Chapter
5.
DECLASSIFICATION OF ATOMIC-ENERGY INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
Classification of “atomic-energy information” [Restricted Data
and Formerly Restricted Data (RD and FDR)] was described in the previous
chapter. Before classification and declassification principles are discussed,
it is useful to review the history of declassification of atomic-energy
information. This history is particularly important because within the
Manhattan Project all atomic-energy information was “born classified,” and it
was only when declassification of some of this information was considered, near
and shortly after the end of World War II (WWII), that much thought was given
to the principles of either classification or declassification of atomic-energy
information. However, when the first declassification principles were
established, they were developed by some of the top scientists working on the
Manhattan Project. The initial declassification policies even required the
approval of President Truman!
This chapter discusses, in three separate sections,
declassification of atomic-energy information. Those sections cover
declassification in the Manhattan Project, declassification under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946, and declassification under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Historical aspects are broadly covered with respect to the Manhattan Project
and the early years of the atomic Energy Commission (AEC) because much of that
information is in documents not readily available to most persons. A final
section to this chapter describes some major document-declassification review
programs carried out since 1954 that concerned RD and FRD.
DECLASSIFICATION IN THE MANHATTAN PROJECT
The first “declassification” of atomic-energy information
occurred when a uranium atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
The second declassification occurred when the plutonium bomb was dropped on
Nagasaki (the event revealed that plutonium could be used as the fissile
material in a nuclear weapon). The third declassification occurred when the
Smyth Report[1]
was published. The Smyth Report was a general account of all the U.S. work
related to the development of atomic energy as directed toward the production
of atomic bombs during WWII. To guide the preparation of the Smyth Report,
General L. R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, directed that a set of
“classification rules” be prepared. Those rules were developed by R. C. Tolman,
one of General Groves’ scientific advisors, and H. D. Smyth, a
scientist on the project and the author of the Smyth Report. The classification
rules were approved by J. B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research
Committee and another of General Groves’ scientific advisors.[2]
Presumably, those classification rules also required the final approval of
General Groves.
To be included in the Smyth Report, information had to satisfy at least one
requirement in each of three categories established by Smyth and Tolman:[3]
I. (A) That it is important
to a reasonable understanding of what had been done on the project as a whole or
(B) That it is of true scientific interest and likely to be truly helpful to
scientific workers in this country and
II. (A) That it is already
known generally by competent scientists or (B) That it can be deduced or
guessed by competent scientists from what is already known, combined with the
knowledge that the project was in the overall successful or
III. (A) That it has no real
bearing on the production of atomic bombs or (B) That it could be discovered by
a small group (15, of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent
scientists working in a well-equipped college lab in a year’s time or less.
Information
concerning actual construction of an atomic bomb was excluded from the report.
The Smyth Report was released to the public on August 11, 1945,[4]
after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August
9). That report was thoroughly reviewed by the major Manhattan Project
participants before its release, with the final review by R. C. Tolman and H.
D. Smyth.[5],[6]
Final release approval for that report was by President Truman.4 The
release was also previously approved by the British, through J. Chadwick, Chief
of the British Scientific Group assigned to the Manhattan Project.,
Comprehensive guidelines for declassifying atomic-energy
information were established shortly after the end of WWII. In early November
1945, General Groves asked R. C. Tolman to draft a declassification policy for
the Manhattan Project. Dr. Tolman assembled a seven-member committee (all
scientists), which consisted of R. F. Bacher, A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J.
R. Oppenheimer, F. H. Spedding, H. C. Urey, and himself.[7],
All members except A. H. Compton attended the Committee on Declassification’s
first meeting, held at Pasadena, California, on November 13-14, 1945. The Committee’s
first report to General Groves was dated Nov. 17, 1945.[8]
The Committee on Declassification, also known as the Tolman
Committee, stated the following as its general philosophy:
In accordance with your
[Gen. Groves’s] directive the Committee has considered the effect of release of
information both on the national welfare and on the national security. In the
interest of national welfare it might seem that nearly all information should
be released at once. In the interest of national security a superficial
consideration of the problem might lead to the conclusion that very little
information should be released.
It is not the conviction of
the Committee that the concealment of scientific information can in any long
term contribute to the national security of the United States. It is recognized
that at the present time it may be inevitable that the policy of the Government
will be to conceal certain information in the interest of national security. Even
within this limitation there are many matters whose declassification would
greatly help the progress of science without violating that policy. If we are
looking to the national welfare or national security as they may be two decades
from now the Committee has no doubt that the greatest strength in both fields
would come from a completely free and open development of science.
Thus, the Committee is
inclined to the view that there are probably good reasons for keeping close
control of much scientific information if it is believed that there is a
likelihood of war within the next five or ten years. It is also their view,
however, that this would weaken us disastrously for the future—perhaps twenty
years hence.[9]
The Tolman Committee’s report listed the following positive and
negative criteria for declassification and transmission of information:
Positive Criteria
1. Advancement of general science
2. Advancement of nonmilitary aspects of
nuclear science
3. Advancement of military aspects of nuclear
science
4. Advancement of general technology
5. Advancement of nonmilitary aspects of
nuclear technology
6. Advancement of military aspects of nuclear
technology
7. Information already substantially known
outside project
8. Information readily obtainable by theory or
minor experimentation
Negative Criteria
1. Disclosure would jeopardize U. S. military
security
2. Disclosure would weaken U. S. position in
international discussions
3. Disclosure would jeopardize patent position[10]
The Tolman Committee considered as a possible positive criterion
“information that cannot be kept secret” but concluded that this was not a
proper criterion.[11]
A possible negative criterion was “disclosure would not give fair credit to
different workers.” However, the committee decided that this also was not
appropriate.[12]
The committee stated that the relative importance of the criteria would change
with time, as follows:[13]
1. As experience is gained in
declassification
2. As the state of general knowledge in
the field changes
3. As the state of the art changes
4. As
the international situation changes and as the formulation of policy by the
government progresses
Starting with a list of topics that encompassed the six major
research and production activities of the Manhattan Project,
the Tolman Committee assigned each topic to one of three categories: immediate
declassification, possibilities for declassification, and not recommended for
declassification.
They suggested that this list be used as a “Declassification Guide.” However, they
recommended that this guide not be generally distributed in its entirety since
it gave an overall picture of the project; declassifiers should get only the
part of the guide that they needed for their particular declassification work
(a continuation of the “compartmentalization” policy).[14]
The Tolman Committee also suggested some declassification
procedures. It recommended that a declassification organization include (1)
directors of organizations originating documents to be considered for
declassification, (2) “Responsible Reviewers” who would review documents in
their field of expertise, and (3) a “District [Manhattan District, United
States Engineer Office] Declassification and Transmission Office.”[15]
Prior to declassification, each document would be reviewed independently by the
originating organization’s director
and by a Responsible Reviewer to ensure that it was declassifiable and that
publication would not adversely affect the government’s patent position.[16]
The Tolman Committee’s intention was “that the principal responsibility for
declassification recommendations should rest with the Responsible Reviewer.”[17]
The major responsibilities of the “District Declassification and
Transmission Office”
were (1) to declassify documents based on the certifications from organization
directors and Responsible Reviewers, (2) to establish “suitable checks” to
ascertain whether declassification was proceeding according to the rules, (3)
to make sure that the declassification process was proceeding promptly and efficiently,
and (4) “on the basis of an overall view to make sure that appropriate material
in all fields is declassified as expeditiously and completely as possible in
order to secure the maximum benefits to be derived from its wider use.”[18]
In late December 1945 the Tolman Committee met in Wilmington,
Delaware, and New York City to obtain declassification suggestions from
representatives of 12 corporations that played major roles in the Manhattan
Project. The Committee also met with General Groves on December 29, 1945.
The Committee on Declassification issued its second report on
January 20, 1946, and its third and final report on June 21, 1946. The
Committee’s views on declassification were made public via a press release,
“Statement of Recommendations on Release of Atomic Project Information,” which
was issued on February 4, 1946.[19]
The second and third Committee reports did not significantly expand on the
proposed declassification philosophy or policy but mostly provided additional
specific recommendations concerning the scientific and technical matters under
consideration for declassification. One interesting feature of the Second Report of Committee on
Declassification was a recommendation concerning declassification of the
Manhattan Project’s routine business correspondence and other non-technical
documents.[20]
The Committee suggested that recommendations for declassification of those
materials should originate with the director of the organization involved and
then should be acted upon by a commissioned officer, who would be assisted by
technically trained enlisted men or technically trained civilians.
