Security Classification of Information: Table of Contents
Chapter 6.
SOME ADVERSE
IMPACTS OF CLASSIFICATION
INTRODUCTION
A
government must classify certain information for national-security reasons, as
was established in Chapter 1 of this document. However, one of our nation’s
fundamental principles is the right of its citizens to be informed. We place a
high value on open, informed discussion about governmental matters. Therefore,
when the U.S. Government keeps secrets from its citizens, that action conflicts
with a basic, constitutional right of citizens to be informed of their
government’s actions so that they can intelligently participate in governmental
processes. A democracy’s requirement for openness in government is in conflict
with a government’s need to keep some information secret for reasons of
national security. When a government keeps secrets in peacetime, national
security has historically been narrowly defined. In wartime, national security
is broader than in peacetime. President George W. Bush’s February 2001
description of national security as including “the defense of the United States
of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the
advancement of United States interests around the globe” and as dependent on “America’s opportunity to prosper in the world
economy”[1]
seems overly broad for peacetime. A similar comment might apply to President
Clinton’s 1993 decision that “environmental issues are significant factors in
The conflict between secrecy and openness in our government is sharpest when citizens want to have informed influence on governmental decisions that concern national-security matters and that have important, long-term implications. It is frequently too easy for government officials (usually in the executive branch of government) to claim special, inside knowledge about a matter and, for alleged national-security reasons, not to share that knowledge with all citizens (or even with most members of Congress). Then, citizens (or Congress) are put into a position of having to accept the decision of the governmental official who has the knowledge, the insider’s rationale being that, if others knew what the insider knows, they would agree with the insider’s judgment.[*] The use of secrecy to limit debate and citizen control of government can undermine the government’s credibility, legitimacy, and efficiency. Unnecessary secrecy about radioactive fallout from nuclear-weapon tests in the 1950s and 1960s probably contributed significantly to the loss of credibility of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) with the American public.
Problems of secrecy even affect enforcement of federal laws. Criminal charges are sometimes not brought against alleged lawbreakers because our legal system requires an open trial, and in prosecutions concerning national-security matters, the prosecutor may need to rely on classified information as evidence. In such instances, criminal charges against alleged lawbreakers may have to be dropped rather than risking damage to national security by revealing the classified evidence. An example of this situation occurred in 1988 and 1989 when some charges against Oliver North (in the “Iran-Contra scandal”) were dropped because some of the documents necessary for the prosecution’s case were classified.
With respect to atomic-energy information matters, the government declassified some Restricted Data (RD) when prosecuting Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in early 1951. Certain RD concerning nuclear weapons was also declassified during the 1964 U.S. District Court trial of George John Gessner for unauthorized disclosure of atomic-energy information.
Another important aspect of classification is the effect of governmental secrecy on our national character. Congressman Moss, one of the congressional leaders who spearheaded the effort to establish the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), stated in 1967, “The strength of our nation is not derived from any policy negative in character.”[3] David Lilienthal, first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, expressed similar thoughts: “Traditionally, democracy has been an affirmative doctrine rather than merely a negative one.”[†] W. Gelhorn has characterized security programs as “marked by apprehensive and backward glances over one’s shoulder” that may retard progress.[4] Further, the strength of an organization generally lies in a dynamic, rather than a static, use of resources.[5] Thus, to the extent that secrecy in government erodes our traditionally open, positive, confident approach to matters, then one of our salutary historical national characteristics has been diminished.
There are other adverse impacts of classification. Economic costs associated with classification of information include salaries of personnel who classify and declassify information, documents, and materials; costs for physical security and personnel clearance investigations; “extra” costs of preparing classified documents and manufacturing classified hardware in secure areas; costs of classified procurements; and storage and inventorying costs for classified documents and material. Costs are incurred when wrong decisions are made because pertinent information was kept secret from decision makers, either because of need-to-know restrictions or clearance requirements.[‡]
Classification
of certain information possibly affected the outcome of the 1960
Classification also creates barriers to the accessibility of knowledge, to friend as well as to foe, and thereby slows down the advance of civilization. The latter effect is of particular concern with respect to science and technology, because much of our technical information has a “dual use”: commercial as well as military applications.
