classification matters, those three nations met in Washington to discuss
information exchange and uranium-ore allocations. The AEC did not inform the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) on the technical exchange program with
the British until the summer of 1948. Implementation of this exchange program
was delayed by the U.S. elections of 1948 and by concerns in the Congress and
by one or more AEC Commissioners about giving atomic-energy information to the
British because such an action was probably prohibited by the Atomic Energy
Act. New information-exchange discussions among the U.S., U.K., and Canada
occurred in September and November 1949. On February 2, 1950, the AEC learned
that Klaus Fuchs, a British scientist who participated extensively in Manhattan
Project activities in the United States and subsequently was a major
participant in the British atomic energy project, was a U.S.S.R. spy. This news
was a major factor in greatly reducing U.S.-U.K. exchange of atomic-energy technical
information.
It is
interesting to note that the JCAE, which had Congressional oversight over the
AEC, had refused to accept classified information in 1947.[58]
However, when Senator Brien McMahon became JCAE Chairman in 1949, he requested
access to classified information.[59]
A
discussion of declassification under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 would not be
complete without mentioning the apparently improper use of classification by
the AEC, in the 1947-1948 time period, to not declassify documents concerning
human radiation experiments conducted by the Manhattan Project. A 1995 report, Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments - Final Report,
mentioned that AEC program officials directed AEC classification officials not
to declassify information on those experiments.
Reasons given for not declassifying such information were “public
relations,” “public opinion,” “opinion of the medical profession,” “legal
suits,” or “because of administrative embarrassment.”[60] It is not unlikely that similar improper
criteria were also used in subsequent years to keep some AEC documents
classified.
DECLASSIFICATION UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
The desire
of our nation’s leaders to make atomic-energy information more accessible to
industry (“peacetime uses of atomic energy”) and to the rest of the world
(President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” Program) led to the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.[61]
That Act became law on August 30, 1954, and its added emphasis on the peacetime
uses of atomic energy
led to the eventual declassification, starting in April 1955, of most
information pertinent to civilian nuclear reactor technology. Also under this
Act, the AEC established a new clearance category (“L,” limited access) which
required only a “national agency check” for access to Confidential RD.[62]
This new category made it easier for U.S. companies to obtain atomic-energy
information pertinent to commercial and industrial use of atomic energy, most
of which could be placed in the Confidential category under the new classification
policy.
The Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 did not significantly
change the definition of RD:
The term “Restricted Data” means all data concerning
(1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production
of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the
production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from
the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title.[63]
The Act created a category of
atomic-energy information that could be shared with the military under the
military’s security clearances (similar to the Type B RD mentioned earlier). By
Sect. 142(d) of the Act, certain RD could be “transclassified” to another
category later designated as Formerly Restricted Data (FRD):
The [Secretary of Energy] shall remove from the
Restricted Data category such data as the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military
utilization of atomic weapons and which the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as
defense information: Provided, however,
that no such data so removed from the Restricted Data category shall be
transmitted or otherwise made available to any nation or regional defense
organization, while such data remains defense information, except pursuant to
an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 2164(b) of
this title.[64]
The Act made it
easier to declassify RD and also specifically provided for the declassification
of FRD:
The [Secretary of Energy] shall from time to time
determine the data, within the definition of Restricted Data, which can be
published without undue risk to the common defense and security and shall
thereupon cause such data to be declassified and removed from the category of
Restricted Data.[65]
In the case of Restricted Data which the [Secretary
of Energy] and the Department of Defense jointly determine to relate primarily
to the military utilization of atomic weapons [FRD], the determination that
such data may be published without constituting an unreasonable risk to the
common defense and security shall be made by the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense jointly, and if the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense do not agree, the determination shall be made by the
President.[66]
Restricted Data could be
declassified if such action would not cause undue risk to the common defense
and security. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, RD declassification required
a determination that it could be done “without adversely affecting the common
defense and security.”[67]
The “undue risk” test of the 1954 Act was intended to allow declassification of
more atomic-energy information.[68]
Note that FRD can be declassified if that action does not constitute “an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security,” which appears to be less
stringent than the “undue risk” test for declassification of RD.
In July 1955, the AEC issued a new Declassification Guide for Responsible Reviewers. This guide was
expected to enable many Secret reports that were of interest to power reactor
industries to be downgraded to Confidential or to be declassified.[69]
On August 23,
1956, the AEC and the Department of Defense issued a new classification guide
for their joint use.[70]
A revised Guide to Unclassified Fields of
Research was also prepared in 1956.[71]
In 1956-1957, the AEC began to encourage the preparation of “local”
classification guides.[72]
By the end of 1958, about 25 guides to local projects or areas of information
had been issued by the AEC.[73]
Monthly Classification Bulletins
began to be issued by the Division of Classification in late 1956 to
disseminate changes and interpretations to classification guidance rapidly and
efficiently.
On December 5,
1956, the eighth revision of the Declassification
Guide for Responsible Reviewers was issued.[74],[75]
Much information was declassified, primarily “to enable industry to design,
construct and operate civilian power reactors and their associated processing
plants.”49 In February 1957, the AEC decided that more information
concerning reactors could be declassified, including some technology acquired
during the military-reactor programs.47
In January 1958
a joint declassification guide on controlled thermonuclear reactions
was approved by the United States and the United Kingdom. On August 30, 1957, those two nations had
announced the joint declassification of all research on controlled
thermonuclear reactions.[76]
In January 1960,
the Classification Policy Guide
became effective, replacing the Declassification
Guide for Responsible Reviewers.[77]
Nearly all information on the technology of isolating and handling plutonium
was now unclassified and could be used in the power and breeder reactor
industry[78]
(and for separating plutonium for nuclear weapons).
A review of
classification policy in the weapons field was completed in 1959. No major
changes were made, but a new classification guide was approved by the
Commission.[79]
In 1960, a gas-centrifuge classification guide was adopted by the AEC. Prior to
issuing this guide, the AEC coordinated its gas-centrifuge classification
policy with the British, The Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG). Subsequent “quadripartite” meetings were held on gas-centrifuge
classification. In 1972, the three European members (who had formed URENCO, a
uranium-enrichment consortium) requested relaxation of centrifuge
classification guidance to assist in commercialization of their gas-centrifuge
technology. In 1974, the British, The Netherlands, and the FRG declassified
some of their gas-centrifuge technology and labeled it “Restricted”
information. Access to Restricted information required a clearance, but the
clearance requirements were not as stringent as for access to Secret or
Confidential information. Later, in 1978, the United States followed a similar
course when preparing to construct the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant at
Portsmouth, Ohio. The United States declassified some gas-centrifuge information
to assist in the construction of that plant (e.g., to lower construction costs)
and labeled it “Restricted Use” information. The DOE abolished that designation
in 2000, 15 years after the Portsmouth plant was cancelled.
In 1966, the AEC
established a classification review panel and initiated a comprehensive and
detailed study of classification policy,
Security Classification of Information: Table of Contents