Declassification approval of those non-technical documents by a Responsible
Reviewer would not be required, as was the case for declassification of scientific
and technical information.
After receiving the approval of Secretary of War Patterson and
President Truman to proceed with declassification according to the policy
developed by the Tolman Committee,[21]
General Groves directed that a declassification guide be prepared. This
declassification guide (classified), dated March 30, 1946, described
information declassified according to the Tolman Committee’s recommendations
and information that the Committee did not declassify. Since the
declassification policy incorporated in this guide had been approved by the
highest level of government, this guide represented the national policy on
declassification of atomic-energy information.
In April 1946, the Manhattan Project declassification
organization began operations. The “Manhattan District Declassification and
Publications Office,” the equivalent of the Tolman Committee’s recommended
“District Declassification and Transmission Office,” was established at the
Manhattan Engineer District’s (MED) headquarters in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The
declassification function was organizationally located in the Manhattan
Engineer District Research Division in Oak Ridge.[22]
Lt. Col. W. S. Hutchinson was appointed MED District Declassification Officer
by the District Engineer. A Manual for
the Declassification of Scientific and Technical Matters,
dated May 1, 1946, was prepared and issued, with the procedures scheduled to go
into effect by May 30.[23]
Declassification was to be by document, via a three-step process,
rather than by “fields of activities.”,[24]
First, the document was examined by a Coordinating Organization Director.
If that director found that the document could be declassified and that its
release would not adversely affect the Government’s patent position, then it
would be sent to a Responsible Reviewer
selected by that director. If the Coordinating Organization Director and the
Responsible Reviewer disagreed about the declassification of a document, then
the document was sent to a Senior Responsible Reviewer
whose decision was final. If the Coordinating Organization Director and the
Responsible Reviewer agreed that a document could be declassified, the
Coordinating Organization Director recommended a disposition of the document to
the District Declassification Officer. The final decision on document
declassification was by the District Declassification Officer. A document was
declassified when the reviews described earlier “clearly indicated that the
information in the document fell in the category of safely releasable material
as defined in a Declassification Guide” prepared by the Committee on
Declassification.[25]
Six different declassification guides
were prepared and distributed to Coordinating Organization Directors and
Responsible Reviewers. Consistent with the recommendations of the Tolman
Committee, those directors or reviewers were issued only the declassification
guides appropriate to their needs. Other persons could also obtain copies of
the guides applicable to their fields of work so that they could more easily
prepare documents for declassification.
Shortly after the MED declassification organization started
operations, a Committee of Senior Responsible Reviewers was established to
assist in clarifying declassification policy decisions and in carrying out the
declassification process. This committee provided high-level classification
advice that could no longer be quickly provided by the Tolman Committee, whose
members had more urgent duties. One reason this advice was needed was that, in
the early phases of declassifying Manhattan Project documents, the Army
required the classification guide to be “rigidly” applied. That is, if the
guide did not specifically state that an item of information was unclassified,
the Army would not allow its publication. Several of the project’s scientists
believed that this restriction was contrary to the intent of the guide, which
was to provide broad guidance and to leave details to the judgment of the
Responsible Reviewers. This concern was expressed to Col. K. D. Nichols, Manhattan
Project District Engineer.
The matter was shortly resolved to ensure that the judgment of the Responsible
Reviewer was an essential part of the declassification process.
Four Senior Responsible Reviewers were appointed in July 1946: W.
C. Johnson (atomic “piles”); W. F. Libby (gaseous diffusion); R. L. Thornton
(electromagnetic separation); and J. H. Manley (weapons). This Committee of
Senior Responsible Reviewers held its first meeting in Berkeley, California, on
August 12-14, 1946. Included on the
agenda was an evaluation of proposed changes to the March 30, 1946,
declassification guide. The committee’s report to General Groves, transmitted
by letter dated August 23, contained the following noteworthy item:
7. We wish to emphasize that it is our opinion
that:
a) The facts of nature cannot long be kept as classified
information,
b) To attempt to do so even for the relatively short time of a year
or two is not conducive to the national welfare.
By October 23,
1946, General Groves had considerably revised and extended the duties and
responsibilities of the Senior Responsible Reviewers.
They were granted authority to recommend declassification actions and
appropriate changes to the Declassification Guides. Those recommendations could
either be made directly to the District Declassification Officer (minor
changes) or to the District Declassification Officer (important changes)
through (1) Dr. Tolman, (2) a member of the Declassification (Tolman)
Committee, or (3) a competent authority in the particular field (e.g., the
director of the laboratory concerned).[26]
About 500
documents were declassified by the end of 1946,[27]
at which time the Army’s responsibilities for operation of the Manhattan
Project’s facilities were transferred to the AEC.
DECLASSIFICATION
UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946
On January 1,
1947, the AEC became responsible for controlling atomic-energy information in
the United States as provided by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.[28]
The U.S. atomic-energy policy was in Sect. 1(a) of that Act.
Accordingly, it is hereby declared to be the policy
of the people of the United States that, subject
at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and
security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as
practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the
standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and
promoting world peace [emphasis added].
Thus the Act explicitly
stated that the “common defense and security” of the United States was the
paramount factor with respect to atomic-energy matters.
Section 10(a) of
the Act gave the nation’s policy for the control of atomic-energy information.
It shall be the policy of the [Atomic Energy]
Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as
to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the
Commission shall be guided by the following principles:
(1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and
enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for
destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of
information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for
industrial purposes; and
(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information
relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide
that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific
progress.21
Section
10(b)(1) defined Restricted Data (RD), gave the AEC the authority to declassify
RD, and set the standard for such declassification:
The term “restricted data” as used in this
section means all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic
weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable
material in the production of power, but shall not include any data which the
Commission from time to time determines may
be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security.21
(emphasis added)
Note that
declassification required approval by the five-member AEC and therefore was not
an action to be taken lightly.
The
standard for declassifying RD, that such an action would not “adversely affect
the common defense and security,” was exacting. At that time, it was difficult
to determine that publication of atomic-energy information, particularly
scientific or technical information, would not be of some help to an adversary.
The AEC’s second Director of Classification indicated that it was hard to reach
a conclusion that declassification of an item of information would not
adversely affect the common defense and security.[29]
The AEC
reaffirmed and continued to implement the MED’s declassification policy
established by the Tolman Committee.[30],[31]
The Public and Technical Information Service was established by the AEC in late
1947 to control and disseminate atomic-energy information.[32]
This organization was responsible for ensuring that information was properly
controlled (classification and declassification) and that documents (classified
and unclassified) were efficiently distributed (“standard” distribution lists
were prepared to help distribute classified documents).
The Declassification Branch of the Public and Technical Information Service was
responsible for declassification matters. During 1947, about 120 scientists and
engineers served as reviewers and recommended the declassification of more than
1000 documents from a group of about 1200 that were reviewed.[33]
At that time, the AEC’s declassification program was administered entirely by
scientific personnel.[34]
The AEC
Declassification Branch began to issue Declassification Information Bulletins
early in its existence. Bulletin No. 1 was issued on February 13, 1947.
Bulletin No. 2, March 20, 1947, stated that releases of information in any
foreign country after March 30, 1946 (the date of the initial Declassification
Guide), could not be used as authority for declassification of certain topics.
During
1948, the AEC approved a plan for distributing, to persons within the “National
Military Establishment” who had only military clearances, certain information
(Type B RD) dealing principally with the military’s use of atomic weapons, as
contrasted to information on the design, development, and production of those
weapons.[35]
This Type B RD was to be treated as defense information (the equivalent to the
classified national-security information currently defined in Executive Order
12958). A Classification Guide for the
Military Application of Atomic Energy was prepared that differentiated
between “regular” RD and Type B RD. To
assist in determining the RD that could be placed in the Type B category and in
other atomic weapons classification matters, a Weapons Effect Classification
Board was established,[36]
which met at Los Alamos on August 13, 1948, with Norris E. Bradbury, Director
of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, as Chairman.
Directors
of contractor laboratories were authorized to release unclassified reports in
certain fields of research under procedures adopted in 1948.[37],[38]
If those directors determined that the reports contained no RD, then those
reports did not have to be sent to AEC’s declassification organization prior to
release. The classification guide, Guide
to Unclassified Fields or Topics of Research, described those areas of
research where there was “low probability” of finding classified information.