This chapter discusses the principal adverse impacts of classification, focussing mainly on the negative effects of classification on scientific and technical progress.
CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION IMPAIRS CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
The First Amendment to the Constitution established the principle of an informed public.[§] When information is classified, the public’s knowledge of the government’s activities is reduced, thereby impeding an informed public evaluation of governmental policies and government officials.[**],[††] Thus, the national-security advantages gained by the classification of information are always counterbalanced, to some extent, by the infringement upon our constitutional right to be informed of our government’s activities. This dichotomy was recognized by Justice Black in New York Times v. United States, when he stated, “The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our Republic.”[6]
Although
the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, it is well-established case law
that the public does not have a First Amendment or statutory right to
classified information. In Near v.
Minnesota, the Supreme Court indicated that the government could prevent
publication of
Most of the court decisions on First Amendment rights to information have involved freedom of the press and prior restraints on publication. Although the First Amendment provides a strong presumption against prior restraint on publication of information,[10] some situations may arise in which the government might prevent publication of information, especially in time of war.[11] Further, publication may result in criminal sanctions against the one who published the information, and there is no constitutional prohibition against such sanctions.[12]
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND CLASSIFICATION
The FOIA,[13] enacted in 1966, provides to any person a statutory right of access to government information. “The basic principle of [the] FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”[14] However, Congress recognized that there were valid reasons for not allowing some governmental information to be made available to the public and therefore included in the FOIA nine exemptions permitting the government to withhold information. Two of those exemptions concern classified information.
The first of those FOIA exemptions concerned with classified information, Exemption 1, states that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.”[15] Thus, classified national-security information that is “properly classified” by Executive Order 12958 may be withheld from disclosure under this FOIA exemption.
The second of the FOIA’s exemptions that deals with classified information, Exemption 3, authorizes the withholding of matters that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matter to be withheld.”[16] This Exemption 3 provides a basis for withholding RD or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD), which are classified by the Atomic Energy Act, from FOIA requests. Note that information that can be withheld from an FOIA request under Exemption 3 is not limited to classified information; the only requirement is that a statute provide the agency with authority to withhold the information. Thus, information other than classified information can also be withheld under Exemption 3.[‡‡]
To date, most of the court decisions concerning denial of FOIA requests for classified information have concerned information classified by Executive Order rather than RD or FRD. Where courts have ruled on FOIA requests for classified information denied by Exemption 3, based on statutes other than the Atomic Energy Act, the standards for judicial review have been said to be “less probing” than under Exemption 1.[17] That is, the courts are less willing to examine critically an agency’s basis for withholding information under Exemption 3 than under Exemption 1. The Department of Justice’s Freedom of Information Guide, May 2000, stated that once the FOIA judicial review has determined that the statute is an Exemption 3 statute and the records fall within that statute’s scope, further judicial review should not be within the FOIA’s jurisdiction.[18] However, courts have reportedly begun to develop a single standard of review for both exemptions.[19] The D.C. Circuit Court has established a standard for judicial review of classified national-security information claims under Exemptions 1 and 3, “finding that summary judgment is entirely proper if an agency’s affidavits are reasonably specific and there is no evidence of bad faith.”[20] Other Circuit courts have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s standard. Also pertinent is a 1996 D.C. Circuit Court decision that indicated that a federal district court’s decision to not review certain classified documents in camera was a “wise decision” because limiting the number of documents examined would “make it less likely that sensitive information will be disclosed.”[21]
The
1966 FOIA was construed by the Supreme Court, in 1973, to mean that records
classified under proper agency procedures were exempt, per se, from disclosure,
without need for any further judicial review.[22]
This situation was changed by 1974 amendments to the FOIA that expressly
provide for de novo review by the courts and for in camera review of classified
documents where appropriate.[§§]
However, courts have been reluctant to substitute their judgment for an
agency’s expertise in national-security matters.[***],[23]
Agency affidavits are generally given much deference. For example, the Supreme
Court stated that the decisions of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency to withhold information on intelligence sources “are worthy of great
deference given the magnitude of the national-security interests and potential
risks at stake.”[24]
As of 1986, no federal appellate court had upheld, on the substantive merits of
the case, a lower court’s decision to reject an agency’s claim that certain
documents were classified.[25]
A 1986 decision compelling the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to release
information classified by the FBI was settled prior to an appellate decision
and is considered to have little precedential value.[26]
However, a 1995 Court of Appeals decision affirmed a federal district court
disclosure order for information claimed by the FBI to be classified.[27]
The latter decision was unique, and the conflict between freedom of
information, as expressed in the FOIA, and “properly classified” information
has so far been clearly resolved in favor of information properly classified by
agency procedures, with the courts giving much deference to agencies’
substantive classification determinations.