This classification guide was to be used in conjunction with the March 15,
1948, declassification guide.[39]
A laboratory or plant had to request and receive specific permission from the
applicable AEC Operations Office before research in those fields could be
conducted as unclassified.[40]
It appears that a facility’s approved list of specific unclassified fields of
research was revised each year, as more atomic-energy information was
declassified. During 1949, more than half of the published technical papers
from AEC laboratories were released in this manner, without formal review by
the declassification system.[41]
In 1949,
the AEC discontinued using the term “Restricted” as a classification level for
documents containing technical information.
The following is from a 1949 Oak Ridge National Laboratory bulletin:[42]
We have been instructed by the Atomic Energy
Commission to discontinue using the term “Restricted” as a classification for
documents containing technical information. This term is to be used only for
administrative purposes.
Documents which contain scientific
information which does not fall within the purview of the “Unclassified Fields
of Research” should be classified “Confidential” or higher. Documents presented
for declassification should be limited to those classified “Confidential” or
higher.
Thus, there would no
longer be any documents marked “Restricted-Restricted Data.” Later in 1949, the
AEC directed that the classification “Official Use Only” was to be used instead
of “Restricted.”[43]
The use of the classification “Official Use Only” was to be limited to
documents that:
(1) Contain information that should not be
disclosed to anyone except for official purposes but which do not warrant a
higher classification.
(2) Do not contain restricted data . . . .
The classification
marking “Official Use Only” was in effect in the AEC from July 18, 1949, until
October 22, 1951.
In
mid-1949, the AEC created the Office of the Director of Classification, which
included the Declassification Branch of the Public and Technical Information
Services.[44]
The Director of Classification was responsible for interpreting AEC-approved
rules and guides for declassification and for the “original classification of
information.”[45]
Reasons for the organizational change included recognition of the specialized
nature of classification and declassification work and the possible conflict of
interest when the declassification function was organizationally under the
person who was also responsible for promoting the dissemination of
atomic-energy information.[46]
This change also reflected increased interest in the problem of secrecy and
recognized that “classification (assignment of an appropriate secrecy category)
is as important as declassification (release from the restricted data
category).”[47]
Organizationally, it appears that the Director of Classification was on the
same level as other Division Directors.[48]
Dr. Harold
A. Fidler was the first Director of Classification. He left that position in
late 1949 to become associate director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at
Berkeley, California.[49]
He was succeeded as Director of Classification
by Dr. James G. Beckerley, who was succeeded in 1954 by Charles D. Luke.
Subsequent heads of the classification organization have been Charles L.
Marshall (1954-1975), John A. Griffin (1975-1979), Robert T. Duff (1979-1984),
Esther L. Ellman-Lytle (1984-1986), F. Charles Gilbert (1986-1988), A. Bryan
Siebert (1988-1999), and Roger K. Heusser (1999-2000). Joan G. Hawthorne is the
current (2002) director of the Information Classification and Control Policy organization,
the most recent designation for the “classification office.”
The Coordinating Organization Director (COD) did not have
a major role in classification matters after the Office of Director of
Classification was established. A 1956 AEC announcement stated that CODs were
to contact the Division of Classification only
with respect to “processing of documents for declassification.”[50]
The AEC
provided the following summary of its 1949 philosophy on the control of
information in its Seventh Semiannual
Report:[51]
CONTROL OF INFORMATION
The Commission has continued to give careful
consideration to the basic policies underlying the control of information. The
Commission, guided by the pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, has
determined that information should be controlled so as to promote the common
defense and security by—
a) Withholding from those whose objectives
may be inimical to the interests of the United States, information which could
be used by them to the detriment of this Nation’s security.
b) Providing adequate information for a
vigorous and efficient pursuit of the goals of this Nation’s atomic energy and
related programs, in a manner consistent with democratic traditions.
The secrecy classification to be applied to
any item of information thus depends upon a balance between the value of that
information to inimical interests and the value expected to accrue to the
United States through its dissemination.
In its consideration of policies in such
matters, the Commission has recognized that the essential assets of the United
States in atomic energy, as in other fields, are the ability and experience of
industry, the knowledge and enthusiasm of scientists, and the maintenance of
momentum in all technical fields. Many of these assets lie outside the
Commission’s organization and depend to an essential degree upon scientists,
technicians, and industrialists having free access to adequate information.
The importance of accountability to the
public must be considered, likewise, in determining information-control policy.
In a democracy, the people must be able to judge the action of their
representatives and officials, and to pass intelligently on policy. The
Commission believes that information about a public enterprise of such magnitude
as the atomic-energy program should be withheld only for reasons soundly based
upon the common defense and security.
The essential factors in appraising whether
particular items of information must be kept secret depend in part on a
technical judgment as to the pertinence of the information to the objectives of
this Nation’s over-all program. In forming this judgment, the Commission looks
to key technical personnel associated with its activities. It also depends on
many factors of nontechnical nature such as, for example, matters related to
military operations, civil defense, plant protection, or international
relations. In this judgment the Commission must obtain the views of competent
authorities in its own organization and in other agencies. The Commission
recognizes that control of information requires constant exercise of judgment,
in the last analysis, by every individual concerned with classified
information.
In
describing its information-control policy in 1950, the AEC indicated that this
policy was guided by three basic principles:
a) Weapons information, including design, production and stockpiles,
should be kept secret.
b) Basic science should be free except where it is directly related
to weapons.
c) Until international control is attained, there shall be no
information exchanged with other nations on the use of atomic energy for
industrial purposes.[52]
For
information not falling into those three categories, the AEC used a simple
criterion to judge the classification of that information: “Will the release of
this information help the United States atomic energy program more than it will
help the atomic energy program of a potential enemy?”[53]
A revision
of the declassification guide was issued on November 15, 1950, and the Guide to Unclassified Fields or Topics of
Research was revised on January 8, 1952. Classification Procedures for AEC Research Contractors[54]
was also issued on January 8, 1952. It established criteria for classification
and security procedures in off-site research contracts and unclassified on-site
research. Those procedures described four categories of research as guides for
off-site projects. Category I was clearly unclassified research and there was
essentially no chance for development of Restricted Data in this category. Category
II included areas that potentially could produce Restricted Data, but since
there was no initial intent to do so they could be started as unclassified
projects. Category III areas were not listed as unclassified fields of research
but information developed in those areas was declassifiable. Category IV areas
were classified fields of research, with presumably little chance of generating
unclassified information.
At an
early date, the AEC cooperated with the United Kingdom and Canada to ensure
uniform application of declassification policies with respect to atomic-energy
information shared as a result of their combined WWII efforts. The U.S.
declassification guide was sent to Canada and the United Kingdom and was
subsequently adopted by them.[55]
The first joint meeting on classification by the three nations was in November
1947. As a result of that conference, the Declassification
Guide for Responsible Reviewers was revised and reissued as the Declassification Guide for General
Application on March 15, 1948.[56]
Meetings among the three countries were thereafter held on an approximate
annual basis, with the sixth meeting held in April 1953[57]
and the tenth meeting held in Ottawa, Canada, in July 1974.
In
December 1947, after the November meeting between the U.S., U.K., and Canada on
classification matters, those three nations met in Washington to discuss
information exchange and uranium-ore allocations. The AEC did not inform the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) on the technical exchange program with
the British until the summer of 1948. Implementation of this exchange program
was delayed by the U.S. elections of 1948 and by concerns in the Congress and
by one or more AEC Commissioners about giving atomic-energy information to the
British because such an action was probably prohibited by the Atomic Energy
Act. New information-exchange discussions among the U.S., U.K., and Canada
occurred in September and November 1949. On February 2, 1950, the AEC learned
that Klaus Fuchs, a British scientist who participated extensively in Manhattan
Project activities in the United States and subsequently was a major
participant in the British atomic energy project, was a U.S.S.R. spy. This news
was a major factor in greatly reducing U.S.-U.K. exchange of atomic-energy technical
information.
It is
interesting to note that the JCAE, which had Congressional oversight over the
AEC, had refused to accept classified information in 1947.[58]
However, when Senator Brien McMahon became JCAE Chairman in 1949, he requested
access to classified information.[59]
A
discussion of declassification under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 would not be
complete without mentioning the apparently improper use of classification by
the AEC, in the 1947-1948 time period, to not declassify documents concerning
human radiation experiments conducted by the Manhattan Project. A 1995 report, Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments - Final Report,
mentioned that AEC program officials directed AEC classification officials not
to declassify information on those experiments.
Reasons given for not declassifying such information were “public
relations,” “public opinion,” “opinion of the medical profession,” “legal
suits,” or “because of administrative embarrassment.”[60] It is not unlikely that similar improper
criteria were also used in subsequent years to keep some AEC documents
classified.
DECLASSIFICATION UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
The desire
of our nation’s leaders to make atomic-energy information more accessible to
industry (“peacetime uses of atomic energy”) and to the rest of the world
(President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” Program) led to the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.[61]
That Act became law on August 30, 1954, and its added emphasis on the peacetime
uses of atomic energy
led to the eventual declassification, starting in April 1955, of most
information pertinent to civilian nuclear reactor technology. Also under this
Act, the AEC established a new clearance category (“L,” limited access) which
required only a “national agency check” for access to Confidential RD.[62]
This new category made it easier for U.S. companies to obtain atomic-energy
information pertinent to commercial and industrial use of atomic energy, most
of which could be placed in the Confidential category under the new classification
policy.
The Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 did not significantly
change the definition of RD:
The term “Restricted Data” means all data concerning
(1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production
of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the
production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from
the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title.[63]
The Act created a category of
atomic-energy information that could be shared with the military under the
military’s security clearances (similar to the Type B RD mentioned earlier). By
Sect. 142(d) of the Act, certain RD could be “transclassified” to another
category later designated as Formerly Restricted Data (FRD):
The [Secretary of Energy] shall remove from the
Restricted Data category such data as the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military
utilization of atomic weapons and which the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense jointly determine can be adequately safeguarded as
defense information: Provided, however,
that no such data so removed from the Restricted Data category shall be
transmitted or otherwise made available to any nation or regional defense
organization, while such data remains defense information, except pursuant to
an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 2164(b) of
this title.[64]
The Act made it
easier to declassify RD and also specifically provided for the declassification
of FRD:
The [Secretary of Energy] shall from time to time
determine the data, within the definition of Restricted Data, which can be
published without undue risk to the common defense and security and shall
thereupon cause such data to be declassified and removed from the category of
Restricted Data.[65]
In the case of Restricted Data which the [Secretary
of Energy] and the Department of Defense jointly determine to relate primarily
to the military utilization of atomic weapons [FRD], the determination that
such data may be published without constituting an unreasonable risk to the
common defense and security shall be made by the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense jointly, and if the [Secretary of Energy] and the
Department of Defense do not agree, the determination shall be made by the
President.[66]
Restricted Data could be
declassified if such action would not cause undue risk to the common defense
and security. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, RD declassification required
a determination that it could be done “without adversely affecting the common
defense and security.”[67]
The “undue risk” test of the 1954 Act was intended to allow declassification of
more atomic-energy information.[68]
Note that FRD can be declassified if that action does not constitute “an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security,” which appears to be less
stringent than the “undue risk” test for declassification of RD.
In July 1955, the AEC issued a new Declassification Guide for Responsible Reviewers. This guide was
expected to enable many Secret reports that were of interest to power reactor
industries to be downgraded to Confidential or to be declassified.[69]
On August 23,
1956, the AEC and the Department of Defense issued a new classification guide
for their joint use.[70]
A revised Guide to Unclassified Fields of
Research was also prepared in 1956.[71]
In 1956-1957, the AEC began to encourage the preparation of “local”
classification guides.[72]
By the end of 1958, about 25 guides to local projects or areas of information
had been issued by the AEC.[73]
Monthly Classification Bulletins
began to be issued by the Division of Classification in late 1956 to
disseminate changes and interpretations to classification guidance rapidly and
efficiently.
On December 5,
1956, the eighth revision of the Declassification
Guide for Responsible Reviewers was issued.[74],[75]
Much information was declassified, primarily “to enable industry to design,
construct and operate civilian power reactors and their associated processing
plants.”49 In February 1957, the AEC decided that more information
concerning reactors could be declassified, including some technology acquired
during the military-reactor programs.47
In January 1958
a joint declassification guide on controlled thermonuclear reactions
was approved by the United States and the United Kingdom. On August 30, 1957, those two nations had
announced the joint declassification of all research on controlled
thermonuclear reactions.[76]
In January 1960,
the Classification Policy Guide
became effective, replacing the Declassification
Guide for Responsible Reviewers.[77]
Nearly all information on the technology of isolating and handling plutonium
was now unclassified and could be used in the power and breeder reactor
industry[78]
(and for separating plutonium for nuclear weapons).
A review of
classification policy in the weapons field was completed in 1959. No major
changes were made, but a new classification guide was approved by the
Commission.[79]
In 1960, a gas-centrifuge classification guide was adopted by the AEC. Prior to
issuing this guide, the AEC coordinated its gas-centrifuge classification
policy with the British, The Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG). Subsequent “quadripartite” meetings were held on gas-centrifuge
classification. In 1972, the three European members (who had formed URENCO, a
uranium-enrichment consortium) requested relaxation of centrifuge
classification guidance to assist in commercialization of their gas-centrifuge
technology. In 1974, the British, The Netherlands, and the FRG declassified
some of their gas-centrifuge technology and labeled it “Restricted”
information. Access to Restricted information required a clearance, but the
clearance requirements were not as stringent as for access to Secret or
Confidential information. Later, in 1978, the United States followed a similar
course when preparing to construct the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant at
Portsmouth, Ohio. The United States declassified some gas-centrifuge information
to assist in the construction of that plant (e.g., to lower construction costs)
and labeled it “Restricted Use” information. The DOE abolished that designation
in 2000, 15 years after the Portsmouth plant was cancelled.
In 1966, the AEC
established a classification review panel and initiated a comprehensive and
detailed study of classification policy,[80]
which was completed in 1967. The existing classification policy was reaffirmed
for the weapons program; the naval reactors program; the nuclear ramjet
program; the nuclear rocket engine; gaseous-diffusion and gas-centrifuge
isotope-separation technologies; and “any other method of isotope separation
which achieves a reasonable potential for the practical production of special
nuclear material in substantial quantities.”[81]
The classification review panel recommended declassification of essentially all
information concerning Army compact reactor technology, zirconium-hydride
moderated SNAP (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power) reactors, and isotopic heat
sources. Those recommendations were implemented by the AEC in 1968.[82]
By the end of
1972, the only AEC programs that were classified to any significant extent were
the nuclear-weapon programs, isotope-separation programs for fissionable
isotopes and lithium isotopes, and the naval nuclear propulsion program. All
the other programs were either completely or mostly unclassified.[83]
In 1974, laser fusion and laser isotope separation classification guidance was
reviewed and revised.[84]
The AEC was
replaced by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1975. Most of the classification of
information responsibilities were assigned to ERDA. On October 1, 1977, ERDA
became part of the newly created Department of Energy (DOE). The Office of
Classification became part of the organization headed by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense Programs (ASDP). The ASDP has the declassification
authority originally assigned to the five AEC Commissioners.
In 1977-1978, the
Office of Classification developed, in coordination with other federal
agencies, a nuclear-nonproliferation classification guide.[85]
A major revision to the basic nuclear-weapon-technology classification guide
was initiated in 1980. The purpose of this revision was to update
classification policy and to provide a more extensive rationale for
classification.[86]
In 1983, DOE began to develop detailed “Topical Guides” for specific
nuclear-weapon areas.[87]
Several significant downgrading and declassification actions were taken in 1985
for the gas-centrifuge isotope-separation program and again in 1997. In May
1989, nearly all information concerning the gaseous-diffusion
uranium-enrichment program was downgraded from SRD to CRD.
In March 1990,
the Under Secretary of DOE directed that a comprehensive review of DOE’s
Restricted Data (RD) classification policies and procedures be done. The study
was carried out by DOE’s Office of Classification, using a small working group,
including support contractors. The group’s final report[88]
encompassed RD and FRD, unclassified sensitive nuclear information [e.g.,
Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)], and certain aspects of
national security information. The thoughtful and well-considered final report
of that working group recommended that the RD system be continued, but that
changes be made to the Atomic Energy Act (1) to eliminate the FRD category and
transfer FRD information to the [classified national security information]
category, (2) to allow reclassification of RD under certain conditions, (3) to
eliminate privately generated information from the RD category, (4) to better
define UCNI, and (5) to allow communication of certain RD to selected nations
for nuclear-weapon-nonproliferation reasons. The report also recommended that
DOE “conduct a comprehensive, fundamental review of all nuclear weapon-related
information to determine what should be classified under present conditions,
with the objective of removing from classification all information that no
longer warrants protection.” Preparation of a new Classification Policy Guide was also recommended, after the
fundamental review was completed.