The question of what is “substantively” properly classified information, which can be withheld from the public, is sometimes difficult to answer. Information is classified in the interest of “national security,” but that term is ambiguous. “The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.”[28] Although the term “national defense” is narrower in definition than the term “national security,” the former term is still fairly broad in scope. “National defense” was defined by the Supreme Court with respect to the Espionage Act as follows: “National defense . . . is a generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness.”[29] Even if the narrower interests of “national defense” indicate that information meets the test for classification, perhaps a consideration of broader national interests (e.g., the adverse impacts of classification) would lead to a decision that the information should not be classified. This “balancing” is discussed in Chapter 6 of Security Classification of Information: Volume 2, Principles for Classification of Information.
CLASSIFICATION AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS
General and Historical
This document is primarily concerned with classification of information in the Department of Energy (DOE). Within DOE, the major classification problems arise with respect to scientific and technical information concerned with uranium enrichment; nuclear-weapon design, testing, and production; naval nuclear reactors; and related matters. Also, in recent years, DOE has also used its scientific and technical expertise in classified work for other federal agencies. Therefore, it is of particular interest to an Authorized Classifier, within DOE or its contractors, to be aware of the impact of classification on science and technology, particularly on scientific progress. Before discussing this subject, the history of classification of scientific information in the United States will be briefly mentioned.
Prior to 1940, the United States had almost no restrictions on the free exchange of scientific and technical information. Probably the only classified scientific or technical information was that relatively small amount originated and classified by the armed services. It has been suggested that the first major scientific effort to be classified by the U.S. armed services was research and development in the 1930s on radar.[30] The only other restrictions on the flow of scientific information were those concerning proprietary information (trade secrets) imposed by private companies and the “temporary restrictions” imposed by individual scientists (on their own research) to prevent premature release of their research findings so that they would not get “scooped.”[†††] However, that situation changed significantly in early 1940, near the beginning of World War II (WWII).
In early 1940, a few U.S. scientists started to withhold nuclear-fission research results voluntarily from journal publication because they feared that publication of this information would aid Nazi Germany in developing an atomic weapon (see Chapter 4). This practice became well established by mid-1940. Significant emphasis began to be placed on secrecy in research and development in areas other than nuclear fission in mid-to-late 1940 after the National Defense Research Council was established. This organization [and its successor Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD)] was formed to apply the latest scientific and technical developments to weapons of war and other defense applications (e.g., radar and the proximity fuse). Many university scientists and engineers worked on these programs during WWII. These programs were generally carried out in university laboratories or in laboratories operated by universities. Many of these programs were conducted under conditions of secrecy, some of which were very stringent.