In December
1993, the Secretary of Energy initiated an “Openness Initiative” within DOE to
support President Clinton’s call for a more open government. At a press
conference on December 7, 1993, the Secretary announced the “largest
declassification of information in DOE history.”
Additional major declassifications were announced by the Secretary on June 27,
1994; February 6, 1996; and January 15, 1997.
In the mid-1990s, DOE stated that 100% of
atomic-energy-related basic science information had been declassified by 1953;
100% of atomic-energy information related to civilian nuclear-power programs
had been declassified by 1959; about 50% of atomic-energy information related
to uranium-isotope separation had been declassified by 1989; and that about 50%
of the atomic-energy information related to nuclear-weapon technology had been
declassified by 1993.[89]
The 1998 DOE regulations on classification and declassification of RD and FRD
identify 14 areas of information that are presumed to be unclassified.[90]
Those are the broad areas of atomic-energy information that have been
completely, or nearly completely, declassified.
In 1994, the DOE
issued Drawing Back the Curtain of
Secrecy - Restricted Data Declassification Policy, 1946 to the Present.[91]
This document (RDD-1)) was a compilation of information regarding atomic-energy
declassification actions from 1946 to the date of issue. This document has been
updated each year since 1994. The updates RDD-2 through RDD-7 have included
prior declassification actions (prior to 1994) that were overlooked for
inclusion in RDD-1, as well as information on declassifications that occurred
after 1994. The most recent RDD document available to the public is RDD-7,
dated January 1, 2001. RDD-7 is more than 150 pages long and is available on
the Federation of American Scientists World Wide Web site
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/rdd-7.html). One or more subsequent RDD documents have
been issued, but they are considered to be “Official Use Only” and are not
available to the public.
In February
1994, the Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
to review DOE classification policies and procedures. The National Research
Council of the NAS formed the Committee on Declassification of Information for
the Department of Energy Environmental Remediation and Related Programs and
investigated DOE classification policy and practice. NAS provided a report on
these matters to DOE on August 9, 1995.[92]
Major recommendations in this report include: (1) “maintain stringent security
around sharply defined and narrowly circumscribed areas, but to reduce or
eliminate classification around areas of less sensitivity;” (2) “the burden of
proof [for declassification] should be on those who argue for classification,
not on those who propose declassification;” (3) “information should be
classified only if the damage to national security demonstrably outweighs both
the public benefit from the disclosure of that information and the costs of
attempting to prevent such disclosure;” (4) DOE’s goal should be “open policies
openly arrived at;” (5) DOE should establish “a systematic review of existing
documents containing RD;” and (6) DOE should promulgate “a regulation to
prohibit abuses of classification under the AEA, comparable to those
[regulations] that now exist for other types of classified information” and to
do this under established federal procedures (i.e., notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which increases accountability because decisions under such
regulations are subject to judicial review).
On December 7,
1993, as part of DOE’s “Openness Initiative,” the Secretary of Energy announced
plans for a comprehensive review of DOE’s classification policies concerning
defense-related nuclear information. DOE initiated this review on June 17,
1994, with the Office of Declassification (formerly the Office of
Classification) as the executive agent for DOE. This was said to be the first
major review of atomic-energy classification policy since that policy was
established by the Tolman Committee in late 1945 and early 1946.
Although the review was primarily directed at information classified by the
Atomic Energy Act (i.e., RD and FRD) and unclassified sensitive information
controlled by that Act (i.e., UCNI), it also included safeguards and security
information (classified national security information) concerning DOE’s
programs. The “Fundamental Review” was formally “kicked off” on March 16, 1995,
by the Secretary of Energy at a public stakeholder meeting.
The specific
purpose of the Fundamental Review was stated as follows:
The purpose of the
Fundamental Review is to review the Department of Energy’s classification
policy with respect to information concerning defense applications of nuclear
technology to determine which information requires continued protection, with
the objective of promptly releasing all information no longer warranting such
protection.[93]
A major reason for instituting
such a review was the end of the Cold War[94]
and, presumably, the reduction in threat to national security from the U.S.S.R.
The scope of the review was as follows:
The fundamental review is a
basic, systematic and comprehensive review of the Department of Energy’s
classification policy to establish that information which must be protected,
with the intent that all other information can be made available to the public.
All information within the Department of Energy’s responsibility will be
included (Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, and National Security
Information). The review will impact the overall Classification Policy Guide
and thousands of specific topics in about 50 Headquarters guides and about 800
local classification guides.[95]
The review was
carried out by a Fundamental Review Group, later named the Fundamental
Classification Policy Review Group, which consisted of a chairman,
vice-chairman, and seven working groups in as many subject areas. About 50
persons were carefully selected by the Office of Declassification to be members
of the review’s working groups. To minimize the burden on participants, each
working group met for a limited number (4 to 6) of one-day meetings, focussing
on revising drafts prepared by the Office of Declassification.
Public comments were actively encouraged.[96]
The
unclassified version of the final report of the Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group was dated January 15, 1997, but was not issued by DOE until
October 1997. A draft of the unclassified report had been issued for public
comment on February 1, 1996.
The final report
noted the four aims of DOE classification policy as expressed in DOE’s 1993
classification policy guide:[97]
(1) assuring defense and nonproliferation by controlling declassification; (2)
promoting peaceful applications of atomic energy by dissemination of scientific
and technical information; (3) promoting dissemination of environmental,
safety, and health-related information; and (4) promoting technology transfer
for U.S. commercial interests.[98]
The 1993 DOE classification policy guide was also said to contain 15 general
policy statements that the DOE uses to achieve a balance among those four aims
when considering specific classification or declassification actions.[99]
The
Fundamental Classification Policy Review Group recommended, instead of the
principle of balancing four aims (see above), that DOE use the following 11
general and 10 area-specific principles:[100]
General Principles:
1. Public trust can best be
held by providing complete and accurate information in a timely manner and
ensuring that only information requiring protection is classified.
2. Classification must be
based on explainable judgments of identifiable risk to national security and no
other reason.
3. Information relating to
environmental, safety, and health issues should be classified only when
national security requirements clearly outweigh the public’s need to know.
4. Classification must never
be used to conceal or delay the discovery of violations of law, inefficiency,
or errors; to prevent embarrassment; or to restrain competition.
5. Classification policy
must be unambiguously related to national policy and enunciated in a manner
understandable by the public.
6. Classification guidance
must be traceable to classification policy and must provide a clear,
unambiguous understanding of what information must be classified.
7. Classification policy and
guidance must be reviewed periodically to ensure harmony with national policy
and to identify information that can be declassified.
8. Classification policy and
practices must honor U.S. international commitments contained in treaties and
other agreements and not inhibit authorized cooperation with other countries.
9. Unauthorized disclosure
does not necessarily provide a basis for declassification.
10. Information or
technology considered obsolete by U.S. standards may still be classified due to
its usefulness to terrorists and proliferators.
11. Open communication of
fundamental science does not preclude classification of implementing
technology.
Nuclear Weapons-Specific
Principles:
1. DOE classification is
primarily focused on stemming the flow of information that could materially
advance the objectives of nuclear proliferators, terrorists, or saboteurs;
assist in significantly improving a nuclear weapon capability; or expose a
significant vulnerability or defect in U.S. weapons.
2. Classification is a major
element in assuring that a U.S. nuclear weapon cannot be used in an unauthorized
manner.
3. Classification may delay,
but cannot prevent, acquisition of a first-generation nuclear weapon; it can
significantly increase the cost and time to develop more advanced capabilities.
4.Information confirming the
technical merits of various approaches to nuclear weapon development, detailed
nuclear weapon design information, performance data gained from nuclear tests,
and information on how test data are used to validate models and databases must
be closely guarded.
5. Basic scientific
information, not revealing details of weapon design or fissile material
production, should not be classified unless there is a compelling reason to
believe that disclosure would significantly assist in gaining or enhancing a
nuclear capability.
Nuclear Materials
Production-Specific Principles:
1. Information that could
materially assist a proliferator in producing special nuclear material shall be
classified.
Military Reactor-Specific
Principles:
1. DOE classification is
primarily focused on protecting information that could materially assist
potential adversaries in exploiting vulnerabilities in U.S. military reactor
systems or in developing or significantly improving military reactors.