The outstanding success of many of those WWII scientific and technical projects, with the resulting national defense advantage for the United States, led to much greater governmental funding of defense-related scientific research after WWII as compared with prewar years. In many cases, this research was classified. Through participation in WWII’s classified projects, a substantial number of U.S. scientists became accustomed to classification of their research, including some basic research, and accepted this situation, even though it was contrary to past practices regarding the dissemination of scientific information.[‡‡‡],[§§§]
Effects of Classification on Scientific and Technical Progress
Reduced Progress in the Same Field of Science. Scientific advances are based, to a greater or lesser extent as determined by circumstances, upon an extensive base of information provided by others. Scientists of many nations contribute to the information base in most scientific fields.[****] The scientific advances in a field, the contributions to the information base, are generally incremental. Each increment is thoroughly reviewed and evaluated (usually repeated to verify the results) by peers in that field of work before it is accepted as a reliable part of the database. Therefore, much discussion and the interplay of many minds contribute to each small advance. No one can predict when or by whom the next important advance will be made. However, information from the same field of science always provides the foundation, the knowledge base, from which the scientific advance springs.[31] Sometimes this information also provides a “missing link,” a key part of the advance.[32] Classification of information, which keeps others ignorant of information already discovered, results in needless duplication of effort[††††] and delays scientific and technological advances.[‡‡‡‡],[§§§§] The United States’ lead in microwave electronics and computer technology was said to be significantly increased after a 1946 decision to release the results of wartime research in those fields.[33]
Reduced Progress in Other Fields of Science. Information from other fields of science often provides new insights, a “cross-fertilization” of ideas, which may contribute significantly to a scientific breakthrough. Information acquired for one purpose may influence wholly different fields in unexpected ways. Examples of such advances include use of X‑rays to treat cancer and long-distance communication technology that ultimately sprang from Galvani’s experiments with frogs’ legs.[34] Loss of the beneficial interaction and insights from information produced in classified fields will probably have an adverse effect on progress in other, unclassified fields.[*****] The hindrance of this cross-fertilization process within the Soviet Union is said to be one of the factors that impedes Soviet progress in science and technology.[35]
Reduced Information Transfer. In addition to depending upon an “information foundation” provided by others, rapid and efficient progress in science depends upon full and free discussion of experimental results and proposed theories. The importance of open exchange of information within the scientific professions was stated in a 1965 report by the American Association for the Advancement of Science:
Free dissemination of
information and open discussion is an essential part of the scientific process.
Each separate study of nature yields an approximate result and inevitably
contains some errors and omissions. Science gets at the process of truth by a
continuous process of self-examination which remedies omissions and corrects
errors. The process requires free disclosure of results, general dissemination
of findings, interpretations, conclusions, and widespread verification and
criticism of results and conclusions.[36],[37]
The information on which scientific advances depend may be obtained by formal means (e.g., publications and conference presentations) or by informal means (e.g., face-to-face meetings, telephone calls, and private correspondence). Informal communications apparently play a large role in research and development.[38],[39] Ideas are rapidly communicated and evaluated through the direct interactions of informal communication. Direct person-to-person meetings, such as discussions and demonstrations of equipment or techniques, have been mentioned as the best method to transmit detailed information about particular research and development techniques.[40] Classification of information in a field of science reduces the opportunity for those direct, beneficial interactions between scientists in that field.
For laboratories involved in unclassified fields of research, the informal mode of communication frequently occurs via a two-step information-flow process that involves a “technological gatekeeper.”[41],[42] In those situations, information flows from outside a laboratory through a gatekeeper to the gatekeeper’s colleagues within the laboratory.39,41 However, for classified fields of research, the information transfer is most frequently via written, classified reports; no gatekeeper mechanism is apparent.[43] This situation may be the result of constraints on informal communications in classified fields of research, for example, a consequence of the “need to know” policy regarding access to classified information. A scientist in one group may be prevented by the need-to-know policy (compartmentalization) from fully discussing research results or problems with a gatekeeper colleague, who has an equal security clearance but not a need to know, in another group in the same organization.[44] Therefore, classification of a field of research may severely restrict its progress within the organization that classifies the research as well as delaying the progress of researchers outside that organization.
Diminished Motivation of Scientists. Another factor in scientific progress is the motivation of scientists. Gaining the respect of professional peers has been a major incentive to scientific achievement.[45] Professional motivation is enhanced by free and open communication within a peer group.[46] For a researcher at the forefront of a field, that peer group includes scientists in other organizations and in other countries. Restricting opportunities for scientific discussions because of classification constraints could diminish the motivation of individual scientists, thereby reducing productivity.
Inadequate Peer Review. Errors that result from inadequate peer review may be some of the most expensive consequences of classification of scientific and technical information. The constraints of classification do not usually permit the most objective appraisal possible of work in progress.[†††††] Publishing scientific work in the open literature subjects it to the scrutiny of the world’s scientists, experts in that field. Constraining the publication of scientific and technical information to classified reports limits the peer review of this information to a small number of persons, none of whom may have the expertise in that scientific field necessary for an exacting review. Thus, there may be more errors in classified scientific and reports than in unclassified reports and journal publications. It has been said that highly classified major technical programs at the forefront of science and which are “engaged in instant application and reduction to practice” will “stand a very high chance of going wrong, because they don’t have the public scrutiny and argument and challenge that is the essence of the best in science and new technology.”[47] Lack of adequate internal peer review (because of compartmentalization) and external peer review (because of classification) is said to increase the probability that “dead-end” research paths may be followed and to decrease the opportunity for cross-fertilization of ideas.[48] Lack of “world class” peer review may also result in a gradual lessening of scientific and technical standards on the part of the workers in a classified field.[‡‡‡‡‡],[49]
Recruitment Difficulties. The adverse effect that secrecy restraints have on recruitment of scientists for work in DOE’s highly classified weapons laboratories has been noted more than once. In 1949, the AEC stated, in connection with the advantages of designating broad areas of research and development as unclassified:
Staffing of atomic energy
projects is hampered so long as there is feeling on the part of many scientists
that employment in the atomic energy program precludes their working on any but
“classified” research projects with consequent denial of general publication.[50]
That problem was mentioned again in 1966.[51] It is interesting to note that AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss alleged, in the 1950s with respect to cessation of nuclear-weapon testing, that the best scientists would leave the AEC’s weapon laboratories if they could not continue to test nuclear weapons.[52]
A 1970 Department of Defense report evaluated the effects of classification of scientific and technical information on research, development, production, and deployment related to weapon systems. That report observed that “the laboratories in which highly classified work is carried out have been encountering more and more difficulty in recruiting the most brilliant and capable minds.”[53] Difficulties in recruiting scientists for classified research within the armed services has also been noted by another author.[54]
Ineffectiveness of Classifying Basic Research. Significant discoveries or breakthroughs in basic research generally occur under circumstances where there is worldwide activity in a scientific field. Researchers in several countries may be at the forefront of that field. In those circumstances, progress in that field can be likened to a “ripening vine.”[55] The field of nuclear fission was in that situation in the late 1930s. That field was “ripe,” with “pickers” ready in several nations, when Hahn and Strassman reported their discovery of uranium fission in December 1938.[56] The Hahn-Strassman discovery was immediately recognized as a significant breakthrough. It provided a key piece of information, a “missing link,” which was rapidly and vigorously exploited by researchers in many countries. Shortly thereafter, there were several instances of nearly identical experiments and results concerned with uranium fission, at essentially the same time, in laboratories in different countries. As one example, the approximate number of neutrons produced by the fission of a uranium nucleus was independently discovered by three groups of scientists in three nations within a few weeks of each other in March-April 1939.[§§§§§]
The example of nearly simultaneous discovery, by three independent groups, of the number of neutrons released during uranium fission is not unique. It frequently happens that significant discoveries in a scientific field are duplicated by others, more or less independently, within a few months. Other specific examples include the “Compton Effect,” discovered independently and almost simultaneously by Compton and Debye, and the discovery of the principle of radar by scientists, and its subsequent development, in several countries at about the same time.[57] Thus, for truly important discoveries at the forefront of science, other persons in other countries are probably soon going to make the same discovery.[58]
Also, military implications of scientific discoveries are frequently recognized at about the same time in different countries. Thus, some scientists working on nuclear fission in early 1939 brought its military possibilities to the attention of their national governments. Consequently, groups were soon established in most major countries to investigate military applications of uranium fission. The dates when those committees were established are shown in Table 6.1. The fact that those committees were established at about the same time indicates that most countries with advanced technologies recognized the military applications of uranium fission at substantially the same time.
Classification of basic research is probably not going to keep others from obtaining essentially the same information, although its acquisition may be delayed. If the Hahn-Strassman results had been kept secret within Germany, then Germany might have exploited that breakthrough to its sole advantage or at least might have had some “lead time.” However, others had narrowly
missed discovering uranium fission,[******] and this discovery probably would have been independently made in other countries within a few months.[††††††]
Classification During Wartime. It may sometimes (rarely) be advisable for national-security reasons to classify even the most basic scientific discoveries, particularly during wartime or when war is imminent.[‡‡‡‡‡‡] As has been discussed previously, the implications of uranium fission on
national security were recognized by some U.S. scientists conducting basic research in this field well before the government was convinced of the potential of atomic weapons. In that situation, the scientists voluntarily withheld publication of their results for national-security reasons, although those results were concurrently distributed to other U.S. researchers in that same field (see Chapter 4).[§§§§§§] It was probably beneficial to our national security that those basic research results were not published.