2. Information on retired
programs is generally obsolete and decisions to retain as classified should
only be made on the basis of applicability to current programs.
Safeguards and
Security-Specific Principles:
1.Sound risk management
approaches should be applied in the decision process to classify safeguards and
security information.
2.Safeguards and security
information that could result in an adversary obtaining a nuclear weapon or
nuclear material, or in nuclear sabotage, or in damage to the health and safety
of government employees or the public must be protected.
The Fundamental
Classification Policy Review Group recommended changing the Atomic Energy Act
to (1) eliminate the “born classified” concept and allow the Secretary of
Energy to designate the information that is Restricted Data, (2) allow
previously declassified information to be reclassified, and (3) eliminate the
FRD category and classify that information as NSI. The Group also recommended
portion marking for RD documents, limiting UCNI to safeguards and security
information, and using more stringent measures (“higher fences”) for 137
classification topics identified in a classified annex.
Although the
review was termed a “fundamental classification policy review,” few
classification policy statements resulted. Of the 21 “principles” listed above,
only four resemble policy statements: General Principle 3, Nuclear
Weapons-Specific Principles 1 and 5, and Nuclear Materials Production-Specific
Principle 1.
The review resulted in the declassification of many topics in existing
classification guides. Most declassifications were the result of direct
recommendations by the review group. In other instances, the review group
recommended further study on possible declassifications, which sometimes
resulted in declassifications without adequate further study.
The
Secretary of Energy established the Department of Energy Openness Advisory
Panel in 1996. The purpose of that panel is to provide advice to the Secretary
of Energy Advisory Board regarding the current status and strategic direction
for the Department’s classification and declassification policies and programs.
That thirteen-member panel first met on July 24, 1996.
MAJOR DOCUMENT-DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW PROGRAMS SINCE 1954
Soon
after the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was enacted, the AEC initiated a program to
review, for declassification or downgrading, documents containing information
of interest to companies interested in commercializing atomic energy,
especially with respect to nuclear-reactor information. In succeeding years,
other major document-declassification reviews were initiated for that and other
purposes. This section provides a brief summary of those programs and the
problems associated with some of those review programs.
April 1955 - February 1956
A
special review of 30,773 classified AEC research and development reports and
internal memoranda was conducted from April 1955 (it was expanded in November
1955[101])
until February 1956. Those reports were selected for review because of their
potential use in the commercial development of atomic energy. The most recent
declassification guide, issued in July 1955, had downgraded or declassified
much information about civilian nuclear-power reactors. The new classification
guidance in this guide was based on declassifications or downgradings approved
at the tripartite classification conference among the U.S., U.K, and Canada
held in October 1954 at Harwell, England. The document declassification review,
held at AEC facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was completed by 35 scientists
and engineers from AEC-contractor organizations and was supervised by AEC
staff. Of the 30,773 Secret reports reviewed, 10,916 were declassified, and
8,574 were downgraded to Confidential.[102]
The
specific rules under which this special declassification review operated are not
known, but they were different from the then-applicable AEC declassification
rules.[103]
Generally, for a report to be declassified, it was first reviewed by the
Coordinating Organization Director for appropriateness (to be released) and
possible declassification. The report was then reviewed by a Responsible
Reviewer, and lastly by the Declassification Branch of the Division of
Classification.
Also,
during this time, declassifications pursuant to the U.S.-U.K.-Canada
declassification agreements of October 1954 made available much of the
technical information presented by the U.S. at the (First) International
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held by the United Nations in
Geneva, Switzerland, August 8-20, 1955.[104]
About 11,000 documents were said to have been reviewed for declassification in
connection with that conference.[105]
1957
A
revised declassification guide was issued on December 5, 1956. The
nuclear-reactor supplement to that guide specifically declassified nearly all
nonmilitary and non-production reactors, and declassified or downgraded much
information about specific military reactors. That supplement was further
revised in February 1957 to declassify more military-reactor information.
Almost all of the basic chemistry and practical technology of reactor fuel
preparation and spent-fuel processing was declassified, except for specific
processing details on production and military reactors.
On
February 11, 1957, the AEC began an expedited review of 18,677 classified
technical documents and reports.[106]
About 80 scientists, engineers, and classification specialists participated in
this review, which was held in Oak Ridge. At any one time, there were about 40
reviewers present. Each reviewer usually participated for 1 to 2 weeks. Of the
18,677 Secret documents reviewed, 9,076 (48.6%) were declassified, and 5,297
were downgraded to Confidential. Initial classification recommendations were
made by the reviewers, which were then followed by a second review by Division
of Classification staff.
The
United Nations Second International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy was held in Geneva, Switzerland, on September 1-13, 1957. Special
declassification reviews of documents were held in connection with U.S.
participation in this conference. About 10,000 classified documents were
reviewed.[107]
Also, on August 30, 1957, in Geneva, the U.S. and U.K. jointly announced the
declassification of research dealing with controlled thermonuclear reactions.[108]
1958
The
Division of Classification established special teams to review the
classification of documents held by 82 former AEC-contractors whose contracts
had expired.[109]
About 10,000 classified documents were to be reviewed. About 5,500 had been
reviewed by June 1958, of which about 4,500 had been declassified.
1961, 1962, and 1965
It
has been said that special document-classification review programs were carried
out by the AEC in 1961 and 1962 (about 20,000 documents) and in 1965 (about
22,000 documents).[110]
However, no additional details on those reviews are available.
1971 to 1978
On
July 19, 1971, the AEC initiated the Comprehensive Classification Review
Program (CCRP). This program, whose official end date was said to be December
31, 1978,
encompassed a review of many classified documents held in AEC offices or by AEC
contractors. During that time, about 2,782,000 documents were reviewed, and
about 1,457,000 (52%) were declassified. Most of the documents reviewed were
from “inactive” files.
The
impetus for the CCRP was the “Pentagon Papers”
controversy. The Division of Classification initiated the CCRP to assure that
there were no unnecessarily classified documents in the AEC.[111]
Under the CCRP, teams of technical experts and classification experts met at
the major AEC and AEC-contractor sites, under the guidance of senior
classification personnel, to review documents that had been assembled for team
review. Generally, the teams consisted mostly of technical experts who did not
necessarily have classification expertise. Reviews sometimes lasted several
weeks, with team membership changing during the longer reviews. The
technical-expert reviewers sometimes reviewed and declassified documents that
were in areas outside their technical expertise. Only one review was required
to declassify a document, in contrast to the AEC’s usual two-review
requirement. As an example of the pace of the declassification, during a 33-day
review at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory during January and February 1973,
388,092 documents were reviewed by about 25 persons; 234,315 of those documents
were declassified.[112]
In
May 1978, an uncleared person using the unclassified section of the Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory’s (LASL) library, found a mistakenly declassified
document in that section.[113]
That document had been declassified during the CCRP and was said to contain
significant classified nuclear-weapon design information. This led to a DOE
decision to re-review all declassified nuclear-weapon reports. About 2000 of
those reports were selected for re-review, on the basis of their titles, and
about 100 were reclassified.
In
May 1979, the same person who in 1978 had found the erroneously declassified
report found another such report in the unclassified section of the LASL
library. At that time, the person was searching for documents, on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union, that might be relevant to the “Progressive”
litigation
then in progress.[114]
The
erroneous declassifications came to the attention of a U.S. Senate subcommittee
chaired by Senator John Glenn. In response to a July 12, 1979, request of that
subcommittee, the General Accounting Office prepared and issued a report on the
“erroneous declassification of nuclear weapon design documents.” The report
stated that 6% of the documents declassified at LASL in 1973 were erroneously
declassified.[115],
DOE has estimated that the overall incorrect CCRP declassifications were
between 1% and 3% of the total documents declassified.
In about
mid-to-late 1979, DOE determined that all documents declassified during the CCRP,
January 1, 1971 through December 31, 1978, should be re-reviewed for
classification and in the interim should be protected as if their original
(pre-CCRP) classification was still applicable. The immediate re-review of the
CCRP-declassified documents was expanded to include all of the approximately
36,000 declassified documents for which a notice of declassification had been
issued by DOE. The approximately 1,400,000 other CCRP-declassified documents
would be re-reviewed as necessary.