In spite of the occasional circumstances when classification of scientific information is justified, the authoritative opinion is that, even in time of war, it is not clear that classification of scientific information always has a net positive result. A 1946 report concerning our wartime scientific efforts stated:
In the midst of war, it is clear that the best
security lies in speed, in achievement, rather than in secrecy. That this
secrecy can defeat its own purpose is shown by the frequency with which enemy
scientists independently discovered techniques zealously guarded by us. Our
secrecy merely slowed down our own production and decreased our time advantage.[59]
Table 6.1.
Approximate dates when committees concerned with the
military
use of uranium were formed in several countries
Country Committee name Date established
United States Advisory
Committee on Uranium October
1939a
Soviet Union Committee
on the Uranium Problem July
1940b
Germany Nuclear
Physics Research Group Summer
1939c
France [“Joliot-Curie
Group”] Spring
1939d
England M.A.U.D.
Committee March
1940e
Japan [Army-Air Force
Study] September-December 1940f
aR. G. Hewlett and O. E.
Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946,
The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 1962, pp. 17-20. The first direct contact between “the physicists of nuclear
fission” and the U.S. Government concerning uranium as an explosive was on
March 16, 1939, via a telephone call from G. Pegram, Dean of Columbia
University, and Adm. S. C. Hooper, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Naval
Operations (R. Rhodes, The Making of the
Atomic Bomb, Simon and Schuster, N.Y., 1986, pp. 292-293). On March 17, E. Fermi described uranium fission to
representatives from the Army and Navy. Shortly thereafter, the Naval Research
Laboratory allocated $l500 to the Carnegie Institution of Washington, D.C., for
research in this area. For reasons of internal policy, the Carnegie Institution
did not accept the grant (R. G. Hewlett and O. E. Anderson, Jr., ibid, p. 15).
bDavid Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (The Soviet Union
and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956), Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1994,
p. 62. See also P. Kelly, “How the USSR
Broke into the Nuclear Club,” New
Scientist 110, 32-35 (May 8, 1986), p. 33. The initial Soviet committee’s purpose was not
specifically militarily oriented (P. Kelly, ibid.).
The Soviet government established a research project on the use of atomic
energy (production of an atomic bomb) in February 1943 and I. V. Kurchatov was
appointed its scientific director on March 10, 1943 (Holloway, p. 88).
cThe first
government-sponsored (by the Reich Ministry of Education) German conference on
the use of uranium in weapons was held in Berlin on April 29, 1939, under
“secrecy” (R. Rhodes, The Making of the
Atomic Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, p. 296; D. Irving, The German Atomic Bomb, Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1967, p. 35). Shortly thereafter, the German War Office, in
an independent effort, started its own research program, stimulated by
recommendations by P. Harteck and W. Groth of Hamburg (Ibid., p. 36). Army
funding began in the summer of 1939 (ibid., p. 41). Later a formal group, the
“Nuclear Physics Research Group,” was established in the Ordnance Department of
the War Office (ibid., p. 45).
dAlthough no formal
governmental committee on uranium appears to have ever been established in
France prior to the end of WWII, French nuclear efforts led by F. Joliot-Curie
were in the forefront of research in nuclear fission in early 1939. By May 4,
1939, F. Joliot-Curie had registered a secret patent concerning nuclear
explosives in the name of the Caisse Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique,
which had supported his research (B. Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, American Nuclear Society, La Grange, Ill.,
1982, p. 29). Support from the French minister for armaments was received by
Joliot-Curie in September 1939.
eG. Thomson, “Anglo-U.S.
Cooperation on Atomic Energy,” Bull. At.
Sci. 9, 46-48 (1953), p. 46. In about May 1939, G. Thomson thought of the
possibility of using uranium fission to produce a weapon and was loaned a ton
of uranium oxide by the British Air Ministry for experiments in that field (R.
Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb,
Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, p. 327). It would seem that the ultimate
purpose of the experiments would have been told to the British Air Ministry
when that request was made and would therefore have been the first governmental
sponsorship or contact in Great Britain with respect to use of uranium fission
for military purposes.
fD. Shapely, “Nuclear Weapons
History: Japan’s Wartime Bomb Project Revealed,” Science 199, 152-157 (January 13, 1978), p. 153. The first reported military-sponsored
study concerning atomic energy was initiated in April 1940 by the Japanese
Army’s Aviation Technology Research Institute (R. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986,
p. 327). Army funds were provided to Y. Nishina’s Riken Laboratory, Tokyo, in
September 1940, for atomic bomb research. The first “committee” was the
“Physics Colloquium” established by the Riken Laboratory for the Japanese Navy.
This colloquium held ten meetings between December 1942 and March 1943.
Dr. Vannevar Bush, the President’s science advisor and Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during WWII, stated the following in 1945:
Our ability to overcome possible future enemies
depends upon scientific advances which will proceed more rapidly with diffusion
of knowledge than under a policy of continued restriction of knowledge now in
our possession.[60]
A policy of “security by achievement,” by rapidly developing the fruits of basic research into weapons systems and other components of our national security, rather than “security by secrecy,” is a recurrent theme emphasized by many scientific and technical leaders since the end of WWII.[*******]
Our position is that you will get the greatest
security by the greatest scientific freedom, because this country, with its
resources and its technological ability, can make the most of any scientific
ideas that appear anywhere in the world.[61]
The Nation’s safety is not safeguarded by retaining
these secrets. The Nation’s safety is safeguarded primarily by building up our
own strength, and it is really only a very minor part of our safety that is
concerned with giving away some of this information.[62]
However, as Frederick Seitz and Eugene P. Wigner noted, after the (First) International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, that “We must bear in mind the fact that if the other side learns all that we know, but we remain ignorant of what they discover, we will find it very hard to stay ahead in the game.”[63] Drs. Seitz and Wigner were commenting on the relative exchange of atomic-energy information between Russian and U.S. scientists and engineers during that 1955 conference in Geneva, Switzerland.
Recognition of the adverse effects of classification upon scientific and technical progress, and consequently on our nation’s strength, was mentioned by the Tolman Committee in 1945 as discussed in Chapter 5. That committee was established to recommend a policy for the declassification of Manhattan Project scientific and technical information. In its first report, the Tolman Committee stated its general philosophy:
It is not the conviction of the Committee that the
concealment of scientific information can in any long term contribute to the
national security of the United States. It is recognized that at the present
time it may be inevitable that the policy of the Government will be to conceal
certain information in the interest of national security. Even within this
limitation there are many matters whose declassification would greatly help the
progress of science without violating that policy. If we are looking to the national
welfare or national security as they may be two decades from now the Committee
has no doubt that the greatest strength in both fields would come from a
completely free and open development of science.
Thus, the Committee is inclined to the view that
there are probably good reasons for keeping close control of much scientific
information if it is believed that there is a likelihood of war within the next
five or ten years. It is also their view, however, that this would weaken us
disastrously for the future—perhaps twenty years hence.[64]
H. D. Smyth, while a member of the AEC, expressed a philosophy similar to that of V. Bush and of the Tolman Committee. He stated that more publication of nuclear research would not only increase progress in that area but, “incidentally, would strengthen our long-term military position.”[65] The AEC also stated the following in 1950:
Secrecy, if unwisely applied, can go far beyond its
objective of safeguarding vital information—it can stifle and smother freedom
of research and freedom of inquiry in nonrestricted areas, and from this the
Nation could only suffer a net loss.[66]
More recently, a research manager at one of the DOE weapons laboratories has stated, “Far more progress is actually evidenced in the unclassified fields of research than the classified ones.”[67] A recent report by a national panel on the effect of national-security controls on international technology transfer summarized the adverse impacts of the Soviet’s system of secrecy on scientific and technical progress within the Soviet Union. The isolation of scientific entities within the Soviet Union system is said to cause “reduced cooperation among scientists, duplication of effort despite central planning, slow diffusion of new ideas and technologies, and errors due to inadequate peer review.”[68]