Re-review
of documents “declassified” during the CCRP became part of a major 1993 DOE
initiative. In October 1993, the Secretary of Energy initiated an “Openness
Initiative.” A significant part of that initiative was to review classified
documents for possible declassification and release to the public. A major new
document-declassification program was initiated within DOE (see below). To help
accomplish the rapid declassification of significant numbers of documents, in
December 1993, the Office of Declassification (new name) relaxed (again) DOE’s
document-declassification requirements with respect to CCRP-declassified
documents. Instead of requiring two classification reviews for a document prior
to its declassification, only one declassification review would be required for
CCRP-declassified documents. This was the same requirement that was relaxed
during the CCRP. This relaxation of the two-review requirement was based on the
fact that one declassification review had already been completed during the
CCRP.
1993 to the Present (DOE Review Programs)
One of President
Clinton’s goals was to establish a more open government. To support that goal,
the Secretary of Energy established DOE’s “Openness Initiative” in December
1993. That initiative included review of classified documents for possible
declassification and public release. DOE operation offices and contractor
organizations were directed to establish large-scale classification-review
programs and to make the results of document declassifications available to the
public.[116]
Such programs differed from the CCRP in that DOE’s regular
document-declassification rules were to apply: A document must be reviewed
twice prior to declassification. The first review must be by either an
Authorized Derivative Classifier (ADC) or an Authorized Derivative Declassifier
(ADD). The second, and final review, must be by an ADD. As established by
existing DOE procedures, both ADCs and ADDs were required to have special
qualifications and special training, with ADDs having the more-extensive
training. From 1994 until February 1997, the number of such large-scale
document-declassification review programs had increased from 2 to 20. To date,
few problems associated with those large-scale reviews have been discovered. A
bibliographic database of declassified DOE documents (OpenNet) has been made
available to the public on the Internet.
1993 to the Present (Other-Agency Review Programs Involving RD and FRD)
President
Clinton’s Presidential Review Directive 29 of April 26, 1993, called for a re-evaluation
of U.S. classification and safeguarding systems based on changed national
security requirements after the end of the Cold War. More specifically, the
Directive established a review of President Reagan’s Executive Order (EO)
12356, National Security Information.
A new EO on security classification of information, EO 12958, became effective
on October 16, 1995. That order, which does not apply to RD or FRD, required
the declassification of documents 25 years old or older that have permanent
historical value as designated by the U.S. Archivist. Governmental agencies, in
an effort to comply with EO 12958, reviewed and declassified large numbers of
documents. Many reviews were “bulk” declassifications of “file series” of
documents; declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages was based only on
a sampling of the documents in that file series. Unfortunately, those reviews
did not detect some RD or FRD documents included with the
non-atomic-energy-related classified documents. Some RD and FRD were found in
those declassified documents. Further, some documents were clearly marked as
containing RD or FRD but their presence had been overlooked. Some documents
contained RD and FRD but were only marked as containing “National Security
Information.” Other documents containing RD and FRD had no classification
markings.[117]
It appeared to
some U.S. Senators, in mid-1998, that “in a frenzied attempt to meet the
[declassification] deadline mandated by E.O. 12958, officials are not taking
proper care to ensure that Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data that
may be commingled with other classified information is not being improperly
released or scheduled for automatic declassification.”[118]
The Senators also alleged that such problems were known as early as December
1995 or January 1996 but were not corrected. Consequently, Congress passed a
law, signed by the President on October 17, 1998, that was directed at ensuring
that documents declassified under EO 12958 were adequately reviewed for RD and
FRD prior to such declassification. This enactment, Sect. 3161 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, required that historically
valuable records subject to EO 12958 declassification requirements had to be
reviewed on a page-by-page basis for RD or FRD unless it was determined that
they were “highly unlikely” to contain RD or FRD.
In compliance
with Sect. 3161 of the above-mentioned Act, in 1999 DOE reviewed 948,000 pages
of documents that had been declassified and released (made publicly available)
by other agencies prior to October 17, 1998, the effective date of the Act.
That review found 14,890 pages containing RD or FRD.[119]
A November 29, 1999, report indicated that DOE audits had prevented agency
declassification and release of about 22,500 pages of documents containing RD
or FRD.[120]
Subsequent DOE audits of about 184 million pages of publicly available records
accessioned by the National Archives and Records Administration discovered 654
documents containing RD or FRD that were inadvertently released.[121]
Epilogue to Major Document-Declassification Review Programs
Perfection
(total risk avoidance) in large-scale document-declassification programs is not
achievable except under unusual circumstances requiring relatively great
expense. Part of the problem with respect to classified atomic energy
information is a result of erosion of the “need-to-know” (compartmentalization)
requirement, which has resulted in RD or FRD being “gratuitously” included in
documents that should not have contained such information (did not need to contain such information). For
example, a document concerned with nuclear reactor matters might unnecessarily
contain non-reactor-related classified information about uranium enrichment or
nuclear weapon design. Classification
reviewers trained in the expected subject-matter of the document (e.g., nuclear
reactors) may not recognize the “gratuitous” RD or FRD (e.g., concerning weapon
design) present in the document. Another factor is that sometimes only a very
knowledgeable reviewer will be able to identify some of the technical RD (most
RD is technical information) in a document, because the technical inferences or
associations that reveal the RD are subtle. Finally, there are the inescapable
“human errors” in the document declassification review and in the subsequent
clerical work to re-mark and re-file the reviewed documents. Consequently,
mistakes will be made during major document-declassification review programs
that involve millions of pages of classified documents. Thus, it should be
expected (acceptance of some risk) that some RD and FRD will erroneously be
released in documents that have been marked as declassified during those review
programs and that such documents, and the classified information contained
therein, will become publicly (and widely) available (and locatable by
electronic searches) through media such as DOE’s OpenNet database (available at
http://www.osti.gov/opennet/).
REFERENCES
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H. D. Smyth, A General Account of the
Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes Under the
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[2]
L. R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told,
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[3]
V. C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the
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[7]
W. S. Hutchinson, “The Manhattan Project Declassification Program,” Bull. At. Sci. 2(9-10), 14-15 (Nov. 1, 1946).
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[8]
R. C. Tolman, R. F. Bacher, A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J. R. Oppenheimer,
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[9]
Tolman Report, pp. 2-3.
[10]
Tolman Report, p. 3.
[11]
Tolman Report, p. 4.
[12]
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[13]
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[14]
Tolman Report, pp. 13-14.
[15]
Tolman Report, p. 14.
[16]
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[17]
Tolman Report, ibid.
[18]
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[19]
B. J. Bok, F. Friedman, and V. Weisskopf, “Security Regulations in the Field of
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321. This article included the contents of a letter dated Aug. 27, 1947, from
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which described the Commission’s policy on atomic-energy-information security.
Hereafter cited as “Bok et al.”
[20]
R. C. Tolman, et al., Second Report of
Committee on Declassification, memorandum to General Groves, Jan. 20, 1946,
p. 2.
[21]
R. G. Hewlett and O. E. Anderson, Jr., The
New World, 1939/1946, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University
Park, Pa., 1962, p. 647. Hereafter cited as “Hewlett and Anderson.”
[22]
William McGill Vaden, The Oak Ridge
Technical Information Center, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of
Scientific and Technical Information, Oak Ridge, Tenn., 1992, p. 9.
[23]
A. P. Donnell, Manual for the
Declassification of Scientific and Technical Matters, EIDMD‑2, Army
Service Forces, U.S. Engineer Office, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, Tenn., May
1, 1946. Hereafter cited as “Donnell.”
[26]
R. J. Batson, Office of the District Engineer, Manhattan Project, letter to R.
C. Tolman, Oct. 23, 1946.
[27]
Hewlett and Anderson, ibid.
[28]
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755.
[29]
J. G. Beckerley, “The New Atomic Energy Law—What it Means to Industry,” A Forum Report, Atomic Industrial Forum,
Inc., November 1954, p. 119; as quoted by H. S. Marks and
G. F. Trowbridge, Framework for
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[31]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Second
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[32]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Third
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[33]
Third Semiannual Report, p. 25.
[35]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Fifth
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Hereafter cited as Fifth Semiannual
Report.
[36]
Fifth Semiannual Report, p. 111.
[37]
Fifth Semiannual Report, p. 114.
[38]
Unclassified Fields or Topics of Research,
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1948. Hereafter cited as “Bulletin GM-93.”
[40]
Unclassified Fields or Topics of Research,
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[41]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Seventh
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[42]
Classification of Papers and Reports on
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Rucker, Executive Director, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.,
May 26, 1949.
[43]
Security Classification of Documents,
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Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Nov. 9, 1949.
[44]
Fifth Semiannual Report, p. 114.
[45]
Fifth Semiannual Report, ibid.
[46]
C. Allardice and E. R. Trapnell, The
Atomic Energy Commission, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974, p. 153.
Hereafter cited as “Allardice and Trapnell.”
[47]
Fifth Semiannual Report, ibid.
[48]
Seventh Semiannual Report, p. 187.
[49]
Allardice and Trapnell, p. 154.
[50]
Announcement No. 63, U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, Oak Ridge Operations Office, July 6, 1956.
[51]
Seventh Semiannual Report, pp.
169-170.
[52]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Eighth
Semiannual Report, July 1950, pp. 227-228. Hereafter cited as Eighth Semiannual Report.
[53]
Eighth Semiannual Report, p. 228.
[54]
Classification Procedures for AEC
Research Contractors, Bulletin GM-RES-2, Serial No. 93, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, Washington, D.C., Jan. 8, 1952.
[55]
Third Semiannual Report, p. 25.
[56]
Restricted Data Declassification
Decisions, 1946 to the Present, RDD-6, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of
Nuclear and National Security Information, Washington, D.C., Jan. 1, 2000, p.
ii.
[57]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Fourteenth
Semiannual Report, July 1953, p. 61. Hereafter cited as Fourteenth Semiannual Report.
[58]
Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic
Shield, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 449.
[60]
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments - Final Report, Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Supt.
of Documents, Wash., D.C., Oct. 1995, Chapter 13, Section 3, “The Practice of
Secrecy.” Available at
http://tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/chap13_3.html.
[61]
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 921; 42 U.S.C. §§2011-2296.
[62]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Seventeenth
Semiannual Report, January 1955, p. xiii.
[67]
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 764, §10(b)(1).
[68]
H. S. Marks and G. F. Trowbridge, “Control of Information under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954,” Bull. At. Sci. 11, 128-130 (1955), p. 129.
[69]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Nineteenth
Semiannual Report, January 1956, pp. 98-99; Twentieth Semiannual Report, July 1956, pp. 63-64.
[70]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twenty-First
Semiannual Report, January 1957, p. 55. Hereafter cited as Twenty-First Semiannual Report.
[71]
Fourteenth Semiannual Report, ibid.
[72]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twenty-Second
Semiannual Report, July 1957, p. 71. Hereafter cited as Twenty-Second Semiannual Report.
[73]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twenty-Fifth
Semiannual Report, January 1959, p. 57.
[74]
Twenty-First Semiannual Report, p.
54.
[75]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Twenty-Third
Semiannual Report, January 1958, p. 164.
[76]
Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Hall, Atoms
for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission,
Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1989, p. 448.
[77]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual
Report for 1960, January 1961, p. 242.
[78]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual Report
for 1961, January 1962, p. 266.
[79]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual
Report for 1959, January 1960, p. 134.
[80]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual
Report for 1966, January 1967, p. 333.
[81]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual
Report for 1967, January 1968, p. 235.
[82]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual
Report for 1968, January 1969, p. 227.
[83]
Twenty-First Semiannual Report, p.
55.
[84]
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Annual
Report for 1974, January 1975, p. 153.
[85]
U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Report
to Congress, 1978, DOE/PE-0014, p. 149.
[86]
U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary’s
Annual Report to Congress, January 1981, DOE/S-0010(81), p. 13-11.
[87]
U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary’s
Annual Report to Congress, September 1983, p. 105.
[88]
Classification Policy Study,
Department of Energy, Office of Classification, July 4, 1992.
[89]
Nuclear Information Declassified by
Program (Estimated). Available at
http://www,osti.gov/html/ osti/opennet/ document/press/pc10tab1.html.
[90]
10 CFR 1045, Nuclear Classification and
Declassification, §1045.15d.
[91]
Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy -
Restricted Data Declassification Policy, 1946 to the Present, RDD-1, U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Declassification, Washington, D.C., June 1,
1994.
[92]
A Review of the Department of Energy
Classification Policy and Practice, National Research Council, National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995.
[93]
Brief Description of Comprehensive
Fundamental Review, Department of Energy communication to members of the
working groups of the Fundamental Review, 1995.
[97]
Classification Policy Guide for Nuclear
Programs, CG-C-3A, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Classification,
Washington, D.C., June 1993.
[98]
Report of the Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group, Albert Narath, Chairman, U.S. Department of Energy,
Jan. 15, 1997, citing Classification
Policy Guide for Nuclear Programs, CG-C-3A, U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of Declassification, Washington, D.C., June 1993.
[100]
Report of the Fundamental Classification
Policy Review Group, Albert Narath, Chairman, U.S. Department of Energy,
January 15, 1997.
[101]
Major Activities in the Atomic Energy
Programs, July-December 1955, Nineteenth Semiannual Report of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C.,
January 1956, pp. 98-100.
[102]
Major Activities in the Atomic Energy
Programs, January-June 1956, Twentieth Semiannual Report of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., July 1956,
pp. 63-64.
[103]
AEC, Nineteenth Semiannual Report,
January 1956, p. 100.
[104]
AEC, Nineteenth Semiannual Report,
January 1956, p. 13.
[105]
AEC Classification Program, AEC
internal document, July 5, 1974, p. 33.
[106]
Major Activities in the Atomic Energy
Programs, January - June 1957, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington,
D.C., July 1957, pp. 71-72.
[107]
AEC Classification Program, AEC
internal document, July 5, 1974, p. 33.
[108]
Atomic Industrial Progress and Second
World Conference, July-December 1958, Twenty-Fifth Semiannual Report, U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., January 1959, p. 89.
[109]
Research on Power from Fusion and Other
Major Activities of the Atomic Energy Programs, January-June 1958, U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., July 1958, p. 112.
[110]
AEC Classification Program, AEC
internal document, July 5, 1974, p. 33.
[111] AEC Classification Program, internal
document, Division of Classification, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C., July 5, 1974, p. 33.
[112]
The Department of Energy’s Erroneous
Declassification of Nuclear Weapons Design Documents, GAO/EMD-79-109,
Comptroller General of the United States, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1979,
p. 3. Hereafter cited as “GAO/EMD-79-109.”
[113]
A. deVolpi, G. E. Marsh, T. A. Postol, and G. S. Stanford, Born Secret: The H-Bomb, the Progressive Case and National Security,
Pergamon Press, New York, 1981, p. 103.
[115]
GAO\EMD-79-109, p. 4.
[116]
Charles B. Curtis, Under Secretary of Energy, Memorandum for Heads of
Headquarters Elements (and) DOE Operations Offices, Declassification of Documents to Support Openness in the Department of
Energy, U.S. Department of Energy, Wash., D.C., June 27, 1994.
[117]
Letter, Kenneth E. Baker, Department of Energy, to James C. Murr, Office of
Management and Budget, July 24, 1998.
Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/baker0798.html.
[118]
Letter, Senators Jon Kyl, Richard Shelby, and Bob Smith to Samuel R. Berger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, July 28, 1998. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/kyl072898.html).
[119]
Letter, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson to Senator John Warner, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, November 29, 1999, and attached Report on Inadvertent Releases of Restricted
Data and Formerly Restricted Data under Executive Order 12598 that Occurred
Before October 17, 1998 (U), DOE/NN-52-001, unclassified executive summary,
August 1999. Available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/ othergov/inadvertent.html.
[121]
Second Report on Inadvertent Releases of
Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data under Executive Order 12958 (U),
DODE/NN-52-002, unclassified summary, December 1999. Available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/inadvertent2.html.
120Third
Report on Inadvertent Releases of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data
under Executive Order 12958 (Deleted Version)(U), DOE/SO-22-0003 (Deleted
Version), May 2001. Available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/inadvertent3.html.
121 Fourth
Report on Inadvertent Releases of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data
under Executive Order 12958 (Deleted Version)(U), DOE/SO-22-0004 (Deleted
Version), August 2001. http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/inadvertent4.html.
122 Fifth
Report on Inadvertent Releases of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data
under Executive Order 12958 (Deleted Version) (U), DOE/SO-70-0005 (Deleted
Version), November 2001. http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/inadvertent5.html.
123 Sixth
Report on Inadvertent Releases of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data
under Executive Order 12958 (Deleted Version)(U), DOE/SO-70-0006 (Deleted
Version), February 2002. http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/inadvertent6.html.
Security Classification of Information: Table of Contents