Summary. It is generally accepted that efficient progress in science depends upon free and open communication among scientists, especially in the area of basic research. This judgment is reflected in a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences, Scientific Communication and National Security (popularly known as The Corson Report), which discussed secrecy and scientific communication.[69],[†††††††] A relevant excerpt from that report follows:
Free communication among scientists is viewed as an
essential factor in scientific advance. Such communication enables critical new
findings or new theories to be readily and systematically subjected to the
scrutiny of others and thereby verified or debunked. Moreover, because science
is a cumulative activity—each scientist builds on the work of others—the free
availability of information both provides the foundations for further
scientific advance and prevents needlessly redundant work. Such communications
also serve to stimulate creativity, both because scientists compete keenly for
the respect of their peers by attempting to be first in publishing the answers
to difficult problems and because communication can inspire new lines of
investigation. Finally, free communication helps to build the necessary
willingness to confront any idea, no matter how eccentric, and to assess it on
its merits.[70]
Therefore, classification of scientific and technical information will slow scientific and technical progress in all areas of science and technology. Slowing the progress of basic research will also slow the progress of applied research, which has its roots in basic research and cannot proceed beyond the limits set by those roots.[71]
However, it should be remembered that one purpose of classifying information is to delay an adversary in the acquisition of that information, so one must always (1) balance the benefits of that delay against the costs of delaying our advances and (2) note the special circumstances with respect to weapons of mass destruction and lead time (see Chapter 1).
ECONOMIC COSTS OF CLASSIFICATION
The economic costs of classification include the following direct costs:
· salaries
for classification office personnel;
· extra
costs to transmit and transport classified documents and materials (e.g.,
special modes of transport and receipting requirements);
· costs
of document storage, including periodic inventories;[‡‡‡‡‡‡‡] and
· costs
of reviewing classified documents for declassification or downgrading.
Although salaries for classification office personnel are easily determined, some of the other direct economic costs have not been well quantified. The Department of Defense estimated in 1971-1972 that it cost about $0.36 for each annual inventory of a Top Secret document and about $2.57 to handle a Top Secret document in transit.[72] Those costs are certainly substantially greater now.
The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) has been reporting classification costs for both government and industry for about six years. For Fiscal Year 2000, those costs were about $5.2 billion, with about $4.3 billion attributed to government and about $0.9 billion to industry.[73] Government classification-management costs were estimated at $213 million, or about 5.0% of the total costs. It is interesting that classification-management costs, which include the costs of making the initial classification determination (said to be the most important part of the classification process), are such a small percentage of the total classification costs. It might be postulated that spending more money “up front” ensuring that the initial classification decision is correct might significantly reduce total classification (and declassification) costs.
The costs of declassification (or downgrading) are frequently overlooked. Declassification costs can be particularly expensive for technical documents many years old, when the reasons for initial classification may not be well understood. Much time and effort may be required of declassifiers to determine the reasons for the initial classification decision, which they must understand before they can reach a sound declassification (or downgrading) decision. Those “hidden” costs of classification are somewhat analogous to waste disposal or decontamination or decommissioning costs. Chemical manufacturers for many years did not consider, or were not required to consider, the costs of ultimately disposing of their process wastes. Those costs are now included in the cost of a product, just as high-level radioactive waste disposal costs are included in the cost of electric power generated from nuclear power stations. Classified programs should include the costs of periodic classification reviews of classified documents as a part of those programs. ISOO reported that Fiscal Year 2000 government declassification-management costs were about $231 million, or about 5.4% of the total government classification costs (and slightly more than the classification-management costs).[74]
As an example of costs of reviewing classified documents for declassification, the Department of Defense reported (in about 1971 and 1972) that 175 man-months were required to review 1,800,000 pages contained in 240,000 classified documents (100,000 of which were declassified) at a cost of $0.66 per document.[75],56 At 173.3 hours per man-month, this represents 30,300 hours of effort (59.4 pages per hour; 7.9 documents per hour). In 1996, some federal government agencies estimated a cost of a dollar or more per page for a line-by-line review of classified documents.[76] In 1999, the U.S. Army reported reviewing about 41.8 million pages at a cost of about 40 cents per